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In this inquiry I pursue two tasks.  First, I locate the roots of Heidegger’s 
philosophical project historically within a specific theological discourse bent on 
redefining the relation between religion and politics.  Heidegger’s main, if covert, intent 
was to combat the egalitarian, pluralistic impulses carried by a tradition of critical 
Christology, which leads from F.W.J. Schelling’s (1775-1854) Philosophy of Revelation
to the work of the radical theologian-philosopher Paul Tillich (1886-1965). These 
egalitarian impulses spring from a broadened understanding of religious community as a 
material communication community unified through the use of shared symbols into a 
community of understanding, knowledge, and interests. 
vThe theoretical expansion and deepening of such a communication model, I detect 
in the writings of the renegade Neogrammarian, Hermann Paul, here considered in light 
of the “neo-Idealist” initiative of one of Paul’s most prominent critics, the Romanist Karl 
Vossler.  Prior to the advanced theological exposition of symbolically mediated 
communication, in works such as Tillich’s book Dynamics of Faith (2001; Engl. orig. 
1957), the Neogrammarian movement in language studies, I argue, holds the key to 
accessing the cloaked Christological subtext of Heidegger’s thought. 
Second, after thus locating Heidegger’s philosophical agenda within its 
intellectual-historical context, I expose how Heidegger manipulates philosophical 
rhetoric to achieve the suspension of Schelling’s theological legacy.  My analysis of 
Heidegger’s rhetorical behavior is focused on his Letter on Humanism (written 1946, 
published 1949), a text very overt in both its philosophical biases and its politics.  The 
Humanismusbrief comes the closest to revealing Heidegger’s own self-positioning within 
his generation.  The work’s conclusion provides a brief look ahead, or Ausblick, to 
indicate the main features of how these findings about the Letter can be brought to bear 
on Heidegger’s masterpiece fragment, Being and Time.  
Through this approach, Heidegger’s inherently political philosophy gains a much 
clearer profile in the context of its formative phase in the waning days of the Weimar 
Republic and opens a new perspective on later attempts by its author to “re-apply” his 
philosophical program to the cultural situation of postwar Germany, as well as to the 
ethical-epistemological problems remaining after twelve years of German isolationism. 
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1Introduction
In this inquiry I pursue two tasks, the first of which is meant to lay the 
groundwork for the second.
First, I locate the roots of Heidegger’s original philosophical project historically 
within a specific theological discourse that aimed at redefining the relation between 
religion and politics, concerned with a new understanding of religious language.  
According to my primary claim, Heidegger’s main, if covert, intent was to stymie the 
egalitarian, pluralistic impulses carried by a tradition of critical Christology, which leads 
from F.W.J. Schelling’s (1775-1854) Philosophy of Revelation1 to the work of the radical 
theologian-philosopher Paul Tillich (1886-1965).
In the following, my focus remains on Schelling as the theoretical pioneer, 
sporadically acknowledged by Heidegger as his philosophical inspiration but mostly 
downplayed as just another representative of German Idealism, a tradition from which 
Heidegger never tired to distance himself.2
The egalitarian impulses of such critical Christology are generated by a politically 
charged epistemology in the early twentieth century that Heidegger was at pains to reject: 
an epistemology centered around a broadened understanding of religious community as a 
material communication community that is unified through the use of shared symbols into 
a community of understanding – a community of knowledge and interests analyzed 
expressly in works such as Tillich’s book Dynamics of Faith (2001; Engl. orig. 1957).
2What will emerge as critical in such a community-based epistemology is the 
materiality of such symbol-oriented communication, which will be spelled out below in 
terms of the contextual, or “geg(n)ende”3 mediation of meaning formation.  In this 
context, meaning formation pertains not just to concept formation, but to different modes 
of cultural agency of the kind that Heidegger analyzes in his opus magnum, Being and 
Time (1927).4  Specifically, cultural agency of this sort is explicated in terms of 
equipment, or “equipmedley” (Zeug),5 and its respective “referential context” 
(Verweisungszusammenhang)6 – a material semiotics of cultural production that the early 
Heidegger helped develop, just as much as he would soon suspend and redirect its 
political force.  
Second, after thus locating Heidegger’s philosophical agenda within its 
intellectual-historical context, I expose, how Heidegger actually manipulates 
philosophical rhetoric to achieve this refutation of Schelling’s theological legacy – a 
practice that speaks both to his philosophical genius and his purposive intervention aimed 
at combating the epistemic shift of his era.  From this perspective, several of Heidegger’s 
central claims appear much less idiosyncratic, as they instead document his discursive 
sensitivity and stratagem.  As we shall see, in many cases his purported innovations are 
actually responses to his tacit interlocutors, attempts to neutralize their positions rather 
than at elucidating his own.
In distinction from political rhetoric or rhetoric in an even more general sense, the 
crucial feature of this kind of philosophical rhetoric consists in its investment in a 
methodological constellation, the inner tensions of which it will mobilize and sometimes 
exploit.  To be clear, philosophical rhetoric, in my use of the term, always preserves a 
3political dimension, regardless how implicit or encrypted it may be on occasion.  Yet by 
drawing its authority or discursive power from an undercurrent of methodological 
debate(s), philosophical rhetoric in a full-fledged sense puts a qualifier on its successful 
discursive working, which other definitions of rhetoric do not impose.  The merit of this 
approach to a philosophical theorem through its rhetoric is that it allows us to unlock 
much of the terminological opacity – as it will in this case, clarifying many of the 
seeming thematic ruptures confronted in Heidegger’s text.  
To set up the parameters for the concrete examination of the rhetorical behavior 
of Heidegger’s writing, my analysis is focused on Heidegger’s Letter on Humanism
(written 1946, published 1949).  The results gained from the analysis of a text that is very 
overt in both its philosophical biases and its politics are meant to be applied “backwards” 
to Heidegger’s masterpiece fragment Being and Time.7  In the present course of this 
inquiry, I will not yet carry out this application to its full extent.  Instead, my primary 
concern remains with the Humanismusbrief.  This text, I believe, comes the closest to 
revealing Heidegger’s own self-positioning within his generation.  Following the detailed 
examination of the philosophical stakes and the rhetorical workings of this document, 
then, I will provide a brief look ahead, or Ausblick, to indicate the main features of how 
these findings about the Letter can be brought to bear on Being and Time.  The full-
fledged analysis of Heidegger’s master fragment will be reserved for an extended future 
version of this study.
Breaking the chronology of Heiddegger’s writings in this way is justified because, 
in the Letter, Heiddegger himself “invites” the reader to turn back and take a fresh look at 
his first major publication.  As a piece of self-editorship (or even self-staging), this 
4(re)interpretive invitation on the part of Heiddegger remains problematic.  Hence, without 
taking Heiddegger’s word for it, I put his retrospective self-analysis to the test and 
examine on what grounds Heiddegger could claim that he never abandoned his project 
from Being and Time.  Is there a subtext that connects Being and Time and the Letter on 
Humanism, or not?  Utilizing the text of the latter to unlock the text of the former is the 
solution I have evolved. 
According to this approach, my work moves beyond the now well-worn debate 
over Heidegger’s Nazi involvement, a debate which has met with extensive treatment 
over nearly the last two decades, in the course of a fourth wave of criticism sparked by 
Victor Farias’ book Heidegger and Nazism (1989; French orig. 1987).  These different 
waves of criticism have been delineated in Hugo Ott’s introduction to his Martin 
Heiddegger: Unterwegs zu seiner Biographie (1988). 8  Instead, as noted, I will try to 
locate the roots of Heidegger’s thinking in a controversy over religion and politics that 
preceded WWII, and to pursue it into its postwar permutations. 
Viewed through the interpretive lens provided in this study, Heidegger’s 
inherently political philosophy in fact gains a much clearer profile in the context of its 
formative phase in the waning days of the Weimar Republic.  Just as importantly, 
preparing a rereading of Being and Time through the optics of the Letter on Humanism
opens a new perspective on later attempts by its author to “re-apply” his philosophical 
program to the cultural situation of post-war Germany, as well as to the ethical-
epistemological problems remaining in the air after twelve years of German isolationism.  
Outline and Significance of the Present Project
5In pursuing the two tasks described above, the chapters progress according to the 
following train of thought.  In the first chapter, I present Schelling as the key figure 
“behind the scenes” of the indicated controversy over new forms of faith and their 
respective practices of material symbol use.  Here Schelling will emerge as the initiator 
of a Christological line of thought that provides a pluralistic framework for grounding a 
new cultural politics. 
In particular, this political potential will be analyzed with regard to Christology’s 
treatment of the persona of the Christ as a semiotic principle that actively shapes and 
transforms the historical self-understanding of the members of religious communities.  
The dynamics of faith within the group are interpreted as a critical political force, which 
can be asserted in its own right, but never separated from the other vectors of cultural 
meaning production operative in the group’s irreducibly complex life-world.  A cultural 
politics of faith thus obviates any dogmatic partitioning, where a domain of (fixed) 
religious meanings is isolated from the rest of social life and thereby invested with 
“auratic authority.”9
Following Schelling’s approach, such politics aims at bridging the gap between 
different forms of “stale theism” ([s]chaler Theismus)10 and ill-founded conceptions of 
atheist secularism, which are superseded as false alternatives.  In this manner, Schelling 
points to a new understanding of socially mediated religiosity, as he insists on an 
irreducible multiplicity of possible religious life-worlds beyond Christian dogma and any 
equally dogmatic rejections thereof.  These new life-worlds constitute immanent 
understandings of the world, shared among those in a community.  
6To make my case for an overdue re-appreciation of the later Schelling’s relevance 
for contemporary Heidegger scholarship, I will begin the first chapter by examining 
specific hermeneutic strategies that are operative in Theodore Kisiel’s landmark 
publication The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time (1993).11  Impressive in its 
comprehensive scope as well as its vision for detail, this study remains illuminating even 
as it fosters what I take to be interpretive trends toward neglecting the neo-Schellingean 
trajectory I want to emphasize.  Speaking of the hermeneutic strategies engaged by 
Kisiel’s work, thus refers to a double bypass, that is, two intersecting routes along which 
the main contributors to the methodology of a new Christologically informed, material 
semiotics have been eclipsed to this point in the existing scholarship.  
Note that this approach makes no assumptions about Kisiel’s intention as an 
author.  Instead, my commentary is meant to clarify different modes of reading 
Heidegger that are promoted by his text.  In order to bring out the interrelatedness as well 
as the variations of emphasis among these routes of Heidegger interpretation, I will use 
the different aspects of the aforesaid twofold bypass to make a transition into the 
following two chapters, respectively, constituting the first section of my inquiry. 
The opening chapter on Schelling, then, will address the first of the two bypasses.  
By giving center stage to Emil Lask’s impact on Heidegger’s early philosophical 
development, the text of The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time reinforces the 
hermeneutic strategy of interpreting Heidegger’s thought process over against (the 
Marburg School of) neo-Kantianism.  In Kisiel’s account, this interpretive trend is not 
lessened but rather strengthened by the fact that Lask is presented as a renegade neo-
Kantian of sorts, whose ability to infuse the language of transcendental value philosophy 
7with mystic overtones reminiscent of Meister Eckhart would have had great appeal to 
Heidegger.  In light of Lask’s hybrid qualities, the present connection is fully compatible 
with both Heidegger’s express turn away from Rickert and his final need to move beyond 
Lask, as well.
Thus understood, my present notion of a neo-Kantian bypass that has helped to 
obscure the Heideggerian program that I am pursuing carries a double meaning, as it 
speaks to a double movement within contemporary discourses on Heidegger.  The 
importance of Schelling is bypassed through a strategic emphasis on Heidegger’s 
bypassing of neo-Kantianism.  The fact that this emphasis has lost nothing of its 
discursive relevance over the ten years since the publication of Kisiel’s seminal book is 
evidenced by his recurrent affirmations of that hermeneutic strategy.12
As for the second bypass, taken up in chapter two, Kisiel’s account of “The 
Dilthey Draft” of Being and Time falls in line with a long-standing tendency in Heidegger 
scholarship.  According to this “tradition,” Heidegger is commonly contextualized in 
terms of Dilthey’s position within the nineteenth-century Geisteswissenschaften debate, 
without contextualizing Dilthey himself in terms of the other factions or interlocutors 
within that discursive constellation.  This pertains especially to the “enunciations” (to 
borrow Julia Kristeva’s term) by the physician Hermann Helmholtz since the 1840s, 
which set the tone for the debate over the status of science for the second half of that 
century and beyond.13
To resist the discursive narrowing of the Geisteswissenschaften controversy, as 
implied by the Dilthey shortcut that most scholars have accepted to date, I set out to 
reterritorialize what I take to be one of the most crucial, but also most neglected sources 
8of Heidegger’s methodology in Being and Time, namely the “Neogrammarian 
Revolution” in the science of language (Sprachwissenschaft) or linguistics writ large in 
the form of nineteenth-century philology.14  More precisely, I will discuss this scientific 
revolution in terms of the “philosophical deviation” of one of his most important, yet 
undersold representatives, Hermann Paul.15
To make this case, I want to scrutinize and critique the Dilthey-bypass in such a 
way as to bring out a crucial line of influence, which relates Heidegger’s quest for a new 
philosophical method back to a specific nineteenth-century controversy over historical 
psychology and philology.  Prior to any attempt at detecting the repercussions of this 
controversy in Heidegger’s text, however, it is useful to begin by establishing a general 
methodological link that connects Heidegger’s project to this particular psychological 
discourse.  This link, I argue, consists in a specific strand of material semiotics within 
Edmund Husserl’s pioneering program of phenomenology, which remains vital for an 
account of both the genesis and the internal workings of Heidegger’s Being and Time. 
In terms of philosophical method, this blueprint for a semiotics of culture speaks 
to the proximity of Husserl and Cassirer, commonly neglected in recent Heidegger 
scholarship.  Acknowledging this connection also casts a new light on the all too familiar 
Heidegger-Cassirer controversy that culminated in the (in)famous Davos disputations, in 
1929.16  To probe this discursive interface, I set out to show how an integral part of 
Husserl’s thought gets effectively distorted and eventually silenced in the course of 
contextualizing Heidegger with reference to Dilthey’s work in the area of historical 
science.  In particular, I will show how the promotion of a false notion of “radical” 
phenomenology, associated with an equally misleading story about Heidegger’s “radical” 
9departure from the theoretical stance of his mentor, has helped eclipse some of Husserl’s 
most important contributions in the context of Dilthey’s critique of historical reason. 
After thus explicating the stakes of philosophical method within this discursive 
constellation, and after showing how Husserl’s thought is intimately related to that of 
Cassirer (and Schelling) within it, we can then proceed to a second phase of critiquing the 
Dilthey-bypass, in the second section of this study, where Heidegger’s occluded 
nineteenth-century interlocutors will have their say.  In particular, Paul’s conception of 
the material mediation of meaning will serve as a linchpin for bringing out the 
methodological ramifications of cultural semiotics, which not only forge a link between 
Paul and Cassirer but also corroborate the lingering bond between Cassirer and 
Heidegger, the latter’s proclamations to the contrary notwithstanding.
Any comprehensive treatment of Paul’s theoretical advances, especially within his 
own field of Germanic studies and historical philology, would explode the scope of this 
investigation.  For my purposes of rereading Heidegger, however, it is important to 
appreciate the ways in which the influence of Paul’s work reached beyond the limits of 
his discipline.  In chapter three, I argue that, to estimate his influence on the field of 
philosophy, where Heidegger’s career took off in the 1920s, we must not consider the 
Neogrammarian revolution in isolation, but rather as embedded in an ongoing debate in 
the humanities, which was in full swing in Germany since the 1870s. 
To this end, we need to take note of the so-called “neo-Idealist reaction”17 to this 
revolution, a motion of resistance against the Neogrammarian impulse toward a 
reorientation concerning both the objectivity and the validity standards of scientific 
inquiry.  Against the background of this debate, Husserl’s previously sketched semiotics 
10
also gains new weight in tracing the different sources of influence within the early 
Heidegger’s development up to Being and Time.  By identifying and explicating these 
philosophical imports as the core of this chapter, we will be able to distinguish different 
aspects of Heidegger’s strategy in his re-staging of these Neogrammarian as well as neo-
Idealist elements of his thought in the Letter on Humanism, the bridge document through 
which Heidegger sought to remount his philosophical project from the Weimar period for 
a postwar era. 
More specifically, the relevance of Neogrammarian innovation for Heidegger’s 
project can be determined most effectively by attending to the work of the influential 
Romanist Karl Vossler, whose crusade against “metaphysical positivism” rendered him 
one of the key figures of the neo-Idealist opposition against Paul’s methodological forays 
into a new area of linguistic research. 
In chapter four, I turn to Paul’s own work that proves him sensitive to the 
fundamental reciprocity inherent in all social communication phenomena.  Concerning 
these routes of mutual influence, he avoids the one-directionality and one-dimensionality 
that undercuts Vossler’s notion of “relative progress.”  Instead of placing the source of 
linguistic creativity and transformatory power in language development solely in the 
“soul” of the individual language user, Paul offers a more robust notion of collective 
meaning formation, in that he stresses the importance of material mediation of all 
communicative processes.  This chapter will thus argue that, by reconceiving the 
individuality of each language user vis-à-vis their respective language community, he 
paves the way for the later projects of hermeneutic thinkers like Gadamer, on one hand, 
and post-structuralist thinkers like Deleuze and Guattari, on the other. 
11
We will begin by turning to Paul’s major work, Prinzipien der Sprachgeschichte
(1880) in comparison to Husserl’s model of the relation of mind and history, and to 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics of understanding.  Thereafter, we will move to a comparison of 
Paul with the early Wittgenstein, in order to outline what is at stake in Paul’s more 
materialist – but not positivist – appropriation of a psychological-hermeneutic approach 
to meaning.  Wittgenstein appears more transcendentalist, until we pursue Deleuze and 
Guattari’s correction of his neglect of the communicative situation.  Finally, as the last 
section of this argument, I will return to how the psychologist-empiricist debate about 
science engaged by these philologists (Vossler and Paul) recasts the history of 
phenomenology as we know it, and hence also sets the stage for Heidegger somewhat 
differently than has been assumed.  In this regard, it is, once more, Schelling’s thought 
that emerges as the central reference point for the second section of my study.
While earlier chapters of the present discussion addressed the contexts in which 
Heidegger’s work functioned, chapter five will show how his specific approach to 
language and meaning evolved from his early writings on.  We will start with his early 
critique of linguistics/philology, reaching back as far as his 1913 dissertation and his 
1916 Habilitationsschrift (first submitted 1915), which together constitute an early call 
for a subject of knowledge constituted differently than the model at play in the 
psychology and philology of the era.  After that I will turn to his Prolegomena zur 
Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs (1925) in order to address how his turn away from philology 
allows him to refute Husserl and his model of intersubjectivity in understanding.  At the 
end of this chapter, I will return to the significance of these modes for the evaluation of 
Heidegger’s project and its appeal to religion. 
12
If the earlier chapters of this study set up the problem of the rhetorics from which 
Heidegger borrowed, the sixth and last chapter has a different function, moving into the 
heart of Heidegger’s most familiar and most controversial writings.  Starting with the 
1949 Brief über den Humanismus, it sets up Heidegger’s paradigm for a new theology of 
reading, which finds and circulates its meanings in concrete expressions of culture, 
including most importantly poetry and what I will explicate as “vital anecdotes” – a 
paradigm that will “recur” in Being and Time, in modified form.  
To make this case, I will open out the Letter as predictive of how he manipulates 
ethics in the text to enact a “theft of faith.”  Heidegger will, once again, deny his roots in 
a post-Schellingean discourse, as he undercuts his own previous sketch of a material 
dialogics, in favor of a rhetorically amplified form of nationalist language cult.  Such 
cultural nationalism is supported by a new conception of communicative space, which 
provides one of the few clear indications of Heidegger’s occluded dialogue with the 
Young Hegelians and their “other mentor” (besides Hegel as inspiration and target), 
Schelling.  At the core of the Humanismusbrief, the actual task that a new kind of 
humanism has to meet, regardless of whether we label it “metaphysical” or 
“postmetaphysical,” is to determine a mode of human communication that can give 
meaning to people’s lives, beyond the dichotomic confines of private and public 
“existence.”
Thus the main challenge for a Schelling-oriented, Young-Hegelian type of 
Existenzphilosophie (in contradistinction to a Sartrean existentialism) is to determine and 
explore a specific communicative spatiality, as Heidegger intimates at the very beginning 
of the Letter on Humanism, in terms of his famous phrase “language is the house of 
13
being” (313).  But soon Heidegger’s orientation will take a different turn, as he redirects 
the post-Schellingean route to “existence in language” in a way that will distort and 
suspend the critical-Christological stakes of the debate over a new paradigm of 
communication. 
The distortive transition from Heidegger’s shrouded roots in Schelling’s thought 
to some semiotic self-corruption thereof is effected by his equivocal interchange of 
Ansprechen (talking-to) and Anspruch (demand, command, address).  The expression 
Ansprechen, I argue, still belongs to the conception of material communication, which 
can be located in Heidegger’s 1925 lecture course, Prolegomena, earlier examined in 
chapter five.  The term Anspruch, by contrast, belongs to a different understanding of 
communicative space, which effaces the concrete “location” or context from which the 
demand is issued.  Instead, demand is now invested with transcendent overtones of 
unmediated access to, or rather reception of, divine meaning – Heidegger’s hint at an 
immaterial semiotics of Being, rendered as ethereal “Saying” (Sagen),18 which Schelling 
would emphatically deny. 
Against the background of these considerations about Heidegger’s communicative 
architecture and his proposal for (re)building “the house of being” in a new form of 
religious language, we can detect the pervasive influence of Christology in the Letter on 
Humanism.  In the present context of communicative space and the possible paths for and 
limits on conveying transcendent meaning, I suggest that the Letter can plausibly be read 
as a guide for those who pray, a  prayer guide.  Cast in Heidegger’s philosophical 
rhetoric, however, such guidance tends to let prayer deteriorate into political idolatry, 
where the act of worship and the search for new forms of religious understanding 
14
becomes dangerously self-referential and cultural-nationalist.  The purported demand 
(Anspruch) of Being calls upon a community (“the Germans,” in this case) not only to 
revere their cultural heritage but to revere their own reverence for their cultural heritage, 
as well.  The culture-nation (of Germany) becomes the immaterial subject-object of its 
own prayers, an invisible community of idolatrous agents.  
Going against the grain of Heidegger scholarship, which tends either to scapegoat 
or exonerate Heidegger completely with respect to the political effects of his crypto-
religious philosophy, I suggest that one of his politically most aggressive texts provides a 
possible remedy to its own tendencies toward idolatrous corruption.  A temporary 
safeguard against the aforesaid kind of political idolatry, then, is contained in the 
anecdote of Heraclitus, which is imparted toward the end of the Humanismusbrief.  The 
anecdotal structure of this segment stands out, because it proves largely immune to 
Heidegger’s ruses of rhetorical distortion.  Because of this feature of semiotic resilience, 
or counter-productivity of meaning, I view Heidegger’s Heraclitus anecdote as an 
example of a vital anecdote of the sort described by Deleuze and Guattari, in What is 
Philosophy? (1994).19  Here, the “vital” aspect relates to the semiotic power of anecdotes 
that can give meaning to people’s lives, while it may help protect human existence from 
idolatrous self-corruption, if always only for the time being.  
Thus understood, vital anecdotes become existential anecdotes, to be interpreted 
within a critical-Christological framework of Existenzphilosophie, following in the 
footsteps of Schelling who paved the way for reforming communicative spatiality, in 
general, and religious language, in particular.  Schelling’s prototypical reconception of 
the material dimensions of religious language, expressly invoked by Heidegger’s Letter 
15
on Humanism as “language as the house of being,” thus opens a plane of Young-Hegelian 
discourse about new practices of theo-philology and existential language philosophy 
pointing ahead to the work of later authors on the same discursive trajectory, such as 
Martin Buber, Fritz Mauthner (Buber’s one-time pupil), Walter Benjamin, and the later 
Wittgenstein.  In this study, I cannot engage these instances of what I perceive as post-
Schellingean projects, which reterritorialize Existenzphilosophie on a manifold plane of 
linguistic mysticism broadly conceived.
Instead, I want to show the extent to which Heidegger’s work belongs within this 
constellation of revolutionizing religious language, by tracing his debt to Schelling 
through the “missing link” of the late nineteenth-century debate over scientific method in 
psychology and historical philology.  Revisiting Heidegger’s early thought in light of 
these discourses will cast a very different light not only on his relation and supposed 
break with his mentor, Husserl (cf. chapter two) and his philosophical opposition to 
Cassirer (cf. chapter four), but also on Heidegger’s theological affinity to his short-term 
colleague at Marburg University, Paul Tillich. 
Like the “linguistic mystics” (Buber, Mauthner, Benjamin, later Wittgenstein), I 
will not treat Tillich’s work in any detail but keep my focus on the Schelling-Heidegger 
connection.  Nonetheless, Tillich deserves special attention as one of the most prominent 
and, I think, most resourceful neo-Schellingeans among Heidegger’s contemporaries.  
For the purposes of my discussion of Heidegger’s cloaked intervention in the reform 
efforts regarding a material semiotics concerned with religious language use – the 
Christological subtext connecting the Humanismusbrief back to Being and Time – I will 
16
deploy Tillich’s notion of the demonic20 as my theoretical reference point in analyzing 
the workings of Heidegger’s philosophical rhetoric. 
Thus claiming a persistent bond of methodology and agenda between Husserl’s 
phenomenological psychology, Cassirer’s philosophy of symbolic forms, and Tillich’s 
Christological approach to history, on one hand, and Heidegger’s “post-humanist” 
analysis of Dasein (before and after WWII), on the other hand, is no disservice to 
Heidegger, in my opinion, because it does not casually brush aside his self-understanding 
and force an unwanted theoretical alliance onto his work.  On the contrary, engaging 
Heidegger as one of Schelling’s most important renegade followers, I suggest, can help 
bring out the best in the early Heidegger, as a thinker to be recognized in his own right 
but within a discursive constellation different from the one(s) he cared to acknowledge, 
especially in the course of his strategic postwar “metamorphosis.”  According to this 
analysis, the early Heidegger is inherently hybrid and demonic, oscillating between 
theological revolution and political idolatry.  In order to appreciate his Christological 
ingenuity and his relevance for contemporary discussions over religious language use, we 
must resist his recurrent disavowal of “German idealism” and nineteenth-century 
historical philology. 
1
 Schelling lectured on various occasions on the philosophy of revelation, primarily between 1831-1841/42. 
In capitalizing the title here, I am referring to the so-called Paulus-transcript of Schelling’s last Berlin 
lecture of WS 1841/42, published in German as: F.W.J. Schelling, Philosophie der Offenbarung 1841/42
[sog. Paulus-Nachschrift], ed. M. Frank (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1977). Meanwhile, the original 
version of Schelling’s lecture on the topic, given at Munich in 1831/32, has been published as: F.W.J. 
Schelling, Urfassung der Philosophie der Offenbarung / Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, ed. W.E. 
Ehrhardt, 2 Teilbände (Hamburg: Meiner, 1992). The original version of the Munich lectures is more 
extensive, and especially the second volume contains important material with respect to Schelling’s 
account of evil and Satan. While mostly referring to the first edition of the 1841/42 lectures, I will indicate 
whenever I resort to the Urfassung. 
2 See: Dieter Thomä, Die Zeit des Selbst und die Zeit danach: Zur Kritik der Textgeschichte Martin 
Heideggers 1910-1976 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1990): “Wenn Heidegger sich dagegen verwahrt 
mit der “zeitlichen” Struktur des Daseins, wie etwa mit der “Sorge,” in eine anthropologische / 
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psychologische / ontische “Beliebigkeit” abzugleiten (vgl. 1927a, § 10), so bekommt dies dann aus der 
Geschichte der Subjektivität heraus eine neu zu verstehende Berechtigung: Er knüpft mit der Zeitlichkeit 
des Daseins an einen geschichtlichen Stand des Subjekts an, er steht in einer Geschichte der 
Selbstverständigung, die nicht äusserlich zu dementieren ist. So findet sich schon bei Schelling eine 
systematische Verbindung der Verzeitlichung der Subjektivität mit dem “Daß” des unvordenklichen Seins; 
zusammengeführt aufs Engste im “ich bin” und dessen “Tendenz zum Geschichtlichen” (s.o.)” (235). “Man 
gelangt – wie sich hier erst andeutet – von einer “klassischen” Subjekttheorie her in eine Nähe zu 
Heidegger, die dieser nie wahrhaben wollte. Dies liegt insbesondere daran, dass der Angelpunkt von 
Heideggers Subjektkritik zeit seines Lebens die Destruktion einer cartesianischen (?) [sic.] Seins-
Gewissheit des reflexiven Subjekts blieb. Bei dieser Fixierung verzerrt sich aber die Wahrnehmung gerade 
solcher Positionen wie der Hegels und Schellings [Thomä note 134]” (234). 
Thomä’s study is helpful for several reasons. As the preceding quotation indicates, he lays his 
finger on a persistent, but false claim toward distance from German Idealism, on the part of Heidegger as 
well as many of his commentators. He also obviates the Heideggerian shortcut, which abbreviates a 
comprehensive critique of the modern subject to some deconstructionist endeavor of anti-Cartesianism. In 
this regard, Die Zeit des Selbst und die Zeit danach deserves credit for its general sensitivity to the complex 
connection between Heidegger and Schelling, in particular. 
At the same time, this link is staged in a way that truncates both Schelling’s and Heidegger’s 
thought, in my opinion, insofar as these authors are jointly placed on a trajectory of ““classical” subject 
theory” (see above), which tends to ignore the historical approach to religion that is crucial to their 
thought, respectively. The “tendency toward the historical” (see above) remains a loose end in Thomä’s 
account because of his one-sided treatment of the notion of “mediation” (Vermittlung), which he considers 
only in the context of subordination under “abstract generality” (abstrakt Allgemeinheit, immediately 
below). While he hints at a broader meaning of mediation, with reference to Hegel, he does not pursue this 
line of thought within Schelling’s own theoretical framework, at least not in the context of the central 
philosophical link between Schelling and Heidegger: “Schelling sieht die Hegelsche Emphase der “tätigen” 
Vermittlung mit dem Allgemeinen (s.o. C.3.2) blockiert von einer abstrakten Allgemeinheit, in der das 
“wirkliche Selbst” nicht mehr unterkommt – und damit setzt die Wendung zum “Daß” ein als Abweichung 
von der dialektischen Bewegung. Aber dieses “Daß” steht nicht prinzipiell gegen die “Vermittlung,” 
sondern tritt nur heraus, wenn die Existenz sich einer drohenden Unterwerfung unter die “Allgemeinheit” 
widersetzt. – Dann stellt sich aber die Frage, unter welchen historischen Bedingungen dieses 
“Heraustreten” einsetzt” (219-220). With respect to Heidegger, Thomä will have to say more on the issue, 
but for Schelling he does not answer this last question, which I deem crucial for assessing Heidegger’s debt 
to Schelling. In fact, he effectively forecloses exploring Schelling’s thought, with respect to (historical) 
mediation, when he writes: “Dabei kann man nicht sagen, Schelling würde Hegel einfach “falsch” lesen –
ebensowenig ist er gegen ihn mit dem Vorwurf der begrifflichen Überhebung über das Sein schon 
selbstverständlich im Recht. Wenn dessen “Einheit” in Schellings Augen ein leeres Konstrukt ist, muss 
dieser sich umgekehrt sagen lassen, er flüchte sich aus der lebendigen Vermittlung in eine Denkfigur 
jenseits aller Vermittlung, eine imaginäre Ursprünglichkeit der Existenz” (221-222) [emphasis added]. As I 
will show in chapter one of this study, in light of the later Schelling’s Philosophy of Revelation, it is not 
convincing to characterize his critique of “negative philosophy,” in general, and Hegel’s thought, in 
particular, as “beyond all mediation.” 
The moral stakes of this misrepresentation are indicated by Thomä himself, when he summarizes 
his comparison between Schelling and Hegel with regard to the “violent” aspect of “generality,” faced by 
the subject:
 “Schelling wie Hegel – “Daß” einerseits, vermittelndes Aushalten der Gegensätze 
andererseits – sind, trotz der schärfer werdenden Unterschiede, auf einen gemeinsamen 
Ausgangspunkt bezogen. Sie gehören zusammen in eine Theorie des Subjekts, das zumindest dem 
Anspruch nach dessen Bestimmung angesichts einer abstrakten, gewaltsamen “Allgemeinheit” 
zum Ziel hat. 
Der Unterschied ist dann “nur,” dass Hegel “Einzelnes” und “Allgemeines” noch in 
einem Prozess zum Wohle ihrer selbst zusammenzubringen beansprucht, während Schelling 
stattdessen um des Subjekts willen den Rückzug antritt. Sie trennen sich also in der Beurteilung 
der Möglichkeiten, die für das Subjekt bestehen” (222). 
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Attributing such a “retreat” (Rückzug) to Schelling, “for the sake of the subject” (um des Subjekts willen), is 
just as implausible as the previous presentation of his view as “beyond all mediation.” It becomes clear that 
Thomä’s account of Schelling casts an increasingly aporetic light on the latter’s view, in large part because 
Thomä does not probe any resources of Schelling’s theological thought. To be sure, he does engage some 
of Schelling’s medical imagery for religious and/or cultural phenomena, such as the “scars of the spirit,” 
but he does not bear out the ramifications concerning the relation between Heilung (cure, convalescence, 
mending) and Heil (salvation): “Das Verhältnis zur Allgemeinheit ist also nicht so, wie es Hegel für seine 
Sythese gebraucht hatte. Heilung für die “Wunden (…), die der menschliche Geist (…) sich selbst 
geschlagen hat,” erwartet Schelling nicht von der inneren Verfassung des “Prozesses,” sondern jenseits des 
subjektiven Dilemmas vom göttlichen “Balsam” (II, 3, S. 10f.)” (229). In this rendering it appears as if 
Schelling is eventually begging the question of subjectivity, as he “retreats” from the violent potential of 
human discourse, namely the tension between the subject and generality (in Thomä’s language), hoping to 
nurse his wounds with some “divine balm,” outside the synthetic process posited by Hegel. 
Such an analysis comes at the cost of downplaying Schelling’s relevance for contemporary 
discussions over symbolic violence and questions of how it may be both engendered and possibly remedied 
by the dynamics of religious discourse. Along these lines, Die Zeit des Selbst und die Zeit danach foregoes 
an approach to Schelling as the theoretical pioneer of a new understanding of Existenzphilosophie, centered 
around the historical mediation of religious meaning, which I want to examine in this study. In this vein, 
Thomä does neither refute nor explicitly replace what he criticizes as a reading of Schelling as the “by now 
notorious precursor of an “existential” turn: “Wir stehen vor der Gegenstellung von “Daß” und “Was,” mit 
der Schelling zum inzwischen notorischen Vorläufer einer “existenziellen” Wendung wird [Thomä note 
83]” (208). By contrast, my first chapter proposes an interpretation of the later Schelling’s Philosophy of 
Revelation that conceives the latter as the blueprint for a new form of Existenzphilosophie that reconstrues 
the historical Vermittlung of religious meanings in ways that remain crucial for the development of 
Heidegger’s thought before and after the publication of Being and Time. 
3 For Gegend, see esp.: Being and Time, § 22; for Heidegger’s evolving use of this expression, cf.: GA 77: 
Feldweg-Gespräche (1944/45), 1995. Here and in the following, the volumes of Heidegger’s 
Gesamtausgabe, or collected edition (Frankfurt a.M.: Vittorio Klosterman, 1976 – ) are designated by 
“GA” plus the volume number. Cf. also: Martin Heidegger, Gelassenheit (Pfullingen: Neske, 1959). 
Translated as: Martin Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking, trans. John M. Anderson and E. Hans Freund 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1966).
4
 Quotations from the German original refer to: GA 2: Sein und Zeit (1927), 1977. Note that the seventh 
edition (1953) establishes the pagination for all subsequent editions. The fourteenth edition (1977) is the 
first to incorporate Heidegger’s marginal notes. 
5
 The common translation of Zeug as “equipment” has the disadvantage of investing the term with 
connotations that tend to restrict its meaning to practical use contexts. To be sure, “equipment” remains 
clearly distinct from “instrument(s).” In this regard, “equipment” is often associated with some kind of 
subconscious handling, as opposed to the conscious deployment of a particular instrument in view of a 
particular task. However, any such hint at subconscious agency does not yet address the question of how 
distinct or specific the goal is, which is supposed to guide or “inform” the subconscious use of 
“equipment,” in Heidegger’s sense. In other words, there is a lurking ambiguity at work, which tends to 
conflate subconscious, implicit, and imprecise. The mere fact that an action (or way of acting) proceeds 
subconsciously does not entail that its practical purpose is vague. Lack of “mental focus” (conscious 
attention or awareness) does not imply lack of “practical focus” (the material precision of the task that is 
subconsciously engaged). Differently put, the psychological lack of explicitness associated with 
subconscious agency does not preclude practical explicitness or precision. Accordingly, rendering Zeug as 
“equipment” still invites interpretations that limit the meaning of Zeug to clear-cut practical assignments to 
be tackled, e.g., in the context of a “workshop” (Werkstatt). Along these lines, standard translations as well 
as standard interpretations are prone to reducing Zeug to Werkzeug. This reduction, partially motivated by 
Heidegger’s own statements, effectively occludes an important strand of materialist semiotics that pervades 
Heidegger’s early writings, in his search for a new philosophical methodology that would redefine the 
boundaries of philosophy as a professional discipline. To preserve this dimension of Heidegger’s thought, I 
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opt for the somewhat eccentric translation of Zeug as “equipmedley,” in order to stress the open-ended, 
meaning-sponsoring aspects of this notion without committing it to the limits of pre-formatted practical 
tasks, however subconscious they may be. I will return to this issue in more detail in chapter six of this 
study, where I point to the different featurings of Zeug in Heidegger’s Being and Time compared to earlier 
versions of the same theme complex. 
6
 See: Being and Time, § 17. Here Heidegger speaks first of “Verweisungsganzheit” (76), but in the 
summary of this paragraph, he uses the term “Verweisungszusammenhang” (82). In her recent translation of 
Being and Time, Joan Stambaugh translates the latter as “referential context,” whereas John Macquarrie 
and Edward Robinson offer the cumbersome and somewhat misleading rendering of “context of 
assignments or references.” For these alternative translations see: Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. 
J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962); Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, 
trans. J. Stambaugh (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1996). For a fair comparison and 
general comment on the merits and demerits of each translation, see: Richard Polt, Heidegger: An 
Introduction (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1999), p. 23. 
7
 There is a sense of minimal agreement among Heidegger scholars that the fragmentary character of Being 
and Time must not be overstated. Most importantly, Heidegger does deliver some follow-up attempts at 
extending, if not completing his analysis. In the few years that immediately follow the publication of the 
“astonishing torso” of his master piece, the most relevant text pointing at partial elaboration are: GA 24: 
Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (1927), 1975. Translated as: Martin Heidegger, The Basic 
Problems of Phenomenology, trans. A. Hofstadter (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982); and of 
equal importance: GA 26: Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz (1928), 1978. 
Translated as: Martin Heidegger, The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, trans. M. Heim (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1984). The clearest index of continuation, in this regard, is Heidegger’s own. He 
thus adds a footnote to the introduction of The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, which states that this 
Marburg lecture course is intended as a newly conceived rendering of the Third Division of Part One of 
Being and Time: “Neue Ausarbeitung des 3. Abschnitts des I. Teiles von “Sein und Zeit.”” (GA 24, 
Anm.1). For helpful, brief commentaries as to how the two subsequent works at hand tend to intersect with 
Heidegger’s initial project in Being and Time, see: Polt (1999), pp. 36-37, 109-112; as well as the following 
contribution to vol. 25 in the series Klassiker Auslegen: Theodore Kisiel, “Das Versagen von Sein und 
Zeit,” Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, ed. T. Rentsch (Berlin: Akademie, 2001), pp. 253-279; esp. pp. 
258-267. While the commentators agree that Heidegger does not manage to tie up all loose end left from 
Being and Time, they both acknowledge a new emphasis on freedom and liberation in Heidegger’s diction, 
which is interpreted as a hint at his (first, if one assumes several) Kehre around the year of 1929. As I argue 
in chapter one, this supposedly new emphasis on freedom, too, receives a new twist, if Heidegger’s project 
is approached through a comparison with Schelling’s Christological thought. 
8
 The counting of these waves of criticism may vary, depending on whether on focuses on the potential 
explosiveness of the material or the actual stir it caused at the time of its publication (Guido Schneeberger’s 
book is a case in point, see right below). My present speaking of four critical waves, then, refers to the 
following sequence, not counting Heidegger’s trial before the de-nazification committee right after the war. 
The first wave was set off by Jürgen Habermas’s detailed review of Heidegger’s then recently published 
Introduction to Metaphysics in the German newspaper, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. The second wave 
pertains to the appearance of Guido Schneeberger’s book Nachlese zu Heidegger. Dokumente zu seinem 
Leben und Denken (1962), notwithstanding the fact that, as Ott points out, this “indispensable text […] has 
been left to gather dust in the libraries, its author dismissed as an outsider.” The third wave took off after 
the reissue in 1983 of Heidegger’s rectoral address, “The Self-affirmation of the German University,” along 
with the first publication of The Rectorship 1933-34: Facts and Thougts, timed – according to Heidegger’s 
instructions – to coincide with the fiftieth anniversary of Hitler’s seizure of power. The fourth wave, 
finally, hit more internationally with the publication of Victor Farías’ book Heidegger and Nazism (1989; 
German edition 1989; French/Spanish original 1987). Depending on how one assesses the respective ripple 
effects, one could associate an earlier fifth wave with Heidegger’s (in)famous Spiegel interview “Only a 
God Can Save Us” (1966), revealed – again, according to Heidegger’s own instructions – with a ten-year 
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delay in 1976. For the preceding data and further commentary, see the introduction to: Hugo Ott, Martin 
Heidegger: A Political Life, trans. A. Blunden (London: Harper Collins, 1993 [orig. 1988]).  
9
 In speaking of “auratic authority,” I am alluding to Walter Benjamin’s account of aura, the (partial) 
demise of which he welcomed in his essay “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction”: 
“And what is really jeopardized when the historical testimony is affected is the authority of the object 
[Benjamin, note 3]. One might subsume the eliminated element in the term “aura” and go on to say: that 
which withers in the age of mechanical reproduction is the aura of the work of art. This is a symptomatic 
process whose significance points beyond the realm of art. One might generalize by saying: the technique 
of reproduction detaches the reproduced object from the domain of tradition” (221). “An analysis of art in 
the age of mechanical reproduction must do justice to these relationships, for they lead us to an all-
important insight: for the first time in world history, mechanical reproduction emancipates the work of art 
from its parasitical dependence on ritual. […] From a photographic negative, for example, one can make 
any number of prints; to ask for the “authentic” print makes no sense. But the instant the criterion of 
authenticity ceases to be applicable to artistic production, the total function of art is reversed. Instead of 
being based on ritual, it begins to be based on another practice – politics” (224). Further down, Benjamin 
shows himself aware of both the stakes and the “threats” related to the changed political function of art, 
which harbors the potential for “progressive” as well as “reactionary” attitudes or modes of perception: 
“Mechanical reproduction of art changes the reaction of the masses toward art. The reactionary attitude 
toward a Picasso painting changes into the progressive reaction toward a Chaplin movie. […] Painting 
simply is in no position to present an object for simultaneous collective experience, as it was possible for 
architecture at all times, for the epic poem in the past, and for the movie of today. Although this 
circumstance in itself should not lead one to conclusions about the social role of painting, it does constitute 
a serious threat as soon as painting, under special conditions and, as it were, against  its nature, is 
confronted directly by the masses. […] Thus the same public which responds in a progressive manner 
toward a grotesque film is bound to respond in a reactionary manner to surrealism” (234-235). On a more 
encouraging or “adventurous” note, he states a page later: “Then came the film and burst this prison-world 
asunder by the dynamite of the tenth of a second, so that now, in the midst of its far-flung ruins and debris, 
we calmly and adventurously go traveling. With the close-ups, space expands; with slow motion, 
movement is extended. The enlargement of a snapshot does not simply render more precise what in any 
case was visible, though unclear: it reveals entirely new structural formations of the subject” (236). For 
Benjamin, then, the new media do not warrant unchecked optimism and belief in progress. Instead, they 
open up new possibilities and an “unexpected field of action” (ibid.). 
10
 See: Schelling, Philosophie der Offenbarung, 170. 
11
 Theodore Kisiel, The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1993). 
12
 Kisiel, Theodore, “Das Versagen von Sein und Zeit;” and Theodore Kisiel Heidegger’s Way of Thought: 
Critical and Interpretative Signposts (New York: Continuum, 2002). Regarding the latter, see esp.: chapter 
five and six. 
13
 For Helmholtz’s role within the nineteenth-century science debate, especially with respect to his 
influence on Ernst Mach who became an important interlocutor for Husserl, see: Katherine Arens, 
Structures of Knowing: Psychologies of the Nineteenth Century (Dordrecht, Boston MA: Kluwer, 1989), 
pp. 22-23, 219-221; and John T. Blackmore, Ernst Mach: His Work, Life, and Influence (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1972), pp. 56-60. Also, cf. Ernst Cassirer’s synoptic account that explicitly 
puts Helmholtz’s influence in relation to the “Definition of Modern Linguistic Science and the Problem of 
Phonetic Laws” (I, 167-176; for Helmholtz’s significance, esp. 168-169) in: Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy 
of Symbolic Forms, trans. R. Manheim (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953-57 [orig. 1923-1929]), 3 
vols. [vol. 1, Language; vol. 2, Mythical Thought; vol. 3, The Phenomenology of Knowledge]. For the 
belated adding of the fourth volume, see: Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, trans. J.M. 
Krois (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), vol. 4, The Metaphysics of Symbolic Forms. Here and in 
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the following, when quoting from Cassirer’s Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, I preface the page number 
with a Roman numeral to indicate the volume. 
14
 I adopt this term from chapter five of: Olga Amsterdamska, Schools of Thought: The Development of 
Linguistics from Bopp to Saussure (Dordrecht, Boston: D. Reidel, 1987). Her book has been an 
indispensable resource for my work on the discursive dynamics between comparative linguistics, (classical) 
philology, and philosophy, in general, and the Paul-Vossler-Cassirer constellation (see below) in particular.  
15
 See: Katherine Arens, “On Rereading Hermann Paul’s Prinzipien der Sprachgeschichte,” Multiple 
Perspectives on the Historical Dimensions of Language, ed. K.R. Jankowsky (Münster: Nodus, 1996), pp. 
105-114. Against the background of her former work, Structures of Knowing (1989), Arens remains the 
only author who explicitly stresses the vital connection between Paul’s status as the key representative of 
the Neogrammarian movement in late nineteenth-century linguistics and the different branches of 
“continental” philosophy that gained a distinct profile within the volatile context of fin de siècle Europe. 
From this perspective, Paul’s contributions strike right at the hard of a vibrant discursive constellation, in 
which Sprachwissenschaft and philosophy “proper” co-entered in an interdisciplinary debate over 
remapping the human sciences, both theoretically and institutionally. While I explore the new vistas that 
have been opened up by this approach with respect to the formative phase of Heidegger’s philosophy, the 
present study remains fundamentally indebted to Arens’ methodological guidance.  
16
 Two recent documentations revisit this encounter: Michael Friedman, A Parting of the Ways: Carnap, 
Cassirer, Heidegger (Chicago: Open Court, 2000), pp. 1-9. Paetzold, Ernst Cassirer – Von Marburg nach 
New York, pp. 86-105. 
17
 Cf. Amsterdamska, Schools of Thought, chapter six. 
18
 For Heidegger’s introduction of, and elaboration on that central expression, in the Letter on Humanism, 
see: “Das auch heute erst noch zu Sagende könnte vielleicht ein Anstoss warden, das Wesen des Menschen 
dahin zu geleiten, dass es denkend auf die es durchwaltende Dimension der Wahrheit des Seins achtet” 
(329). “Das Denken achtet auf die Lichtung des Seins, indem es sein Sagen vom Sein in die Sprache als 
Behausung der Existenz einlegt. So ist das Denken ein Tun. Aber ein Tun, das zugleich alle Praxis 
übertrifft. […] Das Denken bringt nämlich in seinem Sagen nur das ungesprochene Wort des Seins zur 
Sprache” (361). In this place, Heidegger expounds on the meaning of “bringing to language” as well as the 
well-known phrase of being “on the way to language” (or: “underway to language”): “Die hier gebrauchte 
Wendung “zur Sprache bringen” ist jetzt ganz wörtlich zu nehmen. Das Sein kommt, sich lichtend, zur 
Sprache. Es ist stets unterwegs zu ihr. Dieses Ankommende bringt das ek-sistierende Denken seinerseits in 
seinem Sagen zur Sprache. Diese wird so selbst in die Lichtung des Seins gehoben. […] Die Ek-sistenz 
bewohnt denkend das Haus des Seins. In all dem ist es so, als sei durch das denkende Sagen gar nichts 
geschehen. […] Indem wir nämlich die der Sprache zugeschickte Wendung “zur Sprache bringen” eigens 
denken, nur dies und nichts weiter, indem wir dies Gedachte als künftig stets zu Denkendes in der Acht des 
Sagens behalten, haben wir etwas Wesendes des Seins selbst zur Sprache gebracht” (361-362). Das Denken 
ist als Denken in die Ankunft des Seins, in das Sein als die Ankunft gebunden. Das Sein hat sich dem 
Denken schon zugeschickt. Das Sein ist als das Geschick des Denkens. Das Geschick aber ist in sich 
geschichtlich. Seine Geschichte ist schon im Sagen der Denker zur Sprache gekommen. […] Die 
Schicklichkeit des Sagens vom Sein als dem Geschick der Wahrheit ist das erste Gesetz des Denkens, nicht 
die Regeln der Logik, die erst aus dem Gesetz des Seins zu Regeln warden können” (363) [Heidegger’s 
emphasis]. At the very end of the Letter, Heidegger concludes: “Das Denken sammelt die Sprache in das 
einfache Sagen. Die Sprache ist so die Sprache des Seins, wie die Wolken die Wolken des Himmels sind. 
Das Denken legt mit seinem Sagen unscheinbare Furchen in die Sprache. Sie sind noch unscheinbarer als 
die Furchen, die der Landmann langsamen Schrittes durch das Feld zieht” (364). Quoted from: Martin 
Heidegger, “Brief über den Humanismus,” Wegmarken (Frankfurt a.M.: Vittorio Klostermann, 1967). 
Here, I am using the second, expanded edition of 1978, which is included in Heidegger’s Collected Works, 
vol. 9 (Gesamtausgabe, Band 9; hereafter also referred to as: GA 9). 
19
 I will return to the different (structural) traits of vital anecdotes in chapter six. 
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20
 In my discussion of Heidegger’s Letter on Humanism, I will attend to Tillich’s notion of the demonic, in 
the concluding chapter of this study.
23
Section I:
The Double Bypass
24
Chapter One
Schelling: Christology as Semiotics
The roots of Heidegger’s original philosophical project can be located historically 
within a specific theological discourse that aimed at redefining the relation between 
religion and politics.  According to my primary claim, Heidegger’s main, if covert, intent 
was to combat the egalitarian, pluralistic impulses carried by a tradition of critical 
Christology, initiated in large part by the later Schelling’s Philosophy of Revelation.  
My present notion of critical Christology differs, to some degree, from the one 
commonly attributed to Schelling.  According to Christian Danz’s (2000)1 general 
characterization, Christology for Schelling is, first of all, the explication of the content of 
revelation (die Explikation des Inhaltes der Offenbarung).  This content, in turn, consists 
in nothing but the persona of Jesus Christ (die Person Jesu Christi).2  With Danz, we can 
let Schelling speak for himself: 
Der eigentliche Inhalt des Christentums ist aber ganz allein die Person Christi; 
[…] Man kann also sagen: In einer Philosophie der Offenbarung handle es sich 
allein oder doch nur vorzüglich darum, die Person Christi zu begreifen. Christus 
ist nicht der Lehrer, wie man zu sagen pflegt, Christus nicht der Stifter, er ist der 
Inhalt des Christentums. (XIV, 35)3
This passage is doubly intricate, insofar as the two central notions, “persona” (Person) 
and “content” (Inhalt), are not taken in their usual sense or as they are used in ordinary 
language.  Accordingly, the German term Person must not be rendered “person” in 
English.  Instead “persona” seems to be the best option in order to stress that, in 
Schelling’s account, the name Jesus is not the proper name of a person, however special 
in his role as “teacher” of humanity or “founder” of the Christian religion.  As we shall 
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see, for Schelling, the founding paradox of God’s incarnation in Jesus, the puzzle of the 
God-Man who is both fully divine and fully human, cannot be understood if “the Son” is 
considered in (mysterious) analogy to the criteria of human personhood, since the name 
appears to a content, Inhalt. 
Likewise, the term Inhalt is not to be taken in the common sense of content, in 
which the content of a story refers to its plot, subject matter, or topic broadly conceived.  
However, no alternative translation besides “content” is readily available.  To avoid 
misunderstanding, it is therefore crucial to underscore that, according to the kind of 
critical Christology that Schelling helped initiate, the Christian creed is not rooted in a 
story about the (historical) person of Jesus Christ and his exemplary deeds.  As will be 
explained in more detail below, Jesus is not seen as the paradoxical paragon of humanity 
exemplified by a divine agent incarnate.  In this understanding, he is not the protagonist 
of a linearly structured holy narrative, but rather the center of a world understanding. 
As Danz (1998) points out, this approach to Christianity assigns a double-frontier 
position to Schelling’s critical Christology, as it tries to avoid what it perceives as the 
aporias of supranaturalist theology, on one hand, and rationalist enlightenment-theology, 
on the other.4  These views are rejected as implying faulty reductions of the divine to the 
human, or vice versa, which both fail to present the symbolic tension implied by the 
notion of God’s incarnation (Menschwerdung) as something meaningful rather than self-
contradictory or nonsensical.  Although pointing in opposite directions, so the criticism 
goes, both supranaturalist theology and rationalist enlightenment theology ultimately beg 
the question. 
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Their acumen in treating the central tenets of Schelling’s Christology 
notwithstanding, what commentators like Danz generally do not discuss is the 
specifically semiotic framework of Schelling’s view, which extends his theologico-
philosophical discussion into a project of cultural politics and social reform.  Informed by 
a non-deflationary methodology, such cultural politics examines and enlists religious 
meanings as social forces, without secularizing them away in the process.  
Heidegger, I will argue in what follows below, was alert in particular to this 
aspect of Christology as semiotics.  As Heidegger knew, instead of the historical 
occurrence of a somehow “person-like” God-Man, Schelling argues that the name Jesus 
stands for a meaning-giving principle, which engenders various modalities of historical 
self-understanding as the unifying ground for the formation and transformation of a 
specific kind of religious community as communication community.  Such 
understanding, mediated through the historical symbol of the Christ, defies any clear 
distinctions between the form and the content of the Christian message (Evangelium), as 
have been issued by philosophy and theology, under conditions of disciplinary separation 
and hermeneutic competition.  
Superseding such rivalry, the conception of Jesus as persona, offered by critical 
Christology in the mold of Schelling, construes the “content” of Christianity in decidedly 
non-dogmatic terms, namely as the open-ended process of a historical semiotics that 
construes faith as a critical social force in its own right – not a retarding force looking 
backwards, but a search for meaning that engages in a kind of social semiosis.  Following 
this conception of a new religiosity as a social and meaning-giving force, faith is not a 
static belief system, but an active force enacted through the evolving (re)shaping ([Um-
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]Gestaltung) of religious meanings, which are materially mediated by symbolic practices.  
As they enter into social space, those practices carry a form of religious discourse, the 
semiotic productivity of which is not restricted to conscious dialogue among the 
believers, nor does it gesture at collapsing the sacred into the mundane, or vice versa, as 
the religious projects by the rationalist and supranaturalist theologians do, respectively.  
Instead, it creates a productive dialectic between the discourses of the faithful and the 
non-faithful which leads to the production of new social meanings.
The inherently non-dogmatic trait of such Christology, then, consists in its central 
claim that there is no single “Christian mind set” or fixed textual canon5 that could claim 
sole authority over the “historical truth” about Jesus.  On the contrary, the revelation of 
Christian truth is viewed as an ongoing, never finished process of meaning formation, a 
process of semiotic creativity.  From this point of view, neither Christianity as a spiritual 
movement nor the appearance of Jesus are phenomena in history.  Instead, the persona of 
Jesus is a symbol of the creative nature (Wesen) of history itself, for which Tillich later 
coined the phrase of Jesus as the “middle of history.”6  Faith in Jesus, then, leads to new 
engagement with the social sphere as active production of the meanings of history.
The pivotal point that this example brings for the following investigation is that, 
within the historical-semiotic framework of critical Christology, the symbolics of the 
persona of Jesus are directly linked to the riddle of creation, namely the question of how 
God could create a world from Himself, yet different from Himself.7  In other words, the 
riddle of creation (Schöpfung) and the paradox of God’s becoming human in Christ 
(Menschwerdung) are two sides of the same Christological coin.  Said in more 
conventional philosophical terms, this analysis bridges questions of ontology and 
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representation, or, as Heidegger will term it, Being and Being-in-the World, a 
terminological complex more often thought to derive from Hegel.  Yet the recourse to  
Schelling’s central Denkfigur (cognitive motif; literally, thought-figure) in this regard 
highlights that of Zeugung ([pro]creation), along with the questions it spawns concerning 
the identity and/or difference between the creator and his creation.  The Schelling 
connection, then, opens up a new account of world understanding, beyond those of strict 
rationalism. 
These questions will prove central for Heidegger’s analyses in Being and Time,8
in unacknowledged proximity to the later Schelling’s Philosophy of Revelation.  Seen 
against the preceding characterization of Schelling’s pioneering project, Being and Time
thus turns out to be a book that is pervaded by the Christological semiotics of Zeugung .  
As I will demonstrate, in the Weimar years of his philosophical production as well as in 
his attempt to remount his project for a postwar audience, Heidegger is at pains to cloak 
this connection to Schelling and the Young Hegelians.  He does so through a variegated 
vocabulary, which combines the technical terminology of fundamental ontology with the 
everyday idiom of Dasein’s analysis.  
This effort at obfuscation is in fact reinforced in contemporary Heidegger
scholarship along three different, but related routes, which I identify as philosophy’s 
double bypass of Christological semiotics.  To make my case for an overdue 
reappreciation of the later Schelling in this chapter, then, I will begin by examining 
specific hermeneutic strategies that are operative in Theodore Kisiel’s landmark 
publication The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time (1993).  Impressive in its 
comprehensive scope as well as its vision for detail, this study remains illuminating even 
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as it fosters what I take to be interpretive trends toward neglecting the neo-Schellingean 
trajectory I want to emphasize.
The first philosophical bypass, the first way that traditional Heidegger criticism 
has elided this particular account of meaning, is the subject matter of this chapter.  
Calling such avoidance strategies “bypasses” pertains to readings of Heidegger that tend 
to reduce the discursive scope of the formative phase of his thinking to an exchange and 
eventual break with neo-Kantianism rather than to a broader reference to idealism, as I 
am positing here, using Schelling as my example.  Such too-simple readings also 
continue to be instrumental, for example, in occluding the relevance of Cassirer’s thought 
for the early Heidegger.  More pervasively, by suppressing Cassirer’s legacy, this 
discursive reduction also blocks out those crucial philosophical sources, which he and 
Heidegger share.  Approaching Heidegger through Schelling, in this chapter, will allow 
us to uncover how current critics’ hermeneutic strategies perpetuate the myth of 
fundamental difference among the two thinkers, according to a skewed dramatization of 
the Davos disputations in 1929, whose rhetorical repercussions have not ceased to cast a 
distorting light on the initial stages of Heidegger’s intellectual development.  
The Neo-Kantian Bypass: Falsifying Heidegger’s Origin
In the opening part of The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time (1993), 
Theodore Kisiel emphasizes the impact on Heidegger’s early thought by the work of 
Emil Lask, a member of the so-called “Southwest German School” spearheaded by 
Wilhelm Windelband and Heinrich Rickert.  By giving center stage to Lask’s importance 
for Heidegger’s inception of a radicalized phenomenology [of culture], Kisiel reinforces 
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critics’ common hermeneutic strategy of interpreting Heidegger’s thought process over 
against neo-Kantianism.9  In Kisiel’s account, the urgency of upholding this interpretive 
optic is not lessened but rather strengthened by the fact that Lask is presented as a 
renegade neo-Kantian of sorts, one whose ability to infuse the language of transcendental 
value philosophy with mystic overtones reminiscent of Meister Eckhart would have had 
great appeal to Heidegger.  Lask’s stereotype, then, is easily transferred onto Heidegger, 
to justify a particular reading masking the broader appeal I am tracing here.  Yet in light 
of Lask’s hybrid qualities, my approach to Heidegger through Schelling is fully 
compatible with both Heidegger’s express turn away from Rickert and his final need to 
move beyond Lask as well. 
Thus understood, my present notion is that a neo-Kantian bypass has helped to 
obscure the Heideggerian program that I am pursuing.  In fact, this bypass carries a 
double meaning, as it speaks to a double movement within contemporary discourses on 
Heidegger.  The importance of Schelling is bypassed through a strategic emphasis on 
Heidegger’s bypassing of neo-Kantianism.  Textually, this approach is based on one of 
the central tenets in Kisiel’s overall Heidegger interpretation, namely that “[i]t all began 
in KNS 1919” (19, 21).10  More precisely, the inquiry of Kisiel’s Genesis book begins 
with the following claim: 
Thus, through Lask’s mediating of the neo-Kantian tradition in the direction of 
Husserl and Aristotle, the two earliest philosophical influences upon Heidegger, 
he has developed a sense of intentionality and categorial intuition which allows 
him to move toward a new sense of the a priori, that of the facticity of historical 
meaning, which finds its norms in experienceability instead of knowability. (35)
This historical facticity of meaning reflects Heidegger’s choice from 
among the options of the transcendental philosophies of the time. Not an ideal and 
theoretical realm of validity but a “transcendental” realm of pretheoretical 
meaning flowing from life itself. (34)
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In this formulation, the present claim does not hold up to scrutiny.  While Kisiel is 
certainly right in stressing neo- Kantianism as one of the crucial reference points in 
philosophical discourse at the time when Heidegger’s career was about to take off, this 
school had no monopoly over the “historical facticity of meaning,” nor were they the first 
ones to present it in the way that would prove decisive for Heidegger’s own development. 
This becomes clear, once we broaden the question of influence and take into 
account not only those schools of thought from which Heidegger sought ostensibly to 
distinguish himself, but also those philosophical lineages that he incorporated (often 
unchanged) into his own body of thought.  In this regard, the formula “it all began in 
KNS 1919” can be misleading in two related ways, which conjointly promote the neo-
Kantian bypass in Heidegger scholarship under consideration.   
First, if primarily focused on the “Southwest German School” around the figure 
of Rickert, this formula unduly narrows the debate over the “historical facticity of 
meaning,” by downsizing the underlying materialism debate, in which the position taken 
by transcendental value philosophy marked only one of the later stages.  Second, once 
this narrowed neo-Kantian signpost is pinned to the year of 1919, it is prone to foreclose 
other sources that entered Heidegger’s thought before and after these lecture courses but 
still prior to the final writing process and publication of Being and Time. 
Considering the former point, the stakes of the overarching debate about 
materialism are laid out, for example, by Ernst Bloch’s comprehensive commentary in 
Das Materialismusproblem.11  Especially in section 35, “Bürgerliche Auflösungen der 
mechanischen Materie,” Bloch links certain metaphysical questions about the nature of 
matter to epistemological questions about the nature of human consciousness and 
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experience, within a political, ideological context.  Bloch’s discursive mapping is 
instructive, even if one does not agree with his particular Marxist critique of bourgeois 
idealism.12  Highlighting the work of Friedrich Albert Lange (1828-1875) and Ernst 
Mach (1838-1916), Bloch remains sensitive to the different facets of historical facticity 
manifest in human experience.  In the Heidegger context, the latter are blurred by Kisiel’s 
above reference to “experienceability” and “pretheoretical meaning flowing from life 
itself,” which seems to draw Heidegger’s topical breakthrough closer into the vicinity of 
Lebensphilosophie or vitalism, in the mold of Henri Bergson (1859 -1941), rather than 
making any link to this major debate on materialism of the age.  A stereotype here is used 
to foreclose a viable framing within which to discuss Heidegger.
While the Bergson connection was acknowledged early on as an important factor 
especially in Heidegger’s evolving views on the concept of time,13 a further neo-Kantian 
bypass of the Christology debates that I have outlined above, I argue, is best obviated by 
stressing the interfaces of phenomenology and certain currents within the philosophy of 
science, which point from Freiburg to fin-de-siècle Vienna.  In terms of philosophical 
methodology, acknowledging the actual conversation between Husserl’s phenomenology 
and Mach’s phenomenalism (or “empirico-criticism”)14 is crucial for assessing 
“Heidegger’s choice[s] from among the transcendental philosophies of the time,” in 
Kisiel’s phrase.  These considerations about the methodological background and scope of 
Heidegger’s “breakthrough to the topic” already point to the second concern raised 
against Kisiel’s formula according to which “it all began in KNS 1919.”
Considering the further aspect of Kisiels’s argument, trying to recover any 
possible influence after the year of 1919, and leading up to the publication of Being and 
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Time, the role of Ernst Cassirer’s work in particular takes on a new meaning for tracing 
Heidegger’s development up to his magnum opus and beyond.  As is well known, 
Cassirer himself was never comfortable with being labeled a neo-Kantian.15  Yet, this fact 
is commonly not brought to bear on the relation between Heidegger and Cassirer.  
Symptomatically, then, Cassirer is completely absent from Kisiel’s account of 
Heidegger’s early thought.16
Yet this question of what it means to be a neo-Kantian in the era opens up other 
faces to Heidegger’s project.  For instance, Cassirer openly credits Schelling with asking 
the right questions about new forms of religiosity and about the relation between 
religious consciousness, mythical consciousness, and cultural reform, even as he rejects 
some of Schelling’s own answers.17  However, to fully assess the close affinity between 
Schelling’s project of Christological critique and its respective continuations on the part 
of Cassirer and Heidegger, we must go back to the late Schelling’s own text.  The key 
document in this regard is his Philosophy of Revelation (1831; 1841/42),18 which mounts 
the central semiotic motif of Zeugung, which will make a redressed, but no less central 
reappearance in Being and Time as well as in Heidegger’s Kant critique, written soon 
after.  The latter was published as Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (1929), 
composed by Heidegger in the immediate aftermath of the Davos encounter with 
Cassirer.
One of the main inconsistencies generated by critics’ neo-Kantian bypass as 
characterized thus far springs from its negligence of Heidegger’s actual Kant critique, 
which provides many cues that become obliterated, if the beginning of Heidegger’s 
“path” (in Pöggeler’s phrase) is locked primarily into his 1919 lecture course on 
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“Phänomenologie und transzendentale Wertphilosophie.”  The situation is further 
confounded by the additional assumption of a significant break (the perennially 
controversial Kehre) in Heidegger’s thought, which Otto Pöggeler has associated with the 
year of 1929, as the marker of a new beginning.19  Purportedly, Heidegger now moves 
away from the insurmountable dead-ends of Being and Time toward his “actual” magnum 
opus, the Beiträge zur Philosophie (1936-38).20  Right after the publication of Being and 
Time, so the story goes, Heidegger begins to break new ground and enters into the new 
phase of the philosophy of Ereignis – an account that has been promulgated by Heidegger 
himself, through a now-famous footnote in the Letter on Humanism.21
To be sure, the commentaries by Kisiel and Pöggeler are not fully congruent with 
the historical facts, or even with alternate critical accounts.  Kisiel does not follow 
Pöggeler in emphasizing the Beiträge over Being and Time, although his recent account 
of “The Failure of Being and Time” (2001)22 would seem to reinforce Pöggeler’s earlier 
claim about the dead ends generated by Heidegger’s breakthrough work, which prompted 
the author to abandon the completion of this master fragment and move on to a new 
philosophical methodology.  
However, conjointly, these two major commentaries on the unfolding and 
purported transformation of Heidegger’s early thought effectively eclipse the 
philosophical stakes of the Heidegger-Cassirer controversy as they might have appeared 
to contemporaries.  Instead of probing the crucial interfaces of Cassirer’s and 
Heidegger’s critique of Kant, during the late 1920s (strictly speaking 1927-1929), these 
critics divert attention backward to the neo-Kantian “beginnings” pinpointed in 1919 
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(Kisiel) as well as diverted attention forward, that is, underway to a “second start” in the 
name of Ereignis philosophy, in 1936 (Pöggeler).
The effects of these strategies have been serious within the history of philosophy. 
Pulling in two different directions in this manner has created the peculiar effect that the 
lingering claim about Heidegger’s supposed “crisis” and reorientation around the year of 
1929 does not focus on Heidegger’s actual production during that time at all and glosses 
over, most notably, his detailed Kant critique.  The vectors of this alleged reorientation 
are explicated in such a way that the actual “moment” of change in Heidegger’s thinking 
is rendered nebulous.  To be sure, the so-called Kant book, which falls right within that 
moment, has not gone unnoticed by any means.  But its critical reception is continuously 
overshadowed by the rhetorical exploitation of the Davos “spectacle” as a clash of two 
philosophical generations, in which the “sporty” Heidegger somehow debunked the 
“dusty Olympian” Cassirer.23
Along with this rhetorical retirement of Cassirer as the purported loser of this 
debate and any claim to philosophical relevance, the main omission of such treatment 
relates to the central, if cloaked, presence of Schelling’s Christological thought in 
Heidegger’s Kant critique in the late 1920s.  As I will show toward the end of this 
chapter, Heidegger’s attack on the B-edition of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason is, in 
large part, a replication of Schelling’s Kant criticism launched close to a century earlier.  
In particular, Heidegger’s claims in terms of the “self-affection” (Selbstaffektion) of 
“original time” (ursprüngliche Zeit)24 will prove to be strikingly parallel to Schelling’s 
conception of the “inner negation” of God, as the condition for the possibility of the 
creation of a finite world by, or from, an infinite Being.  As I will rephrase and pursue it, 
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the question that Heidegger inherited from Schelling and now levels against Kant is how 
eternity “gives birth” to finite time, or the sense of time that organizes and unifies a finite 
world – a question, which Heidegger went to great length to strip from its immediate 
theological connotations, despite his clear parallel to Schelling's (and Tillich’s) accounts.  
In other words, the christological Denkfigur of Zeugung, in the mold of 
Schelling’s philosophy of revelation, is part and parcel of Heidegger’s defense of original 
imagination (ursprüngliche Einbildungskraft).  The latter, Heidegger claims, must be 
asserted as an independent third power, over against Kant’s tendency (especially in the B-
edition of the First Critique) to subsume this power under his conception of constitutive 
categories as reine Verstandesbegriffe.  More precisely, in discussing the conditions of 
what makes the creation of a finite and thus meaningfully unified (life-) world possible, I 
posit that Heidegger is entering the discourse of Christological semiotics, which 
Schelling had revolutionized in his treatment of the two founding paradoxes of 
Christianity, namely the paradox of God’s creation of the world and the paradox of God’s 
incarnation in the Christ. 
To examine Heidegger’s Christological debts to Schelling during this decisive 
time window in the late 1920s, and hence to overcome the neo-Kantian bypass of this 
phase, I will highlight only those thematic strands in Schelling’s Philosophy of 
Revelation that are most relevant and most easily detectable in Heidegger’s Kant critique. 
To this end, the following section will provide a brief sketch of Schelling’s account of the 
“unpreconceivable” as well as his treatment of the unity of the Trinity, in terms of the 
relation between “three potencies” and “three personalities.”  
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My coverage of these thematic nodes within Schelling’s overall Christological 
programmatic will thus be confined to a basic illumination of the central semiotic motif 
of Zeugung, which organizes the subtext not only of Heidegger’s 1929 Kant book but 
also undergirds integral parts of Being and Time, published two years earlier.  
The Plural God: Potencies and Personalities
As Thomas Buchheim (1997) has plausibly argued, one of the main shifts in 
Schelling’s intellectual development falls within the year of 1806, when he delivered his 
“Anti-Fichte.”25  According to the Schröter-Edition’s division of Schelling’s works into 
“main volumes” (Hauptbände), this also marks the transition from his writings on the 
philosophy of identity (third main volume, covering the years 1801-1806) to the 
philosophy of freedom (fourth main volume, covering the years 1806-1815).  
In the following, my textual references to Schelling fall mostly into the period 
after this transition.  For the purpose of detecting and elucidating Schelling’s influence on 
Heidegger, against the grain of the neo-Kantian bypass, I shall generally focus on the 
later Schelling.  In doing so, I will take my cues primarily from the Philosophy of 
Revelation.
For Schelling, the guiding notion, which informs his Christological analysis of 
Christian symbolics, is “the living God” (der lebendige Gott) (191).  The characterization 
of the latter is contained in one of Schelling’s explications of his conception of 
monotheism: 
Monotheism ist die Lehre, die Gott als solchen, oder seiner Gottheit nach, 
bestimmt. Worauf beruht aber die eigentliche Gottheit? Der wahre Gott, sagt 
man, ist der lebendige. Der lebendige aber ist nur der, der aus seinem 
unvordenklichen Sein heraustretend, dasselbe zu einem Moment von sich macht, 
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sein Wesen davon befreiend, es als Geist setzen kann, womit ihm zugleich die 
Möglichkeit gegeben ist, Schöpfer zu sein, dadurch, dass er seinem 
unvordenklichen Sein ein anderes Sein entgegensetzt. (191)26
 This passage is as crucial as it is puzzling.  On one hand, it introduces Schelling’s 
fundamental distinction between two modalities of God, namely God in the mode of His 
“upreconceivable” being (sein unvordenkliches Sein) and God in the mode of Godhead 
(Gottheit).  On the other hand, it points to the central, Kant-inspired theme complex that 
asks about the conditions of possibility for God’s activity as creator.  Under the name of 
the living God, it is the transition from God to Godhead that “liberates” God from his 
unpreconceivable status through positing Himself as Geist (es [sein Wesen] als Geist 
setzen).  Only by “stepping outside” (heraustretend) His unpreconceivable being, God 
comes alive and becomes truly creative – the “true God” (der wahre Gott). 
The most baffling aspect of this image of God is perhaps the notion of self-
differentiation, implied by Schelling’s speaking of God stepping outside himself, which 
gets even more complicated in light of an immediate qualification.  According to this 
qualifier, the mode of the unpreconceivable is not simply overcome or canceled but 
carried over into the modality of Godhead, of which it now constitutes but one aspect 
(dasselbe zu einem Moment von sich macht).  Hence, not only do we have to distinguish 
between the two basic modalities of the unpreconceivable God and the living Godhead, 
but we will also have to ascertain multiple aspects within the living Godhead itself.  
Even as the meaning of this conception is still unclear at this point, Schelling has 
nonetheless already set the stage for his general claim that monotheism, properly 
understood, is inherently pluralist.  From the viewpoint of his critical Christology, we can 
make sense of both the unity and the creative productivity of a single God only by 
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acknowledging His inherently plural nature, which is implied by the puzzle of the unity 
of the Trintiy.  For Schelling, the living God of Christianity is a plural God:  
Der Schöpfer ist nicht der schlechthin Einfache, und da diese Mehrheit eine 
geschlossene Totalität ist, der All-Eine. (189) 
Gott ist also der All-Eine, den Gestalten seines Seins nach nicht Einer, 
sondern mehrere; nur seiner Gottheit nach ist er notwendig Einer, weil in allen 
jenen Gestalten der Wirkende. Von seiner Gottheit abgesehen, ist Gott nicht 
Einer, sondern mehrere. (191)
To follow Schelling’s solution to this puzzle and to clarify his present notion of the 
unpreconceivable and his conception of God’s self-differentiation (which, as we shall 
see, he addresses as “inner Negation”), I suggest that we must begin by considering 
Schelling’s related commentary on creation, which strikes me as more easily accessible.  
For my present purposes, then, Schelling’s two most central claims about creation are, 
first, that no necessity of its occurrence can be derived from the general concept of God 
and, second, that creation is inherently multi-faceted and cannot be explained as 
“something simply positive” (etwas einfach Positives, 181). 
Right from the start, Schelling objects to the idea that creation begins with the 
conscious, voluntary decision of an intelligent demiurge or creator God.  As he says a 
few pages earlier, assuming such act is hardly more than declaring creation to be 
incomprehensible, and such naïve acceptance amounts to nothing but “stale theism” 
(Schaler [sic!] Theismus) (170).  Instead, creation must be understood as irreducibly 
complex as far as the different factors are concerned, which are joined in its process: 
Schöpfung ist nicht etwas einfach Positives, gleichsam ein aus sich Hinaussetzen. 
Vielmehr das ursprünglich Daseiende wird in Schranken gebracht, das so weit 
dann ein in sich Seinendes, sich selbst Besitzendes ist, dadurch dass an ihm das 
Können hervorgebracht worden; […]. (181)
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In other words, what is naïve about the notion of an intelligent creator God is the 
uncritical assumption of capability, or correlatively possibility, as a simple given.  
“Correlative” means that the notions of capability and possibility are two sides of the 
same coin, in the present context.  In this sense, God’s capability to create the world is 
correlative to the possibility of the world’s being created.  Regardless from which angle 
we look at it, capability/possibility cannot be taken as a simple given.  
For Schelling, God, in His first instance, is not a personal, intelligent designer.27
God did not just have the capability to create the world, then simply to decide to use or 
actualize this capacity, and thus make the world.  By contrast, Schelling holds out the 
possibility that creation has to be explained in terms of the dynamic, processive interplay 
between necessity and contingency.  On a preliminary note, we might thus compress this 
basic insight of Schelling’s critical Christology in the formula: possibility is not a simple 
given but concurrent with the processive interplay of necessity and contingency.
However, even this specification of the multiple aspects of the creative process 
does not yet address the main step from the conditions of the possibility of creation to its 
actual happening.  To this point in his work (covering close to the first two hundred pages 
of the text of his lecture course!), Schelling’s argument has been hypothetical: 
Bis jetzt haben wir die Schöpfung nur als eine mögliche gesehen. Dass der 
Schöpfer diese Möglichkeit ins Werk setzte, ist nicht a priori einzusehen, wie 
überhaupt keine freie Tat. Indem wir aber eine solche zufällige, aber immer mehr 
in Verstand verwandelte Welt, die durch die Mittelglieder bis zum menschlichen 
Bewusstein aufschreitet, vor uns sehen, ist es durch Erfahrung bewiesen, dass das 
Notwendigseinende wirklich und der Tat nach Gott ist; welcher Beweis sich aber 
immer mehr verstärkt. (188)
This statement points us to one of Schelling’s most prominent tenets in terms of 
philosophical methodology: namely, his distinction between negative and positive
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philosophy.  In the present context of Christology, Schelling charges that negative 
philosophy with a concept-centered approach that advances to the characterization of 
God as the necessary being but remains completely mute on the puzzle of creation: 
Bis zu diesem Begriff des notwendig, d.h. allem Begriff voraus Seienden fährt 
auch die negative Philosophie. Sie fährt durch ihren letzten Schluss, das richtig 
verstandene ontologische Argument, darauf. (156-157)
Das Notwendigseiende ist der absolut transzendente Begriff. Die alte 
Metaphysik wollte mit dem Begriff über den Begriff in das Sein hinauskommen. 
(159)
Negative philosophy remains within the confines of the “old metaphysics” (159).  On its 
own terms, such metaphysics is tailored to a pure science of reason – an a priori science.  
It promotes a complete immanent withdrawal of reason, and thus remains within a 
negative of meaning.28  Whenever it pretends to proceed from the concept (of God) to the 
existence (of God and/or the created world), it becomes vulnerable to the charge of 
dogmatic metaphysics.  The latter is gainsaid by Schelling’s famous dictum: “The 
existence of God cannot be evidenced, only the God-ness of that which exists [can].”29
Aligning himself with the Kantian heritage of critical philosophy, Schelling thus 
proposes his own Christological, “post-Kantian” approach, which is meant to execute 
what Kant’s critique of an overreaching metaphysics had already prepared but not carried 
out to the fullest:
Die Transzendenz der alten Metaphysik war bloss relativ, halb, zaghaft; die der 
positiven Philosophie ist absolut und resolut, aber eben darum keine Transzendenz in 
dem Sinne, wie sie Kant verbietet. Habe ich mich erst immanent gemacht in der Idee, 
dann freilich werde ich transzendent. Fange ich aber vom Transzendenten an, wie 
Spinoza, so überschreite ich nichts. Kant verbietet die Transzendenz nur der 
dogmatisierenden Vernunft, die von sich ausgeht; aber er verbietet nicht, vom Begriff 
des Notwendigexistierenden aus zum höchsten Wesen, als Posterius, zu gelangen. 
(159)
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The wording of the last sentence is rather unfortunate, as far as Schelling’s use of the 
expression Begriff is concerned.  After all, his primary claim up to this point has been that 
negative philosophy cuts itself off from the world and boxes itself in through its exclusive 
reliance on concepts immanent to human reason.  But now he seems to be saying that 
positive philosophy also starts from the Begriff (of God or whatever else’s existence is in 
question).  This is not what Schelling means.  He does not change course in the middle of 
his argument.  Instead he gives in to a terminological quirk, namely his routine of 
maintaining the same designation for something at the point of its negation and 
furnishing it with the attribute “absolute” or an adverbial combination therewith.  
According to this befuddling technique, “the Necessary-being is the absolutely 
transcendent concept” (der absolut transzendente Begriff) (159).  That is, he is extending 
the notion of Begriff itself, to include not only the traditional concepts of reason, but also 
concepts of faith, concepts about existence and the like, which rationalist-Kantians would 
cosign to the realm of speculation.
In order not to misunderstand Schelling, one has to heed what he said two pages 
earlier, with respect to the “disloding and dropping of the concept” as the gateway from 
negative to positive philosophy.30  Consequently, Schelling remains consistent with his 
preceding summary of the difference between negative and positive philosophy, where he 
characterizes the starting point of the latter as follows:
Die negative Philosophie war durch ihr allem Sein zuvorkommendes Denken 
apriorische Wissenschaft. Der Anfang der positiven Philosophie ist das allem 
Denken zuvorkommende Sein. Sie geht vom Sein, dem kein Begriff vorausgeht, 
zum Begriff, zum “Überseienden.” (156)
The beginning of positive philosophy is prior to all conceptual thinking, it begins with 
something prior to conceptual comprehension – perhaps best characterized as an 
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embracing of the ground of being.  Internally consistent or not, this general proposal may 
strike many a reader as counter-intuitive, if not a dead end.  One wonders how this is any 
better than the “stale theism” that Schelling discards by rejecting the notion of God as a 
free, intelligent designer, which would leave the phenomenon of creation unexplained (cf. 
170).  How can any philosophy start with the incomprehensible without throwing in the 
towel?  Schelling answers:  
Das Blindseiende ist der mit dem Denken nicht identische Inhalt (im Gegensatz 
zum Anfang der negativen Philosophie) kann ihm aber zugehen. Die negative 
Philosophie hat zum Inhalt das a priori begreifliche Sein, die positive das a priori 
unbegreifliche Sein, damit es a posteriori zum Begreiflichen werde. Und ein 
solches Begreifliches wird es eben in Gott. Das Unerkennbare des Blindseienden 
wird in Gott begreiflich, wird ein der Vernunft in Gott immanenter Inhalt. (159-
160)
Here Schelling prepares for his central notion of the unpreconceivable (das 
Unvordenkliche), which the preceding quotation renders “the a priori incomprehensible 
that [can become] comprehensible a posteriori.”  The conditions of blind-being (das 
Blindseiende) are explained as that which generally precedes thinking, but through an a
posteriori detour (by observing the process phenomenon of creation), it can become 
comprehensible.  This is an almost modern phenomenological move, relating the 
potential to the actual as sharing a ground of being, as blind and revealed.
More precisely, blind-being is not defined as incomprehensible, which would 
seem to undercut philosophical effort altogether from the viewpoint of negative 
philosophy.  Instead, it refers to that which grounds any formation of concepts in the first 
place.  As such, the Blindseiende is not a paradoxical or somehow self-denying concept 
but designates something that reveals itself through creation:    
Gott entäussert sich nicht in die Welt, sondern erhebt sich vielmehr in seine 
Gottheit; entäussert ist er unvordenklicher Weise; […] Am Sein- und 
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Nichtseinkönnen hat Gott den realen Grund, auf welchem er das in der negativen 
Vernunftwissenschaft als blosse Möglichkeit Enthaltene zur Wirklichkeit führt. 
(177)
As already intimated through the conception of the blind-being, positive philosophy 
begins its inquiry at a layer of potential creation that is prior to concept-based thought.  In 
the theologico-philosophical context of God’s necessity, this precludes two assumptions 
for explaining the evolutionary process of the world.  Positive philosophy thus rejects not 
only the premise of an intelligent creator God who decides to “discharge” Himself into 
the world; there is no origin moment, only being.  This position also objects to 
immediately viewing the source(s) of creation in terms of divine potency.  We cannot 
start by looking at God’s capabilities, which He may or may not exercise:  
Der Potenz kann aber nicht Potenz, sondern nur Actus vorhergehen. Aber eben 
darum, um wirklich zu Gott zu gelangen, müssen wir vom Sein ausgehen, das der 
Potenz vorhergeht. (156) 
Das wahre Prinzip kann nicht die Potenz sein, die dem Sein vorausgeht. Prinzip
ist nur, was gegen alle erst nachfolgende Möglichkeit gesichert ist; das unzweifelhaft 
Existierende, obenauf Bleibende. (160)
In the language of mental capacities, Schelling thus introduces the “unpreconceivable” as 
a technical term to support and specify his claim that the analysis of God’s necessity 
cannot begin with a doctrine of potencies.  Instead the “true principle” has to be 
ascertained prior to all subsequent mere possibilities or conceivabilities, as a more 
general ground of being:  
Man könnte sagen: Was aller Potenz, kommt auch allem Denken zuvor! Und 
allerdings, das Sein, das aller Potenz zuvorkommt, werden wir auch das
unvordenkliche Sein, als allem Denken vorausgehend, nennen müssen.  Was der 
Anfang alles Denkens ist, ist noch nicht das Denken; […] (161) [bold print, as 
rendered in this edition of the Paulus-Nachschrift]
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On the plane of the unpreconceivable, there is no production of meaning yet, insofar as 
there is no spiritual motion or development.  This is the level of Spinoza’s dead 
substance, because it does not participate in known being.  While it would be gratuitous 
to call Him dead, God hasn’t creatively come to life yet, as it were.  However, Schelling 
insists, even at this amorphous state, God is not uniform but before  form.  “Das 
unvordenkliche Sein ist das reell Erste. Irgend einmal war nichts als eben dies rein 
Seiende; […]” (162).  In other words, unlimited “pure being” is unqualified homogeneity, 
which Schelling goes on to describe in terms of Gelassenheit.
The latter notion has a double meaning.  It can refer to a state of tranquility and 
by a slight, Heidegger-style stretch of common use, it can designate a state of being-left, 
as in: being-left-alone, being-left-to-onself, being-left-unstirred, being-left-
undifferentiated.  As these alternative renderings indicate, the two meanings are not all 
that far from each other to begin with.  Translated as tranquility, the expression retains 
some mental connotations; in the sense of being-left, it points to the more technical 
aspect of diversification writ large or, in this case, the lack thereof.  Accordingly, 
Gelassenheit is a convenient expression to be included in a monist dictionary, in that its 
connotations hover between a mental quality and a more technical, probabilistic quality 
of being, concerning the transition from conditions of unqualified immobility to a 
diversified process of creative development.  
If it were not for the empirical phenomenon of creation, namely the diversity and 
relative regularity of the world around us, this would be the end of the story.  Qua
unpreconceivable, there is no logical or conceptual necessity for God to ever get out of 
this state of undifferentiated tranquility.  However, since we observe something different 
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from such divine tranquility, the question is how there could be any transition from the 
tranquil divine to the present state of the world’s commotion:  
[…] da aber ausser ihm Anderes existiert, so muss es ein Mittel geben, darüber 
hinwegzukommen. […] 
Nur die von Anfang vorausgehende Potenz haben wir verworfen. […] 
Aber nichts verhindert und es wird von der Natur des Reinseienden nicht 
widersprochen, dass demselben sich nach der Hand eine Möglichkeit darstelle, ein 
Anderes zu sein, als es unvordenklich ist. (162)
As we can glean from this passage, the unpreconceivable is not a concept.  Thus 
Schelling is not offering us a definition of God.  What his conception of the blind God 
points to, instead, is the aspect of continuity and potential, understood as a requisite 
condition or ground (not potency or active power!) for the process of creation.  As a 
subject matter of positive philosophy, the blind God stands for material continuity, not 
conceptual unity or logical consistency.  
In keeping with this interpretation, the “presented possibility of being something 
different” ([dargestellte] Möglichkeit, ein Anderes zu sein) refers to a material anomaly, 
or chance occurrence, within the divine continuum – a random disturbance of tranquil 
homogeneity.  Importantly, the occurrence of such material anomaly is neither precluded 
nor guaranteed, neither impossible nor necessary, in light of God’s homogenous 
condition.  Again, there is no conceptual rigor at work here, which would tip scales either 
way – contrary to the methodology of negative philosophy as a purely immanent science 
of reason.  It is only by dint of the phenomenon of creation that we must assume that such 
material disturbance actually did take place and stirred God out of his indifference.  In 
this account, Schelling’s elaborations on the irreducible aspect of contingency within the 
unpreconceivable assume a notion of absolute chance as an ontic force within an on-
going process of creation, the world’s continuous evolution: 
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Das zufällige wird das ungleiche sein; ist dies entstanden, so wird an der Stelle, 
wo sonst nichts als das reine A war, das B sein, und der actus purus (A), der zuvor 
durch nichts gehemmt, oder in sich zurückgetrieben war, hat einen Gegensatz, 
wird aus der Stelle gerückt, in die Höhe gehoben, […] 
Und auf diese Weise kommt in das unbewegliche Sein eine Beweglichkeit, 
es bekommt eine Negation in sich, hört zwar nicht auf actus purus zu sein, ist aber 
nun […] nur potentiâ actus purus […] (164)
The last quotation indicates one of the general difficulties in sorting out Schelling’s 
account of the relation and interplay of potencies.  Once a change has occurred, the initial 
conditions are hard to recognize in retrospect.  In the present case, the chance occurrence 
of an “inner negation” (Negation in sich) lifts the unpreconceivable onto the level of 
being a potency that stands in tension with a possible other.  In the mode of tranquility, it 
was an “actus purus,” Schelling’s Latin term of choice for what we have identified 
through the notion of the continuum.  By material chance, a region of possible resistance 
congeals within this tranquil homogeneity, which introduces an aspect of contrast and 
alternative – an aspect of heterogeneity. 
Yet even such talk of “inner negation” is problematic because, in its 
unpreconceivable Gelassenheit, its left-alone-ness, the material continuum has no spatial 
dimensions.  Hence it may appear misleading to speak of anything congealing or 
emerging “within” it.  Schelling is aware of this difficulty and, by way of illustration, he 
resorts to the physiological image of inflammation.  The tranquil mode of God as actus 
purus turns into the mode of potentia actus purus, “as if through a body part, which was 
first at rest but now has become inflamed, all the parts lying above it get lifted up.”31
Such metamorphosis can be construed within a monistic framework and does not entail 
or presuppose any substance dualism.  Likewise, the physio-logic of the material 
continuum does not assume or presuppose absolute Newtonian or Cartesian space.  
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Instead, any inside-outside relation is an effect of the contingent “inflammation” of the 
material continuum.  In a manner of speaking, the latter’s homogeneity constitutes a 
rather volatile mode, despite the featuring of its “tranquility.”  Such homogeneity is 
always already laced with material chance happenings.  On occasion, such happenings 
may harden into a relation of contrast, which can now be characterized in terms of 
interiority and exteriority. 
However, to account for the emergence of such contrastive spatiality, we have to 
assume yet another factor: 
Gott ist das das Andere (B) Seinkönnende. Aber er ist das B-Seinkönnende nur, 
sofern er das blinde Sein voraus hat. Und wiefern in jenem Seinkönnen seine 
Gottheit begründet ist, so ist ihm schon hier seine Gottheit vermittelt […] (169)
Die Idee der Gottheit, die über dem actu Seienden ist, offenbart dem vom 
Sein gleichsam prävenierten das Zufällige seines Existierens; es offenbart ihm 
zugleich das Mittel, sich von dem unvordenklichen Sein zu befreien. Die Idee für 
sich hätte keine Gewalt; der actus muss vorhergehen. (168)
In this place, Schelling introduces a further aspect (besides continuity, and absolute 
chance) that is necessary in order to explain how there could have been any evolutionary 
advance from the homogeneous mode of God as the unpreconceivable to the creation of a 
diverse and fickle world.  This aspect concerns mediation (Vermittlung).  According to 
Schelling, we need to assume such an additional power as opertative within the process 
of creation to account for an exlcuded alternative in terms of possible creation failure. 
In the originary mode of the unpreconceivable, God is mere homogeneity, an 
unbound material continuum, which Schellig calls actus purus or A.  With respect such 
tranquil homogeneity, no movement of any kind can be conceived.  As I developed in 
detail, this homogeneity may or may not get “inflamed” in certain areas.  There is no 
conceptual schema or logical necessity that would predetermine or prevent such 
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occurrence.  If such inflamation takes place, this means that there are random shifts or 
condensations, which can congeal into zones of regional resistance.  
According to this physio-logics of “inner negation” (Negation in sich) an element 
of basic tension is introduced into the material homogeneity of the continuum, yielding a 
spatiality of contrast where areas of different intensity are partitioned off.  The power of 
such inner negation, Schelling identifies as the first potency, called B, which disrupts 
God’s Gelassenheit.  It is this power which brings about any creative motion 
whatsoever.32
For the tranquil God, to answer to such “irritation” of his homogeneity, Schelling 
posits a second potency, called potentia actus purus or A2.  However, in terms of possible 
creation failure, God’s response could be overpowering.  In a manner of speaking, He 
could “overreact” to the possibility of His negation, to which He has been alerted by the 
efficacy of B.  God’s will would show itself in its awesome and terrible strength and 
immediately obliterate any contrastive spatiality.33
So the excluded alternative to be accounted for, in view of a continuously 
(re)created world as we observe it, is the absence of a cataclysmic “no-world dialectic” 
where an unbound tranquil continuum would collapse into an equally unbound chaos as 
the unchecked assertion of God’s wrath.34  Hence, for creation to actually take place, 
Schelling asserts the presence of a third potency, called A3, a factor of moderation or 
gradation, which “slows” God’s will down, as it were, so that it would unfold gradually –
rather than catastrophically – into a constantly transforming, diverse manifold.35
The upshot of these considerations is that, for Schellingean Christology, the 
aspects of the continuous, the contingent, and the gradual are correlative factors, which 
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only in combination can account for the phenomenon of the world and its transforming 
diversity.36
This is the core of Schelling’s overall [Christological] argument.  Chance is 
absolute, but absolute here means an irreducible aspect of a metaphysical triplet: 
continuity-chance-graduality.  Any general assertions to the effect that “in the beginning 
there was only chance or sheer chaos” are dismissed as begging the question of possible 
creation.  Absolute chance is not metaphysically singular or independent but marks one 
force in a triadic force field, a tense constellation of three ontic powers.  
Put differently, for Schelling the only meaning of chance is random deviation, or 
more precisely: randomness is deviation.  However, deviation can only “show itself” 
against the background of continuity, i.e., vis-à-vis a material continuum – a ground of 
ontic normativity, if you will.  If there was no such background, chance could not 
“occur.”  Accordinly, if one understands absolut chance to be the only ontic force from 
which everything else derives, it becomes a contradiction in terms.  In this manner, we 
are led to the backbone of Schelling’s case for a pluralist monotheism, the plural God of 
Christianity, which is condensed in the following passage:
[E]ine Möglichkeit kann nicht ausgeschlossen werden, sondern nur eine 
Wirklichkeit. Das unvordenkliche Sein, das wir darum als potentia potentiae 
bezeichnet haben, gibt ihr selbst erst die Möglichkeit, sich zu zeigen. Vor diesem 
Sein konnte sie sich nicht zeigen, und so hat sie im unvordenklichen Sein 
gleichsam eine Stätte gefunden, die sie vorher nicht hatte. Nicht an das 
Existierende selbst, sondern an das in diesem eingeschlossene Notwendige kann 
sie sich wenden […] (178)
If we wanted to pun on Heidegger’s famous phrase, in the Letter on Humanism, we could 
aptly sum up Schelling’s point by saying that continuity is the house of chance or 
probability.37
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Having thus reviewed Schelling’s analysis of the creative workings of the 
metaphysical triplet continuity-chance-graduality, it is important to pay close attention to 
his mode of presentation, if we also want to understand why and how he restates his 
account of divine potencies in terms of divine personalities.  As the last step in our 
programmatic sketch of Schelling’s critical Christology, this will clarify how the puzzle 
of creation can be seen as the flip side of the puzzle of incarnation.  Following Schelling, 
the present conception of creation outlined thus far is meaningful only if we refine 
understanding of it in terms of Zeugung.  Moreover, for the purposes of this study, it is 
only in terms of Zeugung that the resources of Schelling’s Christology for a theory of 
material semiotics focused on cultural politics can be brought to the fore. 
According to this approach, what is perplexing about the Philosophy of Revelation
is that, in large part, it is occupied with the paradoxical task of carrying out the 
“successful failure” of a giant thought experiment.  Underway to the puzzle of the unity 
of the Trinity, Schelling thinks that we cannot understand the possibility of creation 
unless we hypothetically isolate the different ontic forces that are at work within it.  This 
strategy is viable with respect to the first and the second potency.  However, once the 
third potency is “added,” we realize that such separation of forces is not real but only a 
heuristic means to get a more distinct perspective on the various, irreducible aspects that 
are inextricably combined within the single process of creation. 
In fact, if this thought experiment of fragmentary vision were successful all the 
way, it would thereby fail.  That is to say, it would fail to account for the structural unity 
that organizes the open-ended process of an evolving world as well as the creative act 
that manifests itself in the course of it.  In short, a thought experiment of hypothetical 
52
isolation may be useful to help us understand a unified phenomenon.  Yet, the overall 
success of any such trial depends on its purposively built-in failure, at its last step.  
Differently put, if the three potencies were indeed fully isolatable, it is hard to see how 
they could help explain the overarching unity that informs the creative productivity of the 
Godhead and its Trinitarian structure.  In the face of complete isolation, the unity of the 
Trinity would either disintegrate into separate ontic forces, or the potency account and the 
personality account on Schelling’s part would leave the reader with two basically 
disconnected alternatives. 
By contrast, if the third potency marks the very interface between the thought 
experiment of the three potencies and the subsequent account of God’s plural 
personalities, it is not only acceptable but indeed necessary that the two threefold 
conceptions do not match fully or symmetrically.  In other words, it speaks in favor of 
Schelling’s account that the different potencies identified with respect to the puzzle of 
creation and the different personalities identified with regard to the puzzle of incarnation 
cannot be directly mapped onto one another. 
Bearing this in mind, the “cooperation” of the three potencies does not constitute 
a successive or cumulative order.  At the very moment when the third potency is factored 
into our analysis of possible creation, it becomes clear that what has been described as 
three ontic forces are only so many inseparable aspects of a singular, yet irreducibly 
complex process.  To underscore this point, in the later part of his lecture course, 
Schelling ties his strategy of hypothetically separating three potencies within God’s 
creative activity back into an analysis of the theree personalities that are inseparably 
unified in theTrinitarian structure of the Godhead.  This precludes a symmetric mapping 
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that would equate the first potency B with the “Father,” the second potency A2 with the 
“Son,” and the third potency A3 with the holy “Spirit”: 
Die Potenz des Anfangs B ist nicht der Vater, sondern nur die zeugende Kraft des 
Vaters, nur die Potenz des Vaters; der Vater selbst bleibt ausserhalb des 
Prozesses. Wirklicher Vater ist er nur im verwirklichten Sohne, […] Der Vater 
und der Sohn kommen also miteinander zur Verwirklichung. […] Der Vater ist 
erst Vater, wenn er das Sein wieder als Zurückgebrachtes in sich hat. Hier also, 
wo das Sein ein zur Möglichkeit Zurückgebrachtes ist, ist es das 
gemeinschaftliche Sein des Vaters und des Sohnes, und das gilt auch vom Geist.
[…] Es sind nicht drei Götter, weil das Sein und also auch die Herrlichkeit des 
Seins eine für alle gemeinschaftliche ist. Wo demnach die Entgegensetzung der 
Potenzen aufhört, da sind nicht mehr Potenzen, sondern Persönlichkeiten; […] 
(195-196) 
Given the thematic focus of this study, the most important concequence of Schelling’s 
analysis of the Trinitarian constellation of personalities pertains to the open-ended 
process of religious meaning formation that is entailed by it, as well as its non-dogmatic 
implications which promote the critical potential of faith in the context of cultural 
politics.  The key to the political dimension of cultural reform within Schelling’s 
theologico-philosophical program lies in his understanding of the three personalities as so 
many principles of meaning production.  The dynamic interrelation of these principles 
liberates religious discourse from any alleged limits imposed with reference to orthodox 
“legitimacy” or canonical “authority.”  
In this context, the acknowledged indebtedness of Cassirer’s philosophy of 
symbolic forms to Schelling is most apparent, and it is here where the neo-Kantian bypass 
of both thinkers comes full circle, through its neglect of the methodological link between 
critical Christology, material semiotics, and a politically charged, religious 
phenomenology.  
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At a critical juncture in his argument, where Schelling comments on the “final 
purpose” of creation (in section XIV. Das Endziel der Schöpfung), he distances his view 
once again from the suggestion that the creation of the world was something that could be 
logically derived from God’s nature, or something that God somehow “needed” to reach 
a more transparent “self-consciousness” of Himself (183).  In contrast to any such 
derivation scheme or false teleology of divine consciousness, Schelling characterizes the 
“purpose” of creation as an open-ended process of meaning formation.  Such process 
keeps sponsoring and transforming the “real significance” (see right below) of the 
dynamic manifestations of faith mediated through symbol use – a semiotics of cultural 
production and non-dogmatic religiosity.  In reference to the creative interplay of the 
three potencies, Schelling states: 
Das entgegengesetzte Sein wird in verschiedenen Stufen überwunden und so kann 
die zweite Potenz sich in verschiedenem Masse verwirklichen. Dies wird auch 
von der dritten gelten; denn sie ist durch die Überwindung der ersten. Durch dies 
Verhältniss ist eine unendliche Mannigfaltigkeit möglicher Stellungen der 
Potenzen gegeneinander gegeben, und bei dem, welcher der Herr diese Potenzen 
ist, steht es, diese Stellungen alle zu versuchen, und die Mannigfaltigkeit der 
möglichen Welt vor sich im Bilde vorüber gehen zu lassen. Hier erhalten die 
Ideen, die Urbilder, reelle Bedeutung. (184)38
At an equally important point toward the end of his lecture course (XXXIV. Über das 
Werk Christi), Schelling restates this pluralist tenet of his critical Christoloy, in a way 
that translates the idiom of potencies into that of personalities, focused on the persona of 
the Christ with which we began this chapter: 
Aber nicht bloss die drei Potenzen sind gemeint. Jede Provinz eines Reiches der 
Natur hat einen eigenen Herrscher, und das menschliche Bewusstsein ist dadurch 
in die Spannung einer Unzahl solcher Herrscher gesetzt, die an irgendeinem 
Punkte des menschlichen Bewusstseins sind. In einem fortschreitenden Prozess 
wechselt von Moment zu Moment die Bedeutung der in demselben enthaltenen 
Mächte und Potenzen. Darum kann eine Unzahl solcher Mächte auftreten, die an 
irgend einem Punkte des Bewusstseins sich geltend machen können. Christus hat 
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den Menschen davon frei gemacht, d.h. das Unüberwindliche ihrer Macht ihnen 
genommen, nicht ihr Dasein aufgehoben. (313)
This passage is significant because it indicates that the persona of the Christ, in its 
general Christological sense, stands for one of the three creative forces within the 
dynamic constellation of the Trinity.  At the same time, from the perspective of material 
semiotics and its concern with particular manifestations of religious meaning through 
group-specific symbol use, the “work” (Werk) of the Christ relates to the Christ-aspect, as 
it were, of any symbol that fuels and is fueled by religious discourse.  
As a corollary of critical Christology that is both non-dogmatic and universal, this 
implies that the symbolics of the persona of the Christ inform the open-ended production 
of religious meanings in any group, even if no reference to the historical Jesus or even the 
New Testament in general is made.  Christ is understood as a universal semiotic 
principle, whose historical tranformations and meaning-producing powers are not bound 
to the authority of a fixed, textual canon.39  Accordingly, there is no predetermined 
restriction on the kind of symbolic practices through which faith can effect social change 
and cultural transformation.  Bearing these characteristics of Christological semiotics in 
mind, we can now revisit Heidegger’s intellectual production around the year 1929, in 
order to undermine the neo-Kantian bypass, which is commonly followed in philosophy, 
at the expense of Schelling and Cassirer. 
Heidegger’s Kant Critique after Schelling: Zeugung and Einbildungskraft
As was shown by the preceding exposition of Schelling’s Christological 
methodology, in general, and his distinction between negative and positive philosophy, in 
particular, his project can be described as a “post-Kantian” approach to religious 
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discursivity underway to a materialist semiotics of culture, very comparable to Cassirer’s 
Philosophy of Symbolic Forms.  Schelling thus endorses Kant’s criticism of dogmatic 
metaphysics.  He thus credits Kant with paving the way for a new philosophical 
methodology but points out that his improvement has not been carried out to the fullest, 
insofar as the alternatives of negative and positive philosophy are merely juxtaposed, 
leaving us with two loose ends.40
In his 1929 book, Heidegger is of course more detailed than Schelling on this 
issue, regarding the target of his Kant critique – and, as I have argued, his Schelling-
appropriation.  Yet, when it comes to formulating his own alternative, he is much less 
precise than Schelling in the Philosophy of Revelation.  To bring out the parallels 
between Schelling and Heidegger, as well as Schelling’s greater theoretical acumen, my 
discussion will be limited to demonstrating the connection between Schelling’s 
Christological conception of Zeugung and its material-semiotic ramifications, on one 
hand, and Heidegger’s conception of the “self-affection” of “original time,” on the other 
hand.  At the same time, it should become clear that this theme complex lies at the heart 
of Heidegger’s “post-Kantian” project, which identifies him as a direct successor of the 
Schellingean tradition of German idealism, contrary to his own remarks, through which 
he repeatedly seeks to distance himself from “German idealism” in general.41
As is well known, in Kant and the Problem of Metaphyscis, Heidegger argues that 
the A-edition of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason provides more promising an approach to 
the problem of “pure synthesis” (reine Synthesis) than the modified B-edition.  Heidegger 
specifies this problem in § 13. Die Frage nach der Wesenheit der reinen Erkenntnis and 
in § 14. Die ontologische Synthesis, which conjointly form an early climax of the book, in 
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terms of the most central theoretical issues addressed by it.  Heidegger gives Kant credit 
for drawing attention to the activity of pure synthesis effected by the “transcendental 
imagination” (see esp. pp. 63 ff.; and p. 197) vis-à- vis the other two basic capacities of 
pure intuition (reine Anschauung) and pure thinking (reines Denken).  
However, having laid his finger on this mysterious synthetic “root” power, which 
“grounds” the two other “sources” of cognition (Erkenntnis), intellect and sensibility,42
Kant shies away from acknowledging the imagination’s independent status as a 
“structural center” (strukturale Mitte) (64) and eventually collapses it into the intellect.  
This tendency toward “reinterpreting” (Umdeutung) the power of pure imagination into a 
function of pure thinking is especially prominent in the second edition of Kant’s First 
Critique, which is why Heidegger finds the first edition fundamentally preferable.43
Against the backdrop of these considerations, Heidegger presents his account of 
“original time,” which, I argue, represents the most signficant import of Schelling’s later 
thought.  This import relates to the Christological-semiotic Denkfigur of Zeugung, 
familiar from the Philosophy of Revelation and its conception of divine personalities, 
which Heidegger clearly engages, while he immediately blurs the Trinitarian tension that 
Schelling went to great length to analyze in detail.  Heidegger’s coopting of materialist-
semiotic Christology in the tradition of Schelling becomes most tangible through the 
combined reading of §§ 22, 34, 35.44
In § 22. Der transzendentale Schematismus, which may well be seen as the 
theoretical hub of the entire book, Heidegger explicates the “full structure of ontological 
cognition” in terms of the relation between making-sensible (Versinnlichung) and 
transcendence (Transzendenz).  According to Kant, finite cognition (on the part of human 
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beings or other creatures of similar cognitive constitution) requires that the two sources 
of intellect and sensibility work together.  More specifically, the categories of the pure 
intellect (die reinen Verstandesbegriffe) have to be made-sensible (versinnlicht).  In 
Heidegger’s words: 
[Z]ur Transzendenz gehört notwendig Versinnlichung, und zwar reine. Behauptet 
wurde, diese Versinnlichung geschehe als ein Schematismus. […] Die Schema-
bildende Versinnlichung hat zur Absicht, dem Begriff ein Bild zu verschaffen.  
Das in ihm Gemeinte hat so einen geregelten Bezug zu einer Erblickbarkeit. […] 
Das Schema bringt sich, d.h., den Begriff, in ein Bild. (102)
With respect to the transcendental dimension of making-sensible, it all turns on the 
meaning of “picture” in this context.  Heidegger agrees with Kant that, regarding the 
schematization of the pure categories of the intellect, picture or picturing cannot be taken 
in the sense of empirical intuition or even mathematical construction.45  In continuation 
of Kant’s transcendental aesthetics, Heidegger asserts that the notion of picture implied 
by the present conception of transcendental schematism has to be understood as “pure 
picture” (reines Bild) which, in turn, is posited as time.46
However, Heidegger rejects Kant’s “terse” (lapidar) (105) way of accounting for 
the transcendental unity of the pure categories of the intellect in terms of a fixed table of 
judgement (Kant’s famous Urteilstafel, containing three categories under each of four 
rubrics).  Instead, Heidegger argues, the unity of transcendental schematization implies a 
conception of time as “pure self-affection” (reine Selbstaffektion), which Heidegger 
describes in quasi-theological diction (where “Offenbarmachen” sounds close to 
“Offenbarung”): 
Die ursprüngliche Zeit lässt die reine Bildung der Transzendenz geschehen. (197)
Aber nicht als dieses Gebilde [das reine Nacheinander der Jetztfolge] ist die Zeit 
ursprünglicher Grund der Transzendenz, sondern als reine Selbstaffektion. Als 
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solche ist sie auch die Bedingung der Möglichkeit des vorstellenden Bildens, d.h. 
Offenbarmachens, des reinen Raumes. (200) 
The crux in Kant’s tendency to collapse the power of the transcendental imagination 
(which Heidegger tends to identify with original time)47 lies in the fact that he conceives 
of the “pure picture” of the transcendental schematization as “pure succession of a now-
series.”  According to Heidegger’s objection, this fails to explain the production of pure 
space.  The latter notion, in my reading, refers to the very same conception of contrastive 
spatiality that we gleaned from Schelling’s account of how a relation of basic interiority 
and exeriority may emerge from the tranquil continuum of the unpreconceivable.  In fact, 
Heidegger’s prior characterization, in § 22, seems to suggest as much, when he elaborates 
on the effects of transcendental schematization as forming “that which stands against in 
the pure letting-stand-against”: 
Er [der transzendentale Schematismus] bildet das im reinen Gegenstehenlassen 
Gegenstehende dergestalt, dass sich das im reinen Denken Vorgestellte notwendig 
im reinen Bilde der Zeit anschaulich gibt. Die Zeit also ist es, die als a priori 
gebende von vornherein dem Horizont der Transzendenz den Charakter des 
vernehmbaren Angebotes verleiht. Aber nicht nur das. Als das einzige reine 
universale Bild gibt sie dem Horizont der Transzendenz eine vorgängige 
Umschlossenheit. Dieser eine und reine ontologische Horizont ist die Bedingung 
der Möglichkeit dafür, dass das innerhalb seiner gegebene Seiende je diesen oder 
jenen besonderen offenen, und zwar ontischen Horizont haben kann. Die Zeit gibt 
der Transzendenz aber nicht nur den vorgängig einigen Zusammenhalt, sondern 
als das rein sich Gebende schlechthin bietet sie überhaupt so etwas wie Einhalt. 
(108) [my emphases]
While one should be sparing with such pronouncements, I venture to say that this passage 
contains two of the single most important sentences in Heidegger’s opus (see italics).  
The second one, in particular, presents an ingeniously flawed claim, by introducing the 
pseudo-conception of “a single and pure ontological horizon.”  Upon scrutiny, this 
expression is completely vacuous, the mere adding of a terminological construction, 
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which does not serve any purpose in Heidegger’s present argument except to impose a 
condition of completeness about the one-to-one correlation of potential and revelation.  
Yet, this fantastic notion, this move towards a pure ontology rather than a more open 
phenomenology of revelation, will guide his logic throughout the rest of his career.  
Furthermore, this passage offers strong evidence for Heidegger’s cloaked incorporation 
of Schelling’s Christological thought because of his careful use of the terminological 
bundle and setting of the problem that Schelling already offered. 
In light of Schelling’s analysis of the metaphysical triplet of continuity-
contingency-graduality, in particular, three things become clear that I note here before I 
discuss each in more detail.  First, in the above passage, Heidegger assigns (and 
absolutizes) several powers to original time that Schelling’s analysis in the Philosophy of 
Revelation had specified more clearly as the correlative forces within the open-ended 
process of creation.  Second, the first italicized key sentence shows Heidegger to be 
vulnerable to the kind of dogmatic metaphysics that Schelling wanted to obviate by 
means of a new methodology under the title of positive philosophy.   Third, according to 
the second italicized key sentence, Heidegger assigns “one job too many” to original 
time. 
As for the first claim, we can ascertain the following correspondences between 
these two reactions to Kant.  In Heidegger’s above summary of the workings of original 
time, “the transcendent” (das Transzendente) plays a role very similar to Schelling’s 
tranquil continuum, as previously described – it is a staging of potential in itself, blind, 
not-yet-revealed but with the potential to be.  Next, Heidegger’s speaking of “the 
perceivable offer” (das vernehmbare Angebot) appears to be an exact replication of 
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Schelling’s characterization of “the idea of the Godhead” in terms of God’s “wisdom,” 
which was always with God but not created by Him.48  The notion of “circumclosure” 
(Umschlossenheit) is harder to place, but if interpreted as “enclosure” it would bear 
connotations of fundamental partitioning.  Thus understood, it would point to the effect 
of initial negation (or limitation), which Schelling attributes to the first potency (das dem 
Ursein entgegengesetzte andere Sein, B).49
Or, perhaps more likely, Heidegger might be using “circumclosure” and 
“cohesion” (Zusammenhalt) interchangeably to make the same point, in which case both 
expressions would seem to point to Schelling’s description of the continuum quality of 
the transcendent.  In that case, however, Umschlossenheit and Zusammenhalt are equally 
problematic, insofar as original time cannot plausibly be said to “give” continuity to the 
transcendent.  From Schelling’s perspective, such a gesture is gratuitous and thus 
meaningless, because the transcendent – by definition – is the ultimate continuum, 
namely, God in His mode of unpreconceivability, rather than something already 
constructed and hence already limited.  (This already points to my third claim, addressed 
in more detail below.  Heidegger introduces circumclosure and cohesion in the immediate 
context of “the single and pure ontological horizon.”  If, as I argue, the latter notion is 
vacuous, then any characterization of it in terms of its circumclosed or cohesive qualities 
would have to be vacuous, too.) 
The notion of “moderation” (Einhalt), finally, is reminiscent of Schelling’s 
rendering of the third potency as the scalar power, which mediates God’s will into a 
variegated, open-ended process of creation as opposed to being exacted negatively, as 
cataclysmic wrath.  
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As for my second claim, Heidegger’s account of original time as “a priori giving” 
(see first italicization above) appears to be in direct violation of Schelling’s embrace of 
positive philosophy and his insistence that the transcendent qua unpreconceivable can 
become comprehensible only a posteriori.  Hence, it is either misleading or false to speak 
of original time as “a priori giving,” for it is only after we perceive any beings (within 
our “particular, open, ontic horizon” to use Heidegger’s own phrase) that we must 
assume that such “giving” has taken place.  Admittedly, there is a lurking ambiguity here 
between the necessary a priori and the contingent a priori, which unfortunately cannot be 
fully disposed of in view of Heidegger’s diction.50
According to my third and most important claim, the second italicized sentence 
contains a faulty claim about the “single and pure ontological horizon” as the condition of 
the possibility for ontic horizons to form through specific patterns of structural 
organization, by dint of which meaningful items become identifiable within these 
horizons.  If we strip away the convoluted syntax, Heidegger’s claim amounts to a 
peculiar encapsulation of what Schelling had described as ontic horizons within a single
ontological horizon.  However, not only does the positing of such an overarching 
ontological horizon does not do any explanatory work as far as the successful activity of 
transcendental schematization is concerned.  It actually falsifies the workings of original 
time by assigning “one job too many” to it – by prescribing limits to potential (albeit 
totalizing ones).  
Relying on Schelling for clarification once more, we find that Heidegger’s 
speaking of the “horizon of transcendence” (Horizont der Transzendenz) in the preceding 
sentence is already a misnomer.  In the tranquil state of unbound homogeneity, the 
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transcendent has no horizonal qualities yet, since the notion of horizon presupposes some 
kind of contrast (contrastive spatiality) or limitation.  Yet, once any such limitation has 
occurred, what results is a multitude of open ontic horizons, which do not depend on a 
single and pure ontological horizon as their precondition.  
Put in Schelling’s idiom of creation, the creation of multiple (perhaps infinitely 
many) life-worlds as the potential revelations of the ontic does not presuppose the 
creation of worldhood as such.  Hypostatizing the latter notion into a necessary entity 
amounts precisely to the kind of dogmatic metaphysics that Schelling militated against.  
From a critical Christological point of view, the conditions of possibility for creating 
(life-) worlds can be explained without any spurious reference to the necessary existence 
of a single meta-world.  More precisely, the metaphysical triplet of continuity-
contingency-graduality effectively undercuts the suggestion of a single ontological 
horizon as the enabling condition for multifarious ontic horizons. 
Evading the First Detour: Some Conclusions
Taking stock of the above findings, Heidegger’s 1929 Kant critique provides 
substantial cues with respect to his indebtedness to a tradition of critical Christology, in 
general, and the later Schelling’s Philosophy of Revelation, in particular.  Written only 
two years after the publication of Being and Time, the Kant critique also casts a different 
light on his main work than is suggested by the neo-Kantian bypass in present-day 
Heidegger scholarship.  The Schelling connection reveals one of the active reactions to 
Kant’s work, an approach to ontology that circumvents too-simple dogmatism and offers 
the entrance into what might profitably be called a critical ontology project.  Heidegger’s 
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Kant critique sets out on a very parallel path, echoing even some of Schelling’s 
terminology, but then moves to foreclose the collapsing of immanent revelation and 
potential transcendence that is the strongest part of Schelling’s account.  
Specifically in the realm of the history of philosophy, this connection also probes 
Heidegger’s actual intellectual production during a time of purported crisis and 
reorientation, which gainsays his alleged distance from “German idealism.”  More 
critically for the further stages in my project, it anticipates what I believe is one of 
Heidegger’s more serious later moves in empistemology, his assumption of a falsely 
staged opposition to the most prominent interlocutor among his philosophical 
contemporaries, Ernst Cassirer, to whom I will turn in the next chapter. 
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und die hermeneutische Philosophie (Freiburg/München: Karl Alber, 1983).
Here, the author states on a similar note: “Das nächste grosse Werk, in dem Heidegger nach dem 
entscheidenden Umbruch in seinem Denken von 1929 seinen neuen Ansatz darzustellen suchte, waren die 
“Beiträge zur Philosophie” von 1936-1938” (14). Consider also the recent follow-up volume to Pöggeler’s 
first book on Heidegger’s path of thinking: Otto Pöggeler, The Paths of Heidegger’s Life and Thought
(Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities Press International, 1997 [orig. 1992]). Apparently more 
impressed by the fourth wave of the Nazism controversy than someone like Hugo Ott would expect in light 
of prior revelations, Pöggeler’s approach to Heidegger has gained a somewhat more critical edge, while his 
partisanship remains mostly intact. Apropos the relation between Being and Time and the Contributions, he 
writes: “The “aboriginality” of the question of being is at the same time the “downfall” of “rules,” so that 
no gradual “development” from Being and Time to the Contributions is possible” (22). “In Being and Time
it appears that at any moment the interweaving of the systematic construction and the historical 
deconstruction could unravel in Part Two. The Contributions, by contrast, are a unified thought process, in 
the course of whose six stages several distinctive paths are traced, all of which are united by the same 
theme – Ereignis” (23-24). As will become clear in the course of this study, my view differs from 
Pöggeler’s. His reading of the Contributions, I think, vastly overestimates the philosophical resources and 
novelty of a largely aphoristic text. In light of Heidegger’s own previous work and the philosophical 
discourses he (covertly) engages, Pöggeler (1983) strikes me as fundamentally mistaken, when he says: 
In jedem Fall wäre es ganz abwegig, Heidegger’s Denken zurückzuinterpretieren in die sog. 
metaphysische Tradition, sei das nun die Philosophie der Griechen, seien es die Scholastik und die 
Mystik des Mittelalters, sei es die neuzeitliche Philosophie einschliesslich der Positionen des 
späten Fichte und des späten Schelling. Heideggers “Beiträge zur Philosophie” bestimmen das 
Sein als Ereignis, nämlich das “Seyn” oder das Sein selbst, das Wesen des seins oder jene 
Wahrheit des Seins, innerhalb deren das sein als Offenheit des Seienden sich in unterschiedlichen 
Weisen zeigen kann. (55) 
Not only does this comment seem to contradict Pöggeler’s (1987) statement, quoted above, according to 
which the post-1929 Heidegger was led “back into the ground of metaphysics; […] above all from Plato 
and Nietzsche.” In glossing over the decisive difference between the later Fichte and the later Schelling, 
this pronouncement also remains oblivious to the underlying presence of the latter’s thought in Heidegger’s 
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work. Even Pöggeler (1983) himself seems to be uneasy about this glib dismissal of Schelling, when he 
asserts more cautiously: 
Der Schuldbegriff von “Sein und Zeit” akzentuiert also nicht eine Nachtansicht des Daseins; er 
gehört vielmehr in den Versuch einer letzten Begründung des Denkens, wie er in einer ähnlichen, 
jedoch spekulativ-metaphysischen Weise von Schelling unternommen wurde, der seit den 
“Untersuchungen über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit” Hegels Metaphysik durch eine tiefer 
ansetzende Begründung noch einmal zu überholen gedachte. Das Schuldigsein als Grundsein einer 
Nichtigkeit hat aber noch eine zweite Seite, und diese Seite rückt Heideggers Analyse auch aus 
dem Denken heraus, das der späte Schelling unter dem Namen einer positiven Philosophie 
versuchte. Das Dasein ist nicht nur überhaupt infolge seiner Geworfenheit nichtig, sondern auch 
nichtig in seinem konkreten Entwurf, insofern dieser eine bestimmte Wahl ist, die das eine wählen 
kann, das andere aber lassen muss. (104)
Considering Schelling’s work in the Philosophy of Revelation it is not at all clear that Heidegger can be 
claimed to advance beyond Schelling along the lines that Pöggeler hints at in this place. And even if he 
could, it might be all the worse for Heidegger, not Schelling, as someone like Tillich would insist. 
21
 Martin Heidegger, “Brief über den Humanismus,” Wegmarken (GA 9). The first note reads: “1. Auflage 
1949: Das hier Gesagte ist nicht erst zur Zeit der Niederschrift ausgedacht, sondern beruht auf dem Gang 
eines Weges, der 1936 begonnen wurde, im ‘Augenblick’ eines Versuches, die Wahrheit des Seins einfach 
zu sagen. – Der Brief spricht immer noch in der Sprache der Metaphysik, und zwar wissentlich. Die andere 
Sprache bleibt im Hintergrund” (313). 
22
 Kisiel (2002), esp. section: 12.4 Der Abbruch beginnt: Einleitung in die Philosophie (WS 1928/29), pp. 
267-276. 
23
 For these attributes, see: Paetzold (1995), pp. 101-102, 104. 
24
 GA 3: Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik (1929), 1991. See in particular: §§ 34-35. 
25
 Thomas Buchheim, Introduction (Einleitung) to: F.W.J. Schelling, Philosophische Untersuchungen über 
das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit und die damit zusammenhängenden Gegenstände (Hamburg: Felix 
Meiner, 1997), pp. IX-LV. See esp.: pp. XV-XVII.
26
 In the following, whenever I quote from the Paulus-Nachschrift of Schelling’s Philosophie der 
Offenbarung, the italics are always Schelling’s. Any time I add an emphasis of my own, it will be indicated 
through underlining. 
27
 “Wir sind nicht gleich beim persönlichen Gott; […]” (155). 
28
 I glean the notion of immanent withdrawal from the following passage, where Schelling criticizes Hegel 
as follows: “Wenn Hegel die Philosophie damit anfangen will, dass man sich ins reine Denken begibt, hat 
er das Wesen der rationalen Philosophie trefflich ausgedrückt. Dieses Sich-Zurückziehen ins reine Denken
ist aber bei Hegel nur mit Beziehung auf die Logik gemeint; es sind nicht die Sachen, wie sie a priori im 
Denken sind, sondern die Begriffe selbst als solche, als subjektive, gemeint. Aber mit blossen Begriffen ist 
kein wirkliches Denken” (129). 
29
 “Die Existenz Gottes lässt sich nicht erweisen, sondern nur die Gottheit des Existierenden, […], und 
auch diese nur a posteriori” (175). There is no fully satisfactory translation for Schelling’s use of 
“Gottheit” here, insofar as the present context invests it with three interlocked meanings: Godhead, 
Divinity, God-ness. I opt for the latter in this place, to retain the rhetorical force of Schelling’s inversion in 
this sentence. 
30
 “Der Begriff des Blindseienden löst sich von der Voraussetzung, die er in der negativen Philosophie hat, 
ab, und die positive, indem sie den Begriff fallen lässt, und bloss das Blindseiende behält, ist ganz 
selbständig, kann auch geradezu davon anfangen” (157). 
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31
 “[…], wie wenn durch einen zuvor ruhigen, dann in Entzündung geratenen Teil eines Körpers die über 
ihm liegenden Teile in die Höhe gehoben werden” (164). 
32
 “[Als erste Potenz d]ie veranlassende Ursache der ganzen Bewegung, das dem Ursein entgegengesetzte 
andere Sein, B, als dessen Energie wir einen zufälligen, aus den Schranken des blossen Könnens gesetzten, 
schrankenlosen, blinden, gesinnungslosen Willen gefunden haben. Dies Sein nun wirkt ausschliessend auf 
das Ursein, im Anfang völlig ausschliessend, so dass, was jetzt reiner Actus war, wir uns jetzt als rein 
aufgehoben denken müssen” (180).
33
 […] “Die zweite Potenz (A2) ist die ursprünglich negierte, […] die sich nur sofern verwirklicht, als sie 
die andere negiert. Als ursprünglich wirkliche konnte sie sich nicht verwirklichen; dies setzt Negation 
voraus. […] Es musste ihr die erste Möglichkeit (B) vorangehen. Nachdem B aufgehört hat, Potenz zu sein, 
ist es an dem actus purus, Seinkönnendes zu sein. […] Ist dies nun vollendet, hat A2 keinen Gegensatz 
mehr, so bliebe am Ende des Prozesses nichts eigentlich Wirkendes mehr” (181).
34
 This is a metaphysical distinction, and it does not make sense to ask how the latter would “look” any 
different from the former, since both exclude experiential distinction of any kind.  Within the context of 
Schelling’s inquiry into the principles of creation, they mark different stages in a hypothetical process.  In 
this sense, boundless tranquility comes before inner negation, whereas boundless willing would come after 
inner negation.  The fact that creation actually took (and is taking) place implies that God did not “over-
react.”  But then the question is how this should be understood in terms of the interplay of material ontic 
forces within the process of creation.
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 “Die dritte Potenz, A3 in die Wirklichkeit [sic!]. […] So weit A2 nun an B sein Werk vollzogen hat, so 
weit ist dem A3 Raum gegeben, wie denn schon A3 als das Ordnende, Stufenbestimmende, im Prozess 
waltete. Der Geist ist es, der Mass und Ziel setzt, und der siegreichen Potenz eine Grenze der Überwindung 
bestimmt” (182).
36
 To be clear, as far as Schelling’s numerical order is concerned, he does not present continuity as the first 
potency. Instead he puts forth B, which relates to contingency, namely the contingent occurrence of “inner 
negation.” Yet, as we saw in detail, such inner tension can factor only “within” a material continuum. The 
unpreconceivable as actus purus (A) referred to tranquil homogeneity. This is reflected in the alphabetical
rather than the numerical order and accounts for the befuddling way in which the two are mapped onto 
each other (with B as the first potency). Hence, in terms of intensity writ large (including tranquility), 
creation rests on the unpreconceivable A (actus purus) as its amorphous background or serene abyss.  At 
the same time, in terms of motion and intitial contrast, creation begins with the occurrence of B, as the 
acknowledged possibility of negation, which elevates A to a concrete possibility A2 (potentia actus purus). 
– This also explains why Schelling, rather awkwardly, speaks of the “two moments” (zwei Momente: […]) 
(181) after he spent so much time laying out the three potencies involved. It is with these qualifying 
remarks about Schelling’s numerical list and his alphabetical list in mind, then, that I speak of the 
continuous, the contingent, and the gradual as the three ontic forces involved in the process of creation. 
37
 Heidegger, “Brief über den Humanismus”: “Die Sprache ist das Haus des Seins” (language is the house 
of being) (313). 
38
 On a very similar note, Cassirer (1923) states in the first volume of his Philosophy of Symbolic Forms: 
“This transformation into form [Wandlung zur Gestalt] is accomplished in different ways and in 
accordance with different constructive principles [Bildungsprinzipien] in science and in language, in art and 
in myth; but they all agree in so far as that which finally appears before us as a product of their activity in 
no way resembles the mere material from which they originally proceeded. It is thus that spiritual 
consciousness in the fundamental function of sign-creation, in general and in its diverse directions, truly 
differs from sensory consciousness. It is here, in place of the passive givenness of some or another external 
existent, that an independent shaping given by us first arises, through which it then appears differently for 
us in different regions and forms of reality. Myth and art, language and science, are in this sense shapings 
toward being; they are not simple copies of an alreay present reality, but they rather present the great lines 
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of direction of spiritual development, of the ideal process, in which reality constitutes itself for us as one 
and many – as a manifold of forms [Gestaltungen], which are nonetheless finally held together by a unity 
of meaning” (I, 107). – Note that the page number refers to the standard translation by Ralph Manheim, but 
the actual translation is Michael Friedman’s, who quotes this central passage from Cassirer and provides 
his own rendering in English, which I find superior to Manheim’s. See: Friedman (2000), p. 102. 
39
 For Schelling’s commentary on the status of Christian “documents” (Urkunden), see: note 5, above. 
40
 “[…], und Kant setzte richtig: es sei unmöglich, zu einem Begriff unmittelbar die notwendige Existenz 
zu finden. Nur hätte Kant die Komplikation des Notwendigseienden und des Begriffs Gottes trennen und 
das notwendig Seiende ganz frei von allem Begriff setzen müssen. Dies Letzte lag ihm um so näher, da er 
das notwendig Existierende als Vernunftbegriff, der sogar die Vernunft überweltige, anerkannte. Mit Recht 
eifert er dagegen, dass man den Begriff nicht verderbe, indem man ihm den Begriff des höchsten Wesens 
unterlege. So hat aber Kant den höchst immanenten Begriff des höchsten Wesens und den absolut 
transzendenten des notwendig Seienden nebeneinander. Jener ist das Ende der negativen, dies der Anfang 
der positiven Philosophie. So grenzen sie aneinander. Kant setzte sie beide nebeneinander als notwendige 
Vernunftbegriffe” (159). 
41
 To give but one prime example from his Kant book (GA 3) under consideration: “Alle Umdeutungen der 
reinen Einbildungskraft in eine Funktion des reinen Denkens – eine Umdeutung die der “deutsche 
Idealismus” im Anschluss an die zweite Auflage der Kritik der reinen Vernunft noch übersteigerte –
verkennt ihr spezifisches Wesen” (197). 
42
 Ibid., § 6., pp. 36-37. 
43
 Ibid.: “Wird jedoch die transzendentale Einbildungskraft, wie das in der zweiten Auflage geschieht., als 
eigenes Grundvermögen gestrichen und ihre Funktion dem Verstand als der blossen Spontaneität 
übertragen, dann schwindet die Möglichkeit, reine Sinnlichkeit und reines Denken hinsichtlich ihrer Einheit 
in einer endlichen menschlichen Vernunft zu begreifen, ja auch nur zum Problem zu machen. Weil die 
transzendentale Einbildungskraft aber auf Grund ihrer unzerreissbaren ursprünglichen Struktur die 
Möglichkeit einer Grundlegung der ontologischen Erkenntnis und damit der Metaphysik eröffnet, deshalb 
bleibt die erste Auflage dem innersten Zuge der Problematik einer Grundlegung der Metaphysik näher” 
(197). 
44
 In fact, this juxtaposition is encouraged by Heidegger himself: cf. note 149, in § 22, which points ahead 
to §35. 
45
 Cf. pp. 102-103. 
46
 “Die Zeit ist als “reines Bild” das Schema-Bild und nicht etwa nur die den reinen Verstandesbegriffen 
gegenüberstehende Anschauungsform. […] Der Schematismus der reinen Verstandesbegriffe muss daher 
notwendig in die Zeit hineinregeln. Die Zeit aber ist, wie die transzendentale Ästhetik zeigte, die 
Vorstellung eines “einzigen Gegenstandes” [here Heidegger inserts: note 139: A 31 f., B 47]. […] Daher ist 
die Zeit nicht nur das notwendige reine Bild der Schemata der reinen Verstandesbegriffe, sondern auch ihre 
einzige reine Anblicksmöglichkeit. Diese einzige Anblicksmöglichkeit zeigt selbst in sich nichts anderes 
als immer nur Zeit und Zeithaftes” (104).   
47
 “Deshalb ist aber auch das ursprünglich Einigende, das scheinbar nur vermittelnde Zwischenvermögen 
der transzendentalen Einbildungskraft, nichts anderes als die ursprüngliche Zeit” (196).
48
 In the Philosophy of Revelation, Schelling elaborates: “Soll nun die Welt eine freie gesetzte Schöpfung 
des göttlichen Willens sein, so muss zwischen der Ewigkeit Gottes und der Welt etwas in der Mitte sein. 
Die Welt als eine mögliche musste in dem göttlichen Willen enthalten sein. Das Mittel, das nachfolgende 
Sein sich als möglich vorzustellen, hatte der Schöpfer an jener Urmöglichkeit, die er in sich hat, seit er ist. 
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Diese befreit ihn von seinem unvordenklichen Sein; sie gibt ihm die Möglichkeit, dies Sein als Mittel zur 
Überwindung des entgegengesetzten Seins zu verwenden, sich selbst als frei vom Sein, als reine Potenz, als 
Geist zu setzen” (184). “Alles was nun die [salomonischen] Sprichwörter von der Weisheit sagen, stimmt 
überein mit der von uns gegebenen Natur der Urpotenz, die dem Schöpfer erst die Schöpfung vermittelte. 
[…] Jene Urpotenz ist nicht eine Hervorbringung Gottes. Zwar ist sie auch nicht vor ihm als die Potenz 
seines Seins, aber so wie er ist, ist sie da, stellt sich ihm dar als etwas, das er wollen und nicht wollen kann. 
Obwohl nicht Gott, war sie doch nicht Geschöpf, und dadurch eben das Mittlere zwischen Gott und dem 
Geschöpf” (187). 
49
 Cf. note 32, above. 
50
 The use of “necessary” in the first sentence does not speak to the issue, because here necessity pertains 
merely to the character of the transcendental schematism, which by Kant’s and Heidegger’s defnition has to 
engage both pure thinking and pure sensibility. Even the phrase “in advance” in the very sentence under 
consideration does not provide a clear answer, since it could simply connote “prior to experience” as the 
general meaning of a prioricity, irrespective of further qualification in terms of necessary versus contingent, 
of which only the former (the necessary a priori) is rejected by positive philosophy.  
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Chapter Two 
Aberrations of “Radical” Phenomenology: 
Eliding Dilthey and Husserl
The second bypass which critics have used to occlude the epistemological and 
rhetorical thrusts of Heidegger’s work will be the focus of this chapter.  I identify this 
bypass as the Dilthey-bypass, Kisiel’s account of “The Dilthey Draft” of Being and Time
that falls in line with a long-standing tendency in Heidegger scholarship.  According to 
this “tradition,” Heidegger is commonly contextualized in terms of Dilthey’s position 
within the nineteenth-century Geisteswissenschaften debate, without contextualizing 
Dilthey himself in terms of the other factions or interlocutors within that discursive 
constellation.  This pertains especially to the “enunciations” (to borrow Julia Kristeva’s 
term) by the physician Hermann Helmholtz since the 1840s, which set the tone for the 
debate over the status of science for the second half of that century and beyond.1
To resists the discursive narrowing of the Geisteswissenschaften controversy, as 
implied by this kind of Dilthey shortcut, I set out to reterritorialize what I take to be one 
of the most crucial, but also most neglected sources of Heidegger’s methodology in Being 
and Time, namely the “Neogrammarian Revolution” in the science of language 
(Sprachwissenschaft) or linguistics writ large.2
To make this case, I want to scrutinize and critique the Dilthey-bypass in such a 
way as to bring out a crucial line of influence, which relates Heidegger’s quest for a new 
philosophical method back to a specific nineteenth-century controversy over historical 
psychology and philology.  Prior to any attempt at detecting the repercussions of this 
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controversy in Heidegger’s text, however, it is useful to begin by establishing a general 
methodological link that connects Heidegger’s project to this particular psychological 
discourse.  This link, I argue, consists in a specific strand of material semiotics within 
Edmund Husserl’s (1859-1938) pioneering program of phenomenology, which remains 
vital for an account of both the genesis and the internal workings of Heidegger’s Being 
and Time.  
To probe this discursive interface, I will carry out a two-step analysis, jointly in 
this chapter and the next section (chapters three and four).  In this chapter, then, I set out 
to show how an integral part of Husserl’s thought gets effectively distorted and 
eventually silenced in the course of contextualizing Heidegger with reference to Dilthey’s 
work in the area of historical science.  In particular, I will show how the promotion of a 
false notion of “radical” phenomenology, associated with an equally misleading story 
about Heidegger’s “radical” departure from the theoretical stance of his mentor, has 
helped eclipse one of Husserl’s most important contributions in the context of Dilthey’s 
critique of historical reason.  (The psychological-philological analysis will be reserved 
for the next section of this project.)
This contribution of phenomenology to Heidegger’s project consists in a specific 
conception of “[h]istory [as] an all-inclusive personal science, a science of the personal 
and of its facticity taken all-inclusively” (PhP, 176).3  As we shall see, this programmatic 
for reconceiving historical science and research practices lends itself to being extended 
into a comprehensive theory of different domains of cultural meaning formation – a 
regional ontology for cultural studies within a material semiotic framework, centered 
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around the notion of “categorial form” which Heidegger inherits in no small part from the 
second volume of Husserl’s Logical Investigations (1900-01).4
In terms of philosophical method, this blueprint for a semiotics of culture speaks 
to the proximity of Husserl and Cassirer, commonly neglected in recent Heidegger 
scholarship.  At the same time, this affiliation between phenomenology and semiotics 
points in another way to yet another discursive ramification occluded by the Dilthey-
bypass already discussed, namely some striking parallels between Husserl’s approach to 
history and Schelling’s critical Christology.  In keeping with my exposition of the latter 
in the first chapter of this study, we will see how Husserl’s case for regional ontology is 
quite congenial with Schelling’s case for positive philosophy over against dogmatic 
metaphysics.  
Although it will become clear that Husserl’s position retains some restrictions on 
regional meaning production, which both Schelling and Cassirer would want to remove, 
all three authors will emerge as working along the same discursive trajectory of historical 
semiotics and regional ontology – a historical semontology, if you will, almost post-
structuralist in spirit.  The continued relevance of this project is evidenced by the 
contemporary work of authors like Kristeva and Deleuze and Guattari,5 just as it is 
strategically occluded by Heidegger, as he ostensibly severs all ties to “German 
idealism.”
After thus explicating the stakes of philosophical method within this discursive 
constellation, and after showing how Husserl’s thought is intimately related to that of 
Cassirer and Schelling within this constellation, we can then proceed to a second phase of 
critiquing the Dilthey-bypass.  To this end, the results of this chapter, regarding the 
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phenomenological foundation for a historical semiotics, will be brought to bear on 
Heidegger’s (hidden) references, in the next section, where Heidegger’s buried 
nineteenth-century interlocutors will have their say.  
Red Herrings Surrounding the “Dilthey Year” (1924)    
In The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time, Kisiel distinguishes three drafts 
that precede the publication of the final, yet fragmented, version of the book that finally 
made it into the 1927 issue of Husserl’s Jahrbuch.  Covering the last three years prior to 
Heidegger’s landmark publication, he assigns a different thematic as well as author-
oriented focus to each draft.  Yet these differences should not be overstated, he holds, 
because of an underlying continuity of Heidegger’s course of philosophical questioning:  
As we progress from one draft to another, as we move from 1924 to 1925 to 1926, 
the dominant question becomes in turn “What is history?,” “What is being?,” 
“What is time?,” with the other two however always lurking in the background. 
We might therefore speak of a hermeneutic draft, an ontoeroteric draft (focused 
on the question of being as such), and a kairological draft. Each has its dominant 
figure who became its focus of deconstruction: whence the Dilthey draft, the 
Husserl draft, and the Kantian draft. Behind both Husserl and Dilthey is the 
deconstruction of Descartes […]. (313) 
In Kisiel’s rendering, I argue, this division is very misleading, and with respect to his 
characterization of the idiosyncratically coined “ontoeroteric” draft, downright false, in 
light of Heidegger’s own statements in the 1925 text under consideration.  Kisiel’s way 
of chronologically relating these drafts is in need of revision because, upon scrutiny, the 
“Dilthey draft” of 1924 turns out to be a red herring.  As will be shown, Heidegger’s 
1925 text, based on the lecture course series “History of the Concept of Time” 
(Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs, GA 20) can be called a “Dilthey draft”
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with much greater justification, which is obscured by Kisiel’s willful distortion of it as 
“ontoeroteric.”
Before going into any specifics, it is to be noted that Kisiel’s designation of 
“drafts” does not refer to single texts respectively.  Accordingly, he groups two 1924 
versions of “The Concept of Time” (namely the “oral publication,” that is, the public 
address presented to the Marburg Theologians’ Society on July 25 [315]6; and the 
modified, actual follow-up to a “would-be journal article” [321] brought to completion in 
November) together with the so- called “Kassel Lectures” of 1925 under the joint rubric 
of the “Dilthey draft.”  Similarly, for him, the “ontoeroteric draft” comprises the 1925 
lecture course “History of the Concept of Time” along with WS 1925/26 lecture course 
“Logic (Aristotle) [The Question of Truth].”7
Considering the public address at Marburg during the summer of that “Dilthey 
year” (357), Kisiel determines the “recurring leitmotif of the lecture” (317) in terms of 
“the immediacy of human experience” (316), a “still quite nascent phase in the discussion 
of In-Sein, the equiprimordial constellation of involvement with the world and self 
through affective disposition, understanding, and discourse” (317) – culminating in the 
“fulcrum statement “Time is the how” (BZ 27)” (ibid.).8  Assessing the philosophical 
weight of Heidegger’s presentation, Kisiel remark critically: 
What is waiting in the wings, beyond the concept of time which is the one topic of 
the lecture, is precisely the concept of being itself, and therefrom a more radical 
sense of time “itself.” (317) 
Thus, the public lecture of 1924 only intimates the turn from Dasein to 
being, to the “being of [T]emporality” (BZ, 26) of the famous Third Division of 
BT. Muted and thoroughly undeveloped as it is, such intimations feed Gadamer’s 
declaration that this deceptively simple lecture, teeming with “ordinary language” 
statements more than the formal language of ontology, is the “Urform” of BT, if 
we understand this in the sense of a nascent and incipient “primitive form.” (319)
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In continuation of the last remark, Kisiel goes even further and declares that, in light of 
its conceptual crudity, “[t]he lecture is therefore not really a draft of BT.” 9  This 
dismissal is hardly balanced by Kisiel’s concluding celebration of the lecture’s rhetorical 
brilliance.10  This overall judgment concerning the lack of philosophical precision or 
“radicality,” is prone to eclipse the methodological import of this lecture with respect to 
Heidegger’s working conception of Vorwissenschaft (BZ 6), which Kisiel explicitly links 
to Heidegger’s notion of “productive logic,” delivered “more creatively” (320) a year 
later.  
In other words, at the very point where the Dilthey connection could be spelled 
out most forcefully with regard to scientific method, Kisiel defers the issues that are 
deemed significant interventions to the 1925 draft which, however, has already been 
claimed by his “ontoeroteric” label.  Under this label, these interventions are stylized into 
quite different projects.  
The situation is aggravated by Kisiel’s elaboration on the leitmotif of the 
“individuating encounter with death,” already operative in the 1924 public address, and 
how he uses it to establish a methodological link between Heidegger’s crude “oral 
publication” and his later, more creative methodological statements.  Expounding on 
Heidegger’s 1925 notion of “productive logic,” Kisiel writes: 
[…] a “productive logic” (GA 20: 3; also SZ 10), which leaps over the sciences 
into the domains of reality they investigate, sometimes exposing dimensions of 
their being which articulate new directions of research, if not new sciences.  Such 
is the case in this lecture, which “breaks” through the traditional conception of 
time in order to “enter” a new domain of possibility. The method of “destruction” 
is the radical formality of the formal indication: dissolution of the structured what
into the unstructured how of the indeterminate extreme of my certain goneness, 
which is to be kept free of all what, when, how long, and how much” (320-21). 
[emphases added]  
78
This account of the methodological implications of Heidegger’s death motif in the 
context of scientific research is plainly false.  As will become clear through the 
examination of the 1925 text of the Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs, the 
“how” is not unstructured.  Instead, it is to be construed in terms of open structures or, 
more precisely, opens systems of meaning formation, which Heidegger discusses in terms 
of Seinssinn (sense of being).11
By Kisiel’s own account, the summer of Heidegger’s purported “Dilthey year” 
(1924) has been rhetorically stimulating but philosophically toothless thus far.  Moreover, 
in his thematic synopsis of Heidegger’s public address, Kisiel has effectively neutralized
the most important interface between Heidegger’s and Dilthey’s respective project.  The 
question over scientific methodology and the semiotic dimension of In -Sein or being-in-
the-world is deferred to the second draft, where it will not be recaptured in its original 
context.  In particular, this deferral is affected by a faulty engagement of Heidegger’s 
conception of death as an “indeterminate extreme,” which blurs its implications for a 
debate over new standards of research and scientificity – a misconstrual of limit situation
that will keep haunting the interpretation of Heidegger’s conception of death in its 
restated version in Being and Time and beyond. 
Moving on to the next “item,” or couple of items, within the Dilthey draft as 
Kisiel reads it, we find that the article version of “The Concept of Time” later that year is 
construed as yet another red herring, which does not help to elucidate the methodological 
import of Dilthey’s work into the genesis of Being and Time.  As for the “would-be 
journal article,” Kisiel reports that “Erich Rothacker, a follower of Dilthey and coeditor 
of the newly founded Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und 
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Geistesgeschichte and, as philosopher, in charge especially of the latter domain of 
‘intellectual history’” (321), had approached Heidegger in 1922 to submit an article to the 
journal.  Judging by a reassuring statement on Heidegger’s part regarding his intention of 
submission, this “remains a viable publication project into late 1924. […] But it is never 
written, in part because Heidegger’s project of historical destruction assumes a less 
religious orientation by 1925” (322). 
After aborting this item, however, Heidegger proposes a second article to 
Rothacker, intended to comprise a review of the Dilthey-Yorck correspondence, which 
Heidegger plans to supplement with a “fundamental statement about Dilthey’s work in 
general. In the ensuing months, this “review” article grows to more than double its 
originally estimated length and becomes instead a seventy-five-page fundamental 
statement about Heidegger’s own work. […] As a result, it was transferred to Husserl’s 
Jahrbuch, where it appeared well over two years later, after growing into the full-length 
book that we know as Being and Time” (ibid.). 
Several things are to be noted about Kisiel’s staging of this second item within the 
bundle constituting the Dilthey draft.  To begin with, his recurrent remarks about 
Heidegger’s “less religious orientation by 1925” are misleading, unless we reduce the 
meaning of such orientation on Heidegger’s part to overt references to the “theology of 
the Young Luther” or other religious representatives of similarly public stature.12
However, in light of my findings about the pervasive and persisting influence of 
Schelling’s critical Christology, in chapter one, we must reject Kisiel’s repeated claim 
about Heidegger’s advance past theology.  
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In commenting on the 1924 public address at Marburg, discussed above, Kisiel  
states: “But the unspoken possibility of this question [of being as such] was already 
present from the beginning in the phenomenological goal “to understand time out of 
time” (BZ 6) itself and not from the theological starting point of eternity” (318).  As a 
general trait of his Genesis story, Kisiel fully embraces Heidegger’s self-staged return to 
Ancient Greek philosophy, primarily featuring Plato and Aristotle.  In the present context 
of Heidegger’s alleged turn away from theological thought, the claim of the preceding
quotation is thus reinforced two pages further down: 
Heidegger puts this temporal clue toward historical destruction to work for the 
very first time in the lecture through the references to Aristotle’s Physics (BZ 7f.) 
which raise the issue of the paradigm of “in time” operative in the time of 
everydayness and science. It is also at work in the bracketing of the theological 
approach to time through eternity, “the empty being-forever of ” (BZ 5), 
which “turns out to be a mere derivative of being-temporal” (BZ 6). But these are 
only the halting beginnings of a historical destruction of ontology by way of 
fundamental insights into time. At this seminal phase there is hardly a full-fledged 
program in place for destroying the history of ontology along these newfound 
lines, aside from the ongoing confrontation of the towering figure of Aristotle. 
(320) 
The main problem with this characterization is that it perpetuates the myth of Heidegger 
as the thinker who single-handedly took on Ancient Greek thought as the almost single 
and actual challenge to be met in the endeavor of a destruction of historical ontology.  
Heidegger is placed in a philosophical vacuum, presented as a solipsistic genius who 
directs his “radical” gaze to the ancient roots of philosophical questioning.  Not only does 
this characterization of (one of the components of) the so-called Dilthey draft, as Kisiel 
identifies it, fail to illuminate anything about Heidegger’s relation to Dilthey’s critique of 
historical reason, it actively precludes the assessment of such crucial influences on the 
genesis of Being and Time.  
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Kisiel accesses Heidegger’s thought primarily in terms of Heidegger’s chosen, if 
often revered, targets, without asking from where Heidegger got his constructive
impulses.  In the present case, concerning the “paradigm of ‘in time,’” such  
methodological solipsism comes at the cost of eliding the actual pioneer of reconceiving 
the nature and relation of infinite time vis-à-vis finite time, Schelling.  By contrast, one 
ought to insist that the theological discussion of eternity is anything but passé for the 
early Heidegger.  In ostensibly distancing himself from any “empty being-forever,” 
Heidegger will draw from an alternative notion of eternity very much like Schelling’s 
tranquil continuum.  
Importantly, in the present context of the Dilthey draft, this continuing debt to 
German Idealism, which Heidegger is always eager to denounce, can be shown not only 
with respect to Heidegger’s later Kant critique of 1929, as demonstrated in chapter one.  
It is also already detectable, in a somewhat different philosophical language, in the 1925 
lecture course, which does not fit Kisiel’s “ontoeroteric” bill, as the latter will prove to 
promote even more forcefully the solipsistic return to philosophical antiquity just 
criticized. 
Staying for the moment with Kisiel’s present account of the 1924 “would-be 
journal article,” that is, the second article project that did not see publication in 
Rothacker’s journal but was converted directly into the text of Being and Time, we can 
observe how such work-internal solipsism receives yet another spin.  If the unpublished 
piece turned more or less directly into the text of Heidegger’s magnum opus, there is no 
longer any real difference between “draft” and final version.  Of course, it is not Kisiel’s 
fault if things worked out that way.  Nor do we have to assume any artificial or rigid 
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boundaries between drafts and final copies, in speaking of any “real difference,” which 
would seem to undercut the very notion of a draft.  Granting these points, however, still 
leaves the question intact whether the inclusion of the text in question among the 
different items subsumed under the title of the “Dilthey draft” has any explanatory value
at all.  
Pointing to the mere fact that, after all, Heidegger was going to review the 
Dilthey-Yorck correspondence and then add a “fundamental statement about Dilthey’s 
work in general” (322) will not do.  The more intimately the 1924 project is locked into 
the final 1927 text of Being and Time, the less likely it is to shed light on the 
developmental stages and routes of influence affecting Heidgger’s work underway to his 
master piece.  This worry is confirmed by Kisiel’s way of relating the two texts.  In fact, 
one of the most baffling traits of his exposition is that the genesis of Being and Time is 
here not so much explained in terms of the would-be article of 1924.  Instead, since the 
two documents are not really distinguishable in the end anyway, the reference to 
Heidegger’s second almost-submission to Rothacker serves merely as a cue that allows 
Kisiel to interpret (the genesis of) Being and Time in terms of Being and Time – a real 
instance of a hermeneutic circle in practice (not to be mistaken for the famous 
methodological hermeneutic circle, which Heidegger did not deem necessarily vicious). 
To be clear, this criticism does not preclude the general possibility of interpreting 
certain texts on their own terms.  With regard to their internal structure and organization, 
for instance, one may well gain valuable insights from ascertaining “what goes with 
what” (to borrow a phrase from Kenneth Burke’s Philosophy of Literary Form).  
However, by itself any such interpretative approach does not live up to the professed task 
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of Kisiel’s genesis project.  Remember how he introduces his division and designation of 
the different drafts.  In specifying the “identity criteria” for each draft, he states: “We 
might therefore speak of a hermeneutic draft, an ontoeroteric draft […], and a 
kairological draft. Each has its dominant figure who becomes its focus of deconstruction: 
whence the Dilthey draft, the Husserl draft, and the Kantian draft” (313).13  The effects of 
the asserted hermeneutic circle in his account are thus evidenced by the fact that the core 
sections of Kisiel’s presentation of the Dilthey draft do hardly treat of Dilthey’s project at 
all. 
In section I “Dilthey’s Line of Questioning and Yorck’s Basic Intention,” Kisiel 
provides a solid three-page summary of Dilthey’s project (cf. 323-325).  However, the 
bulk of the following discussion (pp. 326-357) consists, for the most part, of work-
internal conceptual genealogies in Heidegger’s growing body of thought, all the way up 
to the treatment of the third and last item in the Dilthey draft bundle, the so-called Kassel 
Lectures (1925).  I say “for the most part,” because there is one significant passage where 
Kisiel shows himself well aware of the methodological stakes of the 
Geisteswissenschaften controversy, in relation to Dilthey’s theoretical contributions.  Yet 
eventually he gives in to the reductivist tendencies that have already been identified, 
especially with regard to his one-sided emphasis on the “towering figure” of Aristotle. 
To be more specific, on pp. 337-338, Kisiel returns to the loose end of 
“intellectual history” that was posited by his prior philosophical profiling of Erich 
Rothacker (cf. 321).  Now he comments in more general terms: 
[P]ublic interpretedness and its curiosity also tyrannize the history of the sciences. 
Confidence in the possession of universally valid sentences replaces the repeated 
questioning back to the original ground-giving contexts of being which constitute 
the respective subject matters of the sciences. This applies especially to the 
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research whose task it is to interpretatively expose the self-referential dimension 
of Dasein itself, in particular “intellectual history” (Geistesgeschichte = history of 
the mind or spirit) and philosophy (337) [emphases added]
The problem at hand is the notion of “historical consciousness” (ibid.) and the question 
whether this notion holds any methodological resources for the historical sciences, as 
they set out to redefine their standards for scientific validity and intellectually responsible 
research.  More specifically, what kind of “universally valid sentences” or judgments can 
be derived for a method relying on the notion of historical consciousness applied to 
specific cultural eras, epochs, or life-worlds.  
In this regard, the “self-referential dimension of Dasein itself” refers to the 
potential problem that the agents of historical research are always interwoven with the 
very material they set out to register and organize meaningfully.  There is no neutral 
standpoint outside the sea of historical happenings, “we” are always already immersed in 
it, which seems to undermine any claims toward scientific objectivity.  Yet, as Heidegger 
will point out, this inevitable degree of participation in history is not necessarily a 
drawback, for it could be considered not only in terms of subjective distortion (of 
scientific data) but, on the contrary, in terms of immediate access.  
In this account, the historical scientist’s unavoidable mode of participation in her 
own dynamic data collection could then result either in deficient modes of appropriating 
history in overly personal or overly standardized ways, i.e., “inauthentically.” Or, such 
ineluctable participation could actually open up space for an original or “authentic” 
encounter with, or experience of, the historical period under consideration.  In the latter 
case, the scientist would not so much seek to conceptually dissect and record the 
“historical consciousness” of a cultural era, according to standards of accurate 
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replication.  Instead, authentic repetition would have to be understood as Wiederholung.14
At least, for Heidegger the seeming tension between inescapable self-referentiality and 
scientific validity in historical research has become an open question again.
Clearly, this question is not new with Heidegger but has previously been dealt 
with in great detail, for example, by the classicist and historian Johann Gustav Droysen 
(1808-1884).  In his exposition of historical method, Droysen thus characterizes the 
“possibility of […] understanding” as follows: 
The method of historical investigation is determined by the morphological 
character of its material. The essence of historical method is understanding by 
means of investigation. […] 
The possibility of this understanding arises from the kinship of our nature 
with that of the utterances lying before us as historical material. A further 
condition of this possibility is the fact that man’s nature, at once sensuous and 
spiritual, speaks forth every one of its inner processes in some form apprehensible 
by the senses, mirrors these inner processes, indeed, in every utterance. On being 
perceived, the utterance, by projecting himself into the inner experience of the 
percipient, calls forth the same inner process. [here, the editor inserts: note 3] 
(121)15
The same discourse on historical method and the enabling conditions as well as limits of 
understanding is continued in Dilthey’s exposition of “objective mind” (objektiver Geist), 
proffered in his account of “The Construction of the Historical World in the Human 
Sciences” (1910).16
By omitting the central role of these predecessors, the dimension that is missing 
from Kisiel’s account of the reshuffled stakes of “intellectual history,” is the positivist-
versus-idealist constellation that was decisive for Heidegger or anyone else who joined 
Dilthey in these debates.  Moreover, the way in which the different factions in this 
controversy tried to stake out their respective positions cut across traditional disciplinary 
boundaries as they were evolving in the era, a fact which Kisiel underplays if not entirely 
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ignores.  In this manner the debate was not confined to the quarters of historiography 
proper but received some of its most decisive impulses from the fields of historical 
philology and comparative linguistics.  
In the area of cultural historiography, it was especially the rival projects of 
Nietzsche’s mentor Jakob Burckhardt (1818-1897), Hippolyte Taine (1828-1893), and 
Droysen that set the tone for subsequent attempts at reconceiving “intelllectual history” 
and reterritorializing historical method, which Heidegger would have been aware of 
through his reception of Dilthey.17  While the Nietzsche of The Birth of Tragedy showed 
clear signs of Burckhardt’s influence, his successor in Basel, the renowned linguist Jacob 
Wackernagel (whom Heidegger references in an important footnote toward the end of 
Being and Time!)18 displayed strong sympathy for the advances in comparative method 
that were promulgated by the Neogrammarians (Junggrammatiker) at the time, pointing 
to the work of Berthold Delbrück in particular.19
Although they never formed a fully homogenous front as a group, the 
Neogrammarians came under increasing attack by the neo-Idealists, who charged them
with “metaphysical positivism.”  As one of the main spokesmen of this idealist reaction, 
Karl Vossler entered into a vivid love-hatred relationship with Hermann Osthoff and 
Hermann Paul.  (The actual dynamics of the Paul-Vossler controversy and their vital 
bearing on Heidegger’s thought form the subject of the next chapter, where I will 
demonstrate Heidegger’s strategic omission of Paul, which is particularly glaring in his 
1925 lecture course, Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs [GA 20].) 
In the context of Heidegger’s Dilthey draft, this multifarious constellation cannot 
be ignored without distorting the actual background of Heidegger’s nascent discussion of 
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the self-referential character of Dasein on the way to its Being and Time rendition.  
Especially the indicated trajectories of cultural historiography (Burckhardt), neo-Idealist 
linguistics (Vossler), and Neogrammarian philology (Paul) need to be taken into account 
in order to unearth Heidegger’s unacknowledged sources and interlocutors with respect to 
the transforming landscape of “intellectual history,” in general, and the various criticisms 
about scientifically flawed notions of “historical consciousness,” in particular. 
Kisiel’s commentary does not sufficiently engage this constellation.  Instead, in 
remarking on certain “ordering schemes” or “comparative typologies,” which Heidegger 
left behind, he invokes the standard reference to Oswald Spengler’s “physiognomic 
morphology” (337).  Spengler’s approach functions as a straw man decoying the reader 
from the real historicism debates of the time, because the modern reader is inclined to 
take sides with Heidegger and dismiss the Spenglerian standard of typified knowledge as 
a scientifistic, rather than scientific, form of “concealed curiosity” (ibid.).  Despite the 
immense popularity of his book, The Decline of the West (volume one, 1918; volume 
two, 1922), however, Spengler had too little theoretical clout to be considered a primary 
reference point for the young Heidegger, as far as the quest for a new philosophical 
method is concerned.20  As Pierre Bourdieu (1991) poignantly puts it: 
It is just as wrong to situate Heidegger in the purely political arena, relying on the 
affinity of his thought to that of essayists like Spengler or Jünger, as it is to 
localize him in the “philosophical” arena “properly speaking,” that is in the 
relatively autonomous history of philosophy, for instance in the name of his 
opposition to the neo-Kantians. The most specific characteristics and effects of his 
thought are rooted in this dual reference, and in order to understand it adequately, 
we must ourselves regenerate, consciously and methodically, the reciprocal 
connections that Heidegger’s political ontology sets up in practice, as it creates a 
political stance but gives it a purely philosophical expression. (5-6)
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Clearly, Kisiel does not propose any straightforward association of Heidegger’s 
philosophical proposals for reconceiving historical science with Spengler’s conservative-
revolutionary rhetoric.  On the contrary, he clearly distances Heidegger’s project from the 
theoretically deficient model of typological classification provided by Spengler.  In this 
regard, Kisiel is not directly subject to Bourdieu’s criticism of politico-philosophical 
conflation.  However, as Spengler is featured as the primary, but all-too-easy target for 
Heideggerian critique, the latter is once again isolated from the most vital influences it 
received in the intellectual-historical constellation, which Heidegger entered in his 
response to Dilthey’s critique of historical reason.21
Again, then, Heidegger’s Dilthey draft becomes in this account misleadingly one-
dimensional, because it insulates Heidegger’s philosophical intervention from its most 
resourceful contemporary alternatives.  With this selective orientation, it favors a 
reductivist lineage, laid out by the author of Being and Time himself, which skips over 
the second half of the nineteenth century and seeks to link Heidegger directly to the 
Ancient-Greek beginnings of a tradition that is supposedly no longer able to tackle the 
conundrum of Dasein’s self-referentiality forcefully enough.  
In consequence, Kisiel’s characterization of the Dilthey draft enacts, as he did 
with the Schelling bypass, exactly a parallel Dilthey-bypass which celebrates the radical 
nature of Heidegger’s approach, at the expense of various pioneers in historical-
philosophical method such as Karl Vossler, Hermann Paul, and – closest to Heidegger –
Ernst Cassirer.  To be sure, the respective contributions of these thinkers are not always 
compatible.  At the same time, we have to pay heed to the fact that, on occasion, these 
theoreticians themselves tend to overstate the actual differences among them, most 
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notably Karl Vossler in his (over)reaction to Paul.  As we shall see, Heidegger proves to 
be aware of these tensions and he will strategically pit them against one another, in an 
effort to set his own Dasein analysis apart from the rest of the field.  
In the context of intellectual history and historical consciousness, the present 
effects of Kisiel’s Dilthey-bypass become most tangible in his commentary on “the 
manifold forms of cultural expression” (338).  As he keeps giving in to Heidegger’s 
strategy of positioning himself over against an emaciated philosophical tradition, from 
which German Idealism and nineteenth-century Sprachwissenschaft have been 
conveniently eliminated, Kisiel’s persistent neglect of the work of Heidegger’s 
contemporary, Ernst Cassirer, comes full circle in the immediate continuation of his 
remarks about Oswald Spengler: 
And although these research endeavors [by systematic and dialectical philosophy] 
seek ultimately to interpret “humanity,” the question of Dasein in its being is 
seldom raised, or it is explored in terms of an already-finished system or an 
unquestioned definition of man as a “rational animal.” Even a “philosophy of 
life” by and large strays into the study of the manifold forms of cultural 
expressions of life or its worldviews. To the degree that life itself in its being and 
as “being” is thematized, it is interpreted in terms of the being of the world or of 
nature. But the sense of being thereby remains in the indifference of a self-evident 
and unquestioned verbal concept. (337-338) [emphases added]
This criticism of inauthenticity in historical science proffers an awkward amalgamation 
of different views, alluding to but not clearly identifying familiar contemporaneous 
projects of Lebensphilosophie (Bergson and/or Ditlthey?), worldview philosophy 
(Jaspers?), and a philosophy grounded in forms of cultural expression (Burckhardt or 
Cassirer?).  All of these strangely intermixed views are here associated with the kind of 
deficient typology (“already-finished system,” “self-evident and unquestioned verbal 
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concept”) that was just introduced under the “popular” name of Oswald Spengler, as if 
none of them had passed beyond the latter’s level of cultural analysis. 
In fact, Kisiel refers to Jaspers’s Psychology of Worldviews on the next page 
where he hints at Heidegger’s sympathetic attitude toward Jaspers’s “basic philosophical 
attitude”: 
In this context [of Dasein’s in its temporal particularity], Heidegger acknowledges 
the importance of Jaspers’s “limit situation” for an ontology of Dasein, and 
expresses solidarity with the basic philosophical attitude expressed in the 
Foreword of Jaspers’s Psychology of Worldviews, with its “center of gravity” in 
this “category” of limit situation. (339) (cf. chap. 3 above)
This approximation of Heidegger and Jaspers, centered around the phenomenological 
motif of death, is rather deceptive.  If we follow Kisiel back to his preceding exposition 
in chapter three and also inspect the actual text of Heidegger’s Anmerkungen zu Karl 
Jaspers “Psychologie der Weltanschauungen” (1919/21), we find that Heidegger’s 
solidarity is skin deep, as far as philosophical method is concerned.  Even if he found 
Jaspers’s notion of the “limit situation” useful as a rudimentary starting point for working 
out his own conception of death in the context of Seinssinn,22 he glibly dismisses 
Jaspers’s approach of blosse Betrachtung (mere inspection) because of its wrong pretense 
of non-interference and neutrality. 
In doing so, Heidegger’s general charge against Jaspers is that he remains 
insensitive to the dynamics of Vorgriff (pre-prehension or anticipatory grasp; literally 
pre-grip), which precludes him from acknowledging the preconceptions, if not prejudices, 
implicit in his own approach.  In his review of Jaspers’s book, Heidegger delivers his 
judgement in stark terms, notwithstanding the conciliatory remarks at the beginning and 
at the very end of the essay.  After indicating Max Weber and Sören Kierkegaard as two 
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of Jaspers’s most important influences, both of whose “actual intentions” Jaspers 
“fundamentally misunderstood” (auf dem Wege eines […] prinzipiellen Missverstehens)23
Heidegger concludes his review by stating: 
Jaspers verfällt einer Täuschung, wenn er meint, in einer blossen Betrachtung 
würde gerade das Höchstmass von Nichteingreifen in die persönliche 
Entscheidung erreicht und so der Einzelne für seine Selbstbesinnung freigegeben. 
[…] Die blosse Betrachtung gibt gerade das nicht, was sie geben will, die 
Möglichkeit eines radikalen Nachprüfens und Entscheidens und, was damit 
gleichbedeutend ist, das strenge Bewusstsein von der Notwendigkeit des 
methodischen Fragens” (42)
Es ist gerade ein Anzeichen für die Verkennung und Unterschätzung der 
echten Methodenproblematik, wenn Jaspers an die Probleme der 
Weltanschauungspsychologie in dieser einzelwisssenschaftlichen Einstellung 
herangeht und verkennt, dass “Allgemeine Psychologie” und 
“Weltanschauungspsychologie” sich so unter sich und sie beide von der 
prinzipiellen Problematik der Philosophie nicht ablösen lassen. (43) 
In Heidegger’s opinion, Jaspers unduly narrows the philosophical scope regarding the 
problem of method.  Jaspers, so the criticism goes, ignores the philosophical 
underpinning of historical psychology.  
Whether this judgment is justified or not, what is more important for my present 
purposes is Heidegger’s general commentary on historical psychology, which is nested in 
his review of Jaspers’s psychology of worldviews.  In particular, this commentary 
illustrates that the Dilthey-bypass, as I have identified it here, was rhetorically 
encouraged by Heidegger himself in his exchange with Jaspers in the early 1920s.  In the 
same review, he asserts:  
Dass wir heute in ganz eigentümlicher Art von, in und mit der Geschichte leben, 
ist doch zum mindesten auch etwas (wenn nicht gar mit eine Hauptsache), “was 
da ist,” auch wenn die “Psychologie” diese Tatsache überhaupt noch nie und die 
Philosophie lediglich in der objektiven Aussenorientierung bemerkt haben.  Aber 
gerade diese Tatsache muss einer die Existenzphänomene intendierenden 
Betrachtung als etwas gelten, was zu “verstehen” ist. (38)  
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Given Heidegger’s early reading of, and familiarity with, psychophysics and historical 
psychology,24 this claim about “psychology” not even having begun to enter the relevant 
level of debate is nothing short of sanctimonious.  Heidegger is clearly (ab)using 
Jaspers’s project as a means to conflate and dismiss the recent currents in historical 
psychology altogether or, more precisely, to gainsay their very existence. 
As is clear from his extensive early criticism of Wilhelm Wundt’s “thought laws” 
(Denkgesetze),25 not only did Heidegger know about the advances made in the field of the 
hermeneutics of historical psychology, he actively responded to the internal conflicts 
within this field, where two rival projects lead to increasing partisanship among the 
debaters.  In his dissertation and his habilitation, Heidegger thus registers the widening 
schism between empirical historical psychology, represented by the work of Wilhelm 
Wundt and conceptual historical psychology, promoted and modified by Paul’s 
methodological work on language development.26
Upon scrutiny, Heidegger’s more or less “polite dismissal” of (rather than general 
sympathy with) Jaspers’s Betrachtung-approach in worldview philosophy, in the early 
1920s, proves to be a strategic means to occlude the extensive work he had already done 
in this area.  This discursive lineage connects him not only to Vossler and Paul, but also 
to Burckhardt and Cassirer, in ways that Heidegger was at painst to downplay, as he was 
drawing closer to launching his magnum opus.  In particular, Heidegger will retain 
crucial theoretical imports from the tense discursive constellation of conceptual historical 
psychology (Paul) as well as neo-Idealist language philosophy (Vossler), in order to 
revamp them in the idiom of Dasein’s analysis.  Such revamping is not so much a 
rejection or overcoming as it is a procedure of supplementation and modification.  As we 
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will see, Heidegger co-opts these discursive strands through a philosophical rhetoric that 
effectively converts nineteenth-century historical psychology into twentieth-century 
phenomenological ontology. 
In doing so, he cloaks the methodological subtext of his project, which links him 
to German idealism in the figure of Schelling, by creating a surface text of “ancient-
Greek radicalism,” variously invested with different connotations of medieval 
scholasticism and a “poeticized” German neo-Classicism invoking Hölderlin – not 
Goethe, who is discarded as one of the primary representatives of a “historical 
humanism.”27
At the Heart of the Dilthey-Bypass: The “Ontoeroteric” Hoax of Fundamental 
Ontology
Sharpening our criticism of the Dilthey-bypass and better situating Heidegger’s 
project, we can distance the latter a degree from the false kind of “ancient-Greek 
radicalism” just mentioned, which must be claimed here as the rhetorically amplified 
symptom of a more deep-seated philosophical commitment than traditional Heidegger 
commentary has admitted.  As indicated earlier, in Kisiel’s rendering this radicalism is 
embraced rather unreservedly in his characterization of Heidegger’s “ontoeroteric” draft 
of Being and Time, namely the 1925 lecture course, Prolegomena zur Geschichte des 
Zeitbegriffs.  To repeat, in his account, this draft is not included in the bundle of textual 
items constituting the Dilthey draft, but this is the very problem, if one wants to reclaim 
the agenda I am assigning to both Being and Time and the Letter on Humanism.  
Assigning an ontoeroteric agenda to this work not only promotes a deceptive version of 
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ancient radicalism, in the above sense, but also preempts the authority of a key document, 
which proves to be more resourceful a candidate for being considered a Dilthey draft than 
the items previously selected from Heidegger’s “Dilthey year” of 1924.    
For Kisiel, the ontoeroteric character of the Prolegomena, then, consists in its 
determinate turn to the question of being as such.  He explains his idiosyncratic choice of 
designation for analyzing Heidegger’s purportedly new philosophical focus, in “hyper-
radical” terms [my expression].  According to Kisiel’s characterization, Heidegger’s 1925 
approach to being as such mobilizes a “double radicality,” which fuses the “radicality of 
Greek ontology” with the “equally primoridal radicality of phenomenology” (362): 
The ultimate radicality that ensues from the fusion of these two radicalities first 
finds its most pointed expression in SS 1925. The point of fusion between 
phenomenology and ontology is accordingly the phenomenon par excellence, the 
ontophenomenon of “being.” In more phenomenological terms, it is our most 
original experience, the primal experience of our beginnings in experience itself, 
which once again is simply “being,” at first bland, then exclamatory, and finally 
interrogative. The primacy that Heidegger now gives to the interrogative 
phenomenon of being thus yields, not just the phenomenological- ontological draft 
of BT, as a result of this fusion, but more pointedly the “onto-eroteric” [here 
Kisiel inserts: note 1]28 draft, focused on the “question of being as such.” (362-
363) [my emphasis]
Under the banner of “ultimate radicality,” the concern of the onto-eroteric approach 
(Kisiel will drop the hyphenation in the following) with “being as such,” is thus specified 
in terms of “our most original experience, the primal experience of our beginnings in 
experience itself.”  This phrase, I argue, is a phenomenological tautololgy29 that lacks any 
explanatory value.  In its present context, however, it proves to be an effective rhetorical 
means to stage Heidegger’s philosophical “pathos”: an ontoeroteric mode, in which “the 
quest for being first manifests itself on the preverbal erotic level.”30  Guided by Plato and 
Aristotle, presumably,31 the radical ontoeroteric phenomenologist attends to an 
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inquisitive mode, which points us to “the full force of the interrogative experience” at 
“the very threshold of language.”32
Under the section heading The Categorial Dimension As World, Kisiel restates his 
account of ontoerotericism.  “The primal experience of our beginnings in experience 
itself, which once again is simply ‘being,’” is now described as “lived absorption in 
categorial apprehension but not yet in categories” (371):  
The “ontological thrust must be underscored: a categorial component or 
modification is operative tacitly, say, in our simple perception of entities, before it 
is conceptually grasped as a category. This prejudicative apriori structure is the 
enabling background to any and every experience. Explicating these implicit 
“objective” structures of experience becomes the task of ontological 
phenomenology. In fact, that is all that phenomenology is: “There is no ontology 
next to phenomenology. Rather, scientific ontology is nothing but 
phenomenology” (98/72). (371) [my emphases]
If we compare the last two quotations, a central problem becomes apparent.  Kisiel shifts 
from “experience itself, which is […] simply ‘being’” to “our simple perception of 
entities” and the structural background conditions that enable “any and every experience” 
on our part.  Here we witness a fundamental slide from experience as such to any 
experience.  These two are not the same, neither logically nor phenomeno-logically, for I 
can make general claims about the enabling conditions for any experience, namely any 
experience in particular, without subscribing to anything like “experience as such.”  
Kisiel’s reference to the latter, thus invokes what may be called the fundamental 
ontologist’s most favorite myth – “the sheer experience of being itself” (366) – w hich 
allows the individual to conceive of the respective discipline of philosophical territory as 
“radical,” “primal” – a quest for “trans-historical” (or ahistorical) ontology rather than 
regional ontologies.  
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Furthermore, the present reference to the “categorial component” in experience, 
explicated in terms of “prejudicative apriori stucture,” gainsays the centerpiece of 
Kisiel’s overall appoach to Heidegger and his account of the genesis story of Being and 
Time, namely his persistent claim that “it all began in KNS 1919” with Heidegger’s 
strategy of “formal indication.”  This claim becomes untenable because Kisiel’s account 
of categoriality cannot stand on its own, that is, without further qualification it amounts to 
a misconception.  Yet, once we try to ammend the present account, we have to reach 
further back than KNS 1919, namely to Heidegger’s earliest writings and to the teaching 
of Husserl: 
In placing overriding emphasis on the radicality of Greek ontology, he 
[Heidegger] appeals to the four years of labor prior to SS 1925. But this must be 
coupled by the equally primordial radicality of phenomenology which Heidegger, 
two years earlier in his first breakthrough of KNS 1919, already understood as the 
“pretheoretical primal science of origins.” (362)33
The categorial act is […] an expressive or articulative act which “discloses
the simply given objects anew, so that these objects come to explicit apprehension 
precisely in what they are” (84/62). The formally indicative magnet word in the 
entire gloss, and beyond, is in fact “structure”: the structurations of being itself, in 
multiplying beings into manifold senses, in providing the apriori structures in and 
by which beings appear, in articulating different regions, sciences, and logics; in 
turn, the articulation itself is obviously a structuration calling for examination; the 
structure of comportment, perception, the perceptual assertion, consciousness, 
encounter, aroundness, worldhood, in-being, and so on. [here Kisiel inserts: note 
4]34 (372) [last four emphases added]
In these passages, crucial to Kisiel’s genesis story, the ontoeroteric myth of “being as 
such,” promulgated as the “passionate” quest carried out by fundamental ontology as 
radical phenomenology, is restated in terms of the structural characteristics of  
“articulation itself.” According to the present “chain” of explication, which incorporates 
terms from Heidegger’s own text, the “categorial” is explicated as “expressive” or 
“articulative;” “articulative” is explicated as “new disclosure of objects;” the latter in 
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terms of “the structurations of being itself,” which, in turn, is spelled out in terms of 
“multiplying beings into manifold senses,” thus articulating “different regions, sciences, 
logics.” 
This concatenation, or rather encapsulation, of definitions remains largely opaque.  
In particular, Kisiel does not explain what it means to “multiply beings into manifold 
senses.”  Nor does he explain why and how these “beings” are given before they are 
distributed among, and organized into, “different regions.”  Presumably, the pre-
individuation of these “beings” is grounded in “our simple perception of entities” before 
their “categorial component […] is conceptually grasped as a category” (371; cf. 
quotation, p. 22, above). 
This opacity notwithstanding, it is still apparent that this account of Heidegger’s 
conception of categorial(s), or categorial acts, as opposed to categories, promotes a 
flawed notion of radical fundamental ontology as the “pretheoretical primal science of 
origins” (362).  Fundamental ontology, so the story goes, has a philosophical job to do 
that is prior to the study of regional ontologies.  Put in the present language of structure, 
the radical phenomenologist wants to interpolate an extra domain of philosophical 
inquiry in between the “structurations of being itself,” on one hand, and the resulting 
regional ontologies, on the other.  According to what I will term this ontoeroteric fantasy, 
radical phenomenology thus aspires to ruling the philosophical territory of “being as 
such” or “articulation itself.”  And to assert this territorial authority, a language is 
invented, which announces the philosophical knowledge or insight to be had in this 
domain of inquiry in terms of: “comportment [itself],” “perception [itself],” “perceptual 
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assertion [itself],”35 “consciousness [itself],” “encounter [itself],” “aroundness [itself],” 
“worldhood [itself],” and “in-being [itself]” and so on (372; cf. last quotation, above). 
To be clear, in his list of these categorial aspects, Kisiel does not attach the 
“itself” qualifier to the respective expression for each categorial.  However, if this 
qualification is not implicity assumed, it is utterly unclear how these various categorials 
are supposed to explicate the notion of “articulation itself” (ibid.).  In that case, Kisiel’s 
entire last sentence would be superfluous, since we could rest simply with the preceding 
statement about “different regions, sciences, and logics.”  In fact, in my opinion, that is 
exactly what we should do.  Articulation itself, consciousness itself, worldhood itself, in-
being itself, etc., are only so many names for the same radical pipe dream, the same 
ontoeroteric fantasy – claiming authority over a philosophical void rather than the 
historically present logics of world presentation, as Heidegger’s contemporaries would 
do.
To illustrate the uselessness of referring to in-being itself for a hermeneutic 
perspective, for example, consider what we may call one of Heidegger’s categorial
glitches in Being and Time (Division One, chapter two, § 12).36  Here, Heidegger sets out 
to explain “the ontological distinction between being-in as an existential [In-Sein als 
Existenzial] and the category of the “insideness” [“Inwendigkeit” von Vorhandenem] that 
things objectively present can have with regard to one another” (56).37  The existential 
character or mode of being-in is attributed to Dasein, whereas those “beings” unlike 
Dasein are characterized through the categorial mode of “insideness,”38 an abstraction 
that more modern Heidegger readers like Derrida caution us against as a false assumption 
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of autonomy that must be put “under erasure.”  As an illustration of “insideness,” then, 
Heidegger provides the following example: 
With this term [being-in] the kind of being of a being [Seinsart eines Seienden] is 
named which is “in” something else, as water is “in” the glass, the dress is “in” 
the closet. By this “in” we mean the relation of being that two beings extended 
“in” space have to each other with regard to their location in that space. Water and 
glass, dress and closet, are both “in” space “at” a location in the same way. This 
relation of being can be extended; that is, the bench in the lecture hall, the lecture 
hall in the university, the university in the city, and so on until: the bench in 
“world space” [im Weltraum]. These beings whose being “in” one another can be 
determined in this way all have the same kind of being – that of being objectively 
present – as things occurring “within” the world. (54)
This illustration on Heidegger’s part appears flawed, insofar as “institutional” or “social” 
entities like universities and city do not have the same mode of being objectively-present 
as do quantities of water, glass, fabric, wood.  At the same time, these “social” entities do 
not easily fit Heidegger’s present characterization of Dasein as “the being which I myself 
always am” (Dieses Seinende, dem das In-Sein in dieser Bedeutung zugehört, 
kennzeichneten wir als das Seiende, das ich je selbst bin. [ibid.]). 
In other words, Heidegger’s above example conflates the categorial and 
existential (according to the terminology of Being and Time), in the context of being-in.  
This categorial glitch is significant because it shows that Heidegger’s tendency to 
equivocate Dasein, by dressing it up with, and then stripping off from it, connotations of 
personal identity, undermines his own ontological distinctions.  While he is at pains to 
preclude any understanding of Dasein in terms of individual souls or conscious psyches, 
he never explains whether Dasein as “the being which I myself always am” has the same 
being-in structure (or care-structure, for that matter) as universities, cities, or perhaps 
corporations. 
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In light of these loose ends, it becomes clear that Heidegger has not made a solid 
case on behalf of radical phenomenology as fundamental ontology,39 for the utility of 
introducing structural categorials such as: “being itself,” “consciousness itself,” or 
“articulation itself.”  Instead, we have good reason to believe that these entries in the 
dictionary of the radical phenomenologist are completely vacuous, a pseudo-language 
that lacks philosophical content.  Such language remains discursively revealing, however, 
if we interpret the corresponding enunciations as the expression of an ontoeroteric 
fantasy, a dream of territorial authority on the part of the philosopher seeking ground 
among his contemporaries. 
For my present purposes, the main point to register in this regard is that, in Being 
and Time, Heidegger’s distinction between the Seinsarten (modes of being) of categorial
versus existential operates with an “emaciated” notion of categorial.  As we shall see in 
the next chapter, his earlier conception (especially in the second part of his 1916 
habilitation) of that notion is more complex and does not yet collapse the categorial into 
the categorical.  Within the young Heidegger’s Bedeutungslehre, the notion of the 
categorial still holds semiotic resources of meaning formation, in terms of open-ended 
structures rather than closed conceptual systems, which are subsequently repressed in 
Being and Time.  This change is lost on Kisiel, for whom everything interesting starts in 
KNS 1919.  
More importantly, the omission of this early version of a full-fledged, 
semiotically “thick” notion of the categorial engenders what I believe is one of the most 
stultifying effects of the Dilthey-bypass in contemporary Heidegger scholarship.  It elides 
the notion of regional ontologies as open systems of meaning production, the dynamic 
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structural features of which are not reducible to static conceptual, or categorical, 
schemes.  Instead, this bypass fosters a false conception of phenomenological radicality 
based on permanent horizons of understanding.  Whether we call it ontoerotericism or 
not, its fundamental mistake is to interpolate a domain of “structuration itself” 
(“articulation itself,” “worldhood itself,” “in-being itself”), between the “structurations 
(plural!) of being itself” and the formation of regional ontologies.  It is the same ad hoc
invention which we detected in Heidegger’s 1929 Kant critique, namely the positing of a 
single ontological horizon as the enabling condition for (understanding) the formation of 
various, semiotically productive life-worlds.
Incidentally, Kisiel points to “Heidegger’s burst of enthusiasm for Kant’s 
schematism” (372) in the very same context of categorial acts, struturation, and 
articulation.  Yet this does not prompt him to consider visible parallels like Cassirer, 
Schelling, or German idealism in general, as pertinent sources for the genesis of Being 
and Time or the preceding Prolegomena.  Instead, we can observe how the neo-Kantian 
bypass and the Dilthey-bypass interlock in Kisiel’s view, for he reduces this burgeoning 
interest in Kant’s schematism to “Heidegger’s “retake” of his own genealogy” (ibid.).  
Consequently, this view remains oblivious to Heidegger’s debt to Schelling as well as to 
his proximity to Cassirer, just as it overlooks the shift of meaning in Heidegger’s notion 
of the categorial. 
The Schellingean subtext, however, becomes quite tangible with respect to the 
discussion of being-in, in Being and Time.  Rather than supporting any ontoeroteric 
ambitions toward radical phenomenology, Heidegger makes a clear gesture at the kind of 
contrastive spatiality that we found explicated in detail in Schelling’s Philosophy of 
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Revelation.  At a crucial juncture in his account of the existential mode of being-in, 
Heidegger thus summarizes his fundamental-ontological approach in terms that are again 
strongly reminiscent of the late Schelling, both terminologically and methodologically:
Ihre Absicht [die Absicht der vorliegenden Untersuchung] ist eine 
fundamentalontologische. Wenn wir sonach dem In-Sein thematisch nachfragen, 
dann können wir zwar nicht die Ursprünglichkeit des Phänomens durch Ableitung 
aus anderen, d.h. durch eine unangemessene Analyse im Sinne einer Auflösung 
vernichten wollen. Die Unableitbarkeit eines Ursprünglichen schliesst aber eine 
Mannigfaltigkeit der dafür konstituierenden Seinscharaktere nicht aus. Zeigen 
sich solche, dann sind sie existenzial gleichursprünglich. Das Phänomen der 
Gleichursprünglichkeit der konstitutiven Momente ist in der Ontologie oft 
missachtet worden zufolge einer methodisch ungezügelten Tendenz der 
Herkunftsnachweisung von allem und jedem aus einem einfachen “Urgrund.” 
(SZ, 131) [the first emphasis is Heidegger’s; other emphases added]
In light of the results gained in chapter one, two things stand out in Heidegger’s 
statement.  First, his rejection of “a simple ur-ground” bears a strong resemblance to 
Schelling’s Christological conception of a plural God.  Second, Heidegger’s seemingly 
unimportant subclause, “Zeigen sich solche, […]” actually marks a concession to 
Schelling’s central tenet of positive philosophy, according to which the essence of the 
transcendent can be understood only a posteriori, that is, only after observing the actual 
effects of the creative factors that are co-constitutive of this essence.  In this regard, 
Heidegger’s speaking of a “Mannigfaltigkeit der [ein Ursprüngliches] konstituierenden 
Seinscharaktere” is strikingly similar to Schelling’s account of the three potencies and 
how they can be pitted against one another in a potentially infinte variety of ways.   
The clincher, however, is that none of this warrants the assumption of “being-in 
itself” (“worldhood itself” or “articulation itself”), as Schelling and Cassirer would insist.  
Radical as they may sound, these pseudo-categorials are nothing but the expression of an 
ontoeroteric strategy, which seeks to reduce regional ontologies to closed categorical
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systems of fixed conceptualization rather than ackowledging their semiotic power as 
open categorial systems of meaning formation.  It is only after the notion of regional 
ontologies has thus been stymied that the fundamental ontologist can rush in an “re-
envigorate” the meaning production in a certain semiotic region through his or her radical 
and “passionate” questioning.  
If we resist this reduction of the open categorial to the closed categorical, 
however, it becomes clear that this kind of radical questioning does not do any 
phenomenological work.  In terms of philosophical methodology, the ontoerotericist 
interpolates a mysterious middle ground between potential being and regional ontologies.
Such positing holds no semiotic resources for contributing to the constitution of 
Seinssinn.  Instead, it amounts to a discursive gesture that lays claim to territorial 
authority in philosophical discourse. And that, as we shall turn to in the next section, 
elides one branch of Husserl’s phenomenological project, one that is all too often 
conflated into a flattened notion of what the discipline comprises.
Eliding Husserl’s Phenomenological Psychology: Distortions of “Categorial Form” 
As another important ramification, this “emaciation” of the categorial eliminates 
the historical dimension of Heidegger’s (increasingly cloaked) conception regional 
semiotic productivity.  Kisiel will hint at the “historical I,” whose “involvement in an 
impersonal “original something,” the It which worlds and properizes me” (366), as 
somewhere buried in Heidegger’s new rendering of the phenomenological project.  Yet, 
by the time he addresses the dynamics of a priori structuration and the articulation of 
different regions (cf. 372),40 this historical aspect is no longer present.  In other words, 
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after highlighting the “magnet word” of “structure” (ibid.), the actual relation between the 
aspects of aprioricity, regionality, and historicality is glossed over in Heidegger’s work 
without being refuted. 
The bypass-effects of this omission are especially noticeable with respect to 
Kisiel’s treatment of Husserl vis-à-vis Dilthey, as far as their respective influence and 
relevance for the genesis of Being and Time is concerned.  Turning to the last item within 
the Dilthey-draft bundle, the Kassel Lectures (1925), we find that both Husserl and 
Dilthey are dismissed all too easily, in the context of categorial intuition (kategoriale 
Anschauung), a move which occludes their clear and continuing appeal to historicity as a 
regional ontology. 
Remember, according to The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time, it is the 
ontoeroteric draft that is supposed to feature the figure of Husserl primarily.41  Yet, this 
does not keep Kisiel from dismissing both Dilthey and the “basically ahistorical Husserl” 
(360) as subject to Heidegger’s de(con)struction of Cartesianism, in the Dithey-draft 
context of the Kassel Lectures already: 
Both Dilthey and Husserl, and before them Descartes, are overtly criticized for 
their fundamental neglect of the question of the being of the entity which they 
make central. Whether the human being is defined as a psychic context, a 
coherence of experience, a center of acts unified in an ego, and so on, none of the 
phenomenologists ever raised the question of the sense of being of this, our own 
Dasein. Instead, they fall back on traditional definitions dividing man into reason 
and sense, soul and body, inner and outer, without sense of what holds these 
realities together as a whole. (360) [my emphases]
This characterization is simply inaccurate, especially as far as Husserl is concerned.  
Calling him “basically ahistorical” is largely justified, but the suggestion that Husserl did 
not attend to “the sense of being” (Seinssinn) or to the question of “what holds these 
realities together” is gainsaid by his explicit treatment of those very themes; especially in 
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the second volume of the Logical Investigations (1900/1901) and his later book on 
Phenomenology of Psychology (1925), a lecture course delivered in the same year in 
which Heidegger’s Prolegomena was published.  Hence, Husserl cannot plausibly be 
disposed of “by way of a parody of the Cartesian self” (ibid.). 
Although “Husserl is not named here” (ibid.), Kisiel seems to be taken in by 
Heidegger’s own statement from the Prolegomena, according to which “Husserl does not 
advance beyond Dilthey.”42  But with Heidegger, more often than not, those statements 
are tempered by assertions that seem to point in the opposite direction.  Along with his 
famous praise of Husserl’s Logical Investigations as the “founding document of 
phenomenology” (das Grundbuch der Phänomenologie), Heidegger indicates the late 
Dilthey’s enthusiasm over this work.43  In this place, Heidegger clearly voices his 
preference for the second volume of Husserl’s Logical Investigations, “which contains 
what is crucial.”44
For the purposes of this study, and within the present context of categorial acts 
and the “structurations of being (itself),” the main contribution on Husserl’s part that I 
want to emphasize in revisiting Heidegger’s Prolegomena relates to his conception of 
material individuality with respect to cultural meaning formation – his acknowledgment 
of a material semiotics of culture.  To be sure, Husserl himself did not fully extend his 
notion of semiotic materiality into the domain of cultural science. Yet, as Katherine 
Arens has shown, Husserl was not quite as “ahistorical” as is commonly assumed.45  In 
this vein, Husserl pointed the way to a new method in cultural historiography, the same 
project that drew Dilthey’s attention as he recognizes the importance of Burckhardt’s 
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analysis of Renaissance culture,46 which marks one of the theoretical advances that 
helped pave the way for Cassirer’s Philosophy of Symbolic Forms.
In preparation for the next chapter, I confine myself here to a brief sketch of the 
kind of meaning-sponsoring material individuality, the import of which can be detected 
in Heidegger’s Prolegomena.  Acknowledging this theme complex about method in 
cultural science within Husserl’s phenomenology is significant for two reasons.  For one 
thing, it insulates Husserl from being dismissed by way of de(con)structing Descartes.  
Considering Husserl’s general notion of “pure subjectivity,” it will become clear that any 
criticism, which is primarily concerned with rejecting the Cartesian conception of 
consciousness, does not apply to Husserl’s explication of the aspect of “matter” 
(Material) with respect to categorial forms (see quotation, right below).   
For another, this particular facet of Husserl’s work casts a new light on 
Heidegger’s phenomenological mentor, which establishes an important link to the 
different projects of nineteenth-century psychology.  Moreover, it corroborates the 
integral connection between Heidegger and Cassirer, grounded in a shared concern for 
methodological reform in cultural science, notwithstanding their different executions of 
this agenda and their different philosophical idioms. 
In Part V. (chapter two, § 20) of his Logical Investigations, Husserl distinguishes 
between the “quality” (Qualität) and the “matter” (Materie) of any act, understood as 
intentional lived-experience (intentionales Erlebnis).47  He goes on to specify this 
distinction as follows: 
Die Qualität bestimmt nur, ob das in bestimmter Weise bereits “vorstellig 
Gemachte” als Erwünschtes, Erfragtes, urteilsmässig Gesteztes u. dgl. intentional 
gegenwärtig sei. Darnach muss uns die Materie als dasjenige im Akte gelten, was 
ihm allerst die Beziehung auf ein Gegenständliches verleiht, und zwar diese 
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Beziehung in so vollkommener Bestimmtheit, dass durch die Materie nicht nur 
das Gegenständliche überhaupt, welches der Akt meint, sondern auch die Weise, 
in welcher er es meint, fest bestimmt ist [here Husserl inserts note 1]. Die Materie 
– so können wir noch weiter verdeutlichend sagen – ist die im 
phänomenologischen Inhalt des Aktes liegende Eigenheit desselben, die es nicht 
nur bestimmt, dass der Akt die jeweilige Gegenständlichkeit auffasst, sondern 
auch als was er sie auffasst, welche Merkmale, Beziehungen, kategoriale 
Formen er in sich selbst ihr zumisst.  An der Materie des Aktes liegt es, dass der 
Gegenstand dem Akte als dieser und kein anderer gilt, sie ist gewissermassen der 
die Qualität fundierende (aber gegen deren Unterschiede gleichgültige) Sinn der 
gegenständlichen Auffassung (oder kurzweg der Auffassungssinn). (LI, 415-416) 
[Husserl’s emphases; my additional emphasis in bold.] 
Here I cannot do justice to the complexity of Husserl’s explication of the “meaning 
aspect of object-oriented apprehension”48 (Sinn der gegenständlichen Auffassung).  
Instead I will attend only to those features that are most crucial in preparing for the 
examination of Heidegger’s Prolegomena, with respect to material individuality in 
meaning formation and the issue of “categorial forms” (kategoriale Formen), in 
continuation of our previous discussion of “categorial acts.”49
To begin with, Husserl’s present notion of “matter” shows that he is not engaged 
in Cartesian epistemology but rather proffers a blueprint for what I am calling a material
semiotics, in which the possibility of meaning formation is spelled out in terms of certain 
epistemic structures.  These structures both integrate and limit the items (Gegenstände) 
that can emerge from a specific context of intentional lived-experiences (intentionale 
Erlebnisse).  Here, the limits of structural organization, called categorial forms, are at the 
same time the enabling conditions for a life-world (transcendental but not transcendent), 
the integrated totality of which both transcends and grounds individual acts of 
consciousness.
Speaking of transcendence here refers to Husserl’s tenet about the stable and 
complete character of the constitution of reality, that is, the claim that there is a unified 
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world whose objectively true features are, in principle, accessible to the 
phenomenological researcher through “the method of ideation” (PhP, 66), which aims at 
a standard for “trans-subjective validity” (PhP, 29), as he puts it in his later book on 
Phenomenological Psychology (1925).50
This notion of transcendent reality, however, does not make Husserl a (naïve) 
metaphysical realist.  He is not interested in any claims about “things in themselves,” 
independent of mental activity, just as he refuses to consider the world a product of 
individual mental construction.  In this manner, he is indebted to Kant’s Critique of Pure 
Reason but also departs from it, by collapsing the mental into the real.  The latter step is 
absolutely crucial for Husserl’s phenomenological project.  It shows his notion of 
transcendence to be one of immanent transcendence, very similar to Schelling’s 
conception of God as the real ground (das reelle Erste) put forth within the framework of 
positive philosophy, regardless of the fact that Husserl did not conceive of it in 
theological or Christological terms.  As Husserl explains with respect to the objects that 
can be encountered and recognized as emerging from this kind of transcendent structural 
background: 
The object transcends the real content of the stream of lived experiences; only its 
real moments are “immanent” to it.
Yet, this concept of the transcendent, of the object present to 
consciousness in its imminence, still includes several great difficulties […] (PhP, 
137)
As Arens (1989), to whose treatment of Husserl’s psychology I am indebted here, points 
out: “The worst of these difficulties is the issue of multiple significations or appearances 
of the object, and the necessity to differentiate between the meaning of an object and its 
various intentional meanings (PhP, 141)” (210).  We can clarify this difficulty by 
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considering how Husserl combines his “method of ideation” with his method of 
“phenomenological reduction.”  The former can be illustrated with respect to Husserl’s 
famous example of the peception of a house, which Arens summarizes as follows: 
An observer can only see it [any particular house] from one side, but its existence 
(the other unseen walls) is always fleshed out by the thinker. Any change in 
perspective on that object does not lead the observer to think that a new object has 
emerged in place of the old, but rather that the object is presented from a new 
perspective (PhP, 45). Each appearance of the house is merely a new horizon in 
experiencing, an “a priori necessary structure” (PhP, 42). (198) 
In the lived experience of a house, there are universal structures of time, space, (color, 
intensity) at work, that can be tickled out by going through a “test series” of perspectival 
shifts.  Rather than disintegrating the notion of an unchanging perceptual ground, these 
shifts can bring out the stable and unifying qualitites of our individual house-perceptions.  
The latter are thus construed as organized by the structural features of an overall 
experiential world in which certain kinds of perceptions become available, including 
spatial (in this case three-dimensional) perceptions, or more narrowly, house-perceptions.  
No single perception of a house, on the part of a single personal observer, can exhaust –
or create – its own enabling conditions, namely the a priori structures of perception in any 
given experiential world.  While there may be several, perhaps infinitely many, such 
worlds, we only have phenomenological access to the transcendent ground, i.e., the priori 
structural make-up of “our own” life world.  Accordingly, the perceptual-structural 
profile of any such experiential domain is cosidered as immanent transcendent.  
The accompanying difficulty in terms of “multiple significations or appearances 
of the object” pertains to the fact that our experience of houses and other things is almost 
always “colored” by other experiential qualities, such as social connotations (the political 
power perceived “off of the walls” of imperial-looking government buildings; or the 
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reassurance, or unease, perceived in the presence of hospitals or morgues).  The crux for 
Husserl is twofold.  First, no two people seem to perceive the same house in the same 
way.  Second, there also seems to be no standard for prioritizing one set of experiential 
“coloration” over another.  
Husserl’s solution to this quandary consists in his “phenomenological reduction,” 
which basically strips perception of all its social or cultural overtones and aims at the 
“pure conceptual essence” (PhP, 59), or eidos, of a house, or anything else that is integral 
part of the unified perceptual nexus of a life world.  Actually looking at a house from 
different angles, or rotating an imaginary house in our mind, can reveal a fundament of 
spatial dimensionality, just as going through a variational sequence of color perceptions 
may grant phenomenological knowledge about a certain color dimensionality.51
To repeat, what any such sequential test series is supposed to reveal is not the 
traits of some “thing in itself” or mind-independent entity (like the Platonic idea of a 
house).  The transcendent ground of perception is mental but not individually mental.  
Ideational analysis thus concerns the perception of perception, as it is sometimes put.  
Any particular eidos is a universal structural feature, a “real moment” (PhP, 137) of an 
experiential world, which can be brought out through sequentially sifting through the 
“real content” of individual perceptions, none of which is able to reveal the “real 
moment,” or real aspect, by itself.  An eidos is a structural quality that is both a priori and 
world-relative, a regional-ontological entity of immanent transcendence or transcendental 
immanence.
Husserl does not posit a single ontological horizon that would contain, or 
encompass, or “ground” all other horizons.  In this place, Husserl is not really interested 
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in the pre-eidetic domain (my term), should any such exist (he would consider that 
assumption beyond the scope of the verifiable).  Yet, if he were to address it, in keeping 
with his general phenomenological method, the pre-eidetic would have to be 
characterized in terms similar to Schelling’s notion of the unpreconceivable, which is not 
a horizon but a “tranquil” or not-yet-differentiated continuum.  Once differentiation takes 
place, we immediately confront a multiplicity of different eidetically structured realms.
Husserl’s present account, we might say, skips over but does not go against 
Schelling’s analysis of the three potencies, and already starts at the level of perceptual 
“personalities”52 instead.  In this regard, his ideational analysis is generally compatible 
with Schelling’s framework of positive philosophy.  At the same time, Schelling and 
Cassirer would object that the phenomenological reduction in Husserl’s material 
semiotics is too restrictive, but that it could be effectively extended into a full-fledged 
theory of cultural meaning formation, be it as critical Christology or as a philosophy of 
symbolic forms.
In this vein, Cassirer expressly acknowledges the methodological resources of 
Husserl’s material semiotics, in general, and his working conception of categorial forms 
(the structural foundation of any experiential world, in terms of its Seinssinn), in 
particular, when he says: 
It is one of the fundamental achievements of Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology 
to have sharpened once again our perception of the diversity of cultural “structural 
forms” and to have pointed out a new approach to them, departing from the 
psychological method. Particularly, the sharp distinction between psychological 
“acts” and the “objects” intended in them is crucial. Husserl’s own development 
from the Logische Untersuchungen (2 vols. Halle, 1913-1922) to the Ideen zu 
einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie (Halle, 1928) 
makes it increasingly clear that the task of phenomenology, as Husserl sees it, is 
not exhausted by the analysis of cognition but calls for an investigation of the 
structures of entirely different objective spheres, according to what they “signify” 
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and without concern for the “reality” of their objects. Such an investigation 
should include the mythical “world,” not in order to derive its specific actuality by 
induction from the manifold of ethnological and ethnic-psychological experience, 
but in order to apprehend it in a purely ideational analysis. As far as I can see, 
however, no attempt of this sort has been undertaken either in phenomenology or 
in mythological research, where the genetic-psychological approach still holds 
almost uncontested sway. (II, 12: note 7)  
As Cassirer implies, Husserl himself did not apply his method to different areas of 
cultural meaning production, in keeping with the (self-imposed) strictures of his 
phenomenological reduction.  However, with respect to Husserl’s later writings, it can be 
shown that he was well aware of the potential for broadening his initial approach. 
In addition to Cassirer’s reference to Husserl’s Ideas Pertaining to a Pure 
Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy, we may thus point again to the 
Phänomenologische Psychologie (1925), of which Heidegger said that it was in the 
making since 1916.53  Here, Husserl directly addresses the issue of cultural analysis: 
Culture is not a layer of properties pertaining to natural objects as psyches, rather, 
it is a psyche in objects of the surrounding world, objects which admittedly are 
natural objects whenever they are investigated from the point of view of natural 
truth, but which as such have only natural properties. […] The world, considered 
personally, is the nature of the natural scientist and of all personalities interested 
in nature; the orientation of the socio-cultural sciences, nature, and correlatively 
the natural scientist, is a personal theme. History is an all-inclusive personal 
science, a science of the personal and of its facticity taken all-inclusively. Eidetics 
[phenomenological psychology] is the all-inclusive science of ideally possible 
forms of personality in the unity of a personally regarded, and thereby historical, 
world. (PhP, 176)
As this passage clearly documents the close methodological ties between Schelling, 
Husserl, and Cassirer, it also hints at the lingering limits that kept Husserl from bringing 
his program to bear on cultural theory with full force.  On one hand, Husserl’s present 
account of historical personality and its “facticity” as the subject matter for “history as an 
all-inclusive personal science” is directly hooked into a project of revolutionizing cultural 
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historiography, which points from Nietzsche’s mentor Jakob Burckhardt and is study on 
Die Kultur der Renaissance in Italien (1860) to Cassirer and Kristeller’s later treatment 
of The Renaissance Philosophy of Man (1948).  
On the other hand, one can detect a crucial limitation to Husserl’s approach, 
which consistis in the fact that his model of personal science does not address or 
accommodate for any feedback dynamics, within meaning formation, between the 
individual perceiver of cultural items (Gegenstände) and the other members of her 
“experiential community.”  Even if we extend the scope of the latter by allowing cultural 
overtones into the ideational analysis of the perception of houses and color fields, 
Husserl’s program remains largely mute on the communicative dimension of materially 
mediated semiotic practices.  
In this regard, the eidetic phenomenologist remains somewhat solipsistic not
because he or she is confined to observations in their own head.  Instead of promoting 
any epistemological (Cartesian) solipsism, Husserl’s position retains a trait of 
communicative isolation insofar as the routes of meaing formation lead only from 
sequentially varied observations by individual phenomenologists to the a priori structures 
of the experiential world that grounds the emergence of their perceptions in the first 
place.  Husserl does not consider the possible effects of mutual influence with respect to 
the semiotic interaction between different eidetic communities, or the semiotic interaction 
between an eidetic community and its individual members. 
To put the point more generally, according to Husserl’s conception of the 
“matter” component in intentional lived-experience, the categorial forms – or forms of 
signification – that determine the Auffassungssinn (meaning-aspect of apprehension) of 
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any given life world do not transform or evolve.  To be sure, semiotic structuration, for 
Husserl, must not be confused with any law-governed causal or genetic process, where a 
substratum of a certain set of things-in-themselves would dictate the semiotic 
superstructure of possible experience.  However, Husserl insist on the “causal unity” or 
“causal habitus” (PhP, 78) of each form of signification, which means that the 
constellation of its “real moments” remains the same, that is, each world preserves its 
“stable style” (PhP, 77) of meaning production.  
In other words, the horizon of each semiotic system is closed and “self-contained” 
(PhP, 165).  While eidetic reality is transcendentally pluralistic and not guilty of the kind 
of metaphysical dogmatism, with which Schelling had charged negative philosophy, 
Husserl claims solid standards of “pure subjectivity” (ibid.) for each life world.  Each 
system of meaning production constitutes a “monad” (ibid.) whose immanent sense of 
being does not change or evolve.  This monadic quality does not pertain to individual 
psyches but to the mental mechanisms which organize and unify a particular experiential 
domain.  
Thus understood, Hussel’s immanent transcendentism operates within a 
philosophical framework of regional ontology, which is not metaphysically dogmatic but 
semiotically deterministic.  Against this background, the phenomenologist hopes to 
ascertain and properly describe the “objectively true” character of a particular life world 
from within its perceptual structures.  Yet, there is no tranformatory participation 
involved in such research activity, which would actively prompt semiotic evolution by 
reshaping or recasting the meaning of any cultural eidos, which cannot be seen as 
“malleable” for Husserl.  
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From Phenomenological Psychology to a Material Semiotics: Some Conclusions
It is with respect to this curb on world-immanent semiotic development, then, that 
Cassirer will seek to extend Husserl’s material-semiotic insights and put them to work for 
a more complex and dynamic theory of culture.  In doing so, he will, as we shall see in 
the next chapter, draw from the earlier work of Hermann Paul whose earlier conception 
of semiotic matter (Vorstellungsmasse) already went beyond some of the limitations, 
from which Husserl was not able, or willing, to free himself.  Accordingly, it is with 
regard to questions about the malleability and structural transformation of certain cultural 
eide, from within a given life world, that new philosophical ground may be broken. 
By contrast, it is a disservice to Husserl (Paul, Cassirer), in particular, and to 
material semiotics, in general, if the phenomenological notion of categorial forms is 
translated into a scheme of fundamental ontology, which seeks to corrupt and 
disempower the productivity of regional ontologies by positing a single ontological meta-
horizon.  I have demonstrated this with specific reference to Kisiel, but this tendency has 
been long the trend among contemporary Heidegger scholars in celebrating Heidegger’s 
“radical” advance beyond Dilthey and Husserl, thus bypassing them both. 
The cost of such radical aberrations becomes especially tangible, when we 
compare his early writings to his 1925 production shortly before the publication of Being 
and Time.  Examining his dissertation and habilitation in conjunction with the 
Prolegomena lecture course will bring out Heidegger’s continued, if increasingly 
cloaked, indebtedness to his phenomenological mentor, from whom he did not depart as 
swiftly or starkly as is commonly assumed.  The significance of illuminating this 
remaining link to Husserl’s material semiotics, by giving special attention to Heidegger’s 
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co-optation of the notion of categorial form, is that it brings out Heidegger’s suppressed 
connection to nineteenth-century historical psychology and comparative philology.  The 
latter, in turn, undercuts the now-standard banning of Cassirer from contemporary 
Heidegger interpretation.  Once Heidegger’s nineteenth-century roots are excavated from 
the subtext of his writings, Cassirer’s continuous relevance can no longer be ignored, 
along with the Neogrammarians congenial to him.  In fact, as we turn to the early 
writings and the Prolegomena, in the next chapter, we will find that one does not have to 
dig very deep to find Heidegger’s buried interlocutors.
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Missverständnisses der eigentlichen Intentionen beider” (40). Quoted from: Martin Heidegger, Wegmarken
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(544). 
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conception of phenomenology or phenomenological research: “Being befalls me, I am betroffen, afflicted, 
stricken, visited by its sense … or nonsense: Greek astonishment, postmodern angst. These middle-voiced 
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unclear how exactly Plato and/or Aristotle are supposed to have paved the way to the “radical” question 
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to support Kisiel’s ontoeroteric case: “Das phänomenologische Fragen führt seinem innersten Zuge nach 
selbst zur Frage nach dem Sein des Intentionalen und vor allem vor die Frage nach dem Sinn des Seins 
überhaupt. So ist die Phänomenologie in ihrer eigensten Möglichkeit radikalisiert nichts anderes als das 
wieder lebendig gewordene Fragen von Plato and Aristotle: die Wiederholung, das Wiederergreifen des 
Anfangs unserer wissenschaftlichen Philosophie” (184). Similarly Heidegger recognizes the “higher level” 
(here compared to Parmenides), on which Plato and Aristotle “worked out the question about being”: 
“Wenn wir uns in die Geschichte zurückorientieren, dorthin wo die Seinsfrage zum erstenmal auftauchte, 
bei Parmenides, dann sehen wir […] Das Sein ist dasselbe wie das Vernehmen des Seienden in seinem 
Sinn. Hier schon in der Frage nach dem, was das Sein ist, wird ausdrücklich das Erfahren des Befragten 
selbst mit in Rechnung gesetzt, obzwar hier die Frage selbst noch gar nicht in ihrer Struktur explizit da ist. 
Später dann, […] [wird] auf einem höheren Niveau die Frage nach dem Sein ausgearbeitet […] – bei Plato
und Aristoteles […]” (201). 
Yet, so far, these remarks of appreciation for the Greek tradition have been inconclusive. It is not 
quite clear yet how, or to what degree, either Plato or Aristotle has exacted (to be sure, in their own way) 
what Heidegger refers to as the “phenomenological tendency” (phänomenologische Tendenz) in this place, 
which consists in “clarifying and understanding being as such” (Sein als solches aufzuklären und zu 
verstehen) (ibid.).  Heidegger himself thus hastens to add that by taking our bearings from the “classic 
scientific philosophy of the Greeks”, we must not take their authority for granted, as far as the 
“fundamental question of being” is concerned: “Wenn die phänomenologisch gewonnene 
Fundamentalfrage nach dem Sein sich als die herausstellt, die die klassische wissenschaftliche Philosophie 
der Griechen gerade lebendig werden liess, so darf dieses geschichtliche Faktum nicht etwa als 
Autoritätsbeweis für die Richtigkeit der Frage genommen werden. Vielmehr kann das nur ein Hinweis 
darauf sein, dass diese Frage im Zuge des forschenden Fragens überhaupt offenbar selbst liegt” (186-187). 
At this point, Heidegger’s reference to Plato and Aristotle appears competely arbitrary, they may 
or may not instantiate the “phenomenological tendency” just as good as anyone else. In fact, at some point, 
Heidegger makes it sound as if Plato could not help himself to attend to the question of being, since this 
question, in a manner of speaking, implies its own mode of being asked, or asking itself: “Dass Plato zur 
Frage nach dem Logos im Sinne der Dialektik kommt, liegt einfach im Sinne der Frage selbst, die er stellte 
und wie er sie stellte, im Sinne der Frage nach dem Sein, die selbst fordert, das Fragen als ein Seiendes zu 
bestimmen” (201). – Aside from the inherent ambiguity of Heidegger’s staging of Plato and Aristotle, the 
fundamental misconception that Heidegger proffers to his readers comes to the fore, when he specifies the 
question of being as such in terms of Dasein’s structure of Jeweiligkeit, for which Kisiel (500) offers the 
following options for translation: “at-the-time-ness,” “particular whileness,” “temporal particularity.” 
Heidegger claims that there is no Dasein, which is not jeweilig: “Der Fudamentalcharacter des Seins des 
Daseins ist demnach hinreichend erst in der Bestimmung gefasst: Seiendes, das ist im Jeweilig-es-zu-sein. 
Dieses ‘je’, ‘jeweilig’, bzw. Die Struktur der ‘Jeweiligkeit’ ist für jeden Seinscharakter dieses Seienden 
konstitutiv, d.h. es ist überhaupt kein Dasein, welches als Dasein wäre, das nicht seinem Sinne nach 
jeweiliges wäre” (206). 
The crux is that, in spelling out the question of being as such in terms of “at-the-timeness” he 
posits “at-the-time-ness as such” (Jeweiligkeit als solche [206]; Heidegger’s emphasis).  Aside from 
looking like a contradiction in terms, this generalziation does not follow logically from Heidegger’s claim 
right before. Even if every Dasein is jeweilig – according to its sense (seinem Sinne nach)! – it does not 
follow that there is Jeweiligkeit als solche. The structurally determined sense of being, for each Dasein, is 
regional. And Heidegger’s insistence that there is structure as such, amounts to saying that there is 
regionality as such, which is a meaningless expression – there simply is no “fundamental character of 
being” (Fundamentalcharaker des Sein), if that is meant to imply region as such, structure as such, sense as 
such. Insisting on these terms means to insist on a no-reality – it is the fundamental ontologist’s perennial 
hoax. 
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 Note Kisiel’s qualifier: “In this question of appropriately titling the different drafts, it should be noted 
that the guiding focus of this draft is not a concept, be it being or time, but “the full force of the 
interrogative experience” first clearly posed in its “initial vitality” and “full vigor” by Plato in the Sophist, 
244A (GA 20: 179/129). The true thrust of “dia-lectic” in Plato, for all its verbosity, suggests that we are in 
this interrogation at the very threshold of language (201/149)” (363). 
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 Cf. also: “The “question of being itself” is clearly meant to be the leading edge of BT itself, that thin 
cutting edge that would bare the immediate and thus radical reality of “being” first described in its fullness 
in KNS” (366). 
34
 This note does not add to Kisiel’s argument here and thus does not affect my present criticism. Kisiel 
simply remarks on the “prolific occurrence of the nondescript word “structure”” in Heidegger’s text, which 
he presents as indicative of “its guiding significance for Heidegger’s formally indicative and schematizing 
approach” (545). There is no further illumination as to what such significance really amounts to, which 
would amend the problems in the main body of the text, addressed in the following. 
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 Kisiel does not define this term, and so it is not clear what exactly that means, or how it is different from 
perception in general, or whether it constitutes a “substructure” of perception. 
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 I am indebted to Katherine Arens for bringing the problematic character of this particular passage to my 
attention. 
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 This is Stambaugh’s (1996) translation for: “Zunächst gilt es nur, den ontologischen Unterschied 
zwischen dem In-Sein als Existenzial und der “Inwendigkeit” von Vorhandenem untereinander als 
Kategorie zu sehen” (SZ, 56). The page number refers to the original pagination, which the GA edition 
shows in the margins.
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 “Das Vorhandensein “in” einem Vorhandenen, das Mitvorhandensein mit etwas von derselben Seinsart 
im Sinne eines bestimmten Ortsverhältnisses sind ontologische Charaktere, die wir kategoriale nennen, 
solche, die zu Seiendem von nicht daseinsmässiger Seinsart gehören. In-Sein dagegen meint eine 
Seinsverfassung des Daseins und ist ein Existenzial. […] In-Sein ist demnach der formale existenziale 
Ausdruck des Seins des Daseins [here Heidegger inserts note ‘b’; see right below], das die wesenhafte 
Verfassung des In-der-Welt-seins hat.” - note ‘b’: Aber nicht des Seins überhaupt und gar des Seins selbst –
schlechthin. (SZ, 54) 
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 Heidegger expressly speaks of “fundamental ontology,” when he returns to the theme complex of “being-
in,” in chapter five, § 28. Die Aufgabe einer thematischen Analyse des In-Seins: “Das bislang 
Herausgestellte ist vielfältig ergänzungsbedürftig im Hinblick auf eine geschlossene Ausarbeitung des 
existenzialen Apriori der philosophischen Anthropologie. Darauf zielt aber die vorliegende Untersuchung 
nicht. Ihre Absicht ist eine fundamentalontologische [Heidegger’s emphasis] (SZ, 131). 
40
 For the full-length quotation, see: p. 96, above.
41
 See: p. 313; quoted pp. 75, 83, above.
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 “Husserl kommt über Dilthey nicht hinaus, so überlegen seine Analysen im besonderen gewiss sind. Im 
Gegenteil, ich möchte mindestens nach meiner Auffassung von Dilthey vermuten, dass Dilthey zwar die 
Seinsfrage nicht stellte, auch die Mittel dazu nicht hatte, dass in ihm aber die Tendenz dazu lebte” (GA 20, 
173). 
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 “Der erste, der sofort die zentrale Bedeutung dieser Untersuchungen erkannte, war Dilthey. Er 
bezeichnete diese Untersuchungen als den ersten grossen wissenschaftlichen Fortschritt in der Philosophie 
seit Kants “Kritik der reinen Vernunft”. Dilthey war siebzig Jahre alt, als er mit Husserls “Logischen 
Untersuchungen” bekannt wurde, in einem Alter, wo andere sich längst sicher und wohl fühlen bei ihrem 
System” (GA 20, 30). 
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 “Der zweite Band, der das Entscheidende enthält, […]” (Ibid., 31). 
45
 See: Katherine Arens (1989), pp. 194-215. 
46
 Cf. Wilhelm Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. XI (Stuttgart: B.G. Teubner, 1960), pp. 70-76. 
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 “[…] Akte[…] in dem oben präzisierten Sinne von intentionalen Erlebnissen […] (409).” “[…] Ähnliche 
Unterscheidungen zwischen Qualität und Materie vollziehen wir bei allen Akten. Es handelt sich bei dem 
letzteren Titel nicht um eine Abteilung und sammelnde Wiedervereinigung von Bestandstücken des Aktes, 
wie Subjetsakt, Prädikatsakt u. dgl. Darnach wäre der geeinigte Gesamtinhalt der Akt selbst. Was wir hier 
im Auge haben, ist etwas ganz Anderes. Inhalt im Sinne von Materie ist eine Komponente des konktreten 
Akterlebnisses, welche dieses mit Akten ganz anderer Qualität gemeinsam haben kann. Sie tritt also am 
klarsten hervor, wenn wir eine Reihe von Identitäten herstellen, in welchen die Aktqualitäten wechseln, 
während die Materia identisch bleibt. Dazu bedarf es keiner grossen Veranstaltungen. Wir erinnern an die 
übliche Rede, dass derselbe Inhalte das eine Mal Inhalt einer blossen Vorstellung, das andere Mal Inhalt 
eines Urteils, wieder in anderen Fällen Inhalt einer Frage, eines Zweifels, eines Wunsches und dergleichen 
sein kann” (411-412). Here and in the following, I indicate Husserl’s italics as such, while I use underlining 
to indicate the block print in his text. If appropriate, any emphasis on my part will be rendered in bold type. 
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 Here I opt for the admittedly awkward translation of “Sinn” as “meaning aspect.” The literal translation 
of “sense” would be misleading because of its connotations of sense perception, in English; at the same 
time, rendering Sinn simply as “meaning” would seem to equate it with Bedeutung. The term “meaning 
aspect,” if cumbersome, strikes me as the best alternative, especially to bring out Husserl’s concern here, 
which lies with the structural organization of meaning, which constitutes the transcendent background of a 
particular life-world, in which particular meanings (Bedeutungen) may become available. 
49
 See: pp. 95 ff., above. 
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 Edmund Husserl (1977 [1925]). 
51
 Cf. Arens (1989), p. 200. 
52
 For Husserl’s actual use of the term “personality” in a very Schellingean fashion, see: PhP (176), as 
quoted below. 
53
 That Heidegger was astutely aware of this facet in Husserl’s thought is evidenced by his remarks in the 
Prolegomena (GA 20), pp. 167-168.
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Section II: 
The Material Mediation of Meaning: 
From Cassirer to Paul and Back Again
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Chapter Three
Vossler and the Refutations of Positivism and Psychologism
The acknowledgement and appreciation of Hermann Paul’s complex contributions 
especially within his own field of Germanic studies and to historical philology, in 
particular, would require a separate study, or rather several studies.1  For my purposes of 
rereading Heidegger, however, it is imperative to register the ways in which Paul’s work 
made a crucial impact far beyond the boundaries of his professional discipline.  
Specifically, the present section, in two chapters, will argue that, to estimate his influence 
on the field of philosophy from which Heidegger forcefully emerged in the late 1920s, 
we must not look at the Neogrammarian revolution as an isolated event, but rather as part 
of an ongoing debate in the humanities, effective in Germany since the 1870s. 
Instead, to establish the stature of philologists like Paul and the most vital 
influence that his work had on philosophy, one needs to take into account the “neo-
Idealist reaction”2 to this revolution, a motion of resistance against the Neogrammarian 
impulse toward a reorientation concerning both the objectivity and the validity standards 
of scientific inquiry.  Against the background of this debate, Husserl’s previously 
sketched semiotics also gains new weight in tracing the different sources of influence 
within the young Heidegger’s development up to Being and Time.  By identifying and 
explicating these philosophical imports as the core of this chapter, we will be able to 
ascertain different facets of Heidegger’s strategy in re-engaging these Neogrammarian 
and neo-Idealist elements of his thought as they will appear in the Letter on Humanism, 
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in which he is trying to remount his philosophical project from the Weimar period for a 
postwar era. 
To this end, we will begin this section, in Chapter three, by locating the linguistic-
philosophical constellation in which Heidegger operates, by looking for especially 
prominent interfaces that would relate his work back to these debates between philology 
and philosophy.  More precisely, the relevance of Neogrammarian innovation for 
Heidegger’s project can be brought out most effectively in the present chapter, I suggest, 
by focusing on one, if not the key representative of the neo-Idealist opposition against 
Paul’s “deviation,” the theoretician and trained Romanist Karl Vossler.  The latter is by 
no means an arbitrary candidate, for he is commonly acknowledged as the primary 
spokesman of idealist resistance in the above sense, in that he authored the “manifesto” 
of this position.3
More importantly in the present context, however, is how Vossler’s work also 
serves as the pivotal point of reference for critical commentary on Paul by one of 
Heidegger’s most notable contemporaries, Ernst Cassirer.  It is not much of an 
overstatement to say that, to this day, Cassirer remains the only eminent Heidegger critic 
in the “public” quarters of professorial philosophy4 who has seen and examined this 
connection in any substantial detail.5  Thus Cassirer’s work will be the material entry 
point to the tie between philosophy and philology that is the key argument of this chapter.  
For a “re-educated” German postwar audience, in particular, this connection has been lost 
in correlation with the willful repression of Cassirer’s own philosophical legacy by the 
“chief executives” of the Frankfurt School, as can be shown, e.g., with respect to one of 
their most influential works, the Dialektik der Aufklärung (1947 [orig. 1944]).6   To fill 
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this lacuna under the guidance of Cassirer, I will thus treat Vossler’s neo-Idealist protest 
first, and then make some comparisons to Husserl’s phenomenological project, to draw
out the particular hermeneutic and historical claims in Vossler’s (ultimately inadequate) 
redrawing of the methodological problem of the linguistic sciences.
After making these arguments, I will turn, in chapter four of this section, to 
Hermann Paul’s corrective, and thus to the heart of how the philology/philosophy 
interchange I am tracing here sets up Heidegger’s unique approach to historical and 
transcendental meaning in a critical hermeneutics.  
Following Cassirer’s Lead: The Vicissitudes of Linguistic “Law”
Before moving into the core of the argument, it is critical to justify this avenue of 
proof, because it is not the most obvious way into the philology/philosophy debate from 
the present point of view.  Most problematic is that the order in which the relevant texts 
appeared does not fully match the historical chronology insofar as Vossler’s “manifesto” 
(1904) is, in large part, a response to Paul’s Prinzipien der Sprachgeschichte (1880).  
Significantly, Vossler dedicates the concluding pages of his intellectual polemic against 
“metaphysical positivism” in (historical) linguistics to critical remarks on Paul’s general 
approach to scientific research in language development.  However, in Vossler’s pen, 
these remarks do not do justice to the tenets of the evolving Neogrammarian project.  In 
fact, we will find Vossler hard pressed to pinpoint the actual differences between Paul’s 
position and his own, in light of several basic assumptions which they both share. 
Given this situation, I suggest that we do not so much have to choose between 
Vossler and Paul, favoring one at the exclusion of the other.  Instead, we have to put 
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Vossler’s overstatement of their supposed theoretical differences back into perspective, 
which will allow us to appreciate both the partial overlap of their methodologies and what 
I will identify as Paul’s further advances, which carry the Sprachwissenschaft debate to 
another level and eventually give him a theoretical edge over Vossler.  
Cassirer’s own judgment on the Paul-Vossler debate also seemingly underwent a 
certain change, at least in terms of emphasis, if not in terms of his underlying theoretical 
position.  At one point, he seemed to have leaned more strongly towards Vossler’s 
engagement of the idealist tradition after Humboldt, whereas most of his 
methodologically more detailed commentary takes side with Paul’s methodology.  
Following this trajectory in Cassirer’s thought is instructive for two reasons, as we use 
this argument to ground our analysis of Heidegger’s position between philosophy and 
philology. 
First, the appeal to Cassirer in addressing the actual differences between Vossler 
and Paul can help us avoid immediate overstatements of their controversy.  Second, it 
may assist us in formulating a more refined account of Paul’s advance over Vossler, not 
as a matter of clear opposition and dismissal but of improvement and expansion.  Thus 
taking our cues from the different stages (of emphasis) in Cassirer’s critical commentary 
on the two authors under consideration, we can then examine in more detail Vossler’s 
case for a Humboldt-inspired neo-Idealism, followed by an account of Paul’s view and its 
theoretical advantages.  
According to Cassirer’s critical commentary, the stakes of the Paul-Vossler 
controversy can be introduces as follows:
If we look back over the whole development of the philosophy of language from 
Humboldt to the neogrammarians, from Schleicher to Wundt, we see that with all 
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its increased special knowledge and insight it has, from the purely methodological 
point of view, moved in a circle. The attempt was made to relate linguistics to 
natural science, […] But the concept of nature that was chosen as a basis proved 
more and more to be a unity only in appearance. […] This development can be 
followed in the concept of phonetic law, which at first designated a strict, uniform 
necessity governing all linguistic changes, but became more and more alien to this 
signification. […] Thus, the very concept which was expected to provide a unified 
foundation for linguistic science, remained fraught with unmediated antagonisms 
which created new problems for the philosophy of language. (I, 173) 
This synoptic account is especially instructive, because it bars a common prejudice, 
which associates the Neogrammarian movement with a version of scientific determinism 
based on a conception of natural laws (including sound laws) as expressions of “‘blind’ 
necessity” (ibid.).  However, as Cassirer intimates in general terms in this passage, the 
pending revolution in linguistic science was not that simple, and no such “deterministic 
breakthrough” could be achieved, if one was looking for a limited theory of linguistic 
epistemology.  Continued research in comparative linguistics did not support the 
ambition of rigidly “naturalizing” Sprachwissenschaft in this manner, either, insofar as 
the guiding concept of law itself remained problematic.  What Paul and the 
Neogrammarians sought were principles, not laws – strategies that could model language 
change, not necessarily predict it.
The crumbling of this too-simple ideal of positivism is enthusiastically embraced 
by Karl Vossler, for whose neo-Idealist position Cassirer provides the following 
characterization which puts that stance into a more nuanced philosophical context: 
In his two books Positivismus und Idealismus in der Sprachwissenschaft (1904) 
(Positivism and Idealism in Linguistic Science) and Sprache als Schöpfung und 
Entwicklung (1905) (Language as Creation and Development) Vossler shows 
unmistakable Hegelian influence; but no less distinct is the line connecting him 
with Wilhelm von Humboldt. Humboldt’s idea that language must never be 
considered a mere work (ergon) but as an activity (energeia), that the “facts” of 
language become fully comprehensible only if we trace them back to the spiritual 
actions from which they arise, is revived here under changed historical conditions. 
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Even in Humboldt this principle is intended to indicate not so much the 
psychological “origin” of language as its enduring form that is effective through 
all the phases of its growth. This growth does not resemble the mere unfolding of 
a given natural germ, but everywhere bears the character of a spiritual spontaneity 
which is manifested in a new way at every new stage. In the same sense Vossler 
sets the concept of language as creation over against the intrinsically ambiguous 
concept of linguistic development. (I, 174) 
This admirably concise summary of Vossler’s viewpoint zeros in on one of the central 
sore spots of this debate about a method to study language change.  In it, different reform 
projects in language studies converged, yielding the “intrinsically ambiguous concept of 
linguistic development.”  As Cassirer indicates, at this point in the debate, attention has 
been withdrawn from the “quest for origins” in linguistic research.  The discussion is no 
longer focused on any genetic or “germ-ic” account of language growth which would 
posit language as a special ontology.  Instead, the interest lies with the form or forms of 
change as the philological terms which need clarification, if they are to ground 
philosophical analyses of the ontology and epistemology of language, especially dealing 
with the degree(s) of creativity and (relative) stability implied by this conception of 
linguistic transformation.  The issue of creativity, in turn, raises the question of the role of 
the individual language user within the dynamics of linguistic evolution that is taking 
place within her language community. 
Regarding both the issue of (degrees of) creativity and the role of language-using 
individuals, Cassirer, in one place, hints at a tendency towards psychologism in Paul’s  
work.  In the essay “The Perception of Things and the Perception of Expression,” which 
forms the second study of his The Logic of the Cultural Sciences (2000 [orig. 1942]),7 he 
thus provides the following critical commentary: 
Hermann Paul has taken another direction from Windelband’s and Rickert’s in 
order to arrive at a solution to the question of the principles of the science of 
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culture. He has the advantage over them in that he did not remain at the level of 
general conceptual distinctions but could take up the thread from his own concrete 
research and was able to draw from its richness. This work is concerned with the 
science of language, and the problems of the history of language constituted the 
paradigm in which Paul developed his fundamental perspective. He begins from 
the assumption that no historical discipline can proceed merely historically, that a 
science of pinciples must always support it. As such Paul wants to use psychology 
[here Cassirer inserts: note 2].8 With this the spell of pure historicism appears to 
be broken. But on the other hand, the science of language and the science of 
culture are as a consequence in immediate danger of falling victim to 
psychologism. Paul’s own theory has not escaped this danger. (38) [Cassirer’s 
emphasis]
Cassirer then goes on to remark on Paul’s debt to Friedrich Herbart’s (1776-1841) 
psychological theory and suggests that “certain elements of Herbart’s metaphysics have 
unknowingly penetrated into the [Paul’s own] theory, jeopardizing its purely empirical 
character” (ibid.).  In this specific regard, he refers to the judgment of Karl Vossler, who 
charges Paul with an import of Herbart’s “agnostic mysticism,” which purportedly results 
in a textual situation where the “basic question – the question as to the essence of 
language – […] is never able to emerge with clarity in his [Paul’s] work” (ibid.).9  All 
these references point to a common issue: how the empirical data of culture reveal the 
constitution of the mind, as well as that mind’s rule-boundedness and degrees of freedom 
in innovation.  “Psychologism” would make language and other cultural products closely 
correlated with the individual mind, whereas a science of culture, as Paul sees it, must be 
based on the common culture of the group.
In a manner atypical of him, Cassirer leaves his comments on Paul rather open-
ended in this particular passage, as he rests content with simply presenting Vossler’s 
judgment.  He does not explicitly say to what extent he thinks Vossler’s estimation of 
Paul’s metaphysical baggage is accurate.  While the very reference indicates that Cassirer 
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thought that Vossler had a point, it is not fully transparent whether he fully endorses this 
line of criticism.  
Hence, we must be careful not to overinterpret the fact that Cassirer appears to be 
critical of Paul in this passage, especially since all his other – methodologically more 
extensive – comments on Paul are appreciative and do not fall in line with what looks like 
a tentative alliance with Vossler against Paul.10  In keeping with my earlier remarks, it 
seems more plausible to assume that Cassirer found valuable contributions in both 
thinkers and that he knew very well where the two agreed and where they parted ways.  
He thus was willing to pursue their debate between empiricism and psychologism as the 
basis for a science of laws within the humanities.
Vossler: The Primacy of the Psychological – “Raphael Without Hands”  
Creativity – the ability to innovate – is the first point of contention between these 
thinkers, because it is difficult to build into a strictly empiricist or positivist viewpoint.  
As is characteristic of his general approach to the science of language, Vossler puts 
strong emphasis on the aspect of creativity, which he spells out in a diction strongly 
influenced by Wilhelm von Humboldt, namely in terms of Sprachgeist (spirit of 
language) and Sprachbegabung (talent for language; or, capacity for language).11  He
thus puts forth one of the central tenets of his position in a way that expresses his anti-
positivist orientation and also underscores the proximity of his theory to Paul’s: 
Wenn die Menschen sich sprachlich untereinander verständigen, so hat das doch 
nicht seinen Grund in der Gemeinsamkeit der Sprachkonventionen oder des 
Sprachmateriales oder des Satzbaues, sondern in der Gemeinsamkeit der 
Sprachbegabung. “Sprachgemeinschaften,” Mundarten u. dgl. gibt es in 
Wirklichkeit überhaupt nicht. Diese Begriffe kommen ebenfalls nur durch mehr 
132
oder weniger willkürliche Gruppierungen zustande und sind ein weiterer Irrtum 
des Positivismus. (37) [the second emphasis is Vossler’s; other emphases added]
This denial of the actual existence of “language communities” (Sprachgemeinschaften) 
based in a shared capacity for language (Sprachbegabung) is a provocative expression of 
Vossler’s overall appeal to individualism in his account of the creative element in all 
language use and language development.  As such, it constitutes a specific variation of 
Paul’s central claim: “Das wirklich Gesprochene hat gar keine Entwicklung” (PrSp, 25), 
which Vossler will address explicitly toward the end of his book, endorsing Paul’s 
account of language change being a change in the psychology and cognition of the uses, 
not of the language materials.  His main point is that the phenomenon of (more or less) 
successful language use, or communication writ large, cannot be explained as based on 
some “shared aspect” (Gemeinsamkeit) of “language convention” (Sprachkonvention) or 
“language material” (Sprachmaterial).12  Instead of any such conventional common 
ground, he argues, the very occurrence of linguistic exchange springs from a shared 
“talent for language” (Sprachbegabung).  
In Vossler’s characterization this talent assumes the features of a congenital 
capacity, on which he elaborates with regard to the language skills observable in 
children13: 
Das Kind wird nicht deshalb, weil es seine Sprachwerkzeuge hat und übt, zum 
geistigen Wesen, sondern es hat und übt seine Sprachwerkzeuge, weil es ein 
geistiges Wesen ist. Die Sprache ist das Symptom des Geistes, aber nicht 
umgekehrt. Die Sprachwerkzeuge sind nicht identisch mit der Sprachbegabung. 
(49)
Das Wesen der Sprache ist innere Tätigkeit: Intuition. […] Die Energeia des 
Sprechens erwirbt man sich durch die Geburt; man hat sie, man übt sie und bildet 
sie, aber man lernt sie nicht. (50) 
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This is Vossler’s rectification of what he deems a “genetic” misinterpretation14 of 
Humboldt’s famous dictum, according to which “language is not a product, but an 
activity” (die Sprache ist kein Werk [Ergon], sondern eine Tätigkeit [Energeia]).  
Through his redefinition of “inner activity” (innere Tätigkeit) as intuition, Vossler means 
to defend what he takes to be the idealist core of Humboldt’s theory of the “essence of 
language” (das Wesen der Sprache) against the misappropriation of the notion of 
energeia, on the part of the positivist. Language depends on spirit, as he notes, and to 
give it an independent concrete existence is misguided. Such misappropriation, he holds, 
is exemplified by the work of Wilhelm Wundt, among others, who falsely “naturalizes” 
(unter welchen Bedingungen […] es am […] naturgemässesten vor sich geht) the creative 
element in our talent for language, within a misguided framework of associational 
psychology.15
Against such positivist aberrations, Vossler enforces the notion of language as 
intuition, when he concludes that “speaking is creation by the spirit” (Sprechen ist 
geistige Schöpfung) (38).  For that reason, as Humboldt says, a language cannot be 
taught, but only “awakened” (ibid.).  Against this background, Vossler proceeds to 
project this general conception of the essence of language as intuition from the plane of 
individual language acquisition onto the plane of collective language use.  After the 
former is construed as a congenital capacity that can be honed but not taught, the latter is 
now considered in terms of the developmental aspects of communication broadly 
conceived.  Apropos language development, then, Vossler introduces a specific 
conception of “relative progress” (relativer Fortschritt): 
Ein sprachlicher Ausdruck entsteht durch individuelle Tätigkeit, aber er bürgert 
sich ein, indem ihn die anderen sich gefallen lassen, ihn aufnehmen, ihn 
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wiederholen: entweder gedankenlos, also passiv, oder ebenfalls schöpferisch, 
also: modifizierend, korrigierend, abschwächend oder verstärkend, kurz: 
zusammenwirkend und kollektiv tätig. Im Moment der Enstehung oder des 
absoluten Fortschrittes betrachtet, ist die Sprache etwas Individuelles und 
Aktives; im Moment des Stillstandes und Festwerdens etwas Passives (sei’s beim 
Einzelnen, sei’s bei der Gesamtheit); im Moment des relativen Fortschrittes, d.h. 
nicht als Schöpfung, sondern als Entwicklung betrachtet, ist sie kollektive geistige 
Tätigkeit. (91) [third emphasis added]
This is the core of Vossler’s argument against any naturalistic or materialist conception 
of linguistic development: language change happens at moments of individual 
appropriation.  As we saw, Vossler dismisses all variants of genetic (causal) explanation 
schemes for language change with reference to the Humboldt-inspired notion of 
“intuition,” defined as “inner activity” of the spirit. “Language is the symptom of spirit 
[Geist], but not vice versa” (49). 
With this definition of Sprachgeist as creative intuition, Vossler’s neo-Idealist 
conception of language has taken a decisive turn toward individualism and away from the 
language community as an independent force.  In the broadened context of language use, 
Vossler’s account drives a wedge between the individual’s creative (the later Heidegger 
might say “poetic”) inspiration over against the stultifying effects of conventionalism 
inherent in any form of group communication.  In fact, from this point of view, 
communication is convention and thereby by definition opposed to individual creativity.  
This idealist critique of the ineluctable corruption, or “averaging effects,” of 
language by the group echoes Nietzsche’s famous commentary on “herd” 
communication, in The Gay Science.16  Similarly, it is largely paralleled by Heidegger’s 
criticism of the “fallen” modes of language in Being and Time (esp. § 35).17  Here we can 
bracket the question, to what an extent the “idealist” label may or may not fit either 
Nietzsche or Heidegger in other regards.  In the present context of Sprachgeist, they all 
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join ranks with Vossler, along an exaggerated, arguably post-Humboldt trajectory of 
comparative linguistics and historical philology.
Yet this seems to leave us with a seeming paradox, which Vossler is well aware 
of.  If the inherent group aspect of communication is reduced to nothing but an obstacle 
to creativity, then any increase in effective communication would be an index of 
linguistic degradation, pointing ahead to the final disintegration of the language 
community at hand.  Considering the German speaking community as his example, 
Vossler concedes:
Aber wer konstituiert denn das “Deutsch”? Das Deutsch kommt doch nicht durch 
die Passivität oder durch die geistige Beschränktheit der Deutschen zustande. 
Wäre die These der Passivität richtig, so müsste die deutsche Sprachgemeinschaft 
sich in demselben Masse auflösen und verflüchtigen, als die Fähigkeit und 
Tätigkeit des sprachlichen Ausdrucks sich bei den Deutschen steigert. – Die 
Erfahrung lehrt das Gegenteil: je begabter und je zivilisierter ein Volk, desto 
vollkommener seine Sprache, desto klarer und sicherer seine Grammatik, desto 
schärfer und feiner nuanciert sein Lexikon. Zweifellos! – Also kommt eine 
Nationalsprache in ihrer Gesamtheit und Gemeinsamkeit nicht durch geistige 
Passivität, sondern durch Tätigkeit, und zwar nicht durch individuelle, sondern 
durch kollektive Tätigkeit zustande: durch Zusammenwirken. (90) [first emphasis 
added]
Here we notice an equivocation in Vossler’s argument (as well as a distinct nationalist 
bias, which will be important for Heidegger’s case), which adheres to his phrase “durch 
die Passivität oder durch die geistige Beschränktheit” (through passivity or through 
spiritual confinement18).  Formally and logically this is a disjunct, pulling him away from 
the creativity he has stressed to this point, but it is apparent that Vossler’s argument gains 
its suggestive force only through conflating these two terms, so that the “passive” 
language takes on the condition of a national act of self-assertion.  This conflation is not 
just a willful imposition, but relates to an ambiguity that is commonly, or colloquially, 
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built into the notion of “spiritual activity” or “mental agility,” in the sense of geistige 
Tätigkeit invoked by Vossler.  
On one hand, the criterion of geistige Tätigkeit seems to be qualitatively neutral 
and a mere index of “mental speed” or the processing capacity inherent in a language that 
facilitates thought.  On the other and, being “mentally slow” or “retarded” is usually 
taken as a judgment not only about lacking “velocity” but also about lacking “ingenuity.”  
The tacit assumption, presumably, is that fast processing is a necessary, though perhaps 
not sufficient, condition for creative processing.  Conceptually, speed does not imply 
creativity, nor does creativity necessarily imply speediness.  However, one might argue 
that, in order to comprehend, analyze, and (creatively?) interpret complex phenomena, 
one has to have a certain degree of mental versatility, to use an expression that conveys 
the ambiguity at hand to the fullest. Being mentally active now assumes additional, if 
covert, qualities of mental maneuverability or flexibility rather than just speed or 
excelleration rates of mental “activity” per se. 
The relevance of this equivocation for Vossler’s argument, which suspends being 
geistig tätig between being mentally active and being mentally versatile, is clear from the 
hypothetical consequenes which he envisions for the German language community under 
prolonged conditions of linguistic passivity.  If there were no collective activity 
(Zusammenwirken), he holds, this language community, just as any other, would 
disintegrate (sich […] auflösen und verflüchtigen).  To be clear, Vossler does not predict 
a scenario of final dissolution.  Instead he expresses his hypothesis in terms of proportion.  
The German-speaking community (die deutsche Sprachgemeinschaft) would dissolve to 
the same degree (in demselben Masse) as its linguistic passivity would increase.  In other 
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words, according to Vossler’s self-criticism of his prior claim, the “thesis of passivity” 
(die These der Passivität) comes down to the seemingly paradoxical claim: The better the 
Germans communicate, the more they dissolve as a language community and become 
individuals. 
What is interesting about this self-criticism on Vossler’s part is that he seems to 
want to preserve some kind of second-order creativity for the notion of effective 
communication, something that might called administrative creativity or, maybe, 
creativity in language maintenance.  For if we do not assume such implict notion in his 
argument, it is not at all clear why the German “national language” (Nationalsprache) 
should evaporate or “die” in the face of increasong passivity.  After all, by Vossler’s own 
definition, passivity does not mean that people speak less.  It only implies that they do not 
produce novel constructions with novel meanings, but merely maintain the linguistic 
status quo.  To use our preceding coinage, we could thus sum up Vossler’s self-criticism 
of his passivity thesis by saying that the linguistic status quo cannot be maintained 
without some kind of second-order creativity, or creativity of maintenance – language 
becomes a strong tool for individualism once it is evolved within the group.  
Differently put, a linguistic equilibrium (the stable status quo) does not
correspond to the complete absence of innovation but requires at least some degree of 
“relatively” creative Zusammenwirken, which Vossler then translates into his notion of 
“relative progress” (relativer Fortschritt) (91).  Linguistically, then, any relatively stable 
status quo is always already representative of a language community’s dynamic state of 
relative progress.  However, the aforesaid ambiguity between being mentally active and 
being mentally versatile carries over into Vossler’s conception of relative progress and 
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thereby undermines his conception of collective activity or Zusammenwirken.  At the 
same time, this ambiguity weakens his final critique of Paul, who, as we shall see, 
proffers a more robust notion of Zusammenwirken, in terms of material mediation in 
language development – a contribution from a group’s changing experience to its 
language, not just from its minds.  
The problem with Vossler’s characterization of collective activity in language is 
that, in the last analysis, it proves to be a model of collectivity, which reduces interaction 
to isolated “offers” of new vision rather than genuine collaboration.  All language users, 
as it were, pitch their individual linguistic innovations into the pot of public discourse, 
upon which it is up to the rest of the group whether they want to accept these offers for 
change or not.  Yet, even this “public” response, in terms of acceptance or rejection, is 
carried out as the mere summation of individual responses.  If those individual responses 
add up to a certain level of statistical significance (occurring often enough to echo and 
put pressure on the group), then the original contribution counts as “incorporated in the 
civic life” (bürgert sich ein) of the language community under consideration.    
In this account, both sides of the linguistic transaction [my term] remain 
thoroughly individualistic as far as creativity is concerned.  When Vossler, in the 
previous quotation (pp. 114-115, above), speaks of the “creative apprehension” of a 
certain linguistic expression “by others through modification, correction, diminution, or 
amplification” (91) (indem ihn die anderen […] aufnehmen […] ebenfalls schöpferisch, 
also: modifizierend, korrigierend, abschwächend, oder verstärkend), such response still 
appears limited to the mere accumulation of individual responses.  To be sure, these 
responses may still engage one another in terms of (statistically significant levels of) 
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common acceptance but not in terms of actual collaboration, that is, not as an 
achievement by the group that surpasses the mere addition of individual performances.
On an almost Darwinian or Schopenhauerian note, Vossler proceeds by stressing 
that all linguistic change, including phonetic change, is a matter of struggle, a judgment 
which again emphasizes its specificity and activity.  Once again, he turns to the language 
activity of children to make his point: 
Man darf sich darum den sprachlichen Lautwandel keineswegs als “spontan” und 
durch den instinktiven Consensus Aller unmittelbar und ungehindert for sich 
gehend vorstellen. Wie alles auf der Welt, so muss auch der Lautwandel ringen 
und kämpfen, bevor er sich behaupten, ausbreiten und herrschen darf. – Wie 
vielen verunglückten Lautwandel gibt es doch! Wie viele individuelle Varianten, 
die am gleichen Tage, an dem sie geboren werden, wieder sterben! Wie vieles 
bleibt auf kleine Kreise beschränkt, wie vieles wird modifiziert, bevor es sich 
durchsetzt! Wie viele sprachliche Neuschöpfungen entstehen Tag für Tag in allen 
Kinderstuben der Welt! Und was bleibt davon? Wie jämmerlich gering ist die 
Zahl der Lautwandlungen, die der Grammatiker verzeichnet, im Vergleich zu der 
Zahl der tatsächlich vorhandenen und vorhanden gewesenen! (93) [my emphases]
This statement is crucial, because it hints at basic overlaps as well as basic differences 
among the conceptions of language change by Vossler and Paul, respectively.  In this 
place, Vossler discards the idea that the successful implementation of a novel expression 
(or phonetic item) rests on the “spontaneous” and “instinctive” sanctioning (Consensus) 
by some kind of communal super subject or collective consciousness.19  As Arens has 
shown, Paul would agree to this, because he also rejects the general conception of a 
“group mind” or a “synergy in mental processing.”20
Hence, it is not the case that language change occurs straightforwardly, when an 
individual produces a new language detail, which is then subjected to the scrutiny 
(judgment, preference) by a somehow unified public mind.  Instead, the new element has 
to “wrestle and fight” (ringen und kämpfen) its way through a multitude of local trials, 
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which may or may not – via ripple effect – eventually result in public acceptance.  In fact, 
the majority of local innovation, he says, does not pass these trials of centrifugal 
expansion of publicity (Wie vieles bleibt auf kleine Kreise beschränkt).
But notice how the status of “modifcation” has changed in Vossler’s 
characterization of linguistic development via innovation (Neuschöpfung).  Previously, 
modification was listed as one of the aspects that was meant to specify how individual 
“offers” for change will meet with relatively creative processing on the part of others.  I 
tentatively explicated this notion of relative creativity, qua group response, in terms of 
administrative creativity or creativity in language maintenance.  In the present context of 
linguistic struggle, however, Vossler appears to assign a different, if not opposite, role to 
modification.  Formerly an index of (relative or second-order) creativity, it is now 
featured as a mere obstacle to innovation in language.  “How much [of individual 
variation] gets modified, before it can become prevalent!” ([W]ie vieles wird modifiziert, 
bevor es sich durchsetzt).  
This sits ill with Vossler’s prior juxtaposition of “modification, correction, 
diminution, or amplification” (91), because now it looks as if modification and correction 
collapse into the weakening effects of diminution.  At the same time, amplification is 
reduced to “mere acceptance” or “repetition” (ibid.) (sich gefallen lassen, […] 
wiederholen), that is, unchanged dissemination understood as a centrifugal ripple effect, 
in the above sense.  In other words, what first looked like a conception of second-order 
creativity, has turned out to be a mere filter mechanism.  Modification and amplification 
thus seem to be mutually exclusive.  If a linguistic invention by one individual gets 
modified, or corrected, by another, we cannot speak of collective activity in the sense of 
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genuine cooperation, for modification means replacement of one element through 
something else.  Accordingly, amplification proceeds only through repetition, which 
expands the radius of the novelty’s “circle” or public ripple effect.  Creativity thus rests 
solely with the individual language user, with group resources acting only to reflect and 
reinforce it.  In fact, earlier in the book, Vossler seems to say as much, when he speaks of 
language development in terms of “contribution”: 
[A]uf diesem Weg erfolgt alle Sprachentwicklung, alles sprachliche Leben. Jeder 
gibt seinen kleinen Beitrag, jeder beteiligt sich schöpfend: Sprechen ist geistige 
Schöpfung. […] Nachsprechen ist Sache des Papageis. Dafür hat der Papagei aber 
auch keinen Stil und ist kein Sprachzentrum. Er ist sozusagen die personifizierte 
Sprachkonvention, die reine Passivität; er spricht die Sprache nach, aber er 
behandelt sie nicht schöpferisch. (38) [emphases added] 
As Vossler says here, “everyone makes his small contribution” (Jeder gibt seinen kleinen 
Beitrag).  It is each individual that constitutes a “language center” (Sprachzentrum), as 
the source for spiritual creation (geistige Schöpfung).  Mere repetition, by contrast, is 
described as but a “parrot” mode that lacks any creativity.  
In this passage, Vossler deploys a specific notion of “style” (Stil), which proves to 
be the centerpiece of his model for a critical aesthetics grounded on the individual subject 
of language, that is, a critical stylistics in the service of a hermeneutic method of 
(re)construction which allows for the specificity of an utterance within a historical 
moment, yet still locates its meaning within the individual psyche as an originary act.  
Generally, this method is not new with Vossler.  In fact, without saying so, here he shows 
himself closest to Johann Gustav Droysen who took up the same anti-positivist cause in 
historical science that Vossler is taking up in the field of linguistics.21
In doing so, both authors place themselves within a hermeneutic tradition is 
indebted to Friedrich Schleiermacher’s (1768-1834) prototypical account of the 
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reconstruction of creative processes for the sake of a decidedly non-dogmatic practice of 
interpretation that aims at tying meanings back to both textuality and historical 
specificity, as well as to the psyches of the writing and interpreting subjects – all as 
contributing factors to the community of meaning.  This approach is non-dogmatic in that 
the new hermeneutic method was not tailored to the specific contents of privileged texts 
(such as holy writings), nor did it grant any author privileged access to their own (textual) 
creations.  The latter aspect, in particular, points to one of the theoretical cornerstones in 
this hermeneutic tradition, famously captured in Schleiermacher’s claim that it is 
generally possible “that we [as interpreters] understand the author better than he 
understood himself.”22
 As for hermeneutic reconstruction, Bleicher (1980) summarizes Schleiermacher’s 
prototypical conception of the former in a way that emphasizes the importance of this 
approach not only for the anti-positivist campaign of Vossler, but also for the 
hermeneutic project of Dilthey and Heidegger’s response thereto: 
Apart from continuing the tradition of hermeneutics by systematizing and 
generalizing the methods of interpretation that had already been in use, 
Schleiermacher ranks as a central figure for two more reasons: one, he 
complemented grammatical exegesis with psychological interpretation, which he 
refered to as “divinatory.” Hermeneutics is as much art as it is science; it 
endeavors to reconstruct the original creative act – “how it really was.” Two, it is 
with Schleiermacher that we encounter the first step to analyze the process of 
understanding and inquire into the possibilities and limits of it. Adumbrating 
Dilthey’s conception, Schleiermacher refers to the substratum of general human 
nature that underlies potentially successful communication. Individual differences 
are acknowledged, which leads to the requirement of congeniality: the interpreter 
ought to approximate the intellectual – “spiritual” – stature of the author as 
closely as possible. (15) [emphases added] 
 This requirement of “congeniality” marks a specific strand of Hegelian thought that 
recurs, mutatis mutandis, in both Droysen and Vossler.  As Gadamer has argued, both 
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authors reject the teleological side of Hegel’s account of world history.23  While they 
redefine the positive dictum of reconstructing meaning “as it was” into the context of an 
individual creator, they are both invested in his notion of universal history.  In other 
words, the universality of history is understood as correlative to “the substratum of 
general human nature,” as Bleicher puts it, which consitutes the enabling conditions for a 
hermeneutic enterprise that is both non-dogmatic and objective.  The human mind 
becomes the universal that history in its appearance is not; that mind generates the 
community impulse for communication, as well, as being the center for the understanding 
of that communication.
Here, a comparison from other voices in that nineteenth-century hermeneutics 
debate becomes critical.  Universal history, in Droysen’s hermeneutic treatment of that 
theme, is featured as a total, if developmental frame of reference – a heuristic for our acts 
of understanding.  By way of simplification, we can say that, for him, the interpreter’s 
understanding “alien,” i.e., historically removed, epochs, texts, or individuals requires 
participation in the same developmental totality of universal history from which these 
subject matters spring.  While a complete vision of this totality is not available to the 
finite mind of any hermeneutically critical historian, univeral history still functions as a 
regulative framework for historical method, an assumption that history and the aggregate 
of human minds can be rendered transparent to each other.  Oriented by the same 
overarching frame of reference, the interpreter and the objects of history to be interpreted 
thus share, and participate in, the same universal historical congeniality.24
With Vossler, who combines Hegel’s account of universal history with 
Humboldt’s account of the universality of the spirit of language, such congeniality is 
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spelled out in terms of the linguisticality of understanding as both the driving force and 
the enabling condition for language development and successful communcation, without
being reducible to either of the two.  He thus finesses the role of the individual within the 
community by rendering their relationship part of a necessary commonality of human 
mind, not as an originating force in their relation.   Mediated by the work of other 
historical hermeneuticists of the day, like Droysen (who goes unmentioned in the 1904 
“manifesto”), Vossler’s present sketch of a model for critical stylistics thus enlist 
Schleiermacher’s hermeneutic notion of reconstructing creative acts, within a linguistic 
framework of the all-pervasive influence of Sprachgeist.  The goal of hermeneutics thus 
is to recreate individuality rather than to recover the network of communication in a time 
or place.
Here, the spirit of language is featured as the creative substratum that both links 
and separates all beings endowed with the “gift of language,” in the sense of a congenital 
capacity or Sprachbegabung.  The spirit thus links all language-talented creatures, insofar 
as they can spontaneously invent their own new language, even if initially they have no 
common ground in terms of shared language conventions.25  Accordingly, the other 
aspect of this relationship, namely of separation, is not primarily concerned with these 
conventional differences, including the differences between one’s mother tongue and any 
foreign language, since those can always be bridged as long as all parties possess the gift 
of language.  Instead, separation among individuals occurs with respect to a difference in 
creativity, which is a matter of spiritual activity or versatility,26 or, if you will, of artistic 
intensity.  Some speakers are simply “more talented,” or more intense in their linguistic 
activity than others, as they set themselves apart from their “conservative language-
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audience” (60).  Here, again, then, the psychology of the individual speaker appears as 
the central creative force in generating meaning through language.
Importantly, this difference is a matter of degree and not absolute, which Vossler 
further explicates through his claim that again begins to sound nationalist: that the 
difference between “cultured language” (Kultursprache) and “non-cultured language” 
(Nicht-Kultursprache [Mundart]) is but a difference of degree and not a “difference in 
essence” (kein “Wesensunterschied”) (59).  Here, regional difference (local-cultural 
“dialect”) is effectively suspended between national unity, featured as linguistic 
continuity, on one hand, and individual creativity, on the other.  Differently put, on this 
continuous scale of linguistic activity or intensity, the creativity of some language artists 
is more “mercurial” (sprunghaft), which means they show greater “individual initiative” 
(individuelle Initiative) (60),27 and thus are more determining of the collective.
As for the reconstruction of any such more or less intense, creative act, Vossler 
cotrasts his (and, interestingly, Benedetto Croce’s) approach of a new critical stylistics 
with “old” forms of aesthetic dogmatism, where the critic would invoke an preconceived, 
abstract ideal of beauty (harmony, or some highest aesthetic good) as the external 
standard to be imposed on a particular artwork.  By contrast, Vossler endorses a point of 
view that compares any “artwork” broadly understood, that is, any creative innovation 
writ large (including any form of linguistic innovations) only to itself.28  That is, Vossler 
combats aesthetics with his stylistics, in order to transpose the exemplary content of a 
work in language into the psychological context of the producer, rather than referencing it 
to the overriding arc of historical development, as a pure Hegelian would.  
He asserts the “scientific” status of this “critical procedure” as follows:
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Dabei ist das kritische Verfahren dasjenige aller geistigen Kritik: nämlich 
bewusste Nachschöpfung oder Reproduktion des inneren Prozesses der zum 
Kunstwerk etc. geführt hat. Wie eine logische oder eine arithmetische Funktion 
einzig nur dadurch zu kontrollieren ist, dass man sie wiederholt, so kann auch die 
ästhetische Funktion nur durch “Nachempfinden,” oder besser: Nachschöpfen 
verstanden und beurteilt werden. Irrtum ist hier möglich und sogar sehr häufig, 
aber Willkür ist ausgeschlossen. Das Verfahren demnach durchaus 
wissenschaftlich. [here, Vossler inserts note 1]29 (42-43) [emphasis added] 
This description is again very Humboldtian in character, as it describes a language 
community as those individuals who are, through their language ability and shared 
historical moment, able to access the work’s content by accessing the acts of mind which 
created it.  On a self-critical note, he illustrates this procedure with reference to the Vita
by Benvenuto Cellini, the individual style of which Vossler had actually failed to 
appreciate according to the new criteria he is now putting forth.30  Thus using his own 
previous analytical work as a tangible counter-example, he emphasizes the need for a 
form of work-internal, or immanent critique of individual style.  He does so, again, in 
order to take a specific position against positivism, and to move his notion of science of 
language into a study of the rule-based acts of mind.
Such critique is also meant to provide a fine-tuned structural analysis that would 
assess any product of spiritual activity (geistige Tätigkeit) on its own terms, so to speak.  
More precisely: 
Erinnern wir uns nun, dass nach unserer Definition das Wesen der Stilistik in der 
idealistischen Ergründung des sprachlichen Ausdrucks als einer rein individuellen
Schöpfung liegt; […] (36) 
Für die Erklärung des toten und von der positivistischen Grammatik aus 
allerhand Zeiten und allerhand Schriftstellern zusammengetragenen 
Sprachmaterials, d.h. für die generelle Sprachuntersuchung, bedeutet es eine 
unschätzbare Errungenschaft, die beiden Pole des menschlichen 
Sprachvermögens: individualisierende und gruppierende Dingauffassung fixiert 
und ihre Kontrastwirkungen im einzelnen aufgewiesen zu haben. Von der 
speziellen Stiluntersuchung aber darf man quantitativ weniger und dafür qualitativ 
um so mehr verlangen: sie sollte sich bemühen, auch die dazwischenliegenden 
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Grade und all die kleineren und besonderen Züge aus der geistigen Physiognomie 
des isolierten Individuums herausarbeiten. (40)  [the first and second emphases 
are Vossler’s; other emphases added]
With this, he hopes to achieve the decisive turn away from positivism and toward a 
conceptual psychology.  Still, there remains a peculiar tension within Vossler’s account 
of “linguistic expression as purely individual creation” (des sprachlichen Ausdrucks als 
einer rein individuellen Schöpfung), because it is not quite clear whether “purely 
individual creation,” here, refers to the creating individual, especially in the role of 
individual language user.  Or, whether it refers to the created individual, namely the 
artistic product, especially in the form of a novel language item that could, eventually, 
affect the language resources, and hence the historical identity, of the language group.  
Significantly, Vossler invests such “purely individual creation” with “both poles 
of the human language capacity: the individualizing and the grouping [mode of] object-
apprehension” (die beiden Pole des menschlichen Sprachvermögens: individualisierende 
und gruppierende Dingauffassung), which the critical-idealist analyst of style is supposed 
to extrapolate (herausarbeiten) from the “spiritual physiognomy of the isolated 
individual” (aus der geistigen Physiognomie des isolierten Individuums).  
To clarify, Vossler’s present approach to linguistic expression as geistige 
Tätigkeit, I argue, correlates with many aspects of Husserl’s method of ideational analysis 
– they are both in a certain sense phenomenologies of mind, analyses of what aspects of 
mind reveal themselves in certain classes of cultural production.  From this point of view, 
it is not by accident that the later Husserl characterized the unique profile of different 
life-worlds in terms of “stable style,” as I discussed in the previous chapter.  The “style” 
becomes in Vossler a more specific historical reference, yet without historical 
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determinism.  However, since Husserl was in several regards theoretically more precise 
than Vossler (at least, in his “manifesto” under consideration), we can effectively 
elucidate the problable intended position of the latter by translating it into the 
phenomenological language of the former, since both derive from similar premises.  In 
doing so, one does not have to assume complete congruence between the two views, only 
significant overlap in some central regards.  
According to a Husserlian version of this paradigm, then, Vossler’s conception of 
the vectoral interplay within linguistic creation can be seen as oriented and also limited 
by dynamic forms of object-apprehension.  Any such form constitutes the organizing 
principle of a uniquely structured process of individualizing-and-grouping  – a dynamic 
mode of structuration that grounds a uniquely nuanced, experiential domain, i.e., a 
specific life-world, in which certain kinds of objects become available as meaningful 
units. 
Speaking of “kinds of objects” here refers to the immanent, categorial dimension 
of regional ontologies, which was explicated in some detail in my discussion of Husserl’s 
Phenomenological Psychology, in the previous chapter.  In other words, these “objects” 
have object status only within a particular life-world governed by particular principles of 
structuration.  In one sense, then, this can be a cognitivist-individual restatement of the 
Hegelian model for historical epochs.  In the words of the last quotation from Vossler, 
not “all those smaller and particular nuances” (all die kleineren und besonderen Züge) 
within a particular life-world are encapsulated in any single object from that life-world –
thus by implication defining the verbal artwork as immanent to that horizon, rather than 
referring to an absolute “true, good, or beautiful.”  The object does not constitute a 
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complete microcosmos of the experiential domain.  Upon ideational analysis (with 
Husserl), however, each such object may grant access to the principles of structuration of 
that domain or life-world.  In the same sense, presumably, Vossler’s critical-aesthetic 
analysis can be said to aim at bringing out these immanent object-apprehending structures 
from within the “spiritual physiognomy of the isolated individual.” 
Yet, at this point, the aforesaid tension within Vossler’s notion of “pure individual 
creation” (reine individuelle Schöpfung) (96) becomes critical, because Vossler does not 
pinpoint his analytical focus as clearly as Husserl does.  Husserl unambiguously assigns 
priority to the structural nature of the phenomenon to be subjected to ideational analysis 
over any idiosyncratic traits in the perceiving consciousness of the phenomenological 
analyst.  In fact, the very challenge and task of proper ideational analysis is to block out 
any such distorting, personal factors from observation but “read” the unique patterns of 
structuration off of the phenomenon that is being inspected.  
For example, by rotating the image of a medieval house in the mind, one should 
be able to identify certain perceptual structures, which organize and unify this house into 
a meaningful unit within a specific medieval lifeworld.  As explained earlier, the later 
Husserl of the Phenomenological Psychology (1925) appears willing to include “cultural 
colorations” into the rotation test sequence.  So, part of this rotation cycle of perspectival 
shifts may include sequences where the phenomenological observer attends to certain 
social processes or rituals, in which the present house-phenomenon is involved (be it a 
wedding ceremony, a court session, or maybe some kind of leasure time gathering such 
as a game night).
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Accordingly, ideational analysis accesses such ramifications of cultural structure 
by taking its bearings from the Verweis31 character of a particular phenomenon like the 
image of a medieval house, or the “Chinese House” in Hermann Hesse’s famous Glass 
Bead Game.32  The latter kind of image, to repeat, does not by itself exhaust all the 
structures of this life-world but serves as a structural gateway into that experiential 
domain.  Crucially, the act of phenomenological observation must not impose personal 
creativity, on the part of the analyst, onto the phenomenon under scrutiny.  Instead, 
Husserl’s method of running a phenomenological test series, or rotation cycle, is meant to 
let the phenomenon “speak for itself,” that is, reveal its structure objectively.  Hereby 
objectivity refers to the immanent stable style, or structural unity, of a particular life 
world, as the enabling condition for the production and apphrehension of cultural-house-
objects (or any other object) as meaningful units, within a horizon with a specific style.  
For Husserl, then, it is the standards of immanent validity of a structurally unified 
life-world which ground its semiotic productivity and makes it, in principle, accessible to 
ideational analysis as the methodological centerpiece of scientific phenomenology.  For 
him, the “spiritual physiognomy of the isolated individual” (inVossler’s phrase) can only 
refer to the semiotic make-up, i.e., the meaning-sponsoring structure, of a cultural eidos
(like the image, not the picture, of a medieval house).  As it is constituted by the objective 
traits of dynamic structuration encrypted in the phenomenon (as a structural life-world 
sample, not a microcosmos) such spiritual physiognomy cannot refer to the unique 
features of the conscious thought process in the phenomenologist’s mind, in the course of 
ideational analysis.  Husserl is thus much more aware than Vossler of the difference 
between the transcendental unity of apperception as the ground on which any life-world 
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will appear and the individual psychology which may generate a speech utterance or 
work within that world.  The phenomenological impulse to a psychology that would 
enable communication within a group by definition belies the kind of appeal to creativity 
that Vossler attempted to make.
By Husserl’s standards, the less individual creativity one contributes to an act of 
understanding, the more skillful one proves as a phenomenologist.  The immanent 
creativity, or semiotic productivity, of any life-world is accessed most truthfully, if we do 
not infiltrate it by making creative contributions to it from within our own lifeworld.  In 
this sense, Husserl clearly believes in the possibility of skillful self-effacement on the part 
of the truly scientific, phenomenological observer.  While this would seem to put him in 
the immediate vicinity of Leopold von Ranke’s criterion of validity in historical research 
(the positivist dictum of a faithful reconstruction), attributing a method of self-effacement 
to Husserl calls for immediate qualification in order to specify further what Vossler had 
partially obscured.33
To be sure, by giving ourselves over to the structural unity of a certain 
experiential domain, as Husserl would assume, we do not achieve a neutral mode of 
observation, because no life-world can be called neutral without being rendered empty or 
meaningless.  Yet within an overall framework of regional ontology, Husserl suggests, 
we can achieve an immanently objective mode of observation, as we explore the stable 
style and fully integrated, or closed horizon of a specific life-world without (any 
amibition at) distorting or transforming it. 
Vossler’s tense notion of “purely individual creation” in linguistic expression, by 
contrast, is not directly associated with the structuration-indexing qualities of a particular 
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cultural eidos, which would have to be a language item for him.34   Instead, Vossler’s 
model for a critical aesthetics gets more problematic as he expressly posits a notion of 
double individuality with respect to style and accent (Accent): 
Die wahre und idealistisch orientierte Stilistik aber muss sich fortgesetzt der 
doppelten Individualität des Stiles bewusst bleiben. Sie muss uns zeigen, wie die 
sprachlichen Fromen 1) durch die Individualität des Künstlers, 2) durch die 
Individualität seiner Intuitionen bedingt werden. Zwischen Voltaires Tragödien 
und Voltaires Romanen ist ein stilistischer Abgrund. 
Ebenso verwendet ein und dasselbe Individuum in seiner Rede, je 
nachdem seine Intuitionen wechseln, auch wechselnden Accent. (77) 
Stil ist individueller Sprachgebrauch. Stilistischer Accent is individueller 
Accent, d.h. er wechselt von Individuum zu Individuum. Insofer aber der Stil 
einen Gebrauch und eine Gewohnheit darstellt, kann er nicht individuell sein. Der 
zur Gewohnheit gewordene Stil ist “Manier” und wird Passivität. Das 
Individuum beginnt sich selber nachzuahmen. (76-77) [the first emphasis is 
Vossler’s; other emphases added]
This account of style is noteworthy for at least two reasons.  First, Vossler defines style in 
such a way that it can never stabilize into an artist’s trademark or “signature trait” – it has 
some claim to being a kind of historical transcendental.  Second, it shows that Vossler’s 
notion of individual language use (individueller Sprachgebrauch) remains conflicted, 
because not everything he says about particular instances of “stylistic accent” 
([s]tilistischer Accent) seems to hold equally for the particular language user or artist. He 
conflates transcendentalism and historical appearance to preserve an empirical dimension 
to the method of his science of language.
As for Vossler’s definition of style, if the latter does turn into anything like a 
signature trait, it thereby becomes mere habit or “manierism” (Manier).  Here it is not 
completely clear whether individual style is limited to a single creative act only, or 
whether the same individual style can span over several artistic productions or 
performances, or what it would mean if adopted by the group.  Vossler’s examples do not 
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help: for instance, he asserts that Voltaire engaged two different styles in his production 
of tragedies and novels respectively.  But that does not yet determine the scope of style 
within either one of these artistic modes.  In other words, did “the individual” called 
Voltaire already “begin to mimic himself” (Das Individuum beginnt sich selber 
nachzuahmen) at the moment he embarked upon writing his second tragedy (or his 
second novel)?  Even more sharply, is individual style always limited to one artwork 
(literary or otherwise) only? 
Vossler does not directly answer these questions.  Yet, his (self-) critical 
comments on his own treatment of Cellini’s Vita, as mentioned before, would seem to 
imply that individual style is indeed limited to single acts of creation, especially when he 
speaks of the “spiritual unity” (geistige Einheit) of works such as this one.35  In fact, at an 
earlier point in his text, Vossler is more explicit on the issue: 
Zum Ausdruck einer inneren Intuition gibt es immer nur eine einzige From. So 
viele Individuen, so viele Stile. Übersetzungen, Nachahmungen, Periphrasen sind 
neue individuelle Nachschöpfungen, die dem Original mehr oder weniger ähnlich 
sehen mögen, aber niemals mit ihm identisch sind. (37)
If every intution implies its own unique form of expression, or style, then individual style 
would indeed be limited to single creative acts, with no room for repetition or 
development of the same style.  As Vossler says here, even attempts at “translation, 
mimesis, [and] paraphrasing” (Übersetzungen, Nachahmungen, Periphrasen) do not 
preserve the same style but already constitute “post-creations” (Nachschöpfungen; 
literally “[modelled-]after creations”), which “may resemble the original more or less, but 
are  never identical with it” (die dem Original mehr oder weniger ähnlich sehen mögen, 
aber niemals mit ihm identisch sind).36
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But from this perspective, the last quotation contains an understatement, when 
Vossler holds that there are “as many styles as [there are] individuals.”  Considering his 
own illustration with reference to the creative production of Voltaire, one ought to say 
that, generally, there are more styles than individuals.  While Vossler may be happy to 
embrace this consequence, it raises further questions for his working notion of language 
use within a community of language users.  In particular, if the individuality of particular 
language users is not congruent with the individuality of particular styles (since the latter 
will be more numerous than the former), then the question becomes, with which of these 
two kinds of individuality individual language use is associated.  One might assume that 
the individuality of language use ought to be related most directly to the individuality of 
particular language users, but this does not easily fit Vossler’s model. 
In fact, the individuality of any particular language user as Vossler has described 
it already marks a limitation on “purely individual creativity.”  Not only may some 
individuals tend to “mimic themselves” (p.76-77), but any extension of individual style 
past a particular “moment” of intuition and its corresponding artistic production already 
marks a degrading down to the level of “relative progress” rather than pure creativity.  As 
a lingering short-coming, Vossler’s conception of individual style and individual accent 
leaves open the question as to just how long or short-lived the corresponding spans of 
intuition are. 
This issue concerning the length, or better scope, of intuition springs from the fact 
that Vossler’s view of critical stylistics is geared to underscore that the activity of Geist is 
all-pervasive with respect to any area of cultural creativity.  Whether in painting, 
literature, or linguistic innovation writ large, Geist is consistently presented as the driving 
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force behind any genuine change of “accent.”  The difficulties in accounting for the 
supposed scope of any such invention springs from the fact that, in the context of 
linguistics, Vossler’s account of intuition in terms of individual accent is such that he 
wants to attribute even the smallest variation or new “nuance” to the creative activity of 
Geist – a Hegelian overstatement: 
Die Aufgabe der Sprachwissenschaft ist darum gar keine andere als die: den Geist 
als die alleinig wirkende Ursache sämtlicher Sprachformen zu erweisen. Auch 
nicht die kleinste akustische Nuance, auch nicht die unscheinbarste lautliche 
Metathesis, auch nicht der harmloseste Sprossvokal, auch nicht der elendeste 
parasitische Laut darf der Phonetik oder der Akustik oder der isolierten Lautlehre 
preisgegeben werden! Phonetik, Akustik, Physiologie der Sprechwerkzeuge, 
Anthropologie, Ethnologie, experimentelle Psychologie, und wie sie alle heissen, 
sind nur beschreibende Hilfsdisziplinen und können uns die Bedingungen zeigen, 
unter denen sich die Sprache wandelt, aber in aller Welt nicht die Ursache. 
Die Ursache ist der menschliche Geist mit seinen unerschöpflichen 
individuellen Intuitionen, mit seiner 		
; und die alleinherrschende 
Königin der Philosophie ist die Ästhetik. – Verhielte es sich anders, so hätte ich 
wahrhaftig die Philologie schon längst an den Nagel gehängt! (63)
Given this emphatic statement about the all-pervasive character of Geist, down to even 
“the most wretched parasitic sound” (which, presumably, would still be creative, as long 
as it constitutes a novelty, that is, a deviation from language convention), it is not quite 
clear how these microscopic units of language change could serve as cultural eide, in 
Husserl’s phenomenological idiom.  
To be more precise, it is not clear how one could perform the same analysis of 
individual style for common acts of language as communication that Vossler suggests for 
texts like Cellini’s Vita, or perhaps one of Voltaire’s tragedies or novels.  The present 
problem of the scope of his correctives between psychologism and positivism thus boils 
down to the fact that single sound deviations do not display the same structural and 
compositional features, on which Vossler relied when he encouraged the critial-idealist 
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linguist to appreciate the unique style of such works as Cellini’s, which he spelled out in 
terms of “its composition [and] leitmotifs ” (ihre Komposition, ihre leitenden Gedanken) 
(40). 
In other words, whenever Vossler pushes the pervasiveness of Geist to its 
extreme, he seems to forego the structual aspect of language change via language use.  In 
doing so, he, in effect, decontextualizes the “inventions” of spirit, which – by his account 
– rise from the inner depths of the individual to be thrown into the arena of public 
discourse as one-directional offers of linguistic transaction.  In the last analysis, this 
decontextualization yields an atomistic notion of linguistic innovation qua linguistic 
deviation, which both Paul and Husserl would reject on communitarian and 
transcendental grounds respectively.  They would argue that, if considered in isolation, 
no new nuance (“innocent” vocal, or “parasitic” sound [63]) can count as creative 
deviation, insofar as no structural account can be given of how it relates to its meaning-
sponsoring environment within a given life-world.  
Significantly, even if we were to stipulate, for example, that a particular sound has 
never been produced in a particular language community and is now uttered and thus 
introduced by a certain individual for the first time, this would not be enough to give any 
interesting account of what this novelty amounts to.  All the interpreter could say is “It is 
new,” but that would not distinguish it from any other unheard-of sound.  All novelties 
would be conflated in an uninformative conception of abstract newness. 
Taking stock of our criticism of Vossler, we can say the following.  According to 
Vossler’s neo-Idealist conception of collective activity in language development, the 
whole (language community) really appears as nothing more but the sum of its parts, 
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rather than a transcendental ground for the community, as his emphasis on psychologism 
might imply.  Hence, his notion of “relative progress” rests on a notion of linguistic 
transaction, which reduces Zusammenwirken to a public after-image of individual 
creativity.  Upon scrutiny, the individual remains the sole source of spiritual creativity, 
and the historical moment loses any compelling role in community and language change.  
Before moving on to examine whether and how Paul’s theory anticipates and 
overcomes these lingering shortcomigs on Vossler’s part, we can make the latter more 
concrete with reference to his striking image of “Raphael without hands,” which he 
borrows from Lessing.  One of Vossler’s most incisive statements about the “talent of 
language” (Sprachbegabung) thus reads: 
Selbst wenn der Mensch aller und jeder Ausdrucksbewegung beraubt wird, so 
bleibt er doch immer noch ein sprachbegabtes Wesen: geradeso wie, nach einem 
berühmten Worte Lessings, Raphael auch ohne Hände ein grosser Maler gewesen 
wäre. Ergo ist die Definition der Sprache als Ausdrucksbewegung falsch, also 
gehört die psycho-physische Funktion nicht zum Wesen der Sprache. […] Ob es 
zur akustischen Äusserung kommt oder nicht, ist praktisch sehr wichtig, 
theoretisch völlig belanglos. (50) [my emphasis]
This stark distinction between theory and practice is not warranted by Vossler’s own 
exposition of language development, in general, and linguistic transaction, in particular;  
it separates ergon and energeia, to return to Humboldt’s terminology, in unacceptable 
ways.  Considering the present example, we find that Vossler’s claim that “Raphael 
would have been a great painter even without hands” actually begs the question about the 
individual workings of Sprachgeist vis-à-vis the collective activity and “relative 
progress” within the language community.  In this regard, we can criticize Vossler’s 
claim on two levels.  
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To begin with, the assertion about Raphael’s artistic talent irrespective of any
outlet or medium for expressing his “talent” (aller und jeder Ausdrucksbewegung 
beraubt), could be dismissed as purely speculative, a too-complete rejection of 
empiricism.  From this point of view, it would seem, everyone who lacks the opportunity 
to express their creativity could claim “greatness” without having delivered any 
“evidence” or manifest support for this claim.  Vossler might not be impressed with this 
criticism and respond that, according to his notion of intuition, within a neo-Idealist 
framework, it is theoretically  consistent to assume the existence of a creative capacity in 
the individual prior to any particular artistic expression.  
In fact, this assumption, he could insist, is part and parcel of the wedge he is 
driving between theory and practice in this passage.  Within this framework, then, the 
demand for tangible evidence or “proof” would already be taken by Vossler as a 
symptom of some positivist reduction of Sprachwissenschaft, with respect to the 
purportedly proper methodological standards for validity – a wrong-headed ambition 
toward verifiability.  However, even if we grant this point, for the sake of argument, 
Vossler’s claim about Raphael’s unexpressed greatness remains inconclusive for the 
present discussion about the individual and the collective dimension of language 
development, which points to another level of possible criticism. 
Next, then, with respect to Vossler’s previous characterization of 
Zusammenwirken as “diminishing” or “amplifying” (91) (abschwächend oder 
verstärkend), the general assertion about Raphael’s potential greatness does not address 
the question about any possible increase, decrease, or just transformation of the 
individual creative capacity as prompted by the dynamic workings of a particular medium 
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(whether it involves the use of one’s hands in painting or any other material practice).  
Here, the inherent ambiguity of Vossler’s notion of collective activity rebounds.  As we 
saw, the latter remained suspended between connotations of some kind of second-order 
creativity (creativity in maintenance), on one hand, and of a mere filter-mechanism in 
terms of the public acceptance of linguistic novelty, on the other hand.  
Similarly, in the present scenario of an impaired artist, doomed to complete 
inarticulateness, Vossler fails to address whether and how the collective processing of the 
individual’s creations or artistic products may affect and transform the impact of the 
individual’s greatness as meaning.  For Vossler, it seems, the route of creativity and 
creative influence only leads in one direction, from the inner depths of the individual’s 
soul37 to the outer arena of public discourse and collective communication.  He never 
considers the opposite route (which, as we have seen, was critical for Humboldt, and 
which will be critical to Paul), from the group back to the individual, except for one hint, 
in a single subclause, at the end of his book.38  In this sense, Vossler’s neo-Idealist 
conception of linguistic innovation, or spiritual creativity writ large, is a one-way street.  
His model of Sprachgeist glosses over the possible feedback effects within language 
development, which Paul had emphasized as crucial in his earlier account of language as
communication, as Arens (1989) has conclusively demonstrated.39
What those feedback effects of the material side of language might be – and hence 
what levels of intertwining exist between psychology and historical experience – will be 
the subject of the next chapter of this section.
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den heterogensten “Sprachgemeinschaften” angehört haben, und zwischen denen es keinerlie gemeinsame 
Sprachkonventionen gibt, zusammen: – sie werden sich vermöge ihrer Sprachbegabung in Kürze 
verständigen” (37-38).
14
 As an example of such “genetic” misinterpretation, Vossler points to an essay by Eduard Wechßler, 
“Gibt es Lautgesetzte?” in: Festschrift für H. Suchier in “Forschungen zur roman. Philologie,” Halle 1900, 
pp. 349 ff. [cf. Vossler’s note 1, on p. 47]. In summing up his criticism of Wechßler, he remarks: 
“Zwischen der Defintion Wechßlers und derjenigen Humboldts besteht aber ein Widerspruch, […]. Für 
Wechßler ist das Primäre an der Sprache die psychophysische, das Sekundäre die rein psychische Funktion. 
So verhält es sich ja auch in Wirklichkeit. Zuerst übt das Kind sein Mundwerkzeug und später erst 
veräussert es geistige Eindrücke. Aber, was für das Anschauungsvermögen das Primäre ist, braucht es 
darum nicht auch für das Begriffsvermögen zu sein. Im Gegenteil! Schon Aristoteles wusste, dass das, was 
empirisch als das Spätere erscheint, in Wirklichkeit d.h. metaphysisch das Frühere ist” (49). 
15
 For this criticism see: Vossler (1904), p. 48. As he explains in this place, the problem with this kind of 
associational psychology is that it does not even begin to address the question about the essence of 
language (a very Heideggerian line of critique). This flawed approach rests content with pointing to the 
reflexive, rudimentary gestures, like shaking one’s head, which get replicated and become associated with 
certain meanings (e.g., aversion, in this case). As these gestures get socially codified into commonly 
understood signals (of aversion, in this case), they become available to conscious manipulation by the 
individuals, who can now purposely deploy such gestures as a purposive expression of their will, as a 
means to intentional acts of signification. However, as Vossler insists not without sarcasm, this naturalist 
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version of linguistic genesis completely bypasses Humboldt’s point with respect to the conception of 
language as energeia:
So mag es ja wohl gegangen sein. Die Darstellung ist ziemlich unanfechtbar. Man stattet den 
primitiven Menschen oder das Tier mit Reflexionsbewegung, mit Absicht oder Willen, mit einem 
Bewusstseinsinhalt, mit Gebärden und mit Stimmbändern aus – und nun kann gesprochen werden. 
[…] W. Wundt, Münsterberg u. A. erklären uns, wie man das Sprechen macht, unter welchen 
Bedingungen und in welchen Situationen es am leichtesten und sozusagen naturgemässesten vor 
sich geht. Nichts weiter. Die Frage nach dem Wesen und nach der Ursache der Sprache wird gar 
nicht gestellt. Man verdeckt das Problem unter der associationspsychologischen Brücke, die man 
von der symptomatischen zur symbolischen Ausdrucksbewegung hinüberschlägt. Der Positivist ist 
damit zufrieden. Er weiss nun, wie das Räderwerk läuft. Deshalb ist es auch so schwer, ihm die 
Augen zu öffnen über ein Problem, das er gar nicht sehen will. (48) [last emphasis added]  
16
 In aphorism 354, “On the ‘genius of the species,’” Nietzsche writes: “[…], I may now proceed to the 
surmise that consciousness has developed only under the pressure of the need for communication; […] 
Consciousness is really only a net of communication between human beings; […] In brief, the development 
of language and the development of consciousness (not of reason but merely of the way reason enters 
consciousness) go hand in hand. […] My idea is, as you see, that consciousness does not really belong to 
man’s individual existence but rather to his social or herd nature; that, as follows from this, it has 
developed subtely only insofar as this is required by social or herd utility. Consequently, given the best will 
in the world to understand ourselves as individually as possible, “to know ourselves,” each of us will 
always succeed in becoming conscious only of what is not individual but “average.” Our thoughts 
themselves are continually governed by the character of consciousness – by the “genius of the species” that 
commands it – and translated back into the perspective of the herd. Fundamentally, all our actions are 
altogether incomparably personal, unique, and infinitely individual; there is no doubt of that. But as soon as 
we translate them into consciousness they no longer seem to be” (298-299); quoted from: Friedrich 
Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. W. Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1974).
17
 Heidegger speaks in a similar voice, when he says the following, where I suggest alternatives to the 
standard translation that is not concerned with bringing out this nuance: 
For the most part, discourse [Rede; better rendered: speech] expresses itself [spricht sich aus] and 
has always already expressed itself. It is language. But then understanding and interpretation are 
always already contained in what is expressed [im Ausgesprochenen; better: what is uttered]. As 
expression [als die Ausgesprochenheit; better: as utterance; literally: as utteredness] language 
harbors in itself an interpretedness of the understanding of Da-sein. […] Discourse expressing 
itself is communication [Mitteilung]. Its tendency of being aims at bringing the hearer to 
participate in disclosed being toward what is talked about in discourse. – In the language that is 
spoken when one expresses oneself [in der beim Sichausprechen gesprochenen Sprache; better: in 
the spoken language with any utterance], there already lies an average intelligibility; and in 
accordance with this intelligibility, the discourse communicated [die mitgeteilte Rede] can be 
understood to a large extent without the listener coming to a being toward what is talked about in 
discourse so as to have a primordial understanding of it. One understands not so much the beings 
talked about, but one does listen to what is spoken about as such. This is understood, what is 
talked about is understood, only approximately and superficially. One means the same thing
because it is in the same averageness that we have a common understanding of what is said. –
Hearing and understanding have attached themselves beforehand to what is spoken about as such. 
Communication does not “impart” the primary relation of being to the being spoken about, but 
being-with-one-another takes place in [bewegt sich im; better: proceeds in; literally: moves within] 
talking with one another and in heeding [Besorgen des; in this context, better: attending to what is 
spoken about. What is important to it is that one speaks. The being-said, the dictum, the 
pronouncement provide a guarantee for [stehen jetzt ein für; ought to be rendered: have to stand in 
for; literally: now stand in for. – Heidegger connotes a replacement that is but a (bad) makeshift.] 
the genuineness and appropriateness of the discourse and the understanding belonging to it. And 
since this discoursing [das Reden] has lost the primary relation of being to the being talked about, 
or else never achieved it, it does not communicate in the mode of a primordial appropriation of 
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this being, but communicates by gossiping and passing the word along. What is spoken about as 
such spreads in wider circles and takes on an authoritative character. Things are so because one 
says so. Idle talk [Gerede] is constituted in this gossiping and passing the word along, a process by 
which its initial lack of grounds to stand on increases to complete groundlessness. (BT, 167-168) 
As indicated, Stambaugh’s translation is not always accurate in these passages. Yet, the similarity of 
Heidegger’s critique of communication to the respective criticisms by Vossler and Nietzsche is apparent. 
This similarity is not reduced, but rather reinforced, by the fact that Heidegger prefaces his commentary by 
emphasizing that he does not use the expression “idle talk” in a “disparaging”way: “The expression “idle 
talk” is not be used here in a disparaging sense. Terminologically, it means a positive phenomenon which 
constitutes the mode of being of the understanding and interpretation of everyday Da-sein” (BT, 167). –
Vossler might not prefer the expression “positive phenomenon,” because, for him, the passivity that is 
entailed by language conventions marks a deficiency, a mere lack, of Sprachbegabung rather than a 
positive force, or phenomenon: “Das Defizit in der Sprachbegabung, die Grenze der geistigen 
Individualität, erklärten wir, sei der wahre Grund für das Zustandekommen von sprachlichen 
Konventionen, von Sprachgemeinschaft und Sprachregel. Es ist kein Minus, keine negative Kraft, sondern 
gar keine Kraft: Nichts!” (89). Yet, with respect to his notion of “relative progress,” Vossler immediately 
qualifies this claim about linguistic conventions as a mere “nothing.” As we shall see, Vossler’s account of 
communication as conformism in opposition to the creativity of Geist remains conflicted. Just as 
Heidegger, in the passage quoted from Being and Time, Vossler keeps wavering between disparaging and 
not so disparaging comments about the ineluctable effects of language use in communication. 
18
 Notice that, in German, the connotations of “geistige Beschränktheit” are harsher than the literal English 
rendering suggests, as it carries overtones of mental retardation or downright stupidity. 
19
 To be clear, the expressions “communal subjectivity” and “collective consciousness” can be used in 
different ways which may not always be congruent in their connotations of different degrees of overall 
mental unity, coherence, or homogeneity. In the present context, I use these two expressions as synonyms 
for a unified mental exigency that would be able to issue – express from its own resources – linguistic 
judgment as “spontaneously” as is normally associated with the conscious language use of individual 
speakers and their respective linguistic attitude (preferences, reservations, aversions, etc.).
20
 See, Arens (1989): “Paul is not looking for a synergy in mental processing, it is not a model for group 
mind. He looks instead for a psychological pattern that conforms to typical mental activity” (135) 
[emphasis added]. The consequences that Arens draws from this insight are crucial for understanding the 
methodological thrust of Paul’s entire project. Following her instructive commentary on the issue, I will 
return to this central feature of Paul’s theory, in the third section of this chapter, below. 
21
 For Droysen’s general agenda, see, e.g. Kurt Mueller-Vollmer’s introductory remarks in: The 
Hermeneutics Reader: Texts of the German Tradition from the Enlightenment to the Present, ed. K. 
Mueller-Vollmer (New York: Continuum, 1985), pp. 118-119.
22
 Cited in Mueller-Vollmer (1985), p. 87. 
23
 Concerning the non-teleological aspect, Gadamer states: “Thus resistance to the philosophy of world 
history drove history into the wake of philology. Its pride was to conceive the continuity of world history 
not teleologically, nor in the style of pre- or postromantic enlightenment, in terms of a final state which 
would be the end of history, a day of judgment for world history, as it were. But for the historical school 
there exists neither an end of history nor anything outside it. Hence the whole continuity of universal 
history can be understood only from historical tradition itself. But this is precisely the claim of literary 
hermeneutics, namely that the meaning of a text can be understood from itself. Thus the foundation for the 
study of history is hermeneutics” (199). For Droysen, in particular, see: “No preconceived idea concerning 
the significace of history should prejudice historical research. However, the self-evident assumption of 
historical research is that history constitutes a unity. Thus Droysen can explicitly acknowledge that the 
unity of world history is a regulative idea, even if it is not a concept of a providential plane” (208). Here 
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and in the following the page references to Truth and Method, refer to: Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and 
Method, trans. J. Weinsheimer and D.G. Marshall, 2nd revised edition (New York: Continuum, 1989).
24
 According to Bleicher’s summary, “Droysen’s hermeneutical theory contains two central points: the 
theory of experience and that of reconstruction. The former, which indicates some Hegelian influence, 
refers to a human need for expressing ‘inner’ processes. In the perception of such expressions, they are 
projected into the inner life of  the perceiver where they give rise to the same processes. The 
correspondence of re-experienced and original process is guaranteed by an ‘absolute totality’ which we 
only have a faint conception of, but in which the originator and perceiver participate on account of their 
shared humaneness. – How the perception of an expression leads to inner reproduction is more properly 
dealt with in the second theory. In the study of history we are, initially, confronted with something 
unfamiliar and it is our task to assimilate it so that we can grasp it adequately and use it. – […] ‘History 
brings to consciousness what we are and what we possess’: our existence is not mere ‘metabolic change’ 
but we participate in a ‘second creation’ – that of an ‘ethical world.’ [Here, Bleicher inserts: note 8: Ibid. 
{Droysen, quoted in Wach (1933), vol. III}, p. 155]. Accordingly, Droysen refuses to concern himself 
solely with methodological questions at the cost of substantive considerations” (18). 
This characterization of Droysen’s ethical concerns is significant, because it indicates the social 
and political stakes of a new critical hermeneutics, for which Vossler, in the aftermath of Droysen’s work, 
provides an aesthetic focus in terms of his critical-aesthetic method, which I will address immediately 
below. Significantly, from a shared platform of anti-positivism, both Droysen and Vossler stress the moral 
dimension of historical-linguistic science. The expressive “style” of Vossler’s “manifesto” is polemical 
throughout, but this should not distract us from the genuine ethical concern that informs his discussion. 
Even if we remain hesitant to take all of his more satirical statements at face value, we should nonetheless 
pay heed to the “danger[s]” (80) of unchecked positivism and empiricism, as he presents them. 
In this context, some of Vossler’s more violent formulations are revealing, when he speaks about 
the “rectal science of radical positivism” (die Afterwissenschaft des radikalen Positivismus), about 
“intellectual suicide” (intellektuellen Selbstmord) (26), about  “dead language parts in mass- and single 
graves” (tote Sprachteile in Massen- und Einzelgräbern) (38), and about the fact that “nothing is more 
dangerous and nothing more ridiculous than an empiricist who philosophizes” (Nichts ist gefährlicher und 
nichts ist lächerlicher als ein Empiriker, der philosophiert) (80). Using somewhat less drastic rhetorical 
means, such moral implications were also highlighted in the neo-Schellingean projects of Cassirer and 
Tillich, respectively, before they were effectively suspended in Heidegger’s work. 
As will be shown in the next section of the present discussion, the work of Gadamer, one of 
Heidegger’s most renowned students, presents something of a hybrid case in this regard. Gadamer’s work 
is of special interest, I argue, because his methodology is most intimately linked as a systematic philology 
to central insights of Paul’s Prinzipienlehre, although this connection is not acknowledged sufficiently. Just 
like Heidegger in Being and Time, Gadamer makes brief references to Vossler at crucial junctures of his 
argument, in Truth and Method, without bringing the Neogrammarian side of the debate over linguistic 
creativity and language development into play. Unearthing this omission will also shed light on Gadamer’s 
tendency to downplay the importance of Cassirer for his own hermeneutic project, a tendency which he 
seems to have inherited from his teacher. 
25
 Cf. note 13, above. 
26
 For the previous discussion of the ambiguity adhering to this term, see p. 136, above. 
27
 As Vossler explains in more detail: “Freilich, je primitiver die Kulturverhältnisse, desto furchtsamer, 
desto zögernder, desto unscheinbarer und unsichtbarer die individuelle Tat in der Fortbildung der Sprache. 
Je geringer dementsprechend der Vorsprung des sprachschöpfenden Individuums vor dem konservativen 
Sprachpublikum, um so weniger sprunghaft und augenfällig, um so kontinuierlicher und regelmässiger die 
Vorwärtsbewegung der ganzen Sprachgemeinschaft. In der Mundart geht es schneckenmässig und 
gleichmässig, in der Kultursprache sprunghaft und weniger einheitlich vorwärts. Aber dort wie hier kommt 
aller Fortschritt nur durch die individuelle Initiative zustande. Nirgends ist Gesetz, überall ist Freiheit das 
Prinzip des geistigen Lebens” (60). 
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28
 In this place Vossler proffers a methodological equation of the “science of language” 
(Sprachwissenschaft), “stylistics” (Stilistik), and “art history” (Kunstgeschichte), yielding the program for a 
“new, critical aesthetics” (neue, kritische Ästhetik).  He emphasizes the non-dogmatic character of this 
novel form of aesthetic criticism in contradistinction from any critique of art and/as language that posits 
any abstract ideal of beauty, which, according to Vossler, has to be dismissed as basically arbitrary: “Also 
nochmals: Sprachwissenschaft im reinen Sinn des Wortes ist nur die Stilistik. Diese aber gehört zur 
Ästhetik. Sprachwissenschaft ist Kunstgeschichte. – Wenn sich viele Philologen beim blossen Klang des 
Wortes Ästhetik bekreuzen, so denken sie dabei wohl immer noch an die alte, dogmatische, nicht an die 
neue, kritische Ästhetik. Die alte verglich das Kunstwerk mit einem abstrakten, selbstgeschaffenen 
Schönheitsideal, die neue vergleicht das Kunstwerk mit dem Kunstwerk selbst; denn sie hat einsehen 
gelernt, dass es ebensoviele Schönheitsideale als Kunstwerke gibt. Nicht der Dichter soll die Intuitionen 
des Kritikers, sondern der Kritiker diejenigen des Dichters belauschen und soll uns zeigen, wo und wieso 
der Dichter mit seiner eigenen Intuition in Widerstreit gerät und seiner Muse untreu wird” (42). 
29
 Note 1: “Näher begründet und ausgeführt finden sich diese Lehren in Croces Ästhetik.” 
30
 See: pp. 39 ff; in particular: “Cellini’s Stil wollte in diesem Fall mit sich selbst verglichen sein, nicht mit 
der Grammatik seiner Zeit. Statt dessen zerpflückte ich die geistige Einheit der Vita und zerschnitt sie nach 
syntaktisch-formalistischen Gesichtspunkten: […] Die feineren Färbungen des Stils gingen verloren, indem 
alles nur auf die zwei Hauptgrundlagen: “verstandesmässig” oder “gefühlsmässig” zurückgeführt wurde” 
(40). “Jedoch nicht bloss das Detail ward vernachlässigt, sondern auch das Ensemble: der Geist der Vita, 
ihre Komposition, ihre leitenden Gedanken konnten natürlich mittels eines vorwiegend syntaktischen 
Studiums immer nur stückweise und unsicher erfasst werden” (40-41). 
31
 For “Verweis,” cf.: Heidegger BT, § 15: “Verweisungsmanigfaltigkeit” (69); then esp.: § 16: 
“Verweisung” (74), and most explicitly: § 17. Verweisung und Zeichen: pp. 76-83; and esp.: “Den 
Verweisungszusammenhang, der als Bedeutsamkeit die Weltlichkeit konstituiert, kann man formal im 
Sinne eines Relationssystems fassen” (88). 
32
 “[…] Denn schon seit Mariafels trug Knecht den Einfall zu einem Glasperlenspiele mit sich herum, den 
er für sein erstes feierliches Spiel als Magister benutzen wollte. Es sollte diesem Spiel, das war der hübsche 
Einfall, für Struktur und Dimension das alte, konfuzianisch rituelle Schema des chinesischen Hausbaues 
zugrunde liegen, die Orientierung nach den Himmelsrichtungen, die Tore, die Geistermauer, die 
Verhältnisse und Bestimmungen der Bauten und Höfe, ihre Zuordnung zu den Gestirnen, dem Kalender, 
dem Familienleben, dazu die Symbolik und Stilregeln des Gartens. Es war ihm einst, beim Studium eines 
Kommentares zum I Ging, die mythische Ordnung und Bedeutsamkeit dieser Regeln als ein besonders 
ansprechendes und liebenswürdiges Gleichnis des Kosmos und der Einordnung des Menschen in die Welt 
erschienen, auch fand er uralt mythischen Volksgeist in dieser Tradition des Hausbaues wunderbar innig 
mit spekulativ-gelehrtem Mandarinen- und Magistergeist vereinigt” (265-266). In: Hermann Hesse, Das 
Glasperlenspiel (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1972).
33
 In this context, Bleicher’s (1980) comment on Droysen applies equally to Husserl: “Droysen’s Historik
emerged in the course of a debate with Hegelian speculation and newly emerged positivism. He 
emphasized the importance of a factual basis – without, however, going so far as Ranke and his school who 
advocated the ‘self-effacement’ of the historian in order to arrive at a correct knowledge of the facts; […]” 
(18). 
34
 As a corollary of its notion of Sprachgeist as pervading all spheres of human life, linguistic idealism, in 
general, and Vossler’s position, in particular, implies a certain form of what Best and Kellner (1991) 
address as “pan-textualism,” which “reduce[s] everything to discourse or textuality” (27). I will examine 
some of the implications of such pan-textualism with respect to Gadamer’s work in the next section. 
Toward the end of Truth and Method, Gadamer distances himself from the radical form of 
linguistic idealism advocated by Vossler and Croce: “We have discerned the speculative structure of the 
event of language both in daily speech and poetic speech. The inner resemblance that thus appears, linking
the poetic word with everyday speech as an intensification of the latter, has already been noted, from its 
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subjective, psychological side, in idealistic philosophy and its revival in Croce and Vossler [Gadamer, note 
11]. If we stress the other aspect, the fact of something’s coming into language, we are preparing a place 
for the hermeneutical experience” (470-471). Because of his role as a critical commentator on the idealist 
tradition in language science, Gadamer’s own work presents an instructive point of comparison for 
assessing the extent to which both Vossler’s anti-positivist position and Gadamer’s extended model of 
critical hermeneutics may be characterized as pan-textualist. For the above reference, see: Steven Best and 
Douglas Kellner, Postmodern Theory: Critical Interrogations (New York: The Guilford Press, 1991). 
35
 For “spritual unity” (geistige Einheit), see: note 30, above.
36
 Vossler’s use of the expression “Nachahmung” (mimesis) in this place does not sit well with established 
conventions in aesthetics, just as it does not with his later comments on Voltaire and those cases, where an 
aristic individual beginns to “mimic itself.” In the present passage, mimesis is said to imply some degree of 
deviation from the original, willy-nilly constituting “new individual post-creations” (neue individuelle 
Nachschöpfungen) (37). In the later passage about the artist’s tendency toward “self-mimicry” (beginnt sich 
selber nachzuahmen) (76-77), however, the notion of mimesis is used to stress the non-, or anti-individual, 
tendency toward passivity and convention. Vossler’s conflicted notion of (self-)mimesis thus mirrors the 
fact that he does not fully reconcile the two senses of individuality implied by his account of “double 
individuality,” which lies at the heart of his sketch for a new “idealistically oriented stylistics” (idealistisch 
orientierte Stilistik) (77). 
37
 Vossler does not use the term “soul” quite as frequently and extensively as one might expect in his 
“manifesto” (45, 50, 53, 63, 65, 89, 98). Yet, the way in which it is featured indicates a national(ist) bias, 
which borders on positing a national subject similar to Wundt’s general conception of a group subject, 
notwithstanding the fact that Vossler distances himself from Wundt at several points in the text. With 
respect to “soul,” however, this theoretical distance seems to shrink: “Sollte nicht so etwas wie ein 
germanischer und nordischer Hauch in die lateinische Seele des heutigen Franzosen sich eingeschmeichelt 
haben?” (74).
38
 “Es gibt nur eine teilweise, aber keine reine Passivität; und diese teilweise Passivität ist eben die 
Einschränkung des Individuums durch die Gesamtheit oder umgekehrt” (96). I will return to this statement 
in more detail, in the next chapter.
39
 See: Arens (1989), pp. 131-146. Arens’ study provides the theoretical foundation for my investigation 
carried out in the next section, as I will indicate at the crucial junctures of my argument. 
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Chapter Four
Paul: The Material Individual and the Open System
In light of the problems adhering to Vossler’s notion of Zusammenwirken, 
discussed in the previous chapter, Cassirer’s (tentative) criticism of Paul, already briefly 
introduced, actually appears more plausible, if leveled against Vossler’s version of 
linguistic anti-positivism.  Turning to Paul’s own work, this impression is confirmed by 
the fact that he had already tightened several of the loose ends that were going to be 
loosened, again, by Vossler’s critique of him.  
More specifically, as we will outline in the present chapter, Paul is sensitive to the 
fundamental reciprocity inherent in all social communication phenomena.  Concerning 
these routes of mutual influence, he avoids the one-directionality and one-dimensionality 
that undercuts Vossler’s notion of “relative progress.”  Instead of placing the source of 
linguistic creativity and transformatory power in language development solely in the 
“soul” of the individual language user, Paul offers a more robust notion of collective 
meaning formation, in that he stresses the importance of material mediation of all 
communicative processes.  
Thus going against the “primacy of the psychological,” Paul carries out 
Steinthal’s redefinition of the “soul” in ways that are more resourceful for a theoretically 
consistent, critical hermeneutics within a framework of material semiotics.1  This chapter 
will thus argue that, by reconceiving the individuality of each language user vis-à-vis 
their respective language community, he paves the way for the later projects of 
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hermeneutic thinkers like Gadamer, on one hand, and post-structuralist thinkers like 
Deleuze and Kristeva,2 on the other hand.  
We will begin by turning to Paul’s major work, his Prinzipien der 
Sprachgeschichte (1880)3 in comparison to Husserl’s model of the relation of mind and 
history, and to Gadamer’s hermeneutics of understanding.  Thereafter, we will move to a 
comparison of Paul with Wittgenstein, in order to outline what is at stake in Paul’s more 
materialist – but not positivist – appropriation of a psychological-hermeneutic approach 
to meaning.  Wittgenstein appears more transcendentalist, until we pursue Deleuze and 
Guattari’s correction to his neglect of the communicative situation.  Finally, in the last 
part of this argument, I will return to how the psychologist-empiricist debate about 
science engaged by these philologists (Vossler and Paul) recasts the history of 
phenomenology as we know it, and hence also sets the stage for Heidegger somewhat 
differently than has been assumed.  In this regard, it is, once more, Schelling’s thought 
that emerges as the central reference point.   
Paul’s Prinzipien and Husserl
Coming from a decidedly different point of emphasis than Vossler, even while 
working in much the same paradigm, Paul’s analysis of linguistic evolution provides a 
conception of language use (Usus) that explains the production of new meanings in terms 
of the dynamic relation between material individuals and open systems of semiotic 
transaction, which continually (re)organizes and transforms the life-world of any given 
Sprachgemeinschaft.  He thus redefines the positivist impulse along with the 
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psychologistic one that Vossler stressed, to the end of providing a science of language 
that, at best, overcomes the two.
“Semiotic transaction” here refers to the transfer and (partial) modification of 
cultural eide, in Husserl’s sense, yet within a distinct historicized framework, much more 
explicit than the life-world and with much more weight on the empirical side of the 
communication than Vossler’s idea of style would accommodate.  Within the overall 
structure, or rather process of structuration, which Paul posits as unifying an experiential 
domain, these cultural images constitute mobile units that have two crucial effects.  
First, as the material carrier of meaning they provide the element of what is 
shared in communication.  They break the spell of Cartesian solipsism, because we no 
longer have to look for “other [immaterial] minds.”  Rejecting (doubt-stricken) self-
consciousness as the ultimate warrant for existence, the Cartesian subject is dismissed in 
favor of the material individual, which cannot be defined in terms of conscious thought 
and introspection.  Instead, the material individual, as implied by Paul’s theory of 
language as communication, is a Sprachzentrum (to adopt and reinterpret Vossler’s 
expression4), in which the combination of certain meanings is more likely than the 
combination of others.  In this sense, each material individual, qua participant in 
communication as semiotic transaction, has a unique combinatorial profile which affects, 
and is affected by, the transfer and renegotiation of cultural images.  In Paul’s rendering, 
the features of such combinatiorial profile on the part of the individual language user are 
spelled out in terms of his notion of “semiotic matter” (Vorstellungsmasse), which I will 
examine in some detail, below.  
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Second, Paul’s emphasis on reciprocity in semiotic transaction, and how the 
transfer of cultural images may change not only the structural profile of these images but 
also the combinatiorial profile of the “material pariticipants” in such communciation, 
points to an important extension of Husserl’s view on the nature of cultural eide  and their 
role as phenomenological signposts to particular experiential domains or life-worlds.  As 
explained in the previous chapter, for Husserl these domains are fully integrated, which 
means that their horizon is closed.  These worlds are not “frozen” or static, but the 
principles of their structuration are more or less fixed, isomorphic with the structures 
available in transcendental mind.  For Husserl, this fixture is the enabling condition that 
makes ideational analysis possible in the first place.  If the life-world, of which the 
cultural image under consideration is a structural sample, were not stable, the 
phenomenologist could not study the latter to access the former.  No eidos can 
encapsulate the structural workings of an experiential domain exhaustively.  Remember, 
the image of a medieval house is not a microcosmos of an entire medieval life- world.  
Yet, if this world had no “stable style,” the image could not even be used as an objective 
Verweis that would allow the phenomenologist to (re)construct the pattern of 
structuration for this domain scientifically. 
Paul, by contrast, views each life-world as an open system, that is, a system of 
open-ended meaning production.  Open-endedness, here means that genuine innovation
can take place with respect to the structurational features of both particular cultural 
images and the particular life-world to which they belong, because neither is fully 
determined by the structural organization of the other.  Genuine innovation, then, refers 
to the production of cultural items (including language items) that can take on a meaning 
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that was not predetermined by a fixed set of combinatorial possibilities.  One of the main 
impositions of false limits, in this sense, would be conceiving of the meaning production 
within a life-world in terms of combining basic conceptual units, i.e., some kind of 
immutable “foundational concepts” or Platonic ideas.  
For instance, if a rather austere experiential domain contained only four core 
concepts of this kind (say, justice, female, male, and work) there would be a limited 
number of possible combinations among them, that would yield different meaning 
combinations.5  Husserl, to be sure, is not that simplistic a Platonist, that is, he is not 
committed to conceptual limits in the narrow sense just described.  However, in terms of 
the general closure of experiential domains, his view does retain some problematic 
implications that Vossler tried to paper over.  For Husserl, as they will be for Paul, the 
“foundational concepts” would have to be perceptual categories.  Modelled on Kant’s 
table of categories, in the First Critique (A80 / B106), the Husserlian phenomenologist 
does not proclaim a single table that would apply across all life-worlds.  Instead, the post-
Kantian ambition of this view is to ascertain a new table of perceptual categories for each 
life-world.  
In this regard, Husserl belongs among the pioneers of taking a regional ontology
as the unit of meaning.  For him, these different category tables are not spontaneous 
concoctions of a creative mind, but – ideally – provide objectively accurate charts of the 
structural principles that engender and limit the particular perceptions that are available in 
a particular experiential domain.  
As I mentioned earlier, the later Husserl of the Phenomenological Psychology
(1925) appears willing to factor “cultural shadings” into his notion of perception.  Yet 
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even within an extended framework of cultural perceptions, he insists on the “stable
style” of each life-world.  His overall conception of regional ontology thus remains 
restrictive insofar as no cultural eidos has the power to bend or modify the perceptual 
limits of the life-world of which it is an index.  And it is this restriction that Gadamer, in 
Truth and Method, has in mind, when he critically remarks on Husserl’s purportedly 
more one-sided focus on perception.6  From this point of view, Husserl remains 
resourceful in light of his acumen in working out the methodological basis for a 
phenomenology of regional ontologies.  At the same time, his view upholds certain 
restrictions that foreclose some of the new vistas of a new critical hermeneutics because 
of what may be called his persistent perceptivism, his willingness to discount historical 
forms of perception in favor of an overriding transcendentalist paradigm.  
The restrictions of this kind of perceptivism, I believe, were already overcome by 
Paul’s Prinzipienlehre.   More specifically, Paul’s position allows for the possibility of a 
life-world’s immanent transformation or, if you will, immanent revolution.  In using the 
term “revolution,” I do not mean to qualify any such transformatory event that initiates 
the restructuring of experience in a specific region of cultural life as a conscious cause of 
political reform.  On the contrary, more often than not these initiatives will not proceed, 
or at least not originate, consciously with a declared socio-political goal in mind.  By 
speaking of “revolution,” I simply mean to underscore the political relevance that any 
such structural reform holds or may acquire over time. Differently put, the structural 
order of a particular domain (of medieval experience, or any other) can be reorganized 
from within.  In this view, cultural eide do have the power to affect and modify the basic 
experiential structure of the lifeworld of which they are part.  On the flip side, each life-
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world has the power to change “old” cultural eide and produce new ones in ways that are 
not predetermined by its unique but fixed table of categories of cultural perception, as 
Husserl would have it.  
In taking a parallel position, Paul’s Prinzipien can thus be said to provide a 
conception of genuine evolution in cultural perception, which will prove vital for the 
work of Cassirer and Gadamer.  In the field of historical psychology and comparative 
linguistics, Paul’s notion of communication as semiotic transaction surpasses Husserl’s 
later phenomenological project, notwithstanding the commonality of their views with 
respect to regional ontologies.  Regarding Gadamer’s work in particular, Paul’s 
Neogrammarian endeavor proves crucial, because his notion of language use – with its 
emphasis on material mediation – is key for understanding Gadamer’s notion of dialogue
and its “logic” of question and answer, an argument based closely on Heidegger’s own 
idea of the Ruf or call.   
Despite Gadamer’s explicit statements to the contrary, his conception of dialogue 
is frequently misunderstood as a model for conscious, verbal communication between 
two (or more) personal interlocutors.  However, Gadamer makes it clear that his actual 
model is the event of reading a text – he is taking a hermeneutic rather than an 
epistemological approach to the project.  The resources as well as possible shortcomings, 
in terms of his alleged pan-textualism and his corresponding notion of Schriftlichkeit, 
cannot properly be assessed, in my opinion, if we do not take into account the 
implications of work Paul’s work with respect to the material dimension of language as 
communication.  Whether it is Gadamer’s central image of the “fusion of horizons”7 or 
his emphasis on tradition, which he inherited from Heidegger’s prior treatment of 
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Überlieferung (as opposed to “mere” tradition),8 Gadamer remains indebted to the 
Neogrammarians as the main “neglected” link between Humboldt’s advances in the 
science of language at the beginning of the nineteenth century and the rise of a new 
critical hermeneutics at the beginning of the twentieth century.  In the quarters of 
philosophy, Droysen, Dilthey, and – to a lesser degree – Vossler are commonly 
acknowledged as pivotal influences, whereas Paul has been consistently silenced over, 
along with the only renowned, philosophical advocate of his work, Ernst Cassirer.   
Cassirer’s Paul   
Against the background of the above considerations, Cassirer’s appreciation of 
Paul’s work can now be brought into sharper relief as defining of what was at stake in the 
historical redefinition of science as a discipline of principles that we have been pursuing 
here.  Somewhat in contrast to his isolated hint at Paul’s propensity for a Herbart-inspired 
“psychologism” in the second study of The Logic of the Cultural Sciences, that was 
referred to above,9 Cassirer gives Paul full credit for his theoretical advances in the 
volume’s subsequent essay, “Concepts of Nature and Concepts of Culture”: 
Paul is above all a historian of language – he is therefore not to be suspected of 
wanting to restrict the rights of the historical perspective in any way. But on the 
other hand, he emphasizes that without settling the fundamental questions, 
without establishing the general conditions of the historical process, no particular 
historical result whatsoever can be reached.  The history of language, like the 
history of any other cultural form, must always be supported by a science which 
deals “with the general living conditions of the historically evolving objects, 
which examines those factors that remain constantly present in all change with 
regard to their nature and efficiency.”10 These constant factors can be found 
nowhere else but in psychology. Paul thinks of psychology as the psychology of 
individuals and not, as Steinthal and Lazarus and later Wundt, as “social 
psychology.” The psychology of individuals is accordingly assigned the task of 
conducting the fundamental questions of the theory of language toward a solution: 
“Everything revolves around deriving the development of language from the 
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reciprocal effects that individuals exercise upon each other”” (64-65). [my
emphases]
Clearly, Cassirer is not associating Paul with any metaphysics that would be bound to a 
conception of “things in themselves,” as Vossler had charged.11  Nor is he commiting the 
error of solipsism that Vossler arguably had, when he moved to the primacy of individual 
mind.  
Instead, Cassirer credits Paul with a working notion of “historically evolving 
objects,” the transformations of which can be understood within a framework of cultural 
analysis that combines the insights of individual psychology with a systematic account of 
the principles (“those factors that remain constantly present in all change”) that underlie 
all shifts in our obeject-apprehension.  
For my purposes of probing the Vossler-Paul-Cassirer constellation and then 
tracing it in Heidegger’s early writings (third section), two things are of special 
importance here.  First, in the context of “historically evolving objects,” Cassirer links 
Paul’s Prinzipienwissenschaft to Husserl’s particular brand of anti-psychologism, 
proffered in the latter’s Logical Investigations – another important clue that puts 
Cassirer’s estimation of Paul in perspective.  Second, in distinguishing Paul’s deployment 
of psychology from the methods proposed by Steinthal,12 Lazarus, and Wundt, Cassirer 
acknowledges Paul’s stress on the crucial aspect of reciprocity in the course of meaning 
formation among different individuals within any given language community.  
Considering these two cornerstones of Paul’s science of principles will thus allow us to 
critically reassess Vossler’s notion of Zusammenwirken and his overall judgment on Paul 
in the concluding pages of his 1904 “manifesto.”  At the same time, focussing on these 
two aspects of Paul’s theory will set the stage for the subsequent tracing of the Paul-
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Vossler controversy, and their reception by Cassirer, as this debate underlies Heidegger’s 
text. 
Cassirer goes on to establish the connection between Paul and Husserl in a way 
that is particularly instructive, because it further corroborates the need for avoiding the 
neo-Kantian bypass, which I criticized in chapter one of the present study.  Cassirer 
contextualizes Paul’s work solidly among his contemporaries and then proceeds to 
indicate the repercussions of his methodological breakthrough, which would have had a 
direct impact on Husserl’s and Heidegger’s thought.  Cassirer’s synopsis sets the stage 
for his work: 
When Hermann Paul set forth his thesis in the beginning of his Principles of the 
History of Language, the struggle between the “transcendental” and the 
“psychological” methods in philosophy and in the general theory of science was 
at its height. On the one side stood the neo-Kantian schools, which insisted that 
the first and most important task of epistemological investigation is to distinguish 
between the quid juris and the quid facti.  Psychology, as an empirical science, is 
concerned with questions of fact, which can never serve as norms for deciding 
questions of validity. Today, this separation between “logicism” and 
“psychologism,” which for a long time determined the total character of 
philosophy, has to a certain extent receded into the background. […] Logic, so the 
extremists among the psychologists had concluded, is the theory of the forms and 
laws of thought. It is certainly a psychological discipline, insofar as the processes 
of thought and knowledge exist only in the psyche. [Cassirer note 13.]13 In his 
Logical Investigations, Husserl has exposed the paralogism that lay in this 
conclusion […] He pointed to the radical and irreducible difference between the 
form as “ideal unity of signification” and the psychological experiences, the 
“acts” of taking-as-true, of believing and judging, which refer to this unity of 
signification and have it as their object. [Cassirer note 14.]14  (65-66)
Cassirer is aware that Husserl’s critique of psychologism is not easily applicable to the 
cultural sciences, where the role of psychological “acts” seems to be even more 
pervasive, thus posing an obstacle to Husserl’s distinction at hand.  “Certainly, in the 
domain of the cultural sciences it appears at first sight to be much more difficult to draw 
such a boundary. […] However, […] [h]ere, too, the domain of a pure “morphology” has 
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crystallized with ever increasing clarity, a morphology that employs other concepts than 
those of empirical psychology and that must be constructed by other methods” (66).
In other words, Cassirer makes a connection between Husserl’s analysis of 
cultural form as “ideal unity of signification” and Paul’s analysis of the “general living 
conditions of […] historically evolving objects,” according to a science of principles.  
This clearly relates Paul’s Prinzipienwissenschaft to Husserl’s method of ideation, which 
we examined earlier.  Against the background of this discussion, we can now say that the 
pivotal interface between Paul and Husserl consists in a tacit or overt affirmation of the 
eidetic character of historical objects (cf. the previous example of the cultural image of a 
medieval house, or Hesse’s “Chinese House”) which – upon phenomenological analysis –
reveal a particular structure for the production of cultural meanings that emerge in 
different forms in different regional ontologies. 
As previously emphasized, Husserl was not always equally willing to 
accommodate for the “cultural coloration” when he considered different perceptual 
modes as the structural gateway to different life-worlds, each of which he assumed to be 
stable in its epistemic “style.”  Yet we also saw that the Husserl of the Phenomenological 
Psychology (1925) was prepared to address the historical aspect of perceptual 
structuration, and in this context he is closest to Paul.  With this qualification in place, we 
can acknowledge the methodological proximity between Paul and Husserl, without 
ignoring the fact that Husserl’s conception of “pure subjectivity” and “stable style” tends 
to preclude, if not downright reject, a discussion of the evolutionary qualities inherent in 
the semiotic productivity of any given life-world and the unique constellation and 
interlocking of different cultural forms within it.  
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In this regard, then, Paul and the “basically ahistorical” Husserl generally agree 
on the semiotic power of eidetic items qua cultural objects, while they tend to disagree on 
the evolutionary traits of eidetic items qua historical objects.  Continuing my introductory 
remarks to this section: for Husserl, systems of cultural meaning production retain the 
“monadic”15 character of being fully integrated, that is to say, life-worlds are considered 
structurally organized systems that are semiotically productive but closed.  Paul, by 
contrast, considers such cultural domains as open systems, in that different life-worlds 
can be distinguished in terms of their structurally different modes of signification, but no 
form of that signification by itself is fully integrated.  Differently put, for Husserl, the 
range of availabe meanings is immanently fixed within the closed horizon of any 
experiential domain.  For Paul, on the other hand, experiential domains are more 
developmental in character.  They constitute processes of structuration, in which different 
structural patterns emerge as prominent at different times, without solidifying into a 
permanent perceptual structure that would fix the immanent limits of possible experience 
once and for all. 
These differences notwithstanding, Paul and Husserl agree, at least to some 
extent, when it comes to the second issue under consideration, namely the reciprocal 
nature of semiotic activity within any particular life-world.  In comparing Paul and 
Husserl with the neo-Idealist critique by Vossler, this basic feature of reciprocity 
becomes crucial when we translate the phenomenological analysis of experiential 
domains into the investigation of linguistic development within the life-world of a 
particular language community. 
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Focused as they are on the role of the individual, that is, of the individual 
language user, Paul and Husserl converge on a conception of semiotic activity that frees 
linguistic agency from the psychologistic constraints of individual consciousness.  
Instead they posit a notion of material individuality, where the individual is reconceived 
as a material Sprachzentrum that is subject to specific feedback effects from the group 
and other individuals.  These reciprocal loops of influence go beyond Vossler’s rather 
narrow model of linguistic transaction, in which “offers” of linguistic innovation are 
directed only from the creative individual at the group, but not vice versa.  
Vossler’s account of linguistic transaction, as we saw, is based on a conception of 
linguistic struggle that explains the possible incorporation of any newly proposed element 
through centrifugally expanding trials of public acceptance.  Any Sprachschöpfung
(language creation) starts as a local “abnormalcy” which, emanating from the creative 
individual, may or may not cause “concentric” ripple effects in the common language 
among the fellow speakers.  Aside from the fact that, according to Vossler, most of these 
inventions do not make it out of the “children’s rooms anywhere in the world,” the main 
problem is that this picture of language development seems to reduce Sprachgeist to a 
centrifugal, one-way evolution rather than a dialogue. 
This uni-directionality, or one-dimensionality, becomes especially problematic
with respect to Vossler’s own illustration of “Raphael without hands,” where he failed to 
make a solid case for the claim that the “theoretical greatness” of a spiritually (geistig) 
talented individual was indepenent of the “practical handicap” of circumstantial 
inarticulateness, even if the latter implies complete barring from any medium of 
expression.  Against the backdrop of the Paul-Husserl connection, we can now sharpen 
180
our criticism of Vossler’s neo-Idealist account of the inner activity of (the language) 
spirit, with respect to the notion of “the living conditions of […] historically evolving 
objects.”  Returning to Vossler’s 1904 “manifesto,” we find the most revealing passages 
of his critique of Paul in the final pages of his text: 
Wenn Hermann Paul in der Einleitung zu seinen “Prinzipien” behauptet, dass alle 
Sprachwissenschaft notwendig immer nur historisch sei, so lässt er eben die 
elementare Sprachwissenschaft, die nur erst den Sinn, aber noch nicht die 
Verwandtschaft der Ausdrucksformen untersucht, nicht zur Geltung kommen. Er 
nimmt die unerlässliche Vorstufe und Vorraussetzung als etwas 
Selbstverständliches hin und fasst lediglich das letzte Ziel der 
Sprachwissenschaft, die Erkenntnis der Entwicklung ins Auge. Als 
selbstverständlich vorauszusetzen ist jedoch nur die unbewusste 		
, nicht 
die bewusste und kritische. Diese macht vielmehr einzig und allein das Wesen der 
Sprachwissenschaft aus. An Stelle der These Pauls: alle Sprachwissenschaft ist 
historisch, müssen wir die unsrige setzen: alle Sprachwissenschaft ist ästhetisch. 
[…] Paul sagt es selbst in fetten Lettern: “Das wirklich Gesprochene hat gar 
keine Entwicklung” (p. 25). 
Eben deshalb, fügen wir hinzu, kann es zunächst auch nicht historisch, sondern 
nur erst ästhetisch betrachtet werden. (96) [first and second emphasis added]
These statements are telling because they show a fundamental misunderstanding on 
Vossler’s part regarding Paul’s use of the term “historical” in the central claim that all 
linguistic science is historical.  As was shown by way of Cassirer’s succinct synopsis of 
the methodological stakes of Paul’s project, Paul’s notion of “historical” method does not
reduce linguistic inquiry to considerations of linear transition in language development.  
On the contrary, Paul goes to great length to insist that, if we do not also take into 
account those “factors that remain constant in all change with regard to their nature and 
efficiency,” we will not be able to gain any insight whatsoever from our empirical 
observations and comparisons of different stages within linguistic evolution.
With reference to our prior comparison of Paul and Husserl, we can say that 
Vossler’s criticism appears to be issued from a Husserl-like position that seeks to inforce 
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the semiotically unified character of any linguistic lifeworld.  In other words, Vossler 
insists on the closure of any life-world’s horizon of meaning, the immanent and 
purportedly ahistorical “Sinn […] der Ausdrucksformen” (significatory sense of forms of 
expression) as he puts it here.  Vossler’s critique of Paul’s historicism thus ultimately 
misses the mark, because he does not see that Paul, in anticipatory extension of Husserl, 
detects a developmental dynamic within each linguistic life-world, resulting in a model of 
immanent semiotic evolution.  This has nothing to do with, first, comparing different 
linguistic products of language communities across history and, then – too late, of course 
– asking about their internal structuration of cultural meanings.  
Prior to Vossler, it was Paul who insisted on a systematic “morphological” (in 
Cassirer’s sense)16 account of the immanent evolution with respect to the semiotic power 
of different life-worlds.  Each of these worlds, or experiential domains (with Husserl) is 
thus construed as engaged in an on-going process of meaning production that is 
structurally different from other such processes, not as “monadically sealed” but as 
uniquely open-ended.  As far as the aspect of unique immanent structuration is 
concerned, Paul and Vossler (along with Husserl and Cassirer) are in general agreement.  
Yet their differences come into play with respect to the nature and degree of integration 
of theses structuration processes, which some of them (Vossler and the early Husserl) 
interpret in terms of closed experiential domains, while the others (Paul, the later Husserl, 
and Cassirer) view them as open horizons of immanent transformation. 
Given such degree of agreement, it is not by accident that Vossler’s criticism 
appears gratuitous, when he tries to turn Paul against himself.  Vossler’s use of one of the 
most central pronouncements of the Prinzipien der Sprachgeschichte (“What is actually 
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said has no development” [Das wirklich Gesprochene hat gar keine Entwicklung] [28]17) 
as evidence againts Paul’s own theory is just not plausible.  
Clarifying the ramifications of this dictum is crucial not only for a critical 
comparison of Paul and Vossler, but also to prevent the conception of the material 
individual, which I have extracted from Paul’s view of language use, from the two 
possible, if contrary, misunderstandings that I have been discussing as central to the 
question of science, namely, in taking language as some kind of physicalism or 
psychologism.  In fact, Paul refers to what I call material individuals variously as “mental 
organisms” (psychische Organismen) and “language organisms” (Sprachorganismen).  
More specifically, in his view, the material qualities of the individual language user are to 
be understood in terms of the structural organization of “representational (semiotic) 
matter” (Vorstellungsmasse) within each individual’s “soul” (Seele; see quotations 
below).  Given this wording, Paul’s account runs the two-fold risk of being reduced either 
to some form of physicalism, if one overinterprets his present notion of “mass.”  Or, it 
may be reduced to some version of psychologism, if one overinterprets his present notion 
of “soul.”  
To avoid both of these misreadings, one has to take into account Paul’s 
programmatic dictum in its entirety, as opposed to Vossler, who provides only half of it.  
Adding the first sentence that Vossler omits, Paul’s claim reads: “Die geschilderten 
psychischen Organismen sind die eigentlichen Träger der historischen Entwicklung. Das 
wirklich gesprochene hat gar keine Entwicklung” (28).  The different dimensions of 
Paul’s conception of the “mental organism” have been worked out in acute detail in 
Arens’ Structures of Knowing (1989), from which the following exposition is drawn.18
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Arens’ analysis of the different implications of Paul’s view regarding the routes of 
communicative influence among such organisms strikes me as conclusive.  My own 
contribution in this context is thus confined to the critical comparison of Paul and 
Vossler, and how their debate elucidates the discursive constellation of Cassirer, 
Heidegger, and Gadamer – Heidegger’s gestures at distancing himself from the rest of the 
field notwithstanding.
In the present discussion, I cannot do justice to Arens’ complex analysis.  Instead, 
I want to focus on a particular line of argument in Paul’s characterization of language as 
communication, which relates his notion of the “mental organism” to his conception of 
“evolving historical objects,” which we saw Cassirer emphasize in connection with 
Husserl’s ideational analysis of cultural eide.19  With respect to these two connected 
thematic focuses, Paul delivers a model for “the interaction between culture and mind” 
(137), as Arens puts it, and thus the question becomes how individual mental organisms 
receive, register, and communicate cultural images among each other.  And how do such 
organisms and images affect and transform each other in the process?  Concerning 
reception, processing and registration of this sort, Paul explains:  
Representations are entered into consciousness in groups and therefore remain as 
groups in the unconscious. […] And not only individual words, but also larger 
series of sounds and whole sentences associate themselves immediately with the 
thought content that was placed in them. These groups, given at least originally by 
the outside world, organize themselves in the soul of each individual to much 
richer and more complicated connections which are completed only in the 
smallest degree consciously, and which then have further unconscious effects, in 
the greatest part never achieving even clear consciousness, and which are still 
nonetheless effective. (PS, 26).20
Critical to note is that Paul’s original term for representation is Vorstellung.  As is clear 
from the above, Paul does not restrict its meaning to conscious respresentations but, on 
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the contrary, underscores that, for the most part, the entering and registering of 
representational complexes in the mind proceeds unconsciously through what we would 
today identify as other semiotic processes.  Importantly, Paul states that these complexes 
or “clusters,” if you will, are not limited to word units but come in all shapes and sizes, 
including “larger series of sounds and whole sentences.”  Not just words, but more 
complex utterances, conventional signs, and even whole expressions carry such cultural 
weight.
What is more, these association patterns “are absolutely not to be confused with 
the categories which are abstracted in grammatical reflection” (PS, 27).  So, not only do 
these registered representational units vary in size, they also cannot be mapped onto a 
grammatical chart that would distinguish the intake of verb phrases, noun phrases, 
sentential units, etc.  According to Paul, these clusters defy any such grammatical 
dissection and classification, for the latter must be considered but an abstract imposition 
from retrospect. 
Next, as far as the unconscious organization and linking of these complexes is 
concerned, no two individuals are alike.  Moreover, “it is as significant as it is obvious, 
that each organism of representational groups is in constant change in the individual” (Es 
ist ebenso bedeutsam als selbstverständlich, dass dieser Organismus von 
Vorstellungsgruppen sich bei jedem Individuum in stetiger Veränderung befindet) (27). 
With respect to this dynamic and “idiosyncratic” processing, Paul elaborates:
[…] the organism of the groups of representations relating to language develops 
in each individual in idiosyncratic fashion, and also achieves an idiosyncratic 
form in each. Even if it should be composed in various individuals out of exactly 
the same elements, these elements will still be introduced in different order, in 
different groupings, with different intensity, into the soul with greater or lesser 
frequency, and will, therefore, form their mutual power relationships and thus 
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their groupings differently, even if we do not account for the difference in the 
general and specific capacities of the individual at all. (PS, 27-28)21
Combined, the last two quotations indicate that, for Paul, language change springs from 
the interrelation between instances of individual language use and their cultural/linguistic 
environment.  With respect to the last passage, Arens points out that Paul’s “statement 
indicates that language use as conditioned by the environment has basic patterns in it, but 
that the weighting of these patterns is individual.  A percentage prediction may be made 
about which pattern will occur, but this is not a unique, valid description of the minds of 
an age” (141).  Also, Paul’s last sentence suggests that his approach is no longer bound to 
the kind of faculty psychology that is still detectable in Vossler’s characterization of 
Sprachbegabung as “language talent.”  While Paul does not discard the issue of differing 
linguistic capacities among language users altogether, he clearly shifts emphasis and 
focuses on the mutual influence between the dynamic patterns of (mostly unconscious) 
representational complexes within the individual mind, on one hand, and the dynamic 
patterns within the linguistic environment, on the other hand.  
This evaluation of the relations between individuals and the group raises the issue 
of communication, because the notion of environment here refers to the linguistic activity 
on the part of the other members of a given linguistic community which surrounds the 
individual language user.  Communication, in turn, points to one of the most important 
aspects of Paul’s Principles, his stress on material mediation in all linguistic transaction.  
Mental contents, he holds, are never communicated directly but can be transmitted only 
through physical “products of human culture” (PS, 1).  Here Paul’s notion of “historically 
evolving objects” (ibid.) takes center stage, and one of the main challenges is not to 
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conflate his account of the “real bearers of historical development” (28) with the physical 
objects that serve as vehicles for communication.  
The real bearers are only the mental organisms, which are engaged in the constant 
registering and rearranging of representational clusters, as described above.  These 
organisms communicate through the production of physical objects (written texts as 
tangible scriptures, works of art in their fixed physicality, and the spoken word as 
acoustic phenomenon or sound image).  In this regard, the aspect of dynamicity in 
material mediation cannot be reduced the static physicality of cultural products.  Instead, 
such mediation is based on the referential character of these products.  They always point 
beyond themselves toward a specific life-world and its unique mode of structuring 
experience. 
This referential character of cultural products can again be illuminated, I suggest, 
through a comparison with Husserl’s conception of cultural eide.  Remember, that, for 
Husserl, no single perception of any object (be it a house or anything else) yields a 
cultural eidos yet.  The latter can only be gleaned from a phenomenological test series of 
perspectival shifts.  At the point where these shifts converge, the eidos emerges not as a 
pictorial representation (or a virtually photographic thought content of a picture 
remembered or imagined) but as a sample of the structuration pattern of a specific 
experiential domain.  
The crux is that no single perception of any “physical” object, by itself, grants 
insight into a particular process of structuration.  Accordingly, in extrapolating an eidos
from a phenomenological test series, Husserl is not interested in issuing any judgment 
about the mind-independent physical reality of any “thing in itself” as the purported 
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substratum of each single perception (which is why I put “physical” in scare quotes in the 
preceding sentence).  In contract, we have already observed that Cassirer, in his 
appreciative commentary on Husserl’s approach,22 stresses the fact that the 
phenomenologist is only interested in the particular experiential totality that a (cultural) 
eidos “signifies,” not in the “reality” of the objects he perceives.  In this vein, ideational 
analysis is indifferent to any form of naïve realism, just as it does not care to issue any 
kind of substance ontology, such as Cartesian dualism.  Instead, it aspires to an objective
perception of perception, to use our earlier phrase.23  And just as Husserl is not interested 
in the physical reality of the object that purportedly “underlies” any single perception, so 
Paul is not interested in the static physicality of any cultural product or linguistic item, 
because it does not help to explain the possibility of language development.  This shared 
indifference toward substance ontology, marks the important interface between Husserl’s 
notion of eidos and Paul’s notion of “historical objects.” 
The main difference between these authors, however, is that for Paul historical 
objects evolve, whereas for Husserl eide do not.  Structurally, again, the horizon of each 
of Husserl’s life-worlds is closed.  By contrast, Paul conceives of life-worlds as open
systems, where the material encounter between an individual mind and a historical object 
can modify the structural profile of the life-worlds, of which they are part, respectively.
To further clarify the character of the materially mediated intercation between 
individual minds and their cultural surrounding, we have to specify the notion of 
registration, in particular.  To repeat one of Paul’s most pertinent statements in this 
respect, “[r]epresentations are entered into consciousness in groups and therefore remain 
as groups in the unconscious. […] And not only individual words, but also larger series 
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of sounds and whole sentences associate themselves immediately with the thought 
content which was placed in them” (PS, 26).24  Two crucial aspects deserve special 
attention, Paul’s reference to “thought content” (Gedankeninhalt) and to “associat[ion]” 
(sich assoziieren).  This diction would seem to raise some of the familiar, but all the more 
vexing issues that spring from a correspondence theory of representation and, by 
extention, a correspondence theory of truth.  The main problem, according to such a 
theoretical framework, concerns the question as to how particular represenations or 
“thought contents” may correspond to those portions of mind-independent reality, which 
they are respresentations of.  What, if any, are the criteria that determine the mapping or 
matching relation between particular representations and their “real” referent?  
From Paul to Wittgenstein
Here it is not my goal to take on the debate over respresentation as 
correspondence in any comprehensive, much less exhausting way.  I rest content with 
pointing to one particular attemp to come to terms with the workings of respresentation, 
which is particularly instructive for an evaluation of Paul’s account of how 
respresentational clusters are entered into the individual mind.  This attempt is put forth 
by Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) in the “second section” (2-2.225) of his Tractatus 
Logico-Philosophicus (1921).  
Even within this segment, I shall restrict my focus to the relation that Wittgenstein 
posits between Welt (world) and Wirklichkeit (reality), while other important aspects will 
be left aside, as they are of no immediate assistance in bringing Paul’s position into 
sharper relief.  To be clear, by enlisting Wittgenstein in such selective manner, I do not 
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mean to issue a conclusive critique of his position.  In fact, I think that the primary 
weakness of the passage under consideration consists not in its plain falsehood but in its 
inherent ambiguity.  Because of that ambiguity and in light of Wittgenstein’s notoriously 
condensed mode of presentation, in the Tractatus, his statements about the World-Reality
relation can be interpreted in terms of what I consider, with Paul, a flawed view of 
transcendentalism with respect to cultural experience and communicative activity.  And it 
is with respect to this feature that I want to use Wittgenstein as a foil.  One of the merits 
of the present reference to the Tractatus, I suggest, is that it already points the way to an 
alternative reading of Wittgenstein that puts him in the direct vicinity of the 
phenomenological thought of Husserl and Mach.  Their differences notwithstanding, both 
of these authors are sympathetic to Paul’s model for a science of principles, especially as 
far as the linguistic import of their respective projects is concerned.25
Turning to the text of the Tractatus, we find that Wittgenstein’s wavering 
between different world conceptions is accompanied by a correlative ambiguity, with 
respect to the relation between a “world” and its “metaphysical subject” (5.641).  On one 
hand, Wittgenstein seems to posit a singular conception of the world (die Welt), as the 
one over-arching unity that comprises all possible realities.  In this sense “world” stands 
for the totality of all realities.  On the other hand, he appears to assume a pluralistic 
conception of an irreducible multitude of worlds, each of which comprises a certain 
subset of realities, without encompassing all such realities in their totality.  Throughout 
the text, Wittgenstein thus keeps oscillation between the singular and the plural 
conception of world(s).  
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According to my reading, the ambiguity remains intact and so no conclusive 
judgment can be issued, resting on the text of the Tractatus alone.  This notwithstanding, 
one can effectively extrapolate certain key traits of “solipsism” (Solipsismus) and “pure 
realism” (reine[r] Realismus) from Wittgenstein’s view, which serve to document his 
theoretical proximity to a particular strand of phenomenology as well as to give a 
counter-example of how not to understand Paul’s theory of language as communication.  
What is more, following this strategy of “clarification by contrast” is not limited 
to negative insights alone.  In combining Wittgenstein’s own examples with the insights 
by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, in What is Philosophy? (1994 [orig. 1991]), we also 
receive constructive hints as to how we should understand Paul’s view.  In this context, I 
argue, Deleuze and Guattari deserve credit for illuminating the commonly neglected, or at 
least underplayed, Wittgenstein-Husserl connection, especially with respect to their 
analysis of the nature of concepts and concept formation, provided in chapter one and 
chapter two of their study.  
One of the most problematic statements, concerning the ambiguity of world, is 
delivered in: 2.063: Die gesamte Wirklichkeit ist die Welt (The sum-total of reality is the 
world).”26  The wording of this claim is perplexing because of the seeming redundancy of 
the phrase gesamte Wirklichkeit.  The attribute does not seem to add anything unless we 
entertain some notion of “partial reality” or different (sub)divisions of reality which may 
or may not add up to a total domain of reality in its entirety (Gesamtheit).  If we give 
Wittgenstein the benefit of the doubt and assume that his intended meaning is not 
redundant, the implicit notion of different divisions of reality still allows for two different 
interpretations with respect to the relation between reality and world.  Based on a “thick” 
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notion of totality, the “sum-total of reality” could refer to all possible realities, in which 
case “the world” would be the single, over-arching unity of any reality whatsoever.  Or, 
based on a “thin” notion of totality, the “sum-total of reality” could refer to all possible 
realities relative to a particular world, in which case “the world” would be one among 
others but still “complete” (vollständig; see: 4.26, below) by exhausting a specific subset 
of possible realities, such as, e.g., the reality of color, of sound, or of heat. 
For the second interpretation in terms of “thin” totality to even make sense, we 
must assume that it excludes a possible alternative, namely an “incomplete” world, 
among other worlds that would somehow relate to a specific subset of realities but not 
exhaust it.  My speaking of “exhausting” here refers to Wittgenstein’s implicit criterion 
of logical homogeneity for a world to count as such, which is implied by his notion of 
“logical form” (4.12; 4.128).  The unity of each world thus consists in its having a logical 
form, which guarantees that all realities that are correlated with this world have to be 
logically consistent.  The theoretical link between logical homogeneity and logical 
consistency is provided by Wittgenstein’s notion of Elementarsätze (elementary 
propositions) (4.21 ff.), which report basic facts (Tatsachen) with respect to a certain 
reality, e.g., color facts within a color reality.  The logical form of any world, then, 
guarantees that any true elementary proposition is logically consistent with all other true 
elementary propositions stated about that world.
Against the background of these considerations, Wittgenstein’s ambiguous line of 
argument, wavering between a “thick” and a “thin” notion of the totality of (a) world, 
proceeds according to the following steps: 
2 Was der Fall ist, die Tatsache, ist das Bestehen von Sachverhalten. 
(What is the case – a fact – is the existence of states of affairs.)
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2.026 Nur wenn es Gegenstände gibt, kann es eine feste Form der Welt geben. 
(There must be objects, if the world is to have an unalterable form.)
2.0271 Der Gegenstand ist das Feste, Bestehende; die Konfiguration ist das 
Wechselnde, Unbeständige. 
(Objects are what is unalterable and subsistent; their configuration is what 
is changing and unstable.) 
2.0272 Die Konfiguration der Gegenstände bildet den Sachverhalt. 
(The configuration of objects produces states of affairs.)27
2.032 Die Art und Weise, wie die Gegenstände im Sachverhalt 
zusammenhängen, ist die Struktur des Sachverhaltes. 
(The determinate way in which objects are connected in a state of affairs is 
the structure of the state of affairs.)28
2.034 Die Struktur der Tatsache besteht aus den Strukturen der Sachverhalte. 
(The structure of a fact consists of the structures of states of affairs.) 
2.04 Die Gesamtheit der bestehenden Sachverhalte ist die Welt. 
(The totality of existing states of affairs is the world.)
2.061 Die Sachverhalte sind von einander unabhängig.
(States of affairs are independent of one another.)
2.062 Aus dem Bestehen oder Nichtbestehen eines Sachverhaltes kann nicht auf 
das Bestehen oder Nichtbestehen eines anderen geschlossen werden. 
(From the existence or non-existence of one state of affairs it is impossible 
to infer the existence or non-existence of another.) 
2.063 Die gesamte Wirklichkeit ist die Welt. 
(The sum-total of reality is the world.)
Note that, in the above, I have quoted selectively from Wittgenstein, skipping over 
certain interim steps that are not directly relevant to my present criticism.  Generally, this 
is risky business, but since my sole purpose in this place is to point to a specific 
ambiguity and tension among particular key concepts in Wittgenstein’s text, I believe that 
this procedure is generally legitimate.  To repeat, I do not aim at a complete 
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reconstruction of Wittgenstein’s overall position, but at pinpointing a sore spot within his 
account of the relation between world and reality.
In the above quotations, we find a certain hierarchy of theoretical levels, not in 
terms of importance but in terms of scope.  According to this hierarchy, the smallest unit 
to be considered in analyzing the constitution of the world are Gegenstände (objects), but 
it turns out that the smallest unit is not the most basic one.  Conjointly, 2.026, 2.0271, 
2.0272, 2.061, and 2.062 form the backbone of Wittgenstein’s idiosyncratic adaptation of 
“logical atomism,” which he had inherited, at least in part, from Bertrand Russell.   
Regarding this doctrine it is crucial that Gegenstände, or objects, are not the primary 
elements of logical form (4.12; cf. above), that is, they do not constitute “logical atoms” 
for Wittgenstein.  Instead it is Sachverhalte, or states of affairs, that are logically most 
basic.  
Yet, by itself, this latter claim is not conclusive, because here we encounter 
already the main ambiguity put forth in Wittgenstein’s characterization of the nature of 
Sachverhalte and how they constitute the world.  The problematic phrase is “bestehende 
Sachverhalte” in 2.04, which I used as my starting point for the present criticism of 
Wittgenstein.  This phrase could refer either to the configuration of objects, which is 
subject to change (according to 2.0271), or, it could refer to the structure that governs the 
configuration of objects, which is not subject to change (as is intimated but not fully 
clarified by 2.032, 2.061, 2.062).   If we do not distinguish between the two aspect of 
variable configuration and stable structure (which Wittgenstein does not, in this place), it 
is not clear what it means to speak of the world as constituted by the “totality of existing 
states of affairs” ([d]ie Gesamtheit der bestehenden Sachverhalte).  More precisely, if 
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Sachverhalte, qua configuration of objects, are subject to change, one wonders what kind 
of stability, cohesion, or unity – if any – is implied by the notion of totality. 
This problem appears aggravated by Wittgenstein’s opening remarks at the very 
beginning of the Tractatus, where he describes the totality of the world, in a way that 
would seem to preclude us from referring to the stable nature of objects (2.0271) in order 
to clarify the meaning of the world’s totality, as featured in section two: “1.1: Die Welt 
ist die Gesamtheit der Tatsachen, nicht der Dinge (The world is the totality of facts, not 
of things).” and “1.11: Die Welt ist durch die Tatsachen bestimmt, und dadurch, dass es 
alle Tatsachen sind (The world is determined by the facts, and by their being all the 
facts).”  In this passage, the totality of the world is spelled as the completeness of the set 
of all facts.  Thus restated in terms of completeness, the previous problem concerning the 
ambiguous nature of Sachverhalte becomes even more involved.  
The configurational aspect of Sachverhalte seems to make the latter susceptible to 
change (2.0271 in conjunction with 2.0272).  However, if any fact (Tatsache) consists in 
the existence of states of affairs (Sachverhalte) (2), the element of change or variability 
would seem to transfer from Sachverhalte to Tatsachen.  And if that is the case, then it is 
not clear how we could ever take stock of the complete set of “all facts,” if they are just 
as much subject to change as the states of affairs by which they are constituted.  The 
same question can be raised from a different angle.  In light of the previous remarks, 
Wittgenstein appears to be at odds with himself, if we compare the following claims:  
1.1. Die Welt ist die Gesamtheit der Tatsachen, nicht der Dinge. 
(The world is the totality of facts, not of things.) 
2.022 Es ist offenbar, dass auch eine von der wirklichen noch so verschieden 
gedachte Welt Etwas – eine Form – mit der wirklichen gemein haben 
muss. 
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(It is obvious that an imagined world, however different it may be from 
the real one, must have something – a form – in common with it. 
2.023 Diese feste Form besteht eben aus den Gegenständen. 
(Objects are just what constitute this unalterable form.) 
2.026 Nur wenn es Gegenstände gibt, kann es eine feste Form der Welt geben. 
(Only when there are objects, does the world have an unalterable form.)
Given the fact that Wittgenstein uses the terms “Gegenstand,” “Ding,” and “Sache” 
interchangeably (see: 2.01, and my note 191), he appears to describe the constitution of 
the world in two incongruent, if not mutually exclusive, ways.  According to (1.1.), the 
world consists in the totality of facts, not of things.  Furthermore, each fact is constituted 
by “the existence of states of affairs” (2).  However, states of affairs were ascribed a 
double-nature.  With respect to the configuration of objects, they appeared variable and 
subject to change (2.0272).  With respect to the way in which objects are connected (die 
Art und Weise, wie die Gegenstände im Sachverhalt zusammenhängen), the structure of 
states of affairs was directly linked to the structure of facts. (2.032).  Yet as long as this 
double-nature of states of affairs is not sorted out, it is not clear how Wittgenstein can 
define the constitution of the world in terms of facts but not of objects, as proposed in 
(1.1).  
Even if Wittgenstein does not directly contradict himself, what remains especially 
problematic is that the “existence” of objects is supposed to constitute the “unalterable 
form” of the world (feste Form der Welt) (2.023, 2.026), whereas the completeness of the 
world is supposed to consist in the totality of “all facts” (1.11), independently of the 
totality of all things, if there is such a thing (1.1).  These passages give the impression 
that Wittgenstein is assigning different roles to the nature of objects.  On one hand, they 
ground the world’s unalterable form; on the other hand, they are irrelevant to the aspect 
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of completeness, implied by Wittgenstein’s account of the world’s totality.  To be sure, 
unalterable form and complete totality may not mean the same thing for Wittgenstein, but 
then it is really not clear what he means by totality at all in his characterization of the 
constitution of the world.  
My suggestion for amending this situation in Wittgenstein’s text is to 
disambiguate the double-nature of Sachverhalt by reading this early part of the Tractatus
as a case for ideational analysis, in Husserl’s sense.  According to this interpretation, 
Wittgenstein’s account of the world as constituted by the totality of facts, in which the 
structure of facts interlocks with the structure of states of affairs, amounts to a specific 
conception of the closed horizon of any life-world that lends itself to scientific analysis.  
For Wittgenstein’s Gegensände to ground the “unalterable form” of the world, they have 
to be understood as eide, as Husserl defines them.  The connection to this particular 
methodological strand of phenomenology is in fact hinted at by Wittgenstein’s 
conception of “formal concepts,” presented later in section four of the Tractatus:  
4.126 In dem Sinne, in welchem wir von formalen Eigenschaften sprechen, 
können wir nun auch von formalen Begriffen reden. 
(Ich führe diesen Ausdruck ein, um den Grund der Verwechslung der 
formalen Begriffe mit den eigentlichen Begriffen, welche die ganze Logik 
durchzieht, klar zu machen.) […] 
(We can now talk about formal concepts, in the same sense that we speak 
of formal properties. 
[I introduce this expression in order to exhibit the source of the confusion 
between formal concepts and concepts proper, which pervades the whole 
of traditional logic.]) […]  
4.127 Die Satzvariable bezeichnet den formalen Begriff und ihre Werte die 
Gegenstände, welche unter diesen Begriff fallen. 
(The propositional variable signifies the formal concept, and its values 
signify the objects that fall under the concept.) 
4.1271 Jede Variable ist das Zeichen eines formalen Begriffes. 
Denn jede Variable stellt eine konstante Form dar, welche alle ihre Werte 
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Besitzen, und die als formale Eigenschaft dieser Werte aufgefasst werden
Kann. 
(Every variable is the sign for a formal concept. 
For every variable represents a constant form that all its values possess,
and this can be regarded as a formal property of those values.) 
4.1272 So ist der variable Name “x” das eigentliche Zeichen des Scheinbegriffes 
Gegenstand. 
Wo immer das Wort “Gegenstand” (“Ding,” “Sache,” etc.) richtig 
gebraucht wird, wird es in der Begriffsschrift durch den variablen Namen 
ausgedrückt. […] 
So kann man z.B. nicht sagen “Es gibt Gegenstände,” wie man etwa sagt 
“Es gibt Bücher.” […]
(Thus the variable name ‘x’ is the proper sign for the pseudo-concept 
object. 
Wherever the word ‘object’ [‘thing,’ etc.] is correctly used, it is expressed 
in conceptual notation by a variable name.) […]
(So one cannot say, for example, ‘There are objects,’ as one might say, 
‘There are books.’) […] 
4.12721 Der formale Begriff ist mit einem Gegenstand, der 
unter ihn fällt, bereits gegeben. Man kann also nicht Gegenstände eines 
formalen Begriffes und den formalen Begriff selbst als Grundbegriffe 
einführen. […] 
(A formal concept is given immediately any object falling under it is 
given. It is not possible, therefore, to introduce as primitive ideas objects 
belonging to a formal concept and the formal concept itself.) […] 
Here Wittgenstein makes it clear that his earlier exposition, in section two, needs to be 
revised.  The ambiguity that adhered to the double-nature of Sachverhalt is now clarified 
by disambiguating the (pseudo-)concept of Gegenstand (object).  The latter, Wittgenstein 
insists, must not be understood and used as if it was a “concept proper” (4.126) like book 
(4.1272).  To obviate the obfuscation of this difference in ordinary language, the 
expression “object” ought to be replaced by the variable name “x,” according to a 
conceptual notation (Begriffsschrift) that is logically rigid (4.1272).  
What is not immediately clear, however, is what Wittgenstein means when he 
asserts that “every variable represents a constant form that all its values possess, and this 
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can be regarded as a formal property of those values” (4.1271).  In the present context of 
section four of the Tractatus, Wittgenstein exposes the ordinary notion of Gegenstand
(object) as a pseudo-concept.  But then we wonder how the “unalterable form of the 
world,” which was predicated on the “existence of objects” in section two (2.026) relates 
to the “constant form” that any variable represents respectively (4.1271).  
Clarification in this regard is all the more called for in light of the last claim 
quoted above, namely that “a formal concept is always already given along with any 
object falling under it” (4.12721).29  This last statement perpetuates the ambiguity that 
was besetting Wittgenstein’s presentation throughout section two.  After driving a logical 
wedge between the lax use of object as a pseudo-concept and the proper use of it as a 
formal concept (to be designated by the variable name “x”), Wittgenstein now seems to 
reapproximate, or somehow link, the two different meanings of “object,” when he says 
that one is “always already given along with” the other (ibid.).  Or, one would like to 
know how his present reference to “any object falling under” a formal concept differs 
from using object as a pseudo-concept.  The primary hint, in this place, is provided by 
(4.1271), which prepares the later formulation of “objects falling under a formal concept” 
in terms of “values being assigned to a variable name.”  Yet, the statement of (4.1271) 
poins us back, yet again, to the idea of “constant form” and our former question as to how 
it relates to the “unalterable form of the world” posited in (2.026). 
The clearest answer to this question, I think, can be given by tying Wittgenstein’s 
present criticism of Gegenstand as a pseudo-concepts back to his earlier remarks on the 
stable structure, versus the variable configuration, of Gegenstände.  According to this 
interpretation, a formal concept is a structural form of experience that remains constant 
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throughout a series of different experiential “values.”  Insofar as these values are 
structured by the same form, they share a “formal property” (4.1271).  From this vantage 
point, Wittgenstein’s explication of formal concepts in terms of “constant form” (ibid.) 
proves very similar to Husserl’s procedure of ideational analysis.  More precisely, 
Wittgenstein’s “formal concepts” are nothing else than Husserl’s eide, and the different 
“values” that can be assigned to them correspond to what Husserl had described in terms 
of the perspectival shifts to which the phenomenologist subjects a given phenomenon.  
This parallelism would also explain what Wittgenstein means when he claims that 
“a formal concept is always already given along with any object falling under it” 
(4.12721).  Put in Husserl’s terms, any such object stands for a single observation, a 
single phenomenon.  As I discussed in detail, no single phenomenon by itself constitutes 
an eidos.  However, Husserl believed, any phenomenon can be put through a 
phenomenological test series, from which the eidos would emerge.  Any particular 
(cultural) eidos (remember Hesse’s “Chinese House”), in turn, constitutes a structural 
sample of a particular experiential domain (such as, e.g., a particular Confucian life-
world).  
In fact, the parallels between these two authors extend even further, because in all 
this Wittgenstein shows the same penchant for perceptivism as did Husserl, before he 
broadenend his approach, especially in the Phenomenological Psychology (1925), to take 
into account the diverse “cultural colorations” of various phenomena.  In the Tractatus, 
Wittgenstein does not yet make any such move.  Instead, he models his life-world 
conception, implied by his account of the relation between formal concepts and the 
“constant form of the world,” mostly on sense perception.30
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An important difference, however, consists in the fact that Wittgenstein seems to 
be drawn to a certain kind of “pure realism” (5.64) that is not obviously compatible with 
Husserl’s kind of objective, or scientific, phenomenalism.  In fact, in section five, 
Wittgenstein approximates “pure realism” to “solipsism” (ibid.), culminating in claims 
such as: “Ich bin meine Welt. (Der Mikrokosmos.)” (5.63),31 and “Das Subjekt gehört 
nicht zur Welt, sondern es ist eine Grenze der Welt” (5.632).32  While Husserl would 
agree, at least in part, with Wittgenstein’s professed anti-psychologism in this context, he 
would not endorse Wittgenstein’s concomitant hint at solipsism.  
As discussed previously, part and parcel of Husserl’s phenomenological method 
was an agenda of making phenomenological research scientifically respectable.  
Ideational analysis is supposed to yield objective results.  So the “limit” or Grenze (cf.: 
5.632, above) of each world is a structural one, which can be clarified by extrapolating an 
eidos from a phenomenal test series.  As a structural sample, to use our earlier expression, 
this eidos provides objective access to a particular experiential domain.  For Husserl, any 
life-world can be unfolded, as it were, from within such an eidos.  Accordingly, his view 
is one of what may be called objective immanence, which grounds the validity standards 
for phenomenological research in the objective structures of any experiential domain to 
be discovered only from within that domain.  Even when he talks of the “monadic” 
character of these domains, he is making a case for immanence not solipsism.  The 
immanent “limit” of any given life-world is a matter of objective structure, which makes 
certain subject positions available, including that of the phenomenological observer.  
Husserl’s life-world is not  grounded in a subject position as the “extensionless” center or 
zero-coordinate as Wittgenstein suggests, when he says: 
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5.64 Hier sieht man dass der Solipsismus, streng durchgeführt, mit dem reinen 
Realismus zusammenfällt. Das Ich des Solipsismus schrumpft zum 
ausdehnungslosen Punkt zusammen, und es bleibt die ihm koordinierte 
Realität. 
(Here it can be seen that solipsism, when its implications are followed out 
strictly, coincides with pure realism. The self of solipsism shrinks to the 
point without extension, and there remains the reality co-ordinated with 
it.)
5.641 Es gibt also wirklich einen Sinn, in welchem in der Philosophie nicht-
psychologisch vom Ich die Rede sein kann. 
Das Ich tritt in die Philosophie dadurch ein, dass die “Welt meine Welt 
ist.” 
Das philosophische Ich ist nicht der Mensch, nicht der menschliche 
Körper, oder die menschliche Seele, von der die Psychologie handelt, 
sondern das metaphysische Subjekt, die Grenze – nicht ein Teil der Welt. 
(Thus there really is a sense in which philosophy can talk about the self in 
a non-psychological way. 
What brings the self into philosophy is the fact that ‘the world is my 
world.’
The philosophical self is not the human being, not the human body, or the 
human soul, with which psychology deals, but rather the metaphysical 
subject, the limit of the world – not a part of it.) 
To make the implications of such solipsism more concrete and to bring out the difference 
to Husserl more sharply, we can turn to one of the most famous pronouncements of the 
Tractatus: “[…] The world of the happy man is a different one from that of the unhappy 
man” (6.43).  Here, Wittgenstein continues his anti-psychologistic account of the 
“philosophical self,” as he extends his notion of the “metaphysical subject” to the realm 
of ethics.  
To capture the implications of Wittgenstein’s famous dictum for his conception of 
world, vis-à- vis Husserl’s, it has to be quoted in context: 
6.423 Vom Willen als dem Träger des Ethischen kann nicht gesprochen werden.
Und der Wille als Phänomen interessiert nur die Psychologie. 
(It is impossible to speak about the will in so far as it is the subject of 
ethical attributes.
And the will as a phenomenon is of interest only to psychology.) 
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6.43 Wenn das gute oder böse Wollen die Welt ändert, so kann es nur die 
Grenzen der Welt ändern, nicht die Tatsachen; nicht das, was durch die 
Sprache ausgedrückt werden kann. 
Kurz, die Welt muss dann dadurch überhaupt eine andere werden. Sie 
muss sozusagen als Ganzes abnehmen oder zunehmen. 
Die Welt des Glücklichen ist eine andere als die des Unglücklichen. 
(If the good or bad exercise of the will does alter the world, it can alter 
only the limits of the world, not the facts – not what can be expressed by 
language. 
In short the effect must be that it becomes an altogether different world. It 
must, so to speak, wax and wane as a whole. 
The world of the happy man is a different one from that of the unhappy 
man.) 
The last sentence is revealing, for it indicates that Wittgenstein conception of the world, 
now invested with ethical features, does not allow for immanent transformation.  Whether 
on the level of sensual perception, or on the the level of “ethical perception” (according 
to Wittgenstein’s overt conflation of “ethics [as] aesthetics”),33 his view does not allow 
for immanent transformation.  The horizon of any life-world is closed.  For Husserl, it is, 
too, but he would reject the idea of fixed ethical transcendentals, as Wittgenstein presents 
them here. 
By introducing this new dimension of transcendental analysis into his inquiry, 
Wittgenstein, I assume, is not giving up his express anti-psychologism.  In other words, 
in the present context of ethics, he maintains his conception of the “philosophical self” as 
the “metaphysical subject” (5.641), which now assumes transcendent status.  To be sure, 
“the unhappy man” is not an individual person that is manically depressed.  Instead, the 
unhappy man stands for a life-world, or form of life, that is oriented by an unchanging 
transcendent entity (or value?, we might ask) that supposedly infuses all acts of 
perception within that world with a certain “formal” quality.  Here, “formal” is 
thoroughly compatible with ethical import, since Wittgenstein is not interested in the 
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psychological upheavals and passions of particular individuals.  Instead, the kinds of 
“passion” or “willing” that are available within a particular experiential domain are 
formally determined by the metaphysical subject that occupies the zero-point of that 
coordinate system (cf., 5.64, above). 
The main problem withWittgenstein’s account, I think, is the implausibly 
monolithic, homogeneous nature of both the metaphysical subject and the world, the 
perceptual “net” (6.341)34 of which it casts from its zero-position.  Meeting Wittgenstein 
on his own terms, this criticism must not resort to counter-examples from personal 
experience or (second-hand) reports about psychic episodes on the part of others.  Thus 
the objection that no one is unhappy all the time would miss the point.  Instead, 
Wittgenstein’s main weakness, I argue, consists in the fact that unhappiness, or sadness, 
does not qualify as a life-world, much less as an “unalterable form of the world” (eine 
feste Form der Welt) (2.026) [emphasis added].  And at this point, Wittgenstein’s 
argument converges with the larger discussion we are pursuing here: the question of the 
psychological or philosophical ties to culture through representation.
By his own standards, the scope of the “logical structure of sadness” is not 
equivalent to, e.g., the “logical structure of color” (die logische Struktur der Farbe) 
(6.3751).  In fact, sadness as such is no cultural logic at all, that is, it cannot be 
considered the governing principle that organizes and structures a particular life-world.  
Upon scrutiny, Wittgenstein’s famous dictum that “the world of the unhappy man is a 
different one from that of the unhappy man” is equal to saying “the world of blue is 
different from the world of yellow.”  The latter has to be rejected, because both of these 
pseudo-worlds are actually part of the same world, namely that of color.  Here 
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Wittgenstein appears vulnerable to his own criticism of psychologism.  Positing a “world 
of sadness,” based on a transcendental fix point of sadness, seems motivated by the kind 
of psychological considerations that he expressly rejects (cf. 5.641).  Hence, in keeping 
with Wittgenstein’s own anti-psychologism, we do not belittle anybody’s sorrow or 
depression, when we assert that “the world of the unhappy man” does not exist.  
Instead, we have entered an intersection between a specific transcendental logic 
and a cultural one – an intersection that requires us to take recourse to yet another 
perspective on how transcendental and cultural logics intersect.
Deleuze and Guattari’s Wittgenstein: A Return to Culture
The problematic character of a one-sided notion of the transcendent, as the 
centerpiece of Wittgenstein’s commentary on human life-worlds, in general, and ethical 
worlds, in particular, can be further illustrated by saying that, in his view, “no happy face 
can turn up in the world of the unhappy man.”  This point is made (with somewhat 
different attributes) by Deleuze and Guattari in What is Philosophy? (1994 [orig.1991]).  
Their commentary is particularly instructive, not only because it points the reader to the 
connection between Husserl and Wittgenstein, in ways relevant to our discussion thus far.  
Their analysis also leads us back to Paul’s conception of language as communication, and 
how his Neogrammarian-versus-neo-Idealist controversy with Vossler remained of vital 
importance not only for the phenomenology of Husserl but also for the next generation of 
purportedly renegade phenomenologists, including Wittgenstein and Heidegger.  
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Concerning the problem raised by Wittgenstein’s famous dictum, Deleuze and 
Guattari speak of the “calm” and “frightened” aspects of different life-worlds (rather than 
happy and unhappy), but the primary issue is the same: 
Let us proceed in a summary fashion: we will consider a field of experience taken 
as a real world no longer in relation to a self but to a simple “there is.” There is, at 
some moment, a calm and restful world. Suddenly a frightened face looms up that 
looks at something out of the field. The other person appears here as neither 
subject nor object but as something that is very different: a possible world, the 
possibility of a frightening world. This possible world is not real, or not yet, but it 
exists nonetheless: it is an expressed that exists only in its expression – the face, 
or an equivalent of the face. (17) 
As this passage shows, Deleuze and Guattari are just as unconcerned with particular 
individual psychological episodes as is Wittgenstein (or Husserl, for that matter).  What 
they are interested in is the susceptibility of life-worlds to “intrusions” by other life-
worlds – other possibilities for life, other perspectives of knowledge that potentially can 
appear within the singular frame of reference.  For them, there is no “metaphysical 
subject” occupying the zero-point of an experiential coordinate system, just as there is no 
“individual subject” that can be confronted as “an other” within this sytem.  Instead, any 
given “field of experience” is viewed as a structurally open system, in which different 
subject positions become available over time.  
An encounter with another subject is thus reconceived as a structural eruption, an 
area of unrest, where new possibilities are distributed.  The “loom[ing] up of a frightened 
face” means that an experiential structure of “calm” is partially unravelled and re-
organized so that one or several new and “fearful” subject positions become available.  
“There is” a regional disturbance, which is not relative to any particular subject that could 
speak of “my world,” as Wittgenstein had previously put it.  There are no subjective 
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boundaries that would either preclude or guarantee the occurrence of such a “frightened 
face.”  
The crucial feature of such a face is its “exist[ence] […] in expression.”  No 
(substance-) ontological claim is made about the existence of a fearful “person,” “thing,” 
or “object.”  Instead, the occurrence of such a face “or an equivalent of the face” consists 
in the regional registration of a new possibility.  Such registering marks an event that 
does not belong to any particular person, nor does it constitute a psychological act of 
conscius perception.  That is to say, registration of this sort may proceed unconsciously in 
its first instance.  To count as a concrete possibility it is not dependent on individual 
acknowledgment by any particular “knowing subject” or perceiving mind.  More 
precisely still, the concrete possibility of fear is not equal to, or dependent on, the 
conscious thought content of any individual mind.  On the contrary, the (re)distribution of 
concrete possibilities is what enables new subject positions to come about, which may be 
occupied by new mindsets, new life-worlds of understanding. But what is such a “face,” 
after all?  And what does it mean to speak of the “equivalent of [a] face?” 
A good example, I think, would be the spontaneous, unplanned proliferation of a 
religious symbol like the Christian cross.  If one morning, in a certain life-world, the 
doors to every private household and/or every public building were “graced” with a 
crucifix, this might spawn an equal proliferation of frightened subject positions, in the 
face of what might look like a “Christian take-over” by the religious right.  Here it makes 
no difference that, in “real life,” such symbolic trends normally do rarely come about 
overnight, although this is generally possible.  There might be a phase of symbolic 
incubation, if you will, before the manifestations of any such trend hit the public eye. 
207
Of course, the same material manfestation on the communal surface of people’s 
doors could be interpreted very differently and might restructure the culturally attested 
matrix of available sentiments in a certain area in a way that would spark waves of 
unheard-of solidarity and fellow-feeling.  Or if the symbol is less powerful, this trend of 
displaying crosses could meet with widespread indifference, that is, with no conscious 
reaction whatsoever.  Yet, even under these circumstances, it would still leave a material 
dent on the community’s material plane of meaning formation, and be it only through the 
occupation of symbolic space that is blocked for other symbols as long as the crosses are 
hanging.  In this case, the psychological surface phenomenon of general indifference does 
not preclude a material impact, because such symbolic “blocking” is still an active force.  
As Deleuze and Guattari might say, the effect of public indifference is, symbolically, 
different from the effect of public euphoria or fear not in kind but only in “intensity.”35
The materiality of concrete communication that this differentiation points to thus 
refers to the occupation of symbolic space and the exercise of symbolic power by 
historical subjects, which always calls for a medium.  As illustrated by the different 
possible impacts that a sudden “increase in crosses” may have on a certain community, 
the material dimension of such communication cannot be reduced to the physical make-
up or the chemical composition of any particular item of cultural production (including 
doors and crosses).  Rather, materiality comprises any concrete matrix of symbolic 
encryption, whether it is the surface of doors, the length of access ramps to interstate 
highways, the proximity of buildings, or the average wait period for a job application to 
be processed.  Notice that none of these can be abstracted into general intervals of time 
and space.  “Application time” is materially different from “restaurant time,” and 
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“highway distance” is materially different from “neighborhood proximity,” because their 
segmentation correlates to different possibilities.  In “application time,” ten additional 
minutes may not make much of a difference, unless it intersects with the “closing time” 
of a post office, from which an application has to be mailed.  In “restaurant time,” ten 
minutes of additional waiting may symbolize an insult to the customer, opening up 
different possibilities of conflict.  
Most of these examples are trivial, of course, but they go to show that – with 
respect to material communication – space and time are always interlaced with symbolic 
activity organized by culture, which varies from region to region, or von Gegend zu 
Gegend as Heidegger would have said at some point in his career.  Differently put, 
different regions are alive with different kinds and different intensities of meaning 
production, which is to say, they vary in their semiotic productivity.
Considering these different scenarios, then, “faces” stand for manifest expressions 
of alternative, yet unspecified meanings.  The “sea of crosses,” in our previous example, 
has no intrinsic meaning in itself, whether purportedly referring to religious 
fundamentalism, Christian charity, or perhaps Satanic solidarity (if, on one day, they are 
all turned upside down).  For a face to count as such, it must constitute a structural 
intrusion within a particular life-world.  In principle, then, anything can become a face, 
but different faces or face equivalents (like crosses) will prove distinctly powerful in 
different experiential domains, at different times.  Accordingly, it is not only the meaning 
but also the intensity of such concrete expressions of new possibilities that is subject to 
change. 
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By contrast, Wittgenstein’s separation of the “happy” and “unhappy world” 
precludes any such intrusion of another face from a different semiotic order.  According 
to his implicit notion of a transcendental coordinator or “metaphysical subject,” the range 
of possible effects that a material influx of crosses could have on the “unhappy life-
world” of a given community is limited by the inherent structure or “stable style” (with 
Husserl) of their experiential domain.  If anything, this world would have to undergo a 
change of limits, and thereby of its overall world-identity, in order to have any existence 
“outside” of sadness.  As Wittgenstein says, it “waxes and wanes [only] as a whole” 
(6.43).  Put in religious terms, Wittgenstein’s metaphysical subject is an immutable deity, 
not the living god of Schelling and Tillich.  The god of sorrow governs the world of the 
unhappy man, which cannot be transformed from within.  If anything, one can only hope 
for a cataclysmic change-over, a “happy apocalypse” that would undo one world in its 
entirety and replace it with a different one – a Kierkegaardian leap on a cosmic scale. 
This aversion to semiotic intrusion is also the target of Deleuze and Guattari’s 
criticism of Wittgenstein, when they comment on his inconclusive treatment of the status 
of “the other,” who is sometimes ranked as a subject and sometimes as but a special 
object among other objects.  Before turning to their explicit reference to Wittgenstein, it 
is helpful to see how their critique is prepared for by linking “the concept of the other” to 
“real language or speech,” for it is here that the connection to Paul comes into play: 
To begin with, the other person is the existence of a possible world. And this 
possible world also has a specific reality in itself, as possible: when the expressing 
speaks and says, “I am frightened,” even if its words are untruthful, this is enough 
for a reality to be given to the possible as such. […] On this condition the other 
appears as the expression of a possible. The other is a possible world as it exists 
in a face that expresses it and takes shape in a language that gives it a reality. In 
this sense it is a concept with three indispensable components: possible world, 
existing face, and real language or speech. (17) [emphases added] 
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The reference to “real language or speech” is signifcant because it entails a broader 
conception of language, a language that is not limited to purposive verbal expression and 
conscious communication but emphasizes the materiality of language, which Paul had 
examined in terms of language use (Usus).  As we have already seen, Paul’s conception 
of Usus is not restricted to a simple pragmatics of language or linguistic instrumentalism 
that would prioritize conscious goals in communication as the ends to which language is 
fitted as a mere means.  What he does emphasize is the mutual pressure relations between 
the individual language user and her linguistic environment.  
For Paul, it is crucial that the dynamics which spring from the efforts to negotiate 
this reciprocal pressure are not reducible to language planning geared toward the kind of 
“herd harmony” that Nietzsche had militated against in the Gay Science (aphorism # 
354).  For this reason, Paul’s conception of Usus as material language use does not 
conceive of communication as the inverse of conformism, which would inevitably squash 
individuality and creativity.  He does not believe in the inevitable antagonism between 
the individual and the group, but rather sees the two as mutually constituting.  According 
to his analysis of language as communication neither side of the linguistic transaction is 
in complete control of the other.  In Arens’ (1989) words: 
Paul’s mind model accommodates the possibility of language variants and allows 
for individual differences. The norm of experience of an historical era is 
differentiated by the individual in the activities of the unconscious and systematic 
aspects of the “mental organism” or equilibrated state of mind constituting the 
language-user’s ego. […] The group enforces regularity (“the unconsciousness of 
elements does not preclude an exact control” [PS, 53]). It guarantees a continuity 
of communications, while it also provides a clear base of expected usage which 
the individual may employ as a base for idiosyncratic explorations. A word in 
usage is tied up with expected representations and references for the community 
of users, but it is not exhausted by these expectations: 
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Through the efficacy of groups, each individual is given the possibility 
and the occasion in generous quantity to reach beyond the norm already 
given in language. (PS, 114) (142-143)36
Accordingly, Paul’s point of view does not promote the kind of “absolute” freedom that 
Vossler seems to seek.  
To be sure, Vossler is not so naïve as to ascribe unrestricted reign to the 
individual in her use of language.  In the context of communication, which inevitably 
involves others, he does not assert that we communicate just as we please.  As was clear 
from our examination of his notion of the “centrifugal trials” of public acceptance, which 
every novel language item has to pass, he is well aware of the different pressure points in
any communicative endeavor.  However, Vossler parts ways with Paul by insisting that 
the individual is the sole source of innovation, and in this regard he enforces the old 
dichotomy between individual invention and public conformity.  Vossler’s picture of 
language use and meaning formation is not one of reciprocity.  If a “frightened face” 
turns up in the middle of a “happy” environment, he holds, it could only have sprung 
from the mysterious depths of an individual soul – inspired by the “spirit of language” 
(Sprachgeist). 
Deleuze and Guattari, in contrast to Vossler but much like Paul, do not accept the 
stark contrast of a creative individual that has to speak over against a solely stultifying 
group context.  As the last quotation indicates, their conception of “real language or 
speech” (17) starts with the notion of an experiential field.  This field does not belong to 
anyone, neither individual nor group, but constitutes the site from which different 
speaking subjects can emerge and where “others” can be recognized.  “Otherness,” we 
saw, is not the predicate of “alien selves,” and thus has nothing to do with the problem of 
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“other minds” that remained unresolved in the second of Descartes’ Meditations on First 
Philosophy.  Thus we do not have to infer some kind of foreign, yet similar intelligence 
from “hats and clothes.”37  Instead, otherness consists in the concrete expression of new 
possibilities.  Encountering “an other” thus refers to the breaking in of one possible world 
into another.  
Earlier, I referred to this event of “breaking in” also as an “intrusion.”  The latter 
expression is useful, I think, in order to stress the eruptive nature of such an event, which 
brings about the regional unravelling of semiotic order.  At the same time, we need to 
preclude two possible misunderstanding regarding this expression.  For one thing, 
intrusion is not meant to connote hostility as, for instance, the military invasion of 
another country or the governmental invasion of one’s privacy.  For another, possbile 
worlds must not be construed as anthropomorphic agents that move about and take action 
as they “invade” each other.  In this sense, invasion does not entail spatial movement 
(within a Cartesian coordinate system of Newtonian space), nor does it entail the 
intentionality of a planned, aggressive campaign.  
We can clarify what the nature of such invasion actually amounts to, by 
considering those aspects of Deleuze and Guattari’s theory that bear on their criticism of 
Wittgenstein.  At the same time, this perspective will help substantiate the connection to 
Husserl and Paul: 
This concept of the other person goes back to Leibniz, to his possible worlds and 
to the monad as expression of the world. But it is not the same problem, because 
in Leibniz possibles do not exist in the real world. It is also found in the modal 
logic of propositions. But these do not confer on possible worlds the reality that 
corresponds to their truth conditions (even when Wittgenstein envisages 
propositions of fear and pain, he does not see them as modalities that can be 
expressed in a position of the other person because he leaves the other person 
oscillating between another subject and a special object). (17-18)
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To understand the dynamics and the linguistic mediation that are involved when a 
possible world of “fear and pain” breaks into the semiotic order of a “fearless and 
painless” world, we have to attend to the basic aspects that distinguish one region or 
Gegend of semiotic productivity from another.38  Deleuze and Guattari identify these 
aspects, when they explicate the vectors of what I have described as “invasionary” 
movement in terms of “plane” and “concept”: 
Philosophical concepts are fragmentary wholes that are not aligned with one 
another so that they fit together, because their edges do not match up. They are 
not pieces of a jigsaw puzzle but rather the outcome of throws of the dice. They 
resonate nonetheless, and the philosophy that creates them always introduces a 
powerful Whole that, while remaining open, is not fragmented: an unlimited One-
All, an “Omnitudo” that includes all the concepts on one and the same plane.  It is 
a table, or plateau, or a slice; it is a plane of consistency or, more accurately, the 
plane of immanence of concepts, the planomenon. (35) 
While parts of this statement may look quizzical at first, they become much less so, once 
we realize how similar Deleuze and Guattari’s account is to the philosophy of Schelling 
and Cassirer.  The “plane of immanence,” I argue, is not essentially different from 
Cassirer’s conception of symbolic form.  Both authors, or author teams, refer to an idea 
of open unity, an open system for the production of concepts, which is governed by a 
particular cultural logic or “consistency.”  The connecting link between their respective
projects is their shared indebtedness to Schelling’s conception of positive philosophy, as I 
will show shortly. 
According to the central idea of openness, then, what distinguishes this kind of 
consistency from logical consistency in Wittgenstein’s sense is the possibility of mutual 
influence and “intrusion” among different worlds or planes.  Technically, Deleuze and 
Guattari do not use the terms “world” and “plane” as fully congruent, insofar as “plane” 
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designates one of the two consituting aspects of a possible world, next to the aspect of 
“concept(s).”  In this sense, the term “world” is more comprehensive” than the term 
“plane,” while the two remain inseparable:   
When immanence is no longer immanent to something other than itself it is 
possible to speak of a plane of immanence. Such a plane is perhaps, a radical 
empiricism: it does not present a flux of the lived that is immanent to a subject 
and individualized in that which belongs to a self. It presents only events, that is, 
possible worlds as concepts, and other people as expressions of possible worlds or 
conceptual personae. (47-48)
Aside from indicating how the terms of “world” and “plane” interlock in Deleuze and 
Guattari’s theory, this passage also features another term that presents the authors’ 
alternative to anything similar to Wittgenstein’s “metaphysical subject.”  Thus, when 
Deleuze and Guattari here equate the idea of possible worlds with the “conceptual 
personae” who populate one plane of immanence, they underscore that any talk about the
world of “the unhappy man” must not be confined to the lived experience that is 
“individualized in that which belongs to a self.”  Nor must it be construed as “immanent 
to something other than itself,” such as Wittgenstein’s “metaphysical subject” as the 
transcendent coordinator and “limit” of a world, to which it itself does not belong.   
Turning to the concept-aspect of possible worlds, Deleuze and Guattari’s 
characterization of concepts as “fragmentary wholes,” I take it, points us to one of the 
most pivotal traits of “invasionary” movement.  Here one might be tempted to interpret 
the breaking of one world into another as the transfer of concepts.  For instance, it seems 
suggestive to speak of a particular religious concept that “invaded” a particular art-world.  
By moving from one plane to another, one may think, a religious concept such as aura
can “invade” a domain of artistic experience, where it will take on a different meaning. 
To make this example even viable, however, we have to stress that it does not ascribe an 
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intrinsic meaning (religious or not) to the concept of aura.  From the perspective of What 
Is Philosophy?, the example would work just as well, if we assumed the opposite 
direction of invasion from a particular art-world into a religious experiential sphere.  
Even with this provision in place, Deleuze and Guattari would reject this notion of 
transferring concepts, since it distorts the nature of concepts and their involvement in 
concrete communication.  
The pivotal point in this regard is that concepts do not travel as concepts  from on 
world or plane to another.  If they did, they could not become meaningful in the other 
world at all, that is, they could not be understood within a different order of meaning 
production.  What makes “world traveling” possible is material mediation.  What may be 
transferred from one world to another is concrete expressions or “faces.”  Faces are not 
concepts, but they can call for the production of new concepts with their appeal to various 
voices of discourse.  To repeat, the happy face (be it a cross or anything else) that turns 
up in the world of the unhappy man does not have any inherent meaning attached to it 
which could readily be translated into a pre-given set of concepts.  Instead, the concepts 
that are necessary for the unhappy man to make sense of this unfamiliar face are still to 
be produced on the plane of immanence that they share.  Some of these new concepts 
may carry “happy” meanings, although there is no way to predetermine that they will.  In 
this case, “happy” does not refer to some universal of happiness but simply means “not-
unhappy,” namely not restricted by the experiential structure of the particular, unhappy 
life-world under consideration.  
In this context, Paul’s notion of language as concrete communication shows its 
full relevance.  Regarding the issue of how meaning is registered, his explanation of how 
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“representations are entered into consciousness” (PS, 26)39 interlocks with what Deleuze 
and Guattari mean, when they characterize concepts as “fragmentary wholes,” the “edges 
[of which] do not match up” (35) an therefore cannot be translated into any “net” (6.341) 
of “formal concepts,” as Wittgenstein suggests in the Tractatus.  In Paul’s words: 
Grammar and logic do, therefore, not correspond, because the expansion and 
application of language does not proceed through strictly logical thought but 
through the natural, unschooled notions as masses of representations, which 
follow more or less logical laws not according to talent and education. […] 
Whoever considers grammatical forms only always in isolation, without their 
relation to the individual activity of the soul, will never come to an understanding 
of language development. (PS, 36)40
Conjointly, Paul’s account of the material mediation of meaning and Deleuze and 
Guattari’s analysis of how concrete expressions (“faces”) may travel among different 
experiential domains to produce new concepts, yields a compelling conception of 
language as communication.   
The particular merit of this conception is that it surpasses the Neo-Idealist notion 
of a speaking subject whose creativity is inevitably hampered by the mechanisms of 
group conformity.  Instead of locating creativity only within the immaterial “soul” of the 
individual speaker (as Vossler still tends to do), this view stresses the material individual
as the participant in an open system of meaning formation, whether we call it a  “plane of 
immanence” or a “symobolic form.”  In this regard, Paul’s work in the Prinzipien proves 
one of the most important precursors of Cassirer’s Philosophy of Symbolic Forms as well 
as of the kind of post-structuralism that is presented in Deleuze and Guattari’s What is 
Philosophy?  All three positions find new possibilities in the reciprocal nature of 
language use, according to which neither the group nor the individual is fully dominated 
by the other.  
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From this point of view Sprachgeist is no longer conceived as some spontaneous 
inspiration from out of nowhere.  Instead, linguistic innovation as the driving force 
behind any language development consists in the construction of new concepts, which is 
always mediated by concrete expressions.  The production and exchange of these 
expressions, qua cultural products, never fails to exceed the conscious intentions of their 
individual interpreters or enunciators.  And this is why any system of concepts keeps 
“leaking,” because it can never exhaust the meaning of the “faces” that provoked its 
construction in the first place. 
Some Conclusions: From Paul to Schelling
The common denominator that underlies this conception of concrete 
communication among different possible worlds, I suggest, is Schelling’s program of 
positive philosophy.  As I demonstrated in chapter one, his Philosophy of Revelation
features the idea of transcendence within immanence as one of its pathbreaking 
theoretical contributions.  In fact, Schelling’s thought here emerges as the initiation of a 
post-idealist philosophy of language, rather than as one of the fountainheads of “German 
Idealism.”  
Against the background of this particular post-idealist tradition, Cassirer never 
fails to acknowledge Schelling’s influence on his philosophy of symbolic forms.  In 
Deleuze and Guattari’s work this influence is somewhat obscured by the fact that they 
tend to give center-stage to Spinoza, rather than Schelling who dedicated integral parts of 
his early carreer to critiquing Spinoza: “Spinoza was the philosopher who knew full well 
that immanence was only immanent to itself and therefore that it was a plane traversed by 
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movements of the infinite, filled with intensive ordinates.  He is therefore the prince of 
philosophers” (48).  At this crucial juncture of their text, however, it becomes apparent 
that Deleuze and Guattari go beyond Spinoza’s insights in ways that were anticipated by 
the later Schelling’s critical Christology:  
He [Spinoza] discovered that freedom exists only within immanence. He fulfilled 
philosophy because he satisfied its prephilosophical presuppositions. Immanence 
does not refer back to the Spinozist substance and modes but, on the contrary, the 
Spinozist concepts of substance and modes refer back to the plane of immanence 
as their presupposition. (48) 
Such relocating of Spinoza’s concepts “back to the plane of immanence,” I would argue, 
is to be found less in Spinoza’s writings themselves than it is in Schelling’s critique of the 
remnants of “negative philosophy” in Spinoza’s (and Kant’s) thought, as I showed in 
chapter one.  
Hence it is Schelling, rather than Spinoza, who prepared the way for Husserl’s 
phenomenology and the “modern moment,” in which philosophy aspires to 
“transcendence within the immanent”: 
[W]hen immanence becomes immanent “to” a transcendental subjectivity, it is at 
the heart of its own field that the hallmark or figure [chiffre] of a transcendence 
must appear as action now referring to another self, to another consciousness 
(communication). This is what happens in Husserl and many of his successors 
who discover in the Other or in the Flesh, the mole of the transcendent within 
immanence itself. (46) 
In this modern moment we are no longer satisfied with thinking 
immanence as immanent to a transcendent; we want to think transcendence within 
the immanent, and it is from immanence that a breach is expected. Thus, in 
Jaspers, the plane of immanence is given the most profound determination as 
“Encompassing” [Englobant], but this encompassing is no more than a reservoir 
for eruptions of transcendence. The Judeo-Christian word replaces the Greek 
logos: no longer satisfied with ascribing immanence to something, immanence 
itself is made to disgorge the transcendent everywhere. (47)
Evidenced by this central passage, the assumption of a Christological subtext in What is 
Philosophy? is anything but far-fetchted.  It can be gleaned directly from the trajectory of 
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modern philosophy, which the authors trace up to their own presentation of 
transcendence within immanence, which they choose to call the “plane of immanence” or 
the “planomenon” (35).  To further strengthen this claim, and to substantiate my 
correlative suggestion that Schelling (not Spinoza) is the real “prince of philosophers,” at 
least in the present context, consider Deleuze and Guattari’s summary characterization of 
“[t]he plane of immanence [as] interleaved.”  Not only does this characterization show a 
strong affinity to Schelling’s (and Cassirer’s) thought, it also helps to specify my 
preceding reference to the idea of a multitude of open systems, and the “movement” of 
concrete expressions, or cultural products, among them:
From chaos the plane of immanence takes the determinations with which it makes 
its infinite movements or its diagrammatic features. Consequently, we can and 
must presuppose a multiplicity of planes, since no one plane could encompass all 
of chaos without collapsing back into it; and each retains only movements which 
can be folded together. […] Every plane of immanence is a One-All: it is not 
partial like a scientific system, or fragmentary like concepts, but distributive – it is 
an “each.” The plane of immanence is interleaved. (50)
This reference to “determinations taken from chaos” and to “infinite movements […] 
which can be folded together” is baffling at first.  Yet, against the backdrop of our 
findings in chapter one, this statement can be read as very comparable to Schelling’s 
solution to the puzzle of creation, namely how a finite world could be created “from” an 
inifinite god.  The clearest indication of this parallel is given by Deleuze and Guattari’s 
present remarks on chaos and how “no one plane could encompass all of chaos without 
collapsing back into it.”  What they are referring to, in my opinion, is something similar 
to Schelling’s second potency (B).  
Put in the language of the Philosophy of Revelation, remember how Schelling 
explained that God, upon being alerted to the possibility of His negation, could “over-
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react” and assert Himself with cataclysmic “wrath,” in which case no finite world or 
worlds would come about.  In the face of an observable finite world, then, we must 
assume a third potency, or scalar power, that mediates and prismatizes God’s wrath into a 
multitude of expressions of the spirit or Geist.  This multitude is what Cassirer refers to 
as symbolic forms and what Deleuze and Guattari call planes of immanence.  The 
vengeance of the stirred God has to be “folded” into movements of the spirit, “each” of 
which is still infinite but not unbound.  Religious thought, for instance, can go on 
infinitely to create concrete expressions and construct new concepts, and so can artistic 
and scientific thought – each on its plane.  
In every instance, the creative process is still infinite but not utterly boundless, 
because each plane is unified by its cultural logic.  As the organizing principle of each 
form of the spirit, cultural logic thus refers to the selection and interpretation of specific 
concrete expressions, which prompt the construction of concepts that are unique to the 
respective plane of meaning formation.  While concepts can be produced only on a 
specific plane, from which they cannot be removed without losing their meaning, the 
“traveling” of concrete expressions is possible.  And whenever a concrete expression or 
“face” of one plane breaks into another plane, it disrupts the conceptual order of the latter 
and stimulates the production of new concepts.  It is because of this double feature of 
plane-bound concepts and “inter-plane-tary” trafficing of concrete expressions that we 
can speak of open systems, which stimulate each other into a self-tranforming movement 
of meaning production – a material semiotics of concrete communication.  
The plausibility of reading Deleuze and Guattari from such a Schellingean 
perspective is further supported by the authors’ concluding remarks of their second 
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chapter, when they summarize their account of transcendence within the immanent in 
playfully religious language: 
We will say that THE [sic!] plane of immanence is, at the same time, that which 
must be thought and that which cannot be thought. It is the nonthought within 
thought. It is the base of all planes, immanent to every thinkable plane that does 
not succeed in thinking it. […] Perhaps this is the supreme act of philosophy: not 
so much to think THE plane of immanence as to show that it is there, unthought in 
every plane, and to think it in this way as the outside and inside of thought, as the 
not-external outside and the not-internal inside – that which cannot be thought and 
yet must be thought, which was thought once, as Christ was incarnated once, in 
order to show, that one time, the possibility of the impossible.  Thus Spinoza is 
the Christ of philosophers, […] the infinite becoming-philosopher […]. (60)
Once again, Deleuze and Guattari’s statements appear dauntingly paradoxical at first, but 
become immediately lucid, if read from the perspective of critical Christology, as their 
own reference to the incarnation of the Christ intimates.  From this interpretive angle, the 
“nonthought within thought,” “which cannot be thought and yet must be thought,” is 
nothing other than the “unpreconceivable” that Schelling had asserted in the name of 
positive philosophy.  “THE plane of immanence” is the gound of thinking, which the later 
Schelling explicates as the tranquil continuum, the unstirred God.  
If this parallelism is valid, we can consider it the theoretical hub of a 
philosophical constellation that puts Paul, Husserl, Cassirer, and Deleuze and Guattari in 
different places on the same post-Schellingean “plane” of critical-Christological thought.  
And it is not despite, but because of their philosophical advance on this plane, that we 
may respectfully disagree with Deleuze and Guattari and re-claim the title of “the 
infinite-becoming philosopher” from Spinoza and give it to Schelling. 
Heidegger belongs onto the same plane, although he never tired of disavowing his 
interlocutors, especially as far as his debt to Paul and Cassirer is concerned.  Now that we 
have identified the discursive interfaces and the proto-post-structurualist current that 
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connect the Paul-Vossler controversy to Husserl’s phenomenology and Cassirer’s 
philosophy of symbolic forms, we are able to detect their vital role in the earliest of 
Heidegger’s writings.  Tracing this route of influence effectively undercuts Heidegger’s 
proclaimed distance from Cassirer, as it demonstrates his persistent investment in a 
Neogrammarian body of thought all the way up to the Prolegomena and Being and Time.  
Accordingly, Heidegger’s development up to his magnum opus cannot be 
properly understood, I believe, if one takes a short-cut back to Humboldt, without 
registering the tension between Neogrammarian and Neo-Idealist tendencies in 
Heidegger’s thinking, which I will indicate in the next section. Here, however, the 
Vossler-Paul debate points to the continuing methodological impact of their science 
debate for the context on which the next chapter will expand.
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Wittgenstein’s diction, as I will show in detail. 
29
 Here I have slightly modified the rather awkward translation by Pears and McGuinness, as quoted above. 
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question:  “Where in the world is a metaphysical subject to be found?” Significantly, he approaches this 
issue through an illustration of “the eye,” which is never seen in any “visual field” (Gesichtsfeld); see: 
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 “I am my world. (The microcosm.)” (5.63). 
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37
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itself (like a piece of wax) as opposed to its variable “external forms” (23), and perceiving other “men,” as 
opposed to their outer appearance. For things like a piece of wax, the “external forms” refer to the variable 
sensory qualities that “came under the senses of taste, smell, sight, tough, or hearing” (21). All of these 
change over time, e.g., if we melt the wax. The wax changes appearances, just like people change clothes, 
or so Descartes’ analogy suggests.  The only persistent qualities of the wax are its being “extended, 
flexible, and mutable” (ibid.), and these cannot be perceived by our senses or by our power of imagination 
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turn, is too feeble to imagine all possible changes and thus deliver a comprehensive understanding of the 
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imagination. It remains then for me to concede that I do not grasp what this wax is through the imagination; 
rather I perceive it through the mind alone” (22). The same “perception by the mind alone” is supposed to 
enable us to distinguish people from their clothes and from mere “automata” (ibid.). 
However, Descartes never explains what the immutable qualities of “men” are, once we strip them 
of their clothes, which – if the analogy is to hold – would mean complete disembodiment. To see other 
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is in my mind” (22). The page numbers refer to: René Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, trans. D. 
A. Cress (Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett, 1993).  
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 Notice that the present reference to a world of fear and pain is used loosely for the sake of illustration. 
Deleuze and Guattari do not replicate the mistake we detected previously in Wittgenstein, when he posited 
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unhappy man.” After all, the very idea of one world breaking into another is meant to amend Wittgenstein’s 
unconvincing conception of a world’s closure, which is entailed by his notions of “logical form” and 
“metaphysical subject.” Clearly, then, Deleuze and Guattari speak of such worlds to show that they are 
neither as homogenous, nor as closed as the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus would have us believe. 
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Section III:
The Philosophical Rhetoric of Heidegger’s Political Ontology
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Chapter Five
Underway to Being and Time: 
The Study of Meaning (Bedeutungslehre) and the Logic of Language (Sprachlogik)
While previous sections of the present discussion addressed the contexts in which 
Heidegger’s works functioned, the present chapter will show how his specific approach 
to language and meaning evolved from his early writings on.  We will start with his early 
critique of linguisitics/philology, reaching back as far as his 1913 dissertation and his 
1916 Habilitationsschrift, which together constitute an early call for a subject of 
knowledge constituted differently than the model at play in the psychology and philology 
of the era.  After that, I will turn to his Prolegomena (1925) in order to address how his 
turn away from philology allows him to refute Husserl and his model of intersubjectivity 
in understanding.  Finally, in the concluding section of this chapter, I will return to the 
significance of these modes for the evaluation of Heidegger’s project and its appeal to 
religion.
From the Dissertation (1913) to the Habilitation (1916)
Going back to Heidegger’s early writings, we can distinguish a specific approach 
to what he ambiguously refers to as the science of language (Sprachwissenschaft), which 
I will highlight here merely by way of sampling some of the most prominent passages in 
this early phase of his work.  Here, Heidegger’s approach is marked by a vehement anti-
psychologism, culminating in his critiques of Wilhelm Wundt, Heinrich Maier, Franz 
Brentano, Anton Marty, and Theodor Lipps.  Heidegger’s respective criticism of these 
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authors varies in emphasis and scope, but we can pinpoint one common denominator, in 
particular, that remains characteristic of this period of his nascent thought.  In his 
dissertation, Die Lehre vom Urteil im Psychologismus (1913),1 it is put most succinctly in 
his critique of Wilhelm Wundt’s conception of Denkgesetze (thought-laws): 
Unter der objektiven Allgemeingültigkeit der Denkgesetze versteht Wundt ihre 
restlose Anwendbarkeit auf alles, was in unsere Erfahrung eingeht. Die 
Erkenntnisobjekte sind deshalb dem logischen Denken konform, weil dieses seine 
Evidenz doch eben den Beziehungen verdankt, die uns mit den 
Erfahrungsgegenständen gegeben sind. Oben wurde die Evidenz durch das 
Postulat der Konformität der Objekte mit dem Denken begründet. Hier wird 
umgekehrt durch die Evidenz die Konformität erklärt!
Auf diese Weise kommt überhaupt keine Begründung zustande, sondern 
Wundt bewegt sich allenfalls im Zirkel. Der letzte Grund hierfür ist nichts anderes 
als die Auffassung, die Denkgesetze seien Tatsachengesetze, die in der Natur 
unseres Geistes liegen. (88)2 [first emphasis added]
Heidegger’s main objection pertains to Wundt’s empiricist method, which posits thought-
laws as “completely applicable” (restlose Anwendbarkeit) to everything that can enter our 
experience.  
Although Heidegger gestures at a possible circularity in Wundt’s line of 
argument, he immediately specifies his criticism and makes it clear that Wundt’s primary 
mistake is a misconception of thought-laws understood as laws-of-fact (or factual laws; 
Tatsachengesetze).  In other words, Heidegger objects to Wundt’s understanding of the 
kind of normativity that presumably governs our thought processes.  Normativity or law-
likeness is inherent in our mental processes and thus can be read off of them, at least 
under ideal conditions of observation.  Heidegger finds this assumption illusory and holds 
that, if anything, such normativity could be an external standard for evaluating 
(Forderung [an]) the logical consistency of our thinking.3  However, in the last analysis, 
he thinks that the problem of applicability is a pseudo-problem that is generated only by 
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Wundt’s false understanding of mental normativity, which, in turn, springs from his 
misguided empiricist method. 
In the dissertation, which addresses Wundt’s work directly and in detail,
Heidegger rests content with exposing internal inconsistencies according to a procedure 
of “immanent examination of Wundt’s theory of judgment” (Immanente Durchprüfung 
der Wundtschen Urteilstheorie) (75).  He does not proffer an actual alternative just yet.  
Accordingly, this work remains somewhat open-ended and closes with a “look ahead” 
(Ausblick) to the more comprehensive future project that would replace the flawed 
method of psychological empiricism, exemplified especially in the work of Wundt.  Such 
an alternative is intimated in terms of a new Bedeutungslehre or interpretive semiotics 
writ large, which would determine the meaning of words in correlation to larger contexts 
of meaning production.  The latter are referred to as “Wirklichkeitsweisen” (efficacies of 
reality, or, modes of reality).  
Once again, contrasting his own prospective view, still to be specified, with any 
genetic schemes of explanation in historical psychology, Heidegger concludes his 
dissertation as follows: 
Die wahre Vorarbeit für die Logik und die allein fruchtbringend verwendbare 
wird nicht von psychologischen Untersuchungen über Entstehung und 
Zusammensetzung der Vorstellungen geleistet, sondern durch eindeutige 
Bestimmungen und Klärungen der Wortbedeutungen. Und erst wenn auf solcher 
Grundlage die reine Logik auf- und ausgebaut ist, wird man mit grösserer 
Sicherheit an die erkenntnistheoretischen Probleme herantreten können und den 
Gesamtbereich des “Seins” in seine verschiedenen Wirklichkeitsweisen gliedern, 
deren Eigenartigkeit scharf herausheben und die Art ihrer Erkenntnis und die 
Tragweite derselben sicher bestimmen können.  Das Gesagte möge andeuten, dass 
die vorliegende Arbeit eine philosophische sein will, indem sie im Dienste des 
letzten Ganzen unternommen wurde. (186-187). 
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Again, at this point, it is not quite clear what Heidegger means by Wirklichkeitsweisen, 
nor what he has in mind when he speaks of the “last whole” (das letzte Ganze).  The 
answer, at least in large part, is given in the second part of Heidegger’s subsequent 
habilitation (Habilitationsschrift), Die Kategorien- und Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus
(1916).4
Under the same rubric of Bedeutungslehre (study or science of meaning[s]), 
Heidegger explicitly returns in his 1916 Habilitationsschrift to the problem of 
applicability previously discussed in his dissertation work on Wundt.  While he refines 
the problem in terms of categorial application, he stands by his initial judgment that this 
problem is a pseudo-problem engendered by erroneous methodology.  Moreover, he now 
cashes in the Ausblick at the end of his doctoral thesis.  In doing so he positions himself 
for the first time vis-à-vis the project of “logical grammar” (338).   
At first glance, this may appear as a thematic shift away from Heidegger’s 
previous work, as if he were moving from historical psychology to linguistics/philology.  
However, no such shift actually takes place between the dissertation and the habilitation.  
What may look like two debates in different disciplines are only so many facets of the 
same discourse in the era’s complex field variously designated as comparative linguistics, 
developmental philology, and historical syntax, which was burgeoning in the second half 
of the nineteenth century.  Focused on the question of scientific method, it marked one of 
the most powerful currents in the Geisteswissenschaften controversy, which threatened to 
invade the disciplinary territory of philosophy proper.  This interdisciplinary movement 
aimed at redefining the science of language in conjunction with, rather than opposition to, 
the field of historical psychology.  To this end, different rival projects were distinguished 
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within that field and appear as rivals still today.  In terms of method, the two most 
prominent candidates for reforming the traditional conception of the historical sciences of 
language, in general, and historico-psychological research, in particular, were the theories 
offered by Wilhelm Wundt and Hermann Paul respectively.  This constellation of 
revolutionizing Sprachwissenschaft points back to the groundbreaking work of the 
Humboldt and the Schlegel brothers.  
Of special importance for Heidegger’s philosophical beginnings and further 
development, however, is the additional twist that comparative linguistics had received in 
the later part of the nineteenth century through the so-called “Neogrammarian revolution” 
and the neo-Idealist reaction and counter-movement it provoked, which I discussed in the 
previous section.  As we have seen, in this tense constellation, the theoretical debate 
between Wundt and Paul was followed by another controversy between Paul and Vossler, 
which re-ignited the same argument over method from a more philological angle.  And it 
is the work of Vossler to which Heidegger expressly turns at a crucial juncture in his 
habilitation, when he delineates the methodological orientation of his own project in 
contradistinction to previous conceptions of what he refers to (tendentiously, against the 
accepted references in the history of philology) as “logical grammar”: 
Die hier in Anlehnung and den Traktat des Duns Scotus aufgestellte Forderung 
einer logischen Bedeutungslehre scheint nun alle Irrtümer wieder zu Ehren 
bringen zu wollen, die man den logischen Grammatikern vorgeworfen hat und 
noch vorwirft. 
“Die einfache Wahrheit, dass der sprachliche Gedanke eine Sache für sich, 
etwas Selbständiges und namentlich etwas wesentlich anderes als der 
logische Gedanke ist, diese einfache Wahrheit wird immer wieder 
verkannt. Demnach hat das Zwitterwesen der logischen Grammatik seinen 
Beruf verfehlt, seine Existenzberechtigung verwirkt.” [here Heidegger 
inserts note 59] 
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The quotation within Heidegger’s text is taken from Vossler’s (1910) Logos article, and 
Heidegger supplements this quote with further and more extensive references to 
Vossler’s work.  This textual signpost clearly shows just how familiar Heidegger was 
with the discursive constellation at the intersection of historical psychology and 
comparative linguistics, which included most notably Wundt, Paul, and Vossler, among 
others.  To show the degree of his technical command of the arguments at play in this 
massive redefinition of the language sciences, consider Heidegger’s extensive note 59:  
K. Voßler,5 Grammatik und Sprachgeschichte oder das Verhältniss von “richtig” 
und “wahr” in der Sprachwissenschaft. Logos I. 1910. S. 86. 
“An und für sich aber ist jedes Sprechen alogisch.” – “Die Logik beginnt 
erst hinter der Sprache oder mittels der Sprache, aber nicht vor ihr oder ohne sie.” 
Voßler, Positivismus und Idealismus in der Sprachwissenschaft. 
Heidelberg 1904. S. 25, 26.  
Am Schluss seiner Abhandlung “Das System der Grammatik” (Logos IV, 
1913. S. 203 ff.), wo als “der wesentliche Gegenstand der Grammatik eine von 
aller geistigeren Tätigkeit und allem geistigen Leben abgelöste Sprache” studiert 
wird, schreibt derselbe Verfasser: “Wohl gibt es auch heute wieder 
Sprachphilosophen, die eine selbständige allgemeine reine, spekulative und 
universale Grammatik, eine Grammatik der Grammatiken [!] fordern. Aus meinen 
Betrachtungen werden diese Neu-Platoniker und Neu-Scholastiker gerade so klug 
werden wie ich aus den ihren” (a.a.O. S. 223). 
Durch das im Text Gesagte dürfte die Möglichkeit und Notwendigkeit 
beider “Standpunkte” erhärtet sein. (338-339)
Significantly, Heidegger presents his own work as some kind of middle path, if not 
compromise solution, between these classical and modern sciences of languages, a 
solution which is meant to retain the valuable resources of “neo-Platonism” and “neo-
Scholasticism” as well as the valid parts of Vossler’s trenchant critique of these two 
traditional trends in the philosophy of language und universal grammar.  
After thus placing himself directly within the Neogrammarian/neo-Idealist 
context, he then sketches the tenets of a philosophically grounded Bedeutungslehre as 
follows: 
234
Die Forderung der Logik einer Grammatik braucht nicht die theoretische Meinung 
vorauszusetzen, der grammatische Sprachgebrauch lasse sich aus logischen 
Gesetzen ableiten. Die Frage, wie die Sprache geworden ist, welchen 
schöpferischen Faktoren sie ihr Dasein verdankt, ist kein Problem der Logik. Man 
mag über Wesen, Aufgabe und Gliederung der Sprachwissenschaft wie immer 
denken, zugegeben muss werden, dass die Sprachgebilde Bedeutungen haben. 
Und nur bei diesen setzt die philosophische Reflexion ein, um reduktiv zu den 
kategorialen Momenten zurückzugreifen und sie vom System der Kategorienlehre 
aus zu würdigen. Diese logischen Bedingungen der Sprache, genauer der 
Bedeutungen, dürfen aber nicht zu sachlichen Ursachen der lautlichen 
Entwicklung der Sprache und gar zu den einzigen umgedeutet werden. Der 
Sprachgeist, der schöpferische Faktor der Sprachentwicklung, hat aber als Geist 
auch eine bestimmte, im besagten Sinne logische Struktur; die und nur die will die 
Logik der Sprache herausheben. . . . Die Sprache wird also von der 
Bedeutungslehre nicht nach ihrem realen Dasein erklärt, sondern nur nach ihrer 
rationalen, d.h. den Inhalt betreffenden Seite hin verstanden. (339-340) 
[Heidegger emphasizes “sachliche Ursachen” {line 10}, “Geist” {line12}, 
“logische” {line 13}, “erklärt” {line 16}, “verstanden” {line 17}; other emphases 
added.]
This passage is remarkable in its density, as far as the juxtaposition and partial conflation 
of multiple language-philosophical discourses is concerned, not as a matter of obscure 
expression on Heidegger’s part.  In fact, except for one awkward sentence at the heart of 
this passage, to which I will turn shortly, his wording is quite lucid and actually very 
telling with respect to his strategic omissions. 
At the beginning, Heidegger clearly distances his analysis from the “old” 
eighteenth-century debate over the “origins” of language, which a philosophical 
audience, including Heidegger himself, would have known through the work of Gottfried 
Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716), Johann Georg Hamann (1730-1788), and Johann Gottfried 
von Herder (1744-1803).  While none of these authors was passé for Heidegger, the 
debate over language had taken a decisively different turn in the second half of the 
nineteenth century, especially against the backdrop of the seminal linguistic advances by 
Wilhelm von Humboldt.6
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Yet, the “mediating” position of Humboldt between these two periods of language 
science has often obscured the crucial inventions and interventions in comparative 
linguistics that came after Humboldt and extended his pioneering work into new 
territories of Sprachwissenschaft with new philosophical stakes – Paul’s and Vossler’s 
work being cases in point.  This overemphasis on Humboldt, at the expense of both his 
followers and detractors in the later nineteenth century, has led to a one-sided celebration 
of the “H-triumvirate,” the so-called “Hamann-Herder-Humboldt” tradition whose legacy 
keeps affecting Heidegger scholarship to this day.7
Heidegger’s explicit references and testimonies to his alliance with regard to this 
tradition have been instrumental, of course, in solidifying this legacy in philosophical 
quarters.  The later Heidegger is always happy to remind his readers of Humboldt’s “deep 
dark insights” that “we must never cease to admire.”8  It is not quite clear in these 
statements what is supposed to be so “dark” about Humboldt.  In fact, if one reads neo-
Idealists like Vossler, who followed in Humboldt’s footsteps, the latter’s thought would 
appear to be the very remedy against the “dark side” in linguistics around the turn of the 
century, namely by combatting those branches of historical positivism that are poised to 
“suffocate” and “deaden” the living spirit of language.9  In contrast to Heidegger’s 
recurrent Humboldt references, Vossler’s influence will not be acknowledged in 
Heidegger’s later writings.  Yet the omission of his name does not reflect an omission of 
his thought, which keeps influencing Heidegger’s quest for a new philosophical semiotics 
of Geist.
In the present passage under consideration, however, the most glaring omission 
consists in Heidegger’s failure to mention the other side of this debate, especially as 
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represented by Hermann Paul, whose name is written all over Heidegger’s present 
account of philosophical Bedeutungslehre vis-à-vis “logical grammar.” 
Unearthing the Neogrammarian Subtext of the Early Heidegger
In the context of the “essence, task, and [structural] organization of language 
science” (Wesen, Aufgabe und Gliederung der Sprachwissenschaft), the reference to 
“phonetic development” (lautliche Entwicklung) and the “creative factor in language 
development” mark an unmistakable reference to the Neogrammarians.  This connection 
is all the more tangible in Heidegger’s text, if presented right after cross-referencing 
Vossler’s 1904 “manifesto,” since the concluding part of the latter is dedicated to a 
critical exchange with Paul’s position, which we examined earlier, in section two of the 
present project.  
This omission must be viewed as strategic, if we consider the internal dynamics 
within the Wundt-Paul-Vossler constellation into which Heidegger is entering in these 
passages.  Heidegger goes to great length to refute Wundt’s historical-psychological 
project of genetic explanation.  As a proposed alternative, Heidegger insists that a 
“categorial[ly]” sensitive study of meaning has to account for the “creative factor” in 
language as an evolving process.  Approaching language as a process phenomenon that
cannot be causally or genetically “explained” but has to be understood in terms of the 
structures within transformation, Heidegger opts for a semiotic methodology very much 
like the one that Paul had put forth in the course of his work in historical philology.10
That is, he is at pains to underscore the creative aspects of understanding, the points 
237
where the individual innovates over and above the common framework towards some 
more universal ground of meaning.
The methodological affinity between Heidegger and Paul is further supported by 
the fact that Heidegger retains some reservations toward Vossler’s approach, even as he 
introduces the latter’s critique of logical grammar in a favorable tone.  In this vein, 
Heidegger is not prepared to wholeheartedly follow Vossler’s glib dismissal of a “self-
sufficient, general, pure, speculative and universal grammar,” a “grammar of grammars.”  
Instead, Heidegger’s wording, relegated to a footnote, gestures at the possibility that 
some “neo-Platonist” or “neo-Scholastic” thought might still hold some resources for the 
philosophical semiotics he wants to evolve.11
In this passage, then, Vossler’s neo-Idealism is deemed too radical and 
untempered and too dismissive of “categorial systematicity” to account for the structural 
as well as creative factors within a process ontology of language, according to a new kind 
of semiotics.  It is important, however, not to overestimate what looks like a “scholastic 
relapse” toward universal grammar on Heidegger’s part.  While it is up for speculation, 
whether Heidegger’s accommodation for possible neo-Platonist resources was a mere 
bow to the more theologically inclined philosophers among his colleagues or possible 
future employers,12 the main concern lies with Heidegger’s use of the term “logic” or 
“logical” in this context.  The latter is crucial, because this surface diction has prompted 
the wide-spread prejudice that the young Heidegger’s attack on psychologism was 
concomitant with a staunch commitment to “pure logic,” which would make him look 
like a neo-Kantian under the determinant influence of Rickert (his habilitation advisor) or 
“like many of today’s analytic philosophers.”13  Independently of any later Kehre (turn)  
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talk, this is the commonly accepted myth of Heidegger’s logic-centered beginnings, 
under Rickert, before he turned to phenomenology, under and soon against Husserl. 
However, if one reads the dissertation in conjunction with (the second part of) the 
habilitation where Heidegger finally provides a glimpse at his own program, this 
characterization is no longer plausible.  And – to return to the focus of my first section –
neither is Kisiel’s favorite claim that “it all began in KNS 1919.”  Upon examining the 
young Heidegger’s writings, we can say with more justification and textual evidence that 
it all began with Heidegger’s encounter with late nineteenth-century psychology, in 
general, and the Neogrammarian-versus-neo-Idealist clash, in particular.  
Heidegger thus enters his individual program through a controversy that revolves 
around two basic methodological alternatives: empiricist historical psychology, bent upon 
ascertaining the “thought-lawful” character of genetic-causal series in mental 
development (Wundt), on one hand; and conceptual historical psychology, which aims at 
detecting not laws but principles in mental development and cultural meaning formation 
(Paul), on the other hand.14  Heidegger clearly opts for the latter without ever giving any 
credit to Paul, as opposed to Cassirer who always did. 
This goes to show that Heidegger did not start out as a streamlining neo-Kantian, 
with a special penchant for scholastic logic and nominalism, his scholarship-related 
obligations notwithstanding.15  Certainly, in his habilitation, Heidegger’s choice of topic 
accommodates for the latter obligation and keeps alive the professional aspiration toward 
a chair in Christian philosophy.  Yet, as far as his search for a new philosophical method 
is concerned, he is already groping for a new interpretive semiotics, as he enters a 
discourse of Sprachwissenschaft that points to Humboldt’s comparative linguistics but 
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has now received a decisive twist through the Neogrammarian revolution and its 
immediate counter-movements. 
Positioning himself over against the most visible interlocutors in that very 
discourse, then, Heidegger plainly rejects Wundt’s method of genetic explanation.  In 
doing so he forms a partial alliance with Vossler, one of the most vociferous spokesmen 
in opposition to such genetic reduction schemes.  However, Heidegger shies away from 
Vossler’s radical case for an overarching science of style, a systematic stylistics (Stilistik) 
that posits the rik of reintroducing some of the totalizing effects of positivism that 
Vossler himself set out to combat.  Without entailing so much as complete rejection, 
Heidegger thus keeps his distance from this aspect of Vossler’s project, which puts him 
in even greater proximity to the work of Paul, who actually was the prime detractor of 
Wundt at the time – a fact that Heidegger strategically omits.
When I presented the last extended quotation (p. 204, above), I remarked on its 
density in terms of content, while acknowledging Heidegger’s fairly transparent mode of 
expression, with the exception of one sentence.  So far we have discussed Heidegger’s 
methodological approach to Sprachwissenschaft, in light of the discursive stakes of late 
nineteenth-century historical psychology and comparative linguistcs.  Against this 
background, we can now attend to this specific, convoluted sentence at the heart of this 
crucial passage:  
Man mag über Wesen, Aufgabe und Gliederung der Sprachwissenschaft wie 
immer denken, zugegeben muss werden, dass die Sprachgebilde Bedeutungen
haben. Und nur bei diesen setzt die philosophische Reflexion ein, um reduktiv zu 
den kategorialen Momenten zurückzugreifen und sie vom System der 
Kategorienlehre aus zu würdigen. (339) 
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In this programmatic statement about the scope of philosophical inquiry into “language 
formations” (Sprachgebilde), Heidegger’s wording appears tortured, compared to the 
fairly transparent diction of the statements surrounding this sentence, aimed at 
recapturing something more apriorist, categorical, about language.  On its own terms, the 
obscurity and vagueness of Heidegger’s diction cannot be fully resolved with respect to 
this pronouncement, but will meet with some clarification in light of his concluding 
remarks at the very end of his habilitation study. 
This opacity notwithstanding, the important thing to notice in this passage is that 
Heidegger speaks of “categorial aspects to be appreciated from [the perspective of] the 
system of the study of categories” (kategoriale Momente […] vom System der 
Kategorienlehre aus zu würdigen) [emphasis added].  He does not speak of any single or 
fixed categorical system or table of categories.  Yet, up to this point, it is up for 
speculation whether the Kategorienlehre which Heidegger wants to promote is concerned 
with the formation of categories or the use of categories.  The former resolution would be 
more ontological in character (and thus leaning toward the Vossler position), while the 
latter is decidedly epistemological (and much more in line with Paul’s work).
Directly preceded by Heidegger’s quote from Vossler (1904), all we can glean 
from the present statement is that he wants to maintain some aspect or degree of 
systematicity in the study of categories, which, presumably, Vossler does not sufficiently 
secure or accommodate for at all.  At the same time, Heidegger’s language remains 
suggestive enough with respect to the reading of the Humboldt-heritage that Heidegger 
shares with Vossler.  In continuation of the programmatic statement just quoted, this 
heritage is intimated by Heidegger’s remarks in terms of the “spirit of language”: “Der 
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Sprachgeist, der schöpferische Faktor der Sprachentwicklung, hat aber als Geist auch 
eine bestimmte, im besagten Sinne logische Struktur; die und nur die will die Logik der 
Sprache herausheben” (339). 
In regard to the specific meaning of “logical” in the present context, Heidegger 
points back to his express comment, in the preceding paragraph of his text.  Still within 
the immediate commentary on Vossler, Heidegger distinguishes two different meanings 
of “logical,” concerning the possibility or impossibility of “logical grammar”: 
Soll der Begriff “logische Grammatik” besagen, die Grammatik müsse aus der 
Logik abgeleitet werden, dann liegt darin etwas Unmögliches. Wenn man nun 
aber darauf hinweist, dass logisch unwahre Urteile sich grammatisch völlig richtig 
ausdrücken lassen, und daraus schliesst: also ist die Grammatik nicht logisch, 
dann versteht man unter dem logischen bzw. alogischen Charakter der Sprache 
etwas ganz anderes, als was die logische Bedeutungslehre mit dem Ausdruck 
“logisch” meint. Logisch und logisch sind in beiden Fällen nicht dasselbe. (339) 
[emhases added] 
Heidegger thus wants to put forth a “logical semiotics” (logische Bedeutungslehre), in 
which he is careful to distinguish his use of the term “logical” from those misguided 
usages that imply a conception of  “logical grammar,” in which grammar had to be 
derived from logic.  (Yet he is not going as far as appealing to semantics.)  Any such 
derivation Heidegger dismisses as “impossible.”  In this passage, Heidegger’s insistence 
to keep the term “logical” already appears rather willful, given his own indication of 
possible, if not probable, misunderstanding.  
As we saw, Heidegger then switches to an idiom clearly reminiscent of Humboldt 
(albeit a one-sided reading of Humboldt), when he moves on to characterize the “spirit of 
language” in terms of “logical structure.”  At this point, the reader wonders what work 
the adding of the attribute “logical” really does for Heidegger, for it seems that he might 
as well have skipped it and confined himself to a reference to “structure” alone.  This 
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suspicion about gratuitous terminology, which is not motivated by methodological or 
philosophical content but deployed to some strategic end instead, is further supported by 
the way Heidegger proceeds to sketch the basic tenets of a new Bedeutungslehre that 
would accommodate for the spirit of language, i.e., for “the creative factor of language 
development” (339). 
Remember the very end of the quotation that grounded my discussion of the 
Wundt-Paul-Vossler constellation, where Heidegger writes: “Die Sprache wird also von 
der Bedeutungslehre nicht nach ihrem realen Dasein erklärt, sondern nur nach ihrer 
rationalen, d.h. den Inhalt betreffenden Seite hin verstanden” (339-340).  
Here, Heidegger performs yet another befuddling shift of terminology, when he 
equates “rational” (rational) with “content-related” (den Inhalt betreffend).  Since the 
emphasis, according to Heidegger’s own italics, is on “explanation” (erklären as Wundt 
would have it) versus “understanding” (verstehen), the reader’s attention is drawn away 
from the aforesaid terminological slide; especially so, since Heidegger immediately shifts 
gears and interpolates a two-paragraph, “third party” commentary by Werner on Scotus.16
Only after this interpolation does Heidegger finish his own line of thought concerning the 
new approach of Bedeutungslehre, in order to finish the chapter with yet another “side 
track” remark on Werner’s systematic bias in his evaluation of Scotus’s “logic of 
language” (“Sprachlogik”).17
In this well-engineerd manner of presentation, Heidegger exacts his most crucial 
terminological maneuvers in a way that “mollifies” some of his conceptual transitions.  
He does so through an internal shift of emphasis within those paragraphs or sentences 
that are meant to convey his own position, combined with an external shift, that is, a 
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technique of alternation, by means of which Heidegger intercepts his own train of thought 
and stochastically returns to the surface text of the Scotus case study.  At the same time
he keeps progressing on the plane of his own methodological subtext, without letting his 
view congeal into a solid picture for the reader to critically examine. 
As a case in point, Heidegger’s present line of terminological shifts reaches an 
interim stop with a gesture at a “new dimension” of language philosophy that would lay 
bare the “last theoretical fundaments” of language.  Heidegger thus rounds out his 
pending distinction between two senses of “logical,”18 when he writes: 
Aber gerade psychologische und historische Untersuchungen über die Sprache 
gehören nicht in eine Sprachphilosophie. Diese hat ihre Probleme in einer ganz 
neuen Dimension zu suchen. Ihr obliegt die Herausstellung der letzten 
theoretischen Fundamente, die der Sprache zugrunde liegen. Ohne die eindeutige 
begriffliche Fassung von “Bedeutung überhaupt,” “in der Bedeutung gemeinter 
Gegenstand,” “Bedeutungskategorie,” “Beziehung der Bedeutungsformen” ist der 
sichere Gang der Untersuchungen über die Sprache gar nicht möglich, abgesehen 
davon, dass die Bedeutungslehre durch die Lösung der namhaft gemachten 
Probleme einen fundamentalen Bezirk der Logik bearbeitet. (340)
Notice the ambiguity that adheres to Heidegger’s phrase “fundamental region of logic” 
(fundamentale[r] Bezirk der Logik), which can be read in at least three different ways, in 
the present context.  First, within the predetermined framework of logic proper as a 
philosophical discipline, the new method would work on, or in, one special area.  
Accordingly, Bedeutungslehre would be relegated to a sub-territory of logic.  
Or, second, the new method might actually provide the very fundament for logic 
or, perhaps, different kinds of logic.  Heidegger’s diction is “perfectly” ambiguous in this 
regard.  His use of the indefinite article, in speaking of “a fundamental area” of logic, 
would suggest the former reading. Alternatively, any reading that puts the emphasis on “a 
fundamental area” of logic starts to gravitate toward the second rendering, moving 
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apriorist in direction. There is also a third possible interpretation, according to which the 
new Bedeutungslehre makes one regional contribution to the foundation of logic, while 
other areas of that foundation will have to be grounded by other approaches or methods.  
Regardless which of these three interpretive options the reader actually chooses, 
Heidegger has already succeeded at moving the terms of the language discussion away 
from “rational” and “content-related” to “theoretical” and “pre-logical” or “logic-
founding.”  The last two terms are not used by Heidegger as such, but are my compressed 
rendering for his explication of the new Bedeutungslehre as an approach that “cultivates a 
fundamental region of logic” (einen fundamentalen Bezirk der Logik bearbeitet). 
However, this progressive shift along the terminological trajectory of “logical” is 
not complete yet.  It will come full circle some sixty pages later, toward the very end of 
Heidegger’s habilitation project, when he takes stock of “the intimate connection between 
the problem of categories and the problem of judgment(s)”: 
Der enge Zusammenhang zwischen Kategorien- und Urteilsproblem lässt dann 
auch das Form-Materialverhältnis und die bedeutungsdifferenzierende Funktion 
des Materials erneut zum Problem werden. Die Form-Materialduplizität ist heute 
ein ausschlaggebendes Mittel erkenntnistheoretischer Problembearbeitung, so 
dass eine prinzipielle Untersuchung über Wert und Grenzen dieser Dublizität 
unumgänglich geworden ist. (405) [second emphasis added]
Heidegger’s comment on the “value and limits” of a basic “form-matter duplicity” (Wert 
und Grenze dieser [Form-Material]Duplizität) in epistemology, with respect to the 
“meaning-differentiating function of the material” that is in need of a principle-oriented 
inquiry, is perhaps one of the boldest instances of omitting the work of philologists like 
Hermann Paul who would argue the contrary.  Heidegger’s diction barely manages to 
conceal the fact that he is coopting Paul’s methodology almost verbatim, while he still 
refuses to identify him (or any other Neogrammarian) by name.  
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Heidegger’s methodological staging of the “meaning-differentiating function of 
the material,” I argue, can hardly be read as anything but a slightly tweaked rendering of 
Paul’s conception of Vorstellungmasse (semiotic matter).19  I say tweaked, because of 
some remaining oddity in Heidegger’s locution which, however, does not take away from 
the unmistakable coopting of Paul, whose work is here being used without any 
identification of the author.  The oddity pertains to the phrase “des Materials” (see 
quotation, above).  While it is common practice in German to use the definite article in 
reference to a general subject matter or type of entity (e.g., die Materie for “matter” as a 
technical term in physics), Heidegger’s syntactic construction is still somewhat 
perplexing.  
Insofar as his speaking of das Material (to use the nominative case form of 
Heidegger’s genetive construction) follows immediately upon the phrase Form-
Materialverhältnis, one is inclined to assum e that Heidegger uses the same term twice in 
the same sense, within the same sentence.  Even so, once we isolate the Material-
component from the combined noun phrase Form-Materialverhältnis, the former seems 
to take on a special meaning in that the implied materiality gains new philosophical 
weight.  The reason for this impression, at least in part, might be seen in the fact that the 
combined noun phrase is already peculiar.  In the present epistemological context dealing 
with the relation between the “problem of categories” and the “problem of judgment,” the 
reader is likely to expect a reference to the common Form-Inhalt (form-content) 
distinction.  Instead Heidegger speaks of “form” and “material,” and once such material 
is posited in isolation, it is no longer apparent what materiality Heidegger has in mind, 
while his use of the definite article suggests that he is still referring to a commonly 
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known philosophical subject matter.  Although the meaning of the term may be unclear at 
this point, Heidegger has thereby extracted a new notion of materiality from the familiar 
form-content nexus.  Breaking the formulaic mold, he thus departs from a classical locus 
of traditional epistemology while still invoking its authority over proper philosophical 
inquiry.
However, the “newly” extracted notion of materiality is not new, and it is not 
Heidegger’s.  Instead, it is a Neogrammarian import from Paul’s work in historical 
philology, which broadened the notion of epistemological content into a specific 
conception of semiotic materiality as the centerpiece of a theory about the material 
mediation of meaning formation and transformation:
What enables these physical products to serve as the means for transmitting 
representations to another individual is either an inner, direct connection to the 
representations (one should think, for example, of a cry of pain, a gesture of rage), 
or a connection mediated through the association of ideas […] Through this type 
of communication, no content of representation can be created anew in the soul. 
The content about which we are concerned must rather already be present there, 
and called forth through physiological stimulations. […] The content of 
representations itself is uncommunicable. Everything which we believe we know 
about those of another individual rests only on conclusions about our own. […] 
The greater the correspondence, the easier the understanding. (PS, 14-15)
In fact, in the last quotation from Heidegger, he himself makes a clear gesture at Paul’s 
work through his express reference to a methodology that would examine such mediation 
of meaning in terms of structural “principles” (not laws!) governing a process of semiotic 
evolution. 
Heidegger’s remarks in this passage are a direct continuation of his earlier 
statements about “logical grammar” and philosophical method, textually anchored in his 
prime reference to Vossler.  Against this background his present reference to “principles” 
(prinzipielle Untersuchung; Heidegger emphasizes the first word) establishes a clear 
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connection to the Neogrammarian discourse on method in comparative linguistics, as any 
participant in the debate over reforming Sprachwissenschaft would have recognized in 
1916, when Heidegger published his habilitation, since several of the Neogrammarians’ 
public statements had the subtitles of “investigations of principles.”  Given Heidegger’s 
extensive work on Wundt and his detailed references to Vossler, it is simply not plausible 
to assume that he could have been oblivious to Paul’s towering presence at the time.  
Hence, italicizing  prinzipielle in a discussion of the material dimension of meaning 
formation, without mentioning Paul, cannot be interpreted as anything but a strategic 
omission on Heidegger’s part.  
The asserted thematic link between Heidegger’s earlier comments on logical 
grammar and his present commentary on the meaning-differentiating function of “the 
material” is further corroborated in light of the baffling cluster of an alternative 
terminology that Heidegger uses to mark the conceptual challenges that the novel kind of 
Bedeutungslehre will have to take on.  Remember how he proffered the signpost of such 
new route of inquiry, using scare quotes for every terminological item that alludes to his 
borrowing: “Ohne die eindeutige begriffliche Fassung von “Bedeutung überhaupt,” “in 
der Bedeutung gemeinter Gegenstand,” “Bedeutungskategorie,” “Beziehung der 
Bedeutungsformen” ist der sichere Gang der Untersuchungen über die Sprache gar nicht 
möglich, […]” (340).20
The idiosyncratic character of Heidegger’s vocabulary precludes conclusive 
judgment on the exact meaning of these new entries in his methodological dictionary.  
However, in light of our examination of his subsequent borrowings from Paul, it is 
especially the second item that appears much more revealing now.  Arguably the most 
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awkward, at first glance, Heidegger’s phrase “in der Bedeutung gemeinter Gegenstand” 
can thus be interpreted as a hint at Paul’s conception of the material mediation of 
meaning.  
According to the latter, meaningful items become identifiable only as they emerge 
from a dynamic background of semiotic matter (Vorstellungsmasse).  In other words, 
what Heidegger here addresses as “intended object” (gemeinter Gegenstand) becomes 
available to a philosophical investigation into language only as embedded within a 
material-semiotic context, that is, within the material dimension of a process of 
signification – “within [an act of] signification” (in der Bedeutung), as Heidegger densely 
puts it. 
As shown by these efforts at decoding Heidegger, some of his most cryptic 
prounouncements become much more transparent, if read through the lens of Paul’s 
material semiotics.  Discursively, the link to Paul, I argue, is conclusively established 
through the Wundt-Vossler connection, while the interpretive merit of exposing 
Heidegger as deeply indebted to the Neogrammarian project can be demonstrated only 
when it is brought to bear on the variegated fabric of Heidegger’s text.  In keeping with 
this approach, Heidegger’s often opaque characterization of a historically critical, anti-
psychologistic study of meaning can effectively be elucidated, once we undo his strategic 
omission of the actual pioneer of this project, Hermann Paul.  Paul’s material semiotics 
set the methodological standard for any opposition to empirical reduction schemes within 
historical psychology.  Heidegger’s account of the “meaning-diffentiating function of the 
material” is in unmistakable alignment with Paul’s philosophical “divergence”21 in 
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comparative language research, while he goes to great length to occlude the philological 
tradition from which he is drawing. 
After thus locating Heidegger within the late nineteenth-century constellation of 
an interdisciplinary discourse that cuts across historical psychology and historical syntax, 
we can observe with greater clarity how he expounds his reterritorialization of 
philosophical logic over against the traditional conception of “logical grammar.”  His 
suspenseful dictum that, for a critical comparison of these two endeavors, “logic and 
logic are not the same” (339) receives its last rendition (at least, in his habilitation thesis) 
when Heidegger finally couches his sketch of a philosophically sound study of meaning 
in terms of the “translogical.” 
Allerdings, durch ein Stehenbleiben innerhalb der logischen Sphäre des Sinnes 
und der Sinnstruktur wird eine endgültige Aufhellung dieser Frage nicht zu 
gewinnen sein. Man kommt allenfalls zu einer Potenzierung (Stockwerklehre der 
Formen bei Lask),22 die fraglos das Bedeutsame leistet, in die 
Strukturmannigfaltigkeit des Logischen selbst hineinzuleuchten, die aber doch 
gerade das Problem der bedeutungsdifferenzierenden Funktion des Materials noch 
kompliziert und in eine neue Sphäre hineinversetzt, ohne die fundamentale 
Verschiedenheit des sinnlichen und unsinnlichen Materials genügend in 
Rechnung zu setzen. 
Man vermag die Logik und ihre Probleme überhaupt nicht im wahren 
Lichte zu sehen, wenn nicht der Zusammenhang, aus dem heraus sie gedeutet 
werden, ein translogischer wird. (405) [all emphases added]
Toward the end of his habilitation thesis, Heidegger thus cashes in his earlier gesture at 
the “logical structure” of Sprachgeist, that is, of “the creative factor in language 
development” (339).23  Starting from this anticipatory characterization by Heidegger, we 
have followed the different stages of his progressive shifting along the terminological 
trajectory of “logical”: from “logical structure” (logische Struktur) to “rational” (rational) 
as equated with “content-related” (den Inhalt betreffend) (340); onto “theoretically 
fundamental” ([die] letzten theoretischen Fundamente) and “logic-founding” ([…] einen 
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fundamentalen Bezirk der Logik bearbeitet) (ibid.); onto the “meaning-differentiating 
function of the material” (die bedeutungsdifferenzierende Funktion des Materials) (405); 
and finally onto the “translogical” (translogisch) (ibid.). 
Along the way, we were able to indicate clear signs of Heidegger’s theoretical 
debt to the Neogrammarian revolution in historical psychology, whose key contributor he 
strategically obscures, as he critically underscores the neo-Idealist position of Vossler 
without mentioning the latter’s main interlocutor, Paul.  In the course of locating 
Heidegger’s discursive position in the context of reforming philosophical method for a 
new Bedeutungslehre, Paul’s conception of the material mediation of meaning emerged 
as the crucial, but willfully cloaked subtext of Heidegger’s endeavor to redefine the 
domain of logic for a reformed Sprachwissenschaft.  Such scientific reform is intimated 
through a programmatic sketch of a historical semiotics that would determine the 
structural principles governing the on -going process language development, that is, the 
creative factor(s) of the “spirit of language” (Sprachgeist). 
These terminological shifts become crucial as Heidegger emerges into his new 
program, a refutation of Husserl and Cassirer and their shared attention to the forms of 
appearance of cultural meaning rather than to questions of ontology.
The Prolegomena (1925)
In the text of the Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffes (Prolegomena to 
the History of the Concept of Time),24 Heidegger’s wavering between Vossler and Paul 
takes on a new dimension.  Heidegger will purposely shroud his direct exchange with the 
thought of these authors in order to distance his philosophical stance from the work of his 
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most distinguished contemporary Ernst Cassirer.  More precisely, through increasingly 
bold manipulations and partial distortions of these Neogrammarian and neo-Idealist
sources, Heidegger displaces what would otherwise be taken as indexes of 
methodological overlap to create an impression of “radical” philosophical difference.  
Heidegger’s theoretical debts to Paul and Vossler are thus converted into signs of 
departure from Cassirer’s project, by way of a calculated philosophical rhetoric that is as 
ingenious as it is deceptive.
In terms of organization, the Prolegomena is divided into two parts, a 
“preparatory part” (vorbereitender Teil) and a “main part” (Hauptteil).  In the following, 
I will also refer to the former as the “first part” and the latter as the “second part.”  As I 
approach it, the preparatory part is not “just preparatory,” both in its volume and content.  
Boasting close to a hundred and seventy pages, it already contains some crucial 
maneuvers on Heidegger’s part as to how he positions himself vis-à-vis a philosophical 
tradition, which points from the Neogrammarian-Neo-Idealist controversy to the work of 
his mentor Husserl as well as to the philosophy of symbolic forms by Cassirer.  In the 
preparatory part, then, Heidegger will “respectfully dismiss” Husserl in a manner that sets 
the stage for his less than respectful disposal of Cassirer’s thought, in the main part. 
While Heidegger appears humble when he points out that he still considers 
himself Husserl’s student, who remains in the process of learning from his teacher,25 he 
does not hesitate to point out that, after all, Husserl never managed to mover beyond 
Dilthey.26  This posture of respectful dismissal toward his mentor is mirrored by the 
division of the first part into two further segments.  Up to the end of § 10 (p. 139), 
Heidegger confines himself to a careful synopsis of Husserl’s phenomenological project, 
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in general, and his method of ideational analysis, in particular.  In the course of this 
segment, no direct criticism is leveled against Husserl.  On the contrary, it is in the name 
of Husserl that Heidegger glibly discards the view of his former teacher, Rickert, whose 
“misunderstanding of phenomenology and intentionality” is exposed in § 5. b) (pp. 41-
46).
Taking sides with Husserl, for the time being, Heidegger’s exposition of the basic 
tenets of phenomenology mounts all the integral theoretical elements we discussed 
previously.  In an attempt to defend the phenomenological method against a 
misunderstanding of its notion of intentionality, Heidegger rejects Wundt’s criticism that 
all phenomenological insight is tautological in character.  To say that a “representation is 
a representation of something,” or that a “judgment is a judgment about something,” does 
not seem to add anything that was not already implied in the notion of representation or 
judgment in the first place.27  This estimation, however, misses the point, Heidegger 
holds.  Once we have freed ourselves from the traditional array of “realistic or idealistic 
theories of consciousness” (47), we realize that the intentional relation (intentionale 
Beziehung) has nothing to do with conscious “acts” in terms of “perception, judgment, 
love, hate …” (ibid.).  Instead what is necessary is a structural analysis of the intentional 
aspect of all phenomena.28
To illustrate the workings of this kind of analysis, and thereby clarify the “basic 
mode of intentionality” (Grundverfassung der Intentionalität), Heidegger turns to an 
“exemplary case of natural object-perception” (exemplarische[r] Fall einer natürlichen 
Dingwahrnehmung), the perception of a chair (48).  The chair example29 illustrates the 
very same working of ideational analysis that we examined previously with respect to the 
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perception of a medieval house (or a “Chinese House”), although Heidegger couches his 
account in a somewhat different language.  To emphasize the point that no single 
perception constitutes an eidos, Heidegger speaks of any single percept as a mere 
“shading” or “off-shading” (Abschattung).30  At the same time, he does not use the notion 
of eidos for his own exposition.  Yet, this Husserlian notion is clearly implied by 
Heidegger’s distinction between “phenomenon” in the “genuine Greek sense of the term” 
(112) as what is “revealed” (Offenbares) (113), according to the original structure “of 
showing-itself” (des Sich-zeigens), as opposed to phenomenon as “appearance” or “mere 
appearance.”  The latter is but a modification of the former, a Schein (113) or mere 
pretense.  In this place, Heidegger treats himself to a terminological orgy,31 but upon 
scrutiny the different aspects of “the structure of appearance as reference” ([d]ie Struktur 
der Erscheinung als Verweisung) (ibid.) merely restate the different stages, or levels, 
involved in the test series of perspectival shifting, according to Husserl’s “rotation 
method.”  The phenomenologist has to distinguish single chair perceptions from the eidos
of a chair, which emerges at the point of convergence of a sequence of perspectival 
rotations as a structural image (not as a mental picture!) of a particular experiential 
domain or life-world.  
In short, phenomenology as Heidegger approaches it is concerned with structural 
sampling.  His convoluted account of “the structure of appearance as reference” thus 
elaborates on the fact that the “intentionality” of any single perception has nothing to do 
with the “act” of a conscious subject that directs its epistemic gaze, so to speak, upon an 
object of perception, which it interprets to be about a portion of mind-independent 
reality.  Instead, any percept points beyond itself, namely to an eidos.  Any eidos, in turn, 
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constitutes the structural sample of a life-world.  Any life-world, finally, can be
conceived phenomenologically as the “appearing itself” (das Erscheinende selbst) (113), 
namely that, which is “revealed” by ideational analysis.  Verweisung thus proves a matter 
of indirect reference or purposive eidetic detour.  As an eidos, then, “the chair is no 
experience and no object of experience but, according to its mode of being, totally 
different from the mode of being of [any instance of] experience” (Der Stuhl ist kein 
Erlebnis und kein Erlebnisding, sondern seiner Seinsart nach total verschieden von der 
Seinsart des Erlebnisses) (137-138).
Significantly, Heidegger proceeds to conclude his synopsis of Husserl’s method 
in terms of “immanent perception” (immanente Wahrnehmung), in which his wording is 
strongly reminiscent of Schelling’s conception of positive philosophy: 
Andererseits ist alles Gegenständliche der sogenannten immanenten 
Wahrnehmung dadurch bestimmt, dass es von derselben Seinsart ist wie die 
immanente Wahrnehmung selbst. Darin liegt, dass der Gegenstand der 
immanenten Wahrnehmung absolut gegeben ist. Der Erlebnisstrom ist somit eine 
Seinsregion, die eine Sphäre absoluter Position ausmacht, wie Husserl sagt. […] 
Das besagt aber, wenn wir das Frühere zusammennehmen, dass die Sphäre des 
reinen Bewusstseins, die wir auf dem Wege der transzendentalen und der 
eidetischen Reduktion gewinnen, eine solche ist, die durch den Charakter des 
Absolut-gegebenen ausgezeichnet ist. (138) [second emphasis added]
Certainly, not everyone who uses the term “absolute” is thereby hearking back to 
Schelling or to some German-idealist context.  In the present passage, however, it is clear 
that Heidegger addresses exactly those theoretical stakes in Husserl’s point of view, 
which we analyzed previously along the Paul-Husserl-Wittgenstein trajectory.  
The latter, in turn, again anticipate Deleuze and Guattari’s critique of 
Wittgenstein that showed their rejection of a solipsistic “metaphysical subject” as the 
transcendental coordinator, or “zero-coordinate” of an experiential field modeled on a 
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Cartesian coordinate system.  In this regard, the authors of What is Philosophy? proved in 
keeping with Husserl, notwithstanding their differences over the open or closed character 
of “possible life-worlds.”  As we saw, the connecting link between Husserl’s 
phenomenology and Deleuze and Guattari’s post-structuralist semiotics of immanent 
meaning (trans)formation and “world traveling” consists in their joint investment in a 
conception of “the transcendent within the immanent.”  This conception is construed as 
the theoretical marker of the “modern moment” in philosophy, which Deleuze and 
Guattari find enunciated fully for the first time in the work of Spinoza, whereas I suggest 
to credit one of Spinoza’s most prominent critics with this pioneering role, Schelling. 
In light of these considerations, we must reject Heidegger’s rendering of Husserl’s 
thought as just another, although more sophisticated, brand of Cartesianism: 
Hier lässt sich schon eine Verwandtschaft zu Descartes erkennen. Was freilich 
auf einer höheren Stufe der Analyse der Phänomenologie als das reine 
Bewusstsein herausgearbeitet ist, ist das Feld, das Descartes unter dem Titel der 
res cogitans vorschwebt, das Gesamtfeld der cogitationes, während die 
transzendente Welt, deren exemplarischen Index Husserl ebenfalls in der 
Grundschicht der materiellen Dingwelt sieht, bei Descartes als res extensa
charakterisiert ist. Diese Verwandtschaft besteht nicht nur faktisch, sondern 
Husserl nimmt da, wo er sagt, dass diese Betrachtung zu einem Höhepunkt 
gediehen sei, ausdrücklich auf Descartes Bezug. Er sagt, dass nur zum Austrag 
komme, was Descartes in den Meditationen, freilich in anderer Methode and 
philosophischer Absicht, eigentlich anstrebte. (139) [fourth and last emaphases 
added]
Here we get a first taste of the corrosive effects of Heidegger’s philosophical rhetoric, 
that is, a rhetoric that is fueled by the willful (mis)representation of other authors’ 
methodologies, which Heidegger stages in specific ways to create philosophical tension 
between their work and his own.  In particular, this enables him to create an impression 
of difference, departure, and innovation, where there is none.  I say willful, because in 
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deploying this technique, Heidegger has no qualms gainsaying his own previous accounts 
of the author at hand, often within the same text.  
The present passage is a case in point, for, according to Heidegger’s own synopsis 
of Husserl’s method in the earlier pages of the preparatory part of his study (originally 
delivered as a lecture course), equating Husserl’s view with Cartesian metaphysical 
dualism can hardly be seen as anything but a fundamental distortion.   Heidegger’s main 
ruse is effected by means of the phrase “the entire field of the cogitationes” (das 
Gesamtfeld der cogitationes), which he attributes to Husserl as an analogue to Descartes’ 
res cogitans.  However, if Heidegger’s own summary of Husserl’s method of epoché is 
correct, then we must assert that Husserl never committed to any such single, overarching 
ontological horizon or Gesamtfeld, but maintained a view regional ontology within a 
framework of immanent transcendence (in the sense of Deleuze and Guattari).  Consider 
Heidegger’s statement, made only a few pages earlier: 
Darin zeigt sich das Eigentümliche, dass der Gegenstand der Reflexion, Akte, zur 
selben Seinssphäre gehört wie die Betrachtung des Gegenstandes. Reflexion und 
reflektierter Gegenstand gehören beide zu ein und derselben Seinssphäre; der 
Gegenstand, das Betrachtete, und die Betrachtung sind reell ineinander 
beschlossen. Gegenstand und Erfassungsart gehören zum selben Erlebnisstrom. 
Dieses reelle Beschlossensein des erfassten Gegenstandes in der Erfahrung selbst, 
in der Einheit derselben Realität, bezeichnet man als Immanenz. Immanenz hat 
hier den Sinn des reellen Zusammenseins des Reflektierten und der Reflexion. 
Damit ist eine besondere Mannigfaltigkeit eines Seienden, nämlich des Seins von 
Erlebnissen und Akten charakterisiert. (132) 
This characterization, if accurate, makes it clear that Husserl was not given to the notion 
of a “Gesamtfeld of cogitationes,” but maintained a view of different “planes of 
immanence,” that is, a view of regional ontologies, where the “absolute position” 
(absolute Position) of each “region of being” (Seinsregion) (138) consists in a 
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transcendent within the immanent, not a zero-coordinate of transcendental subjectivity as 
Descartes and the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus would have it.  
Heidegger’s correlative claim that Husserl posits not only a metaphysical subject, 
in the above sense, but also a transcendent world similar to Descartes res extensa is 
equally unconvincing.  It is implausible to claim that Husserl saw the “examplary index” 
of “the transcendent world” in the “ground-layer of the material thing-world” ([…] die 
transzendente Welt, deren exemplarischen Index Husserl ebenfalls in der Grundschicht 
der materiellen Dingwelt sieht) (139).  Once again, Heidegger himself makes the case 
against this suggestion, when he explicates Husserl’s working notion of epoché as 
follows, using his earlier example of the perception of a chair phenomenon:   
Diese Betrachtungsart des Aktes und seines Gegenstandes ist keine transzendente 
Erfassung des Dinges selbst; in dieser Betrachtung der Reflexion, sagt man, 
mache ich gewissermassen die Wahrnehmung, die konkrete Wahrnehmung selbst 
nicht mit; ich lebe nicht eigentlich in der Wahrnehmung des Stuhles, sondern in 
der Einstellung der immanenten reflektiven Erfassung der Stuhlwahrnehmung, 
nicht in der Thesis der materiellen Welt, sondern in der thematischen Setzung des 
sie erfassenden Aktes und ihres Gegenstandes, wie er im Akte da ist. Dieses 
Nicht-Mitmachen der Thesis der materiellen Welt und jeder transzendenten Welt
wird als , Sichenthalten, bezeichnet. (135-136). [emphases added]
It is baffling to see how Heidegger can write this, in order to claim the exact opposite 
three pages later, when he approximates Husserl’s understanding of different immanent 
realities to Cartesian dualism.  
At this point we might wonder whether Heidegger’s understanding of immanence, 
in Husserl’s version or otherwise, is perhaps different from the post-Schellingean 
conception of immanent transcendence or “transcendence within the immanent” (Deleuze 
and Guattari).  If so, his critique of Husserl would still be incorrect, but at least he could 
not be charged with wielding a willfully manipulative philosophical rhetoric over his 
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audience and readership.  However, this line of defense seems blocked, if we notice just 
how keenly aware Heidegger was of the central importance of the immanent-transcendent 
relation in its full complexity: “Diese Scheidung [von Immanenz und Transzendenz] in 
zwei Seinssphären ist nun dadurch eine merkwürdige, dass gerade die Sphäre der 
Immanenz, die Erlebnissphäre, die Möglichkeit bestimmt, innerhalb deren überhaupt die 
durch die Kluft getrennte transzendente Welt gegenständlich werden kann” (134). 
Furthermore, what is rhetorically remarkable about Heidegger’s spurious 
presentation of Husserl as a more sophisticated Cartesian is the “casually self-
undermining” character of its ending, when he admits that Husserl might have perceived 
some general kinship between his approach and that of Descartes, while the latter’s 
endeavor proceeds “of course according to a different method and philosophical agenda” 
(freilich in anderer Methode und philosophischer Absicht).  This phrase seems to suggest 
the opposite of the point Heidegger is making.  After all, claiming that two authors are 
largely similar except for their different methods and agendas is either a contradiction in 
terms or a euphemism for their essential differences.  If so, Heidegger’s rhetorical 
performance cuts a rather weak figure, in this instance.  While he may not be at his most 
brilliant in this passage (in the last chapter of the present study, I will point to much more 
impressive examples), it is still worth noticing that even here Heidegger avails himself of 
some careful preparation, which finesses what would otherwise appear to be a rhetorical 
blunder. 
This preparation consists in Heidegger’s pretense of speaking in Husserl’s own 
voice.  In other words, he gives the impression of letting Husserl speak for himself: 
“Diese Verbindung besteht nicht nur faktisch, sondern Husserl nimmt da, wo er sagt, dass 
259
diese Betrachtung zu einem Höhepunkt gediehen sei, ausdrücklich auf Descartes Bezug” 
(139).  Crucially, Heidegger does not provide any quote or reference to substantiate this 
supposedly self-professed connection between Husserl and Descartes.  After quoting 
Husserl diligently in the course of summarizing his teacher’s overall phenomenological 
method, Heidegger does not bolster his criticism in the same way.  We have to take 
Heidegger’s word for it that this is what Husserl said of himself.  Differently put, 
Heidegger exploits Husserl’s authority with respect to a right to self-editorship, in order 
to support a “factual” (faktisch) claim that would remain less than compelling, if it were 
not warranted by the voice of his target himself.  In terms of rethorical technique, then, 
the “casually self-undermining” character of Heidegger’s commentary on Husserl is 
effected by presenting his criticism in the form of implicit self-criticism.  Heidegger is 
just the messenger of what Husserl said, whithout necessarily being aware of the 
methodological implications of this “self-indictment.” 
By contrast, if we do let Husserl speak for himself through his own text, it 
becomes clear that Heidegger’s proffered parallelism does not withstand scrutiny.  As 
Elisabeth Ströker (1977) has pointed out, it is not very instructive, much less conclusive, 
to simply ascertain a general similarity between Descartes’ methodical skepticism in the 
Meditations on First Philosophy and Husserl’s phenomenological procedure of epoché.32
Husserl thus distances himself from the Cartesian method, in § 10. (Exkurs: Descartes’ 
Verfehlen der transzendentalen Wendung) of his Cartesian Meditations (first publication 
in French translation, 1931 [original manuscript, 1929]): 
Descartes hatte den ernsten Willen zu radikaler Vorurteilslosigkeit. Aber wir 
wissen durch neuere Forschungen, und insbesondere die schönen und 
tiefgründigen der Herren Gilson und Koyré, wieviel Scholastik im verborgenen 
und als ungeklärtes Vorurteil in Descartes’ Meditationen steckt. […] Im 
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Zusammenhang damit darf es auch keineswegs als selbstverständlich gelten, als 
ob wir in unserem apodiktischen reinen Ego ein kleines Endchen der Welt gerettet 
hätten, als das für das philosophierende Ich einzig Unfragliche von der Welt, und 
dass es nun darauf ankomme, durch recht geleitete Schlussfolgerungen nach den 
dem Ego eingeborenen Prinzipien die übrige Welt hinzuzuerschliessen. (25-26)
Leider geht es so bei Descartes, mit der unscheinbaren aber 
verhängnisvollen Wendung, die das Ego zur substantia cogitans, zur abgetrennten 
menschlichen mens sive animus macht und zum Ausgangsglied für Schlüsse nach 
dem Kausalprinzip, kurzum der Wendung, durch die er zum Vater des (wie hier 
noch nicht sichtlich werden kann) widersinnigen transzendentalen Realismus 
geworden ist. (26)
The myth of Husserl’s Cartesianism has proved quite resilient, especially among 
Heidegger scholars.33  However, as Heidegger’s own (!) characterization of Husserl’s 
epoché, in 1925, and Husserl’s actual (!) self-commentary, in 1929, demonstrate, Husserl 
does not endorse metaphysical dualism (Descartes) or its solipsistic inverse, metaphysical 
subjectivism as “pure realism (Wittgenstein).  On the contrary, we find that Husserl 
rejects both of these as “non-sensical [forms of] transcendental realism.” 
The Historicity of Phenomenology: Prolegomena, 2
In the further course of the preparatory part of Heidegger’s Prolegomena, this 
distortion and rhetorical manipulation of “immanent transcendence” becomes even more 
daring.  In a passage where Heidegger quotes “profusely” from Husserl’s Ideen II , he 
reiterates the charge of Cartesianism against his phenomenological mentor.  This 
statement is especially signficant, because it strikingly illustrates the theoretical affinity 
between Heidegger and almost the entire post-Schellingean constellation, which has been 
identified and explored in this study: Schelling-Paul-Husserl-Cassirer.  In criticizing 
Husserl’s gravitating toward a “personalistic psychology” (personalistische Psychologie) 
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(167), inspired in particular by Dilthey’s Ideen zu einer beschreibenden und 
zergliedernden Psychologie (1874),34 Heidegger elaborates: 
Die personalistische Einstellung und Erfahrung wird als inspectio sui, als innere 
Betrachtung seiner selbst als des Ich der Intentionalität, des Ich als Subjekt der 
cogitationes bezeichnet. Hier ist schon durch den Ausdruck allein ganz deutlich 
an Descartes erinnert. Jedes solcher Ich hat zugleich seine Naturseite als 
Untergrund der Subjektivität. Geist ist kein abstraktes Ich, sondern die volle 
Persönlichkeit; Ich, Mensch, Subjekt als Personen können nicht darin aufgehen, 
Natur zu sein, da dann das fehlen würde, was der Nature Sinn gibt [Heidegger 
inserts note 11: Ideen II, S. 297]. 
“Nämlich, streichen wir alle Geister aus der Welt, so ist keine Natur mehr. 
Streichen wir aber die Natur, das “wahre,” objektive-intersubjektive 
Dasein, so bleibt doch immer etwas übrig: der Geist als individueller 
Geist; nur verliert sich die Möglichkeit der Sozialität, die Möglichkeit 
einer Komprehension, die eine gewissen Intersubjektivität des Leibes 
voraussetzt.” [note 12: a.a.O.] [emphasis added] 
“Im Bewusstseinslauf des Geistes bekundet sich aber in jedem 
Falle seine Einheit, seine Individualität.” [note 13: a.a.O., S. 297 f.] 
Der Geist hat ungleich den Dingen in sich selbst seine 
Individualität. [note 14: a.a.O., S. 298 ff.] 
“Geister sind eben nicht Einheiten von Erscheinungen, sondern 
Einheiten von absoluten Bewusstseinszusammenhängen,” [note 15: a.a.O., 
S. 301] – immanent Gegebenes. (170)
Facing such a battery of quotes, one would assume that Heidegger is presenting a solid 
case, almost too generous in his provision of textual evidence.  The opposite is actually 
the case, for Heidegger immediately resumes his former line of critique, which reduces 
Husserl to a modern-day Descartes.  
After such copious referencing, Heidegger’s follow-up commentary seems 
laconic.  Yet appearances are once again deceiving, as he swiftly attaches some further 
remarks as to how Husserl’s position has inherited its short-comings from a nineteenth-
century debate over psychophysicalism.  Presented in the manner of an afterthought, this 
kind of intellectual-historical “footnote” is all the more deserving of our attention, since 
most of them will be eliminated from Being and Time, which may be seen as the 
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“revised” version of the Prolegomena as the “Urform” of Heidegger’s magnum opus, as 
Gadamer called it.35  Thus Heidegger continues: 
Das ist dieselbe Überlegung bezüglich des reinen Bewusstseins als Residuum der 
Weltvernichtung. Husserl kommt hier nur wieder auf seine Unterscheidung des 
Seins unter anderem Titel zurück. Es bleibt ontologisch alles beim Alten. […] 
Deutlich wird hier der Einblick, wie diese Analyse der Person wieder zurückläuft, 
wie sie letztlich and Descartes orientiert ist. Die Bestimmungen über die Person 
und ihre Konstitution laufen in charakteristische Überlegungen, in die Frage des 
Ineinandergreifens von personalistischer und naturalistischer Einstellung aus. 
Gefragt wird nach dem Verhältnis von Seele und Leib, geistiger und physischer 
Natur, gefragt wird nach dem alten Problem, das im 19. Jahrhundert viel 
diskutiert wurde, nach dem psychophysischen Parallelismus, letztlich aber 
bestimmt die Relativität der Natur und die Absolutheit des Geistes. (170-171).
As for the repeated charge of Cartesianism, none of the quotes that Heidegger provides 
corroborates his claim about Husserl’s project.  On the contrary, not only do these text 
excerpts gainsay Heidegger’s point, they put Husserl on a post-Schellingean “plane,” in 
the direct vicinity of Paul and Cassirer.  Above all, Husserl’s speaking of “a certain 
intersubjectivity of the body” (eine gewisse Intersubjektivität des Leibes), in the context 
of “possible sociality” (die Möglichkeit der Sozialität) sounds very similar to Paul’s 
conception of the material mediation of meaning in the course of concrete 
communication.  
In this sense, the “intersubjectivity of the body” can be understood as referring to 
the kind of semiotic matter that is constantly being reshaped within every individual 
“mental organism,” in Paul’s sense, as well as to the materiality of concrete expressions 
as the shareable medium of communication and meaning transfer from one possible 
world to another.  According to this interpretation, Husserl’s characterization of “the 
spirit as individual spirit” is compatible with the notion of the material individual as the 
actual agent of semiotic evolution and language development.  
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At the same time, Husserl’s hint at a plurality of “spirits” (Geister) may well be 
seen as an acknowledgment of the multitude of “planes of immanence.”  By insisting on 
the inherent plurality of the “planomenon” (Deleuze and Guattari), in turn, one displays 
sensitivity to Schelling’s Christological puzzle of creation and his critical claim that the 
creativity of spirit calls for a scalar power, or “third potency,” which prismatizes (God’s) 
infinite creativity into different worlds, each following its own cultural logic of concrete 
expression and concept construction. 
Next, Heidegger’s “footnote” to intellectual history with respect to the nineteenth-
century debate over “the old problem [of] psychophysical parallelism,” continues the 
false story with which he opened the Prolegomena.  This opening is remarkable for its 
blatant omission of both the work of hermeneutically critical historians like Droysen, and 
the work on new methodological standards of scientificity in the humanities by historical 
philologists like Paul: 
Die wissenschaftliche Lage um die Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts ist nur in den 
Hauptzügen im Hinblick auf die Art und Tragweite der Erneuerung der 
philosophischen Wissenschaften zu charakterisieren. […] 
Die historischen Wissenschaften verzichteten überhaupt auf eine 
philosophische Besinnung. Sie lebten hinsichtlich ihrer allgemeinen geistigen 
Orientierung in der Welt von Goethe und Lessing; allein entscheidend galt ihnen 
die konkrete Arbeit, und das besagt, die Tendenz auf “Tatsachen.” Das erforderte 
die Erledigung einer ersten Aufgabe in der Geschichte: die Erschliessung und 
Sicherung der Quellen. Damit ging Hand in Hand die Ausbildung der 
philologischen Kritik, der Technik der Interpretation. Die sachliche Interpretation, 
das, was man die “Auffassung” des in den Quellen vorgegebenen Materials nennt, 
blieb hinsichtlich ihrer methodischen Leitung und ihrer Prinzipien der jeweiligen 
geistigen Existenz des Historikers überlassen; die Auffassung wechselte je nach 
den Impulsen, die in ihm lebendig waren. Diese waren verschieden und wurden 
seit den siebziger Jahren wesentlich aus der Politik genährt. Daneben gab es eine 
kulturgeschichtliche Richtung. Daher entstand in den achtizger Jahren eine 
Diskussion, ob Geschichte Kulturgeschichte oder politische Geschichte sei. Nicht 
vorgedrungen ist man in die prinzipielle Sphäre, weil jedes Mittel dazu fehlte. Das 
zeigt aber, dass das Grundverhältniss des Historikers zu seinem Gegenstande 
unsicher und allgemeinen bildgungsmässigen popolären Überlegungen überlassen 
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war. Dieser Zustand herrscht heute noch, wenn auch beide jetzt unter dem Titel 
der Geistesgeschichte zusammengenommen werden. (14-15) [last three emphases 
added]
In Heidegger’s perspective on the Geisteswissenschaften debate in the nineteenth-
century, then, the “historical school” (Ranke, Droysen) apparently did not exist.  Even 
Dilthey, whom Heidegger will mention later,36 is not worth acknowledging at this point, 
when it comes to the general advances (or lack thereof) in the historical sciences in the 
1870s and 1880s.  Similarly, the “public appearance” of the Neogrammarians, in 1871, 
never seems to have taken place.  Instead, the (second half of the) nineteenth century was 
pervaded and weakend by a general trend of Bildungshumanismus and neo-Classicism, 
hearking back to the era of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749-1832) and Gotthold 
Ephraim Lessing (1729-1781).
More specifically, Heidegger’s recurrent use of the term “principles” (Prinzipien) 
and “principle-oriented” (prinzipielle) reinforces my earlier claim that Heidegger’s 
consistent passing over Paul’s work (or that of other Neogrammarians) is nothing short of 
willful.  As I mentioned before, Paul had no monopoly over the expression “principle.”  
The latter was a technical term and common currency in comparative linguistics and 
language science (Sprachwissenschaft), at the time.  However, Paul was certainly the one 
who championed the term through the title of his widely received book, which had gone 
through five editions by 1920.  As I showed in the previous section, Heidegger had read 
Vossler extensively by the time of his habilitation (1916), if not before, including 
especially Vossler’s polemic “manifesto” (1904), with its explicit, if not compelling, 
attack on Paul in the conclusion.  By 1925, Heidegger was thus more than aware of 
Paul’s eminent standpoint in the field of philological research and language development.  
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Hence, for him to speak of “philological critique” in the 1870s and 1880s as oblivious to 
“principles” (Nicht vorgedrungen ist man in die prinzipielle Sphäre, weil jedes Mittel 
dazu fehlte), has to be seen as either careless or strategic.  Given the diligent construction 
and rhetorical precision of Heidegger’s texts, including his lectures, I find the explanation 
in terms of carelessness highly unlikely.  
What is more, Heidegger not only disavows the Neogrammarian conception of 
concrete communiction and the material mediation of meaning in Husserl’s work, he 
actually incorporates it into his own account of “the essence of language,” in the main 
part of the Prolegomena.  In doing so, Heidegger promotes the familiar Humboldt-
shortcut that I explained earlier as a tool to efface later developments in the philosophy of 
language.  Accordingly, he will engage insights that have met with greater clarification 
only in the second half of the nineteenth century, but reference only Humboldt by name: 
Mit dieser eigentümlichen Seinsart, die die Alltäglichkeit im Man als besorgendes 
miteinander Aufgehen in der Welt kennzeichnet, ist nun auch eine alltägliche Art 
der Selbstauslegung des Daseins vorgegeben. Sofern Dasein in der Welt sich 
primär begegnet, und aus der miteinander besorgten Welt die Öffentlichkeit selbst 
Daseinsziele und Daseinsauffassung bestimmt, werden auch vermutlich alle 
fundamentalen Begriffe und Ausdrücke, die das Dasein zunächst für sich selbst 
ausbildet, im Blick auf die Welt, in der es aufgeht, gewonnen sein. Dieser 
Tatbestand, der sich in der Sprachgeschichte ganz deutlich zeigen lässt, bedeutet 
aber nicht etwa, wie man gemeint hat, dass die Sprachen zunächst nur an den 
materiellen Dingen orientiert seien, und dass die sogenannten “primitiven” 
Sprachen gewissermassen über die Auffassung der materiellen Dinglichkeit nicht 
hinauskommen. Das ist eine völlige Verwirrung der Interpretation des Sprechens 
und der Selbstauslegung. (342-343) [first and second emphasis added]
A few lines down, Heidegger’s only author reference in this context is to Humboldt and 
one of his examples concerning a language that seems to replace all personal pronouns 
(Personalpronomina) with adverbs of location (Ortsadverbien).  This phenomenon has 
sparked a controversy as to whether the original meaning of these expressions was 
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adverbial or pronominal in character.  While such a difference may be of interest from a 
grammatical point of view, Heidegger holds, “the argument is moot eventually” (der 
Streit ist am Ende ohne Boden), from a philosophical point of view, once we realize that 
all expressions of that kind are “adverbs of Dasein” (Daseinsadverbien), which entail 
only so many facets of the “orientation toward Dasein” (Orientation auf das Dasein) 
(343). 
More importantly for our purposes of extracting Heidegger’s implicit notion of 
concrete communication, this passage forges an intimate link between “speech” (Rede), 
being-with-one-another (Miteinandersein), and “the They” (das Man), popularly 
notorious from Being and Time.  Significantly, in the Prolegomena, Heidegger has not 
yet truncated das Man to being associated mostly with Gerede (chatter) rather than Rede
(speech).  Because of this truncating in Being and Time, Heidegger’s repeated claim that 
his use of the expression das Man is not meant as one-sidedly negative is never quite 
convincing.  Considering the text of the Prolegomena, however, this claim is much more 
plausible.  
In the last quotation, Heidegger ascribes to “the public itself” (die Öffentlichkeit 
selbst) the power to “determine goals and apprehensions of Dasein” (Daseinsziele und 
Daseinsauffassungen [zu] bestimm[en]) (342).  At this point, the communal aspects of 
“the public,” “being-with-one-another,” along with the communicative aspect of “speech” 
are all part of the same structure of “being-in-the-world.”  Clearly, group communication 
is not immediately identified with mechanisms of social conformity and distortion or 
leveling of meaning.  This readiness on Heidegger’s part to view socially mediated 
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speech as something neutral or positive is even more evident, when he extends his prior 
remarks as follows: 
Wie wir noch sehen werden, gehören die Sprache und die Rede selbst zum Dasein 
als In-der-Welt-sein und Miteinandersein, und wir werden sehen, wie von da aus 
notwendig bestimmte Selbstauslegungen des Daseins, bestimmte Begriffe, die das 
Dasein von sich selbst bildet, vorgezeichnet sind, ohne dass man sagen kann, 
diese Begriffe seien primitiv. Wenn man diese phänomenalen Strukturen des 
Miteinanderseins im Man und des Aufgehens in der Welt im Blick behält, dann 
hat es nichts Rätselhaftes mehr, dass das Dasein, sofern es sich selbst 
ausdrücklich meint und sich selbst ausspricht, eigentümliche Bedeutungen und 
Auslegungssinne gebraucht. (343) 
Besides confirming the neutral, if not positive rendering of das Man, this last passage 
provides another important clue about Heidegger’s unacknowledged debt to Paul and his 
brand of Neogrammarian thought, the aspect of partial limitation implied by the notion of 
material meaning and concrete expression, as I have used it so far.  When Heidegger 
speaks of “certain self-interpretations of Dasein” as “necessarily pre-figured” (wie von da 
aus notwendig bestimmte Selbstauslegungen des Daseins […] vorgezeichnet sind) by the 
language and speech aspect of being-in-the-world, I suggest, he is talking about 
something like open structures of meaning formation.  
If this is a plausible reading, then Heidegger’s somewhat puzzling reference to 
“idiosyncratic meanings and modes of interpretation” (eigentümliche Bedeutungen und 
Auslegungssinne) explicates the discursive nature of Dasein as something similar to 
“planes of immanence” (Deleuze and Guattari), which are both infinte and yet not 
completely boundless, since each is governed by its own cultural logic.  What is more, 
there is no fixed hierarchy among such planes, which would justify calling the meaning 
production on one of them “primitive” in comparison to others.  
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Still, the affinities between Heidegger’s account of how Dasein communicates 
with itself and Paul’s conception of language as communication does not stop here.  The 
emphasis on materiality of meaning (as opposed to the mere “apprehension of material 
thinghood” [Auffassung der materiellen Dinglichkeit] (342)], is carried further in 
Heidegger’s notion of the “grounding nexus” (Fundierungszusammenhang), according to 
which talking-to  (Ansprechen) is grounded in being-in (In-sein), which is the primary 
quality of Dasein in its immanent “horizon:”
Die primäre Form aller Auslegung als der Ausbildung des Verstehens ist das 
Ansprechen von etwas aus seinem “Als-was” her, das Ansprechen von etwas als 
etwas, d.i. ein Appräsentieren im Besprechen des so im primären und leitenden 
Anspruch Appräsentierten. […] 
In dem zuletzt Gesagten aber liegt für uns etwas Wesentliches: 
Wortausdruck – Sprache – ist nur, sofern es dieses Ansprechen gibt, uns solches 
Ansprechen von etwas als etwas ist nur möglich, sofern es Auslegen gibt, 
Auslegung ist wiederum nur, sofern es Verstehen gibt, und Verstehen ist nur 
sofern das Dasein die Seinstruktur der Entdecktheit hat, d.h. das Dasein selbst als 
In-der-Welt-sein bestimmt ist. Mit diesem Fundierungszusammenhang der 
einzelnen Phänomene: Ansprechen, Auslegen, Verstehen, Entdecktsein, In-Sein, 
Dasein ist zugleich die Sprache definiert, bzw. der Horizont vorgegeben, aus dem 
heraus das Wesen der Sprache  allererst gesehen und bestimmt werden kann. Sie 
ist nichts anderes als eine ausgezeichnete Seinsmöglichkeit des Daseins selbst, 
wobei Dasein in der bisher explizierten Struktur zu nehmen ist. (360) [second 
emphasis added] 
The beginning of this passage is quizzical, when Heidegger speaks of the “talking-to of 
something from out of its “as-what,” talking-to of something as something.”  In my 
opinion, “talking-to” means nothing else than the encounter with a concrete, but not-yet 
interpreted expression – the looming up of a “face” that breaks into our life-world.  We 
feel addressed by it, just as we address it by staring at it.  It is only in the very event of 
such “mutual response,” which must not be confused with a conscious dialogue (as 
Gadamer would point out),37 that we come about as “viewing subjects” in the first place.  
In this sense, mutual response is equal to mutual constitution.  There are no knowing or 
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talking subjects prior to any such encounter, the reciprocity of such concrete 
communicative clashes (or “invasions” of world) is basic. 
In the course of such an encounter, the semiotic structure of a life-world unravels 
in a certain region where new subject positions become available, which can be occupied 
via (self-)interpretation ([Selbst-]Auslegung) and understanding (Verstehen).  While 
Heidegger’s list of links may suggest a linear causal process, it is important to underscore 
that this “grounding nexus” is more of a force field than a rope or chain (reaction).  
For example, it would not make sense for Heidegger to fully separate and then re-chain 
Ansprechen (talking-to), Entdecktsein (being-discovered), and In-Sein (being-in), or 
Auslegen (interpret) and Verstehen (understand).  These aspects are only so many facets 
of a multifarious process of meaning formation on a plane of immanence.  To speak of an 
event of talking-to, as opposed to not talking-to – or better, less talking-to – only refers to 
differences in communicative intensity.  Since not all regions of any plane of immanence 
are being equally “invaded” by concrete expressions form other possible worlds.  As 
noted earlier, everything can become a face, but not everything looms up with equal 
expressive or “facial” force.  (In our previous illustration, the “crosses on our doors” may 
go unrecognized for the time being.  Materially, they are still engaged in the struggle over 
symbolic space, but they are not “talking-to” us just yet.)  
At this point, it has become clear that Heidegger’s analysis of the essence of 
language in terms of Dasein’s immanent self-interpretation and self-transformation is 
very parallel to Paul’s analysis of language development.  The concreteness of 
communication is acknowledged by Heidegger even more, when he restates his 
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characterization of the dynamics of talking-to, in terms of communication or in-forming38
(Mitteilung; lit. sharing or passing on information) and participation (Teilnahme): 
Die Rede ist als Seinsart des Daseins qua Mitsein wesentlich Mitteilung, so dass 
in jeder Rede das, worüber die Rede ist, durch das, was gesagt ist, durch das 
Gesagte als solches, mit den Anderen geteilt wird. […] In der Rede als Mitteilung 
vollzieht sich eine Aneignung der Welt, in der man im Miteinandersein immer 
schon ist. Das Verstehen der Mitteilung ist die Teilnahme am Offenbaren. […] 
Mitteilung muss aus der Struktur des Daseins als mit dem Anderen sein 
verstanden werden. Sie ist nicht so etwas wie ein Transport von Erkenntnissen 
und Erlebnissen aus dem Innern des einen Subjektes in das Innere des anderen, 
sondern sie ist das Offenbarwerden des Miteinanderseins in der Welt, und zwar 
aus der entdeckten Welt selbst her, die im Miteinandersprechen offenbar wird. Im 
Miteinandersprechen über etwas werden nicht Erlebnisse hin und her zwischen 
Subjekten ausgetauscht, sondern im Sprechen miteinander ist das Miteinandersein 
bei der besprochenen Sache selbst, und erst aus dieser her – im je schon Mitsein 
in der Welt - erwächst das Sichverstehen. (362-363)
Here we find Heidegger in basic agreement with our previous claim that it is only 
through concrete expressions that possible worlds can communicate, and since any other 
person is a different possible world (rather than a bodiless mind, immaterial soul, or 
Descartes’ “naked self”), “we” as Dasein can also communicate only by breaking into 
another structure, regardless whether such “invasion” generates hostile or friendly (or any 
other meaning) over time.  We communicate by impacting and reshaping the “semiotic 
matter” (Vorstellungsmasse) that constitutes the other’s “mental organism” (Paul). 
Another remarkable detail about this last passage consists in Heidegger’s choice 
of religious language.  In fact, his present construal of Rede as Mitteilung, and of 
Mitteilung as Teilname am Offenbaren is reminiscent of Schelling’s philosophy of 
revelation in a way that goes beyond superficial terminological resemblance.  Against the 
backdrop of the post-Schellingean constellation delineated in the last chapter, 
Heidegger’s characterization of speech as material revelation locates him firmly on the 
“plane” of critical Christological thought, concerned with the puzzle of creation, which 
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took different shapes in the pen Paul, Husserl, Cassirer, and Deleuze and Guattari – a 
discursive locus that Heidegger sought to occlude rhetorically, while drawing from it 
philosophically. 
Recognizing Heidegger’s Masks: Some Conclusions
Upon scrutinizing some of Heidegger’s most important early writings, his 
dissertation (1913) and his habilitation (1916), we found the myth of his “initial neo-
Kantianism” disproved.  Neither was he as taken by the work of Emil Lask as Kisiel 
(1993) would want us to believe, nor is it the case that “Heidegger sounds like many of 
today’s analytic philosophers” in these writings, as Polt (1999) intimates.39  Instead, 
Heidegger shows himself deeply involved with the nineteenth-century 
Geisteswissenschaften debate over the possibilities for reforming the science of language 
in tandem with the science of history.  More specifically, Heidegger’s thought diplays a 
strong investment in the controversy between the Neogrammarians and their neo-Idealist 
detractors, representend by Hermann Paul and Karl Vossler as their most influential 
spokesmen.  
With respect to Paul’s work in particular, Heidegger’s rhetorical gestures at 
theoretical distance and departure from philosophical tradition become increasingly 
daring.  Vossler is still mentioned at a crucial juncture in Heidegger’s habilitation, but 
will vanish into anonymity in the subsequent writings.  Paul, by contrast, is never ever 
mentioned while Heidegger keeps drawing from his body of thought, most noticeably in 
the Prolegomena (1925).  In the text of this lecture course, it is only through the 
simultaneous disavowal of Droysen, Dilthey, and Husserl that Heidegger’s philosophical 
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rhetoric manages to keep his debt to nineteenth-century “philological critique” and 
“historical psychology” from becoming too prominent.  However, once we zero in on the 
central conception of concrete communication and the material mediation of meaning the 
façade of Heidegger’s radical new beginning becomes porous.  
The most glaring lacuna in Heidegger’s rhetorical shield, in this regard, is perhaps 
what looks like a close-to-verbatim quote of Paul’s famous dictum in the Prinzipien,40
which Vossler (1904) had treated explicitly.  As demonstrated earlier, Heidegger had read 
Vossler, and at a crucial juncture toward the end of the Prolegomena, he states: 
Als Gesprochenheit wächst die Sprache nicht mehr, aber trotzdem kann sie noch 
als Rede und Ausgelegtheit lebendig sein. Der “Tod” einer Sprache schliesst die 
“Lebendigkeit” der ihr zugehörigen Rede und Entdecktheit nicht aus, gleichwie 
gestorbenes Dasein geschichtlich noch in einem eminenten Sinne lebendig 
werden kann, vielleicht viel eigentlicher als in der Zeit, als das Dasein selbst 
eigentlich war. (374) [emphasis added]
In my reading, this is an accurate paraphrase of Paul’s conception of language 
development, which takes place on the level of “mental organisms” who impact each 
others Vorstellungsmasse through communication via concrete expressions (Heidegger’s 
Rede und Entdecktheit).  In this passage, Heidegger projects this account of “living 
language” as communication onto a broader plane of historical existence (Dasein’s 
historicality), but the theoretical fundament remains Paul’s notion of the material 
mediation of meaning, which can never be exhausted by the more or less rule-governed 
layer(s) of conscious dialogue.
It is only after rhetorically disarming, and simultaneously coopting, this semiotic 
tradition that Heidegger can proceed to bypass the work of Ernst Cassirer as flippantly as 
he does in the main part of the Prolegomena.  In Being and Time, by comparison, he is 
273
less audacious and faints “general agreement” with Cassirer.41  About a year earlier, in 
the Prolegomena, he is less polite: 
Man sieht übrigens, dass die universale Tragweite solcher Phänomene wie 
Zeichen und Symbol leicht Veranlassung gibt, sie zum Leitfaden einer 
Interpretation des Alls des Seienden, der Welt im ganzen, zu verwenden. Kein 
Geringerer als Leibniz versuchte mit seiner Characteristica universalis eine 
Systematik des Alls des Seienden aus der Orientierung am Phänomen des 
Zeichens. Neuerdings hat dann Spengler die Idee des Symbols nach dem Vorgang 
von Lamprecht für die Geschichtsphilosophie und Metaphysik überhaupt 
verarbeitet, ohne eine eigentlich wissenschaftliche Klärung der damit 
bezeichneten Phänomengruppe zu geben. Zuletzt hat Cassirer in der Schrift 
“Philosophie der symbolischen Formen” [note 1] die verschiedenen 
Lebensgebiete Sprache, Erkenntnis, Religion, Mythos unter der 
Grundorientierung als Ausdrucksphänomene des Geistes zu deuten gesucht. Er 
hat zugleich versucht, die Kritik der reinen Vernunft, die Kant gegeben hat, zu 
einer Kritik der Kultur zu erweitern. Auch hier ist das Phänomen des Ausdrucks, 
des Symbols im weitesten Sinne, als Leitfaden genommen, um von da aus all 
Phänomene des Geistes und des Seienden überhaupt zu deuten. Die universale 
Verwendbarkeit solcher formaler Leitfäden wie “Gestalt,” “Zeichen,” “Symbol,” 
täuscht dabei leicht über die Ursprünglichkeit oder Nichtursprünglichkeit der 
damit erreichten Interpretation hinweg. Was für ästhetische Phänomene 
angemessener Ansatz sein kann, kann für andere Phänomene gerade das 
Gegenteil einer Aufklärung und Interpretation bewirken. (277) [note 1: E. 
Cassirer, Philosopie der symbolischen Formen, 1923]
Heidegger has no qualms at listing Cassirer in one breath with Spengler, as if Cassirer 
were just the last representative of a lost cause that began venerably with Leibniz but 
soon deteriorated to the theoretical level of popular writers like Spengler “and” Cassirer.  
On a more substantial note, this statement is somewhat ironic because 
Heidegger’s criticism of Cassirer deploys a line of argument that Cassirer himself 
generally endorses, expressed succinctly, e.g., in his 1942 criticism of Benedetto Croce, 
Vossler’s leader and ally in the fight for a new “stylistics.” As Cassirer states in his essay, 
“The “Tragedy of Culture””: 
This fundamental notion prevails even in Lessing, although he gives it a 
considerably freer formulation. He concedes the genius the right to extend the 
limits of the individual genres; but he does not believe that these limits can in 
274
principle be annulled. Modern aesthetics has attempted to treat all these fixed 
differences as mere ballast that we must simply throw overboard. Benedetto 
Croce has gone the farthest in this respect. He declares all classification of the arts 
and all distinctions of genera of art to be mere nomenclatures, which can serve a 
practical purpose but which lack any theoretical significance. […] (119) 
If this were true without qualification, it would lead one to the strange 
conclusion that by calling Beethoven a great musician, Rembrandt a great painter, 
Homer a great epic poet, and Shakespeare a great dramatist, we would merely be 
referring to unimportant empirical circumstances, which are insignificant from the 
aesthetic point of view and are unnecessary to their characterization as artists. If 
there is only “the” art on the one hand, and the individual on the other, then the 
medium in which an individual artist wants to express himself is relatively 
accidental. […] However, such a conception would not, it seems to me, do justice 
to the artistic process. For it would break the work of art into two halves, which 
would stand in no necessary relation to each other. In truth, however, the 
particular mode of expression not only belongs to the technique of the formation 
of the work but is already part of the conception of the work of art itself. (120)42
Clearly, Cassirer is opposed to any totalizing aesthetics that would level all differences in 
terms of expressive medium.  The above statement is not only a clear objection to 
Vossler’s notion of “Raphael wihtout hands,” it also show that Cassirer’s general 
emphasis on the materiality of meaning, via concrete expression, does in no way issue a 
“formal guideline” (formaler Leitfaden), with universal pretense, which Heidegger 
attibutes to him in the Prolegomena.  Heidegger’s criticism is unwarranted and not 
supported by his own prior comments on the role of symbols, in the context of his 
distinction between two senses of “phenomenon.”43
Next, one of the main discoveries about the “Urform” of Heidegger’s 
breakthrough work44 consists in the favorable featuring of group communication in the 
Prolegomena, which contrasts with his truncated version thereof, delivered in Being and 
Time.  In the Prolegomena, we saw, “speech,” “being-with-one-another” and the public 
determination of goals and self-understanding on the part of das Man are productively 
intertwined in the “founding nexus” of Dasein, namely its multifarious stucture of being-
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in-the-world.  Considering the workings of group communication and the production of 
new meanings, Heidegger’s account of the “essence of language” turns out to be based on 
a central notion of “immanent transcendence,” which we traced previously through the 
workings of Schelling, Paul, Cassirer, and Deleuze and Guattari.  
By way of comparison we might say that, in the Prolegomena, Heidegger 
subscribes to a theory of language as communication, which betrays the methodology of 
Hermann Paul, who is theoretically engaged but rhetorically silenced.  In Being and Time
(§ 34.), the treatement of Rede no longer shows the same breadth, as the speech in the 
arena of das Man becomes more and more reduced to Gerede, as one of the “fallen 
modes” of language (§§ 35-37).  Following this tendency, Heidegger gravitates toward a 
neo-Idealist critique of social language use, which pits the creative individual against the 
“deadening” conformism of the group, much as Vossler did in his 1904 “manifesto.” 
In another rhetorical twist, Schelling’s philosophy of revelation is echoed in 
Heidegger’s further elaboration on the material dialogics of “talking-to” (Anrede), which 
are spelled out as in-forming (Mitteilung) and “participation in the revealed” (Teilnahme 
am Offenbaren).  The encounter with concrete expressions, or “faces,” is couched in a 
theological idiom that seems to allow for a religious dimension in the self-interpretation 
of Dasein.  In other words, at the heart of his own theory of language he accommodates 
for a religious “plane of immanence.”  However, this does not keep him from discarding 
religion as a discourse that is unfit to produce phenomenological and philosophical 
insights.  Theoretically committed to speech as a process of revelation, Heidegger’s 
philosophical rhetoric takes up the cause of phenomenological atheism:  
Wir haben uns das Prinzip der phänomenologischen Forschung klar gemacht und 
zwar so, dass wir aus der faktischen Arbeit zunächst die Hauptleistungen 
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heraushoben und versuchten, diese einheitlich zu sehen, d.h. zu bestimmen, dass 
mit der Intentionalität das eigentliche Sachfeld gewonnen ist, […] Damit ist die 
Aufgabe der Philosophie seit Plato überhaupt erst wieder auf wirklichen Boden in 
dem Sinne gebracht, dass jetzt die Möglichkeit einer Kategorienforschung 
besteht. Die Phänomenologie wird diesen untersuchenden Gang, solange sie sich 
selbst versteht, beibehalten gegenüber aller Prophetie innerhalb der Philosophie 
und gegenüber aller Tendenz auf irgendwelche Lebensleitung. Philosophische 
Forschung ist und bleibt Atheismus, deshalb kann sie sich die “Anmassung des 
Denkens” leisten, nicht nur wird sie sich sie leisten, sondern sie ist die innere 
Notwendigkeit der Philosophie und die eigentliche Kraft, und gerade in diesem 
Atheismus wird sie zu dem, was ein Grosser einmal sagte, zur “Fröhlichen 
Wissenschaft.” (109-110). 
Through this plea for (re)territorialization, Heidegger absolves the phenomenologist from 
providing guidance in life (Lebensleitung).  In the same breath, religion (or any kind of 
theism) is declared unfit for doing “proper” philosophical work.  Purportedly invoking 
Nietzsche’s authority as a philosophical “giant” (ein Grosser), Heidegger holds that 
religion can never be a “gay science.”  However, if phenomenology holds the key to the 
dynamic structures of meaning formation, including social meaning formation, it is not 
clear how anyone or any field could provide guidance in life without being assisted by 
the phenomenologist or doing phenomenology themselves.  In this sense, Heidegger’s 
general case against “prophecy in philosophy” appears to create a dangerous void.  
Phenomenology is not obliged to be socially activist, and – via disciplinary decree – no 
other domain of meaning production (or meaning discovery) is authorized to step in. 
Aside from sitting ill with Heidegger’s (1925) view of language as revelation, 
phenomenological atheism of this sort is far from being neutral and harbors political 
dangers that will become apparent in Heidegger’s Letter on Humanism, to which I turn in 
the next and final chapter of the present study. 
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 Martin Heidegger, Die Lehre vom Urteil im Psychologismus: Ein kritisch-positiver Beitrag zur Logik. 
Dissertation, Freiburg i. Br. 1913 (Leipzig: Johann Ambrosius Barth, 1914); reprinted in: Martin Heidegger 
(GA 1), pp. 59-188. 
2
 The page numbers refer to the general pagination of this volume of the Gesamtausgabe (GA 1), not to the 
additional marginal pagination, which indicates the page numbers of the previous 1972 edition of 
Heidegger’s Frühe Schriften. 
3
 In chapter one of division five (V. Abschnitt) of his dissertation, Heidegger takes stock of the general 
results of his preceding criticisms of various individual authors. Significantly, at this juncture he returns to 
Wundt, with whom he began his inquiry. In this place, Heidegger issues a concession which, upon scrutiny, 
comes close to patronizing the author he is criticizing. He allows for the possibility of transforming 
Wundt’s theory into something useful for developing a new theory of judgment, if only the author would 
“skip over,” or abandon his central tenets: 
Die psychologische Tatsache, dass beim Urteilen ein Zusammen von Vorstellungen gegeben ist, 
hat Wundt veranlasst, der Lehre vom Urteil überhaupt, der Darstellung der “logischen Formen,” 
eine genetische Untersuchung der Vorstellungen und Vorstellungsverbindungen 
vorauszuschicken. Die Tatsache der Vorstellungsverbindungen im Urteil bietet aber auch den 
Ausgangspunkt für eine Untersuchung darüber, wie sich im Urteil das urteilende Ich zu diesen 
Vorstellungsverknüpfungen verhält. Diese Verknüpfungen lösen im Subjekt ein Zwangsgefühl 
aus, es kann nicht anders als sie anerkennen. Und dieses psychisch erzwungene Zustimmen wird 
als das Wesen des Urteils betrachtet. In einer solchen Art der Betrachtung des Urteils steckt von 
vornherein ein richtiger Gedanke, insofern auf das der Blick eingestellt wird, was sich bei der 
Urteilstätigkeit darbietet; dieser Theorie wird es somit auch leichter, einer logischen Auffassung 
des Urteils näherzukommen. Das realpsychische Sichdrängen, Verknüpfen und demzufolge 
Zwangsauslösen der Vorstellungen braucht nur gleichsam übersprungen zu werden. Man erkennt 
dann das im Urteil Gedachte, das Gegenständliche rein als solches, das nichts Psychisches mehr 
ist und nicht psychische Reaktionen auslöst. Das Verhältnis des an die Stelle der 
Vorstellungsverknüpfung getretenen Gegenstandes zum urteilenden Subjekt ist kein Auslösen 
eines Zwanges, sondern erhält den Charakter der Forderung. Wird aber trotz dieser wesentlichen 
Um- und Fortbildung der Urteilslehre das Wesen des Urteils in dem vom Gegenstand geforderten 
Verhalten des psychischen Subjekts gesehen, dann ist der Psychologismus nicht überwunden. 
(163-164)
4
 Martin Heidegger, Die Kategorien- und Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus. Habilitationsschrift, Freiburg 
i. Br. 1915. Note that the final chapter was added later for the printed version](Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul 
Siebeck], 1916); reprinted in: Martin Heidegger (GA 1), pp. 189-411. – For Heidegger’s mistake in 
identifying the author of the treatise that marks the focus of his habilitation, see: John Caputo, The Mystical 
Element in Heidegger’s Thought (New York: Fordham University Press, 1986): “Heidegger’s 
Habilitationsschrift is a study of a medieval treatise entitled De modis significandi, composed by a 
fourteenth-century Scotist (Thomas of Erfurt), though wrongly attributed by Heidegger to Scotus himself” 
(145). Here, Caputo inserts note 4: “Martin Grabmann, Mittelalterliches Geistesleben (München: Huebar 
Verlag, 1926), Band I. See Grabmann’s reference to Heidegger on pp. 145-46” (275). This reference 
contains a typo. The publishing house belongs to: “[Max] Hueber,” cf. the entry in note 5, below. 
5
 The spelling of Vossler’s last name varies among different publications. The 1904 “manifesto” renders 
the author’s name “Voßler,” which is also the spelling that Heidegger adopts in this place. The other 
spelling with double “s,” is found, e.g., in: Karl Vossler, Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Sprachphilosophie
(München: Hueber, 1923). As in the previous section and throughout this study, I keep the second spelling 
of Vossler’s name. 
6
 See again: Hans Arens, Sprachwissenschaft: Der Gang ihrer Entwicklung von der Antike bis zur 
Gegenwart (Frankfurt a.M.: Athenäum, 1974).
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7
 See, e.g.: Cristina Lafont, The Linguistic Turn in Hermeneutic Philosophy, trans. J. Medina (Cambridge, 
Mass.: The MIT Press, 1999). 
8
 See: Martin Heidegger, On the Way to Language (New York: Harper & Row, 1982), p. 136. 
9
 Cf. one of Vossler’s (1904) most polemic passage, in which he avails himself of particularly violent 
language, bringing about an ominous “style” of “cemetery” imagery. His comparison of language parts to 
dead body parts is as gripping as his reference to “numbered mass graves” is disturbing: “Eine Sprache als 
Konvention und Regel betrachten, heisst also, sie unwissenschaftlich betrachten. Ergo ist Syntax überhaupt 
keine Wissenschaft – so wenig als Flexionslehre und Lautlehre. Dieses ganze Feld grammatischer 
Disziplinen ist ein von nimmermüden Positivisten angelegter unermesslicher Kirchhof, wo allerhand tote 
Sprachteile in Massen- und Einzelgräbern hübsch gebettet liegen, und die Gräber sind mit Aufschriften 
versehen und numeriert. – Wem hat nicht schon der Modergeruch dieser positivistischen Philologie 
beklemmend auf die Brust gedrückt!” (38). 
10
 In the further course of his career, Heidegger will use such disciplinary labels vaguely but strategically, 
by suggesting an opposition of his thinking to historical philology, in particular, and “mere language 
philosophy,” in general. In doing so, however, he never distinguishes any discursive constellations and 
opposing factions within the former or specifies the context and the proponents of the latter.  In this mode 
of decontextualized presentation, his remarks often gain an air of unprovoked criticism that tends to 
foreclose further investigation into these disciplinary formations. Yet, this does not cancel the rhetorical 
effect of vehemently, if not transparently, distancing Heidegger from certain disciplines, a testimony to the 
territorial independence of first philosophy and to the status of Heidegger as a “radical” whose commentary 
reaches us from an intellectual space beyond disciplinary, scientific infighting. Cf. his critical remarks on 
“historical philology” in the preface to the second (1950) edition of Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics
(GA 3, XII); and his comparable dismissal of “mere language philosophy” (blosse Sprachphilosophie) in 
the Letter on Humanism (1949) (GA 9, 318). 
11
 Cf. p. 233, above. 
12
 As Rüdiger Safranski relates: “Der frisch promovierte Doktor der Philosophie sitzt an seiner 
Habilitationsarbeit über die DIE KATEGORIEN- UND BEDEUTUNGSLEHRE DES DUNS SCOTUS. 
Das Schätzler-Stipendium, von dem er einstweilen sorgenfrei leben kann, verpflichtet ihn auf die 
philosophische Verteidigung des Wahrheitschatzes der Kirche in Gestalt des Thomismus. Wenn er sich 
beeilt, hat er Chancen, den immer noch unbesetzten Lehrstuhl für Christliche Philosophie zu bekommen. 
Die Dinge stehen nicht schlecht. Da beginnt der Krieg” (75). In: Rüdiger Safranski, Ein Meister aus 
Deutschland: Heidegger und seine Zeit (München: Carl Hanser, 1994). 
13
 This misleading characterization is promulgated by Richard Polt in his otherwise instructive introduction: 
“The German educational system requires that prospective university teachers produce two substantial 
theses, a dissertation and a Habilitationsschrift. The industrious Heidegger finished his dissertation in 1913 
and titled it the The Theory of Judgment in Psychologism: A Critical-Positive Contribution to Logic. His 
Habilitationsschrift (1916) was titled Duns Scotus’ Theory of Categories and Meaning [Here Polt inserts 
note 10]. There is no need for us to review the complexities of these early works. But it can be helpful to 
look at some basic features of young Heidegger’s philosophical orientation, as they will help us understand 
the dramatic shift that was soon to occur in his thought. – This shift is indeed dramatic, for the mature 
Heidegger is famous for his explorations of the history of language and his plays on words, and he is 
infamous for his pronouncement that “the idea of ‘logic’ itself disintegrates in the turbulence of a more 
original questioning” [note 11]. But young Heidegger calls his dissertation a “contribution to logic,” and he 
seems to identify logic with philosophy itself. He often stresses that logic has nothing to do with grammar 
or etymology: the meaning of a statement is independent of the peculiarities of the language in which it is 
expressed [note 12]. Heidegger sounds like many of today’s analytic philosophers when he says it is the 
logician’s duty to strive for “unambiguous definitions and clarifications of the meanings of words” [note 
13]. – What does Heidegger mean by “logic”? Today we usually think of logic primarily as formal, 
symbolic logic. Heidegger is aware of the advances in symbolic logic made by Frege and Russel, but he 
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thinks that this approach to logical problems is too limited [note 14]. Logic in the broader sense studies “the 
conditions of knowing in general. Logic is theory of theory” [note 15]. In other words, the job of logic is to 
explain how theoretical claims can be meaningful and true” (11). – Note 10: Neither text has been 
published in English translation. The originals can be found in Frühe Schriften, GA 1. Note 11: “What is 
Metaphysics?” in Basic Writings, p. 107. We will take a close look at this claim in Chapter 5. Note 12: GA 
1, pp. 32, 103, 302, 338, 340. Note 13: Ibid., p. 186. Note 14: Ibid., pp. 42-43. Note 15: Ibid., p. 23. – To be 
fair, there may be practical and pedagogical reasons as to why an introductory study does not focus on 
exactly those early writings by a certain author, which are not availabe in translation. However, Polt’s 
speaking of an “indeed dramatic shift” remains false. According to the view argued in this study, no such 
shift occurs. If anything, Heidegger shifts emphasis in obfuscating his nineteenth-century sources in the 
areas of comparative linguistics and historical psychology. 
14
 Here I return to  the distinction between “empirical psychology” and “conceptual psychology,” which I 
previously adopted from Arens (1989); see: chapter two, p. 92, note 26, above. 
15
 Cf. note 12, above. 
16
 What is remarkable about this injection, too, is that Heidegger slips in another hint at his own alternative 
conception, when he refers to the “idiosyncrasy of the scope of meaning as the actual “expressing layer”” 
(die Eigentümlichkeit des Bedeutungsbereiches als der eigentlich “ausdrückenden Schicht”). Yet this 
suggestive notion of layer(s) of meaning is not explicated any further at this point, but merely used as a 
rhetorical means to stress – suggestively but vaguely – the difference between his view and Werner’s: 
“Werner bezeichnet den Traktat des Scotus als “die Hauptleistung des scholastischen Mittelalters auf dem 
Gebiete der Sprachlogik, d.i. des Versuches der Ineinsbildung von Grammatik und Logik.” [Heidegger note 
60: Die Sprachlogik des Duns Scotus. S. 549.] Scotus will nicht “die Grammatik in die Logik 
hineinbilden,” sondern die logische Struktur der Bedeutungen verstehen. Werner übersieht die 
Eigentümlichkeit des Bedeutungsbereiches als der eigentlich “ausdrückenden Schicht.” – Er will sich zwar 
“auf ein Urteil über den sachlichen Wert” des Traktats nicht einlassen, bemerkt aber, dass “eine vom 
Standpunkt des mittelalterlichen Denkens abgefasste Sprachlogik nicht auf den Namen einer 
Sprachphilosophie im heutigen Sinne des Wortes Anspruch machen könne;” eine solche hat nach seiner 
Meinung auf “die genetische Entwicklung der Sprache” zu achten. [Heidegger note 61: a.a.O. S. 550.]” 
(340). 
17
 “Es zeigt übrigens das Urteil Werners über die “Sprachlogik” des Scotus, wie sehr die Werturteile in der 
Geschichte der Philosophie vom eigenen systematischen Standpunkt abhänging sind. Ist dieser theoretisch 
nicht haltbar, dann muss auch das historische Werturteil einer Revision unterzogen werden. – Inwieweit 
nun Duns Scotus mit den Einzelausführungen des Traktats das Richtige getroffen hat, wird sich in dem nun 
folgenden Kapitel über seine Formenlehre der Bedeutungen herausstellen” (340-341). 
18
 “Logisch und logisch sind in beiden Fällen nicht dasselbe” (339), cf. p. 241, above.
19
 As noted earlier (see: chapter four, p. 183-184, above), the German term Vorstellung has connotations of 
both representation and imagination. Hence, translating it simply as representation would be misleading in 
the present context, especially with respect to Paul’s specific account of how such 
“representation/imagination-matter” functions in the transformatory processes of meaning formation, in 
general, and linguistic evolution, in particular.
20
 Cf. quotation, p. 243, above.
21
 Cf., again, Arens (1996), pp. 105-106.  
22
 This central passage, as integral part of Heidegger’s conclusion to this work, provides clear evidence 
that, contra Kisiel, Lask is appreciated but already out of the picture, as early as 1915 (or 1916, if we go by 
the publication date of this text, rather than its first submission to the habilitation committee at Freiburg.) 
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23
 Cf. quotation, pp. 240-241, above.
24
 Martin Heidegger, Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs (GA 20). As Petra Jaeger notes in the 
afterword by the editor (Nachwort des Herausgebers) at the end of this volume of the Gesamtausgabe: 
“Martin Heidegger hielt die unter dem Titel “Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs” angekündigte Vorlesung im 
Sommer-Semester 1925 als vierstündige Lehrveranstaltung an der Marburger Universität. Der Untertitel 
lautete: “Prolegomena zu einer Phänomenologie von Geschichte und Natur”” (443). […] “Da Heidegger 
nicht mehr zur Ausführung der zentralen Thematik der Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs gelangte, erschien es 
angebracht, bei der Veröffentlichung der Vorlesung den ursprünglichen Titel abzuändern in “Prolegomena 
zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs;” denn diese “Prolegomena” sind ausgearbeitet und wurden vorgetragen” 
(444). – Here and in the following, I shall refer to Heidegger’s text also simply as “Prolegomena,” in 
keeping with the title of the present subsection of this chapter. 
25
 “Es bedarf wohl kaum des Geständnisses, dass ich mich auch heute noch Husserl gegenüber als 
Lernender nehme” (168). 
26
 “Husserl kommt über Dilthey nicht hinaus, so überlegen seine Analysen im besonderen gewiss sind. Im 
Gegenteil, ich möchte mindestens nach meiner Auffassung von Dilthey vermuten, dass Dilthey zwar die 
Seinsfrage nicht stellte, auch die Mittle dazu nicht hatte, dass in ihm aber die Tendenz dazu lebte. Bei der 
grossen Unbestimmtheit der Diltheyschen Formulierungen gerade in der Dimension der fundamentalen 
Phänomene ist es unmöglich, das Vorhandensein dieser Tendenz objektiv zu belegen” (173-174). 
27
 The translations of Heidegger’s text are my own. In the original, the full passage under consideration 
reads as follows: “So fundamental die Intentionalität ist, so leer bleibt sie auf den ersten Blick. Wir sagen 
einfach: Vorstellen ist Vorstellen von etwas, Urteilen ist Urteilen über etwas usw.; man sieht nicht recht 
ein, wie von solchen Strukturen eine Wissenschaft möglich sein soll. Diese Wissenschaft ist offenbar 
zuende, bevor sie eigentlich angefangen hat. Das scheint in der Tat so zu sein, als wäre diese 
phänomenologische Feststellung der Intentionalität eine Tautologie. So hat Wundt früher schon gesagt, die 
ganze phänomenologische Erkenntnis lasse sich reduzieren auf den Satz: A = A. Wir wollen versuchen zu 
sehen, ob nicht sehr vieles zu sagen ist und am Ende das meiste noch gar nicht gesagt ist” (47). – Cf. 
Heidegger’s previous remarks on intentio, which are also meant to deflect the suggestion that 
phenomenology is a trivial endeavor: “Intentio besagt dem Wortsinne nach: Sich-richten-auf. Jedes 
Erlebnis, jede seelische Verhaltung richtet sich auf etwas. Vorstellen ist ein Vorstellen von etwas, 
Erinnerung ist Erinnerung von etwas, Urteilen ist Urteilen über etwas, Vermuten, Erwarten, Hoffen, 
Lieben, Hassen – von etwas. Man wird sagen das ist eine Trivialität, sie ausdrücklich noch betonen, keine 
sonderliche Leistung, die gar die Bezeichnung einer Entdeckung verdiente. Gehen wir jedoch dieser 
Trivialität etwas nach und stellen wir heraus, was sie phänomenologisch meint” (37). 
28
 “Das bisher über die Intentionalität Gewonnene ist formal gesprochen leer, aber das eine ist schon 
deutlich, dass for allem der Strukturzusammenhang selbst frei vergegenwärtigt werden muss, ohne dass wir 
realistische oder idealistische Theorien über das Bewusstsein im Hintergrunde haben, dass wir lernen, die 
Gegebenheiten als solche zu sehen und zu sehen, dass Beziehungen zwischen Verhaltungen, zwischen 
Erlebnissen, selbst nicht Komplexionen von Dingen sind, sondern dass die Beziehungen zwischen den 
Verhaltungen selbst ihrerseits wieder intentionalen Charakter haben, dass die ganzen Beziehungen des 
Lebens in sich selbst durch diese Struktur bestimmt sind. (46-47) […] Von hier aus können wir zugleich 
terminologische Fixierungen gewinnen, um einen Ausdruck zu verstehen, der in der Phänomenologie oft 
gebraucht und ebenso oft missverstanden wird: Es handelt sich um den Begriff des Aktes. Die Verhaltungen 
des Lebens nennt man auch Akte: Wahrnehmung, Urteil, Liebe, Hass … Was besagt hier Akt? Nicht etwa 
Tätigkeit, Vorgang oder irgendeine Kraft, sondern die Bedeutung von Akt meint lediglich intentionale 
Beziehung. Solche Erlebnisse sind Akte, die den Charakter der Intentionalität haben. Man muss diesen 
Aktbegriff festhalten und nicht mit anderen konfundieren” (47). 
29
 For the first presentation of the chair example, see: p. 37 of Heidegger’s text.
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 As Heidegger explains in § 6.: “Bei Gelegenheit der Charakteristik des Zusammenhangs der Weisen des 
Vorstellens zeigte sich unter diesen eine bestimmte Stufenfolge vom blossen Leermeinen (signitiven 
Akten) zum originär gebenden Wahrnehmen (intuitiver Akt im engsten Sinne). Leermeinen ist in seinem 
Sinne unerfüllt, es hat sein Vermeintes im Wie der Unerfülltheit. Leermeinen bzw. Vermeintes kann sich in 
gewisser Weise in der anschaulichen Vergegenwärtigung erfüllen. […] Aber so gross auch die 
Vollkommenheit der Fülle sein mag, sie zeigt eine Differenz gegenüber der Fülle der Wahrnehmung, die 
das Seiende leibhaft gibt. Aber auch in dieser, sofern wir uns an die sinnliche Wahrnehmung materieller 
Dinge halten, ist sie nicht total; sie gibt zwar das Seiende originär, aber doch immer nur von einer Seite. So 
adäquat eine Wahrnehmung sein mag, das wahrgenommene Seiende zeigt sich immer nur in einer 
bestimmten Abschattung” (65). 
31
 “Schein ist eine Modifikation des Offenbaren, Offenbares, das es zu sein prätendiert, aber nicht ist. Der 
Schein ist nicht Phänomen in diesem privativen Sinne; er hat den Charakter des Sichzeigens, aber das, was 
sich zeigt, zeigt sich nicht als das, was es ist; während Erscheinung gerade die Darstellung des wesenhaft 
gerade nicht Offenbaren ist. Schein geht so immer zurück auf Offenbares und schliesst die Idee des 
Offenbaren in sich. Nun aber wird zugleich deutlich, dass eine Erscheinung, ein Symptom, nur das sein 
kann, was sie ist, nämlich Verweisung auf etwas anderes, was sich nicht zeigt, dadurch, dass das 
Erscheinende selbst sich zeigt, d.h. dass das, was sich als Symptom gibt, Phänomen ist. Die Möglichkeit 
der Erscheinung als Verweisung von etwas auf etwas liegt darin, dass das Etwas, das verweist, sich selbst 
an ihm selbst zeigt. Anders gewendet: die Möglichkeit der Erscheinung als Verweisung ist fundiert in dem 
eigentlichen Phänomen, d.h. im Sich-zeigen. Die Struktur der Erscheinung als Verweisung setzt in sich 
selbst schon die ursprünglichere des Sich-zeigens, d.h. den eigentlichen Sinn von Phänomen voraus. Etwas 
kann nur als Sich-selbst-Zeigendes verweisend sein” (113). 
32
 As she explains critically, in the preface (Einleitung) to Husserl’s Cartesianischen Meditationen: “So 
folgenreich und letzthin entscheidend nun zwar für Husserls Idee der philosophischen Letztbegründung 
sich die Entdeckung des Ich als eines transzendentalen Ego, die Freilegung seines Erfahrungsfeldes sowie, 
in ihrem Gefolge, die der transzendentalen Intersubjektivität erweist, so wenig darf jedoch ausser acht 
gelassen werden, […] [d]ass […] Cartesischer Zweifel und Husserlsche Epoché sich nicht einfach nur 
gradweise in der Radikalität des Fragens unterscheiden, aus der dann im letzteren, konsequenteren Falle die 
Freilegung des transzendentalen Untersuchungsfeldes bloss “resultierte,” sondern dass Zweifel und Epoché 
sinnverschieden sind. […] Denn für Husserl steht von vornherein nicht in Frage, ob die Welt ist, sondern 
wie sie für das Bewusstsein da ist. Gesucht wird mithin in der Phänomenologie auch nicht nach “Beweisen” 
für ihre Existenz, sondern gesucht wird nach Wegen der Klärung des Sinnes aller einschlägigen 
Existenzbehauptungen und Existenzmeinungen. […] Dass in Husserl’s Epoché alle Seinsetzungen nebst 
allen impliziten Seinsmeinungen “auszusetzten” [sic.] sind, dass ihre Enthaltung, Inhibierung gefordert 
wird und die Welt “dahingestellt” bleibt, hat bei Husserl keinen skeptischen, sondern den positiven Sinn, 
dass sie in ihrem Bestande nicht angetastet und nicht einmal vorübergehend der methodischen Fiktion des 
Umsturzes unterworfen wird, sondern dass sie so gerade “Gegenstand,” noematisches Korrelat des 
transzendentalen Bewusstseins, werden soll” (XXIII-XXIV). “Darin liegt das entscheidend Neue der 
Husserlschen Phänomenologie gegenüber Descartes’ Unternehmen. […] Indem aber Husserl es so darstellt, 
als habe Descartes nur seine eigene Entdeckung nicht entdeckt, bleibt jedoch verborgen, dass Descartes’ 
Zweifel, phänomenologisch gesehen, lediglich eine Modalisierung der “Urdoxa des schlichten 
Weltglaubens” und mithin untauglich ist, diesen ausser Funktion zu setzen. Gerade darum aber geht es in 
Husserl’s phänomenologischer Reduktion” (XXIV). See: Edmund Husserl, Cartesianische Meditationen
(Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1977). 
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 Cf., e.g., the popular book by: John D. Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics: Repetition, Deconstruction, and 
the Hermeneutic Project (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987). 
According to the view argued in this study, Caputo’s view is mistaken, when he asserts: “The idea 
of presuppositionlessness arises only when Husserl wants to characterize the nature of phenomenology as 
science. At this point he has recourse to the inherited idea of Cartesian science, not in the sense of a 
deductive system, from which he expressly departs, but rather in the sense of achieving an absolutely 
indubitable and presupposition-free beginning. This ideal does not arise from concrete phenomenological 
inquiry. It has no correlate in the way intentional life is lived in ordinary, prescientific experience. Husserl 
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asks us to believe that scientific consciousness is free from the very conditions which make consciousness 
in general possible in the first place. He asks us to believe, in effect, in two selves, one conditioned and 
finite, the other unconditioned and free from limitation. And while he means to say that there is but one 
self, he ends up unable to deliver on that claim. [Here Caputo inserts note 16: Husserl distinguishes two 
levels of consciousness, reflecting and reflected upon, in one and the same ego; he denies that there are two 
different selves; see Cartesian Meditations, § 15.]” (55). 
Caputo’s main shortcoming, in my opinion, is that he fails to appreciate the role and meaning of 
an experiential field as the “indubitable and presupposition-free beginning,” in Husserl’s account of 
transcendental subjectivity. In keeping with my earlier discussion of possible worlds, Husserl’s regional 
ontology is generally comparable to Deleuze and Guattari’s post-structuralist account of different “planes 
of immanence,” which does not posit either an absolute subject or an absolute object (the world). 
Differently put, when Caputo speaks of Husserl’s purported notion of a second self that is “unconditioned 
and free from limitation,” he glosses over the distinction between infinite and boundless. For Husserl, each 
experiential field, is “unconditioned by a transcendent fix point (whether “metaphysical subject” or mind-
independent world-substance)” but is bound by its “stable style” of structure, its own “cultural logic,” as 
Cassirer would say. – To repeat, I think Husserl remains vulnerable to the charge of perceptivism, which 
informs his conception of life-worlds with closed horizons, but he is not vulnerable to metaphysical 
dualism, or a double notion of self, as Caputo suggests.
Turning to one of Caputo’s later remarks on the same issue, we might say that Husserl is not 
susceptible to “Heidegger’s objection,” while he may well be susceptible to “Derrida’s objection”: “The 
work of redescribing what “reason” means and of liberating it from metaphysics and dogmatism is 
beginning to catch on. Husserl wanted to liberate rationality from the deductive model that had come to 
dominate all discussions of reason from Descartes on and to replace it with an intuitive model. Reason for 
him is an evidential system, an interconnectedness of experience with intuitive credentials which makes up 
the ordered panorama of the sciences and their foundation in transcendental life (Ideas I, Part IV). 
Transcendental phenomenology is everything that reason and metaphysics want, but without the idle 
constructs of groundless theorizing (Cartesian Meditations, §64). Eventually, however, Husserl’s liberation 
ended up in a new subjugation of reason to intuition which tied the hands of reason in a new way, by 
demanding a transcendental self-justification of it (Heidegger’s objection) and by precluding the free 
manipulation of signs which do not require intuitive redemption (Derrida’s objection)” (219). 
Here it is worth emphasizing that even “Derrida’s objection” needs qualification, because the 
transfer of meaning from one possible world to another is not completely free but subject to material 
mediation. In this regard, the semiotic potential of “concrete expressions” (cf. previous chapter) always 
transcends the conscious intentions of interpreting subjects but it is never “absolutely free,” never without 
any material boundaries. Instead, concrete expressions are open structures. If Derrida’s objection to the 
requirement of “intuitive redemption” also rejects any limits with respect to the irreducible materiality of 
meaning, then his objection to Husserl (in Caputo’s rendering) is just as flawed as Heidegger’s. 
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 For Heidegger’s account of Dilthey’s influence on Husserl, see esp.: Prolegomena, pp. 163 ff. 
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 For the details of this assessment, see: Theodore Kisiel, Heidegger’s Way of Thought (New York: 
Continuum, 2002), p. 36, note 1. Note that Gadamer explicitly refers to the text of Heidegger’s public 
lecture in 1924, which I discussed in detail in chapter two. Here and in the following, my applying the label 
of Urform to the Prolegomena (1925) differs from Gadamer’s original account, insofar as I consider the 
Prolegomena as the crucial prototype-version on the way to Being and Time.
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 See esp.: pp. 161 ff.; cf. note 26, above.
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 Cf. my earlier commentary on Gadamer’s stress on written textuality (Schriftlichkeit), as the core 
meaning of dialogue, rather than conscious verbal exchange, pp. 173-174, above. 
38
  I choose this neologism as a translation of Mitteilung in order to stress the materiality involved in the 
circulation or traveling of not-yet interpreted information. From the standpoint of material semiotics, “in-
forming” adequately captures the mutual material impact, or indentation, if you will, that springs from the 
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encounter with a concrete expression. The face that invades my world leaves a mark on me, just as my 
confrontation with it cannot fail to “ingrave” or “in-form” a trace on this face.  
39
 See: Polt (1999), p. 11; cf. note 13, above.
40
 “Das wirklich gesprochene hat gar keine Entwicklung” (what is actually spoken has no development at 
all) (PS, 28). 
41
 See: Martin Heidegger (GA 2), p. 51, note 1: “Neurdings hat E. Cassirer das mythische Dasein zum 
Thema einer philosophischen Interpretation gemacht, vgl. “Philosophie der symbolischen Formen.” 
Zweiter Teil: Das mythische Denken. 1925. Der ethnologischen Forschung werden durch diese 
Untersuchung umfassendere Leitfäden zur Verfügung gestellt. Von der philosophischen Problematik her 
gesehen bleibt die Frage, ob die Fundamente der Interpretation hinreichend durchsichtig sind, ob 
insbesondere die Architektonik von Kants Kritik d. r. V. und deren systematischer Gehalt überhaupt den 
möglichen Aufriss für eine solche Aufgabe bieten können, oder ob es hier nicht eines neuen und 
ursprünglicheren Ansatzes bedarf. Cassirer sieht selbst die Möglichkeit einer solchen Aufgabe, wie die 
Anmerkung S. 16 f. zeigt, wo C. auf die von Husserl erschlossenen phänomenologischen Horizonte 
hinweist. In einer Aussprache, die der Verf. gelegentlich eines Vortrages in der Hamburgischen Ortsgruppe 
der Kantgesellschaft im Dezember 1923 über “Aufgaben und Wege der phänomenologischen Forschung” 
mit C. pflegen konnte, zeigte sich schon eine Übereinstimmung in der Forderung einer existenzialen 
Analytik, die in dem genannten Vortrag skizziert wurde.” 
42
 Quoted from: Cassirer (2000). 
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 “Das Charakteristische der Verweisungsfunktion in der Erscheinung, im Erscheinen, ist die Funktion der 
Indizierung, der Anzeige von etwas. Anzeigen von etwas durch ein anderes besagt aber gerade, es nicht an 
ihm selbst zeigen, sondern indirekt, vermittelt, symbolisch darstellen. Wir haben hier also einen ganz 
anderen Zusammenhang unter dem, was wir mit Erscheinung meinen; beim Phänomen haben wir gerade 
keinen Verweisungszusammenhang, sondern die ihm eigentümliche Struktur des Sich-selbt-zeigens. Es 
wird nun darauf ankommen, dass wir den inneren Zusammenhang zwischen Phänomenen in diesem echten 
Sinne und Erscheiungen gegenüber Schein abgrenzen” (112-113). Notice that “symbolic (re)presentation” 
(symbolisch darstellen) is linked to the notion of Erscheinung, and the referential character (das 
Charakteristische der Verweisungsfunktion) of the latter is made possible only by the fact that there is 
something that “reveals” itself (113), to which the Erscheinung can refer. In short, referentiality 
presupposes revelation. But this does not meant that the referential function of Erscheinungen is 
superfluous, since revelation is never direct, immediate, or complete – the need for symbolic mediation 
remains fully intact at this point. Considering these remarks, combined with Heidegger’s later explication 
of concrete communication as revelation (pp. 360 ff.), it is not at all clear how Heidegger’s use of symbol is 
different from Cassirer’s. On the contrary, whenever he puts forth his own account of the “essence of 
language” or the self-interpretation (Selbstauslegung) of Dasein, he seems very much in tune with a 
material-semiotic tradition that points from Schelling, over Paul, to Husserl and Cassirer. To easily dispose 
of Cassirer as just another Spengler, as Heidegger does (p. 277) is anywhere between self-undermining and 
scholarly insincere. 
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 To repeat, for my specific use of the expression “Urform” (as different from Gadamer’s use), see: note 
35, above. 
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Chapter Six
Heidegger’s Letter on Humanism: 
Concluding Remarks on the “Vital Anecdote” in a Demonic Text 
If the earlier chapters of this study have set up the problem of the rhetorics from 
which Heidegger borrowed, the present chapter has a different function, moving into the 
heart of Heidegger’s most familiar and most controversial writings.  Starting with the 
1949 Brief über den Humanismus, it sets up Heidegger’s paradigm for a new theology of 
reading, which finds and circulates its meanings in concrete expressions of culture, 
including most importantly poetry and what I will explicate as “vital anecdotes” – a 
paradigm that will “recur” in Being and Time, in modified form.  To make this case, I 
will open out the Letter as predictive of how he manipulates ethics in the text to enact a 
“theft of faith,” Heidegger will, once again, deny his roots in a post-Schellingean 
discourse, as he undercuts his own previous sketch of a material dialogics, in favor of a 
rhetorically amplified form of nationalist language cult.  My conclusion will recapture the 
Christological interest in concrete communication and its potential for resisting structural 
corruption through the demonic effects of political idolatry.  In particular, from the 
discussion of Heidegger’s Letter, I will extrapolate a line of questioning that proposes a 
critical rereading of Being and Time focused on the sign-character of Zeug (equipment) 
and its moral implications for a new materialist semiotics, concerned with the structural 
dynamics that underly the use of religious language.
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Heidegger’s Letter on Humanism (Brief über den Humanismus; hereafter also 
referred to as: Humanismusbrief) (1949 [written 1946]) may well be seen as one of 
Heidegger’s most controversial writings, for at least three related reasons.  
First, it was conceived and delivered within the politically tense atmosphere of the 
immediate postwar years.  Against the jagged landscape of rubble and debris, 
Heidegger’s Brief constitutes an eminent instance o f philosophical Trümmerliteratur, 
which stands out from the body of literature that was later subsumed under the name of 
this genre.1  Second, at this crossroads between the numbing effects of political 
catastrophe and the first stirrings of cultural reconstruction, the Letter on Humanism turns 
to the question of human dignity in a provocative and seemingly paradoxical manner, as 
Heidegger objects to humanism in the name of humanism.  Third, within the corpus of 
Heidegger’s writings, the present text marks one of the few instances where he expressly 
addresses the possibility and limits of “ethics” in relation to the project of “fundamental 
ontology” familiar from his project of Being and Time. 
Let us now turn to the Letter to see the mature form of the arguments that I have 
been tracing to this point.  
From Ansprechen to Ankunft: Heidegger’s Language of Cultural Nationalism
Considering the time when Heidegger originally put the Humanismusbrief on 
paper, in 1946, it appears significant that the Letter was conceived simultaneously with 
several other eminent, philosophical commentaries such as Karl Jaspers’ (1883-1969) 
study on Die Schuldfrage (The Question of [German] Guilt),2 Max Picard’s (1888-1965) 
Hitler in uns selbst (Hitler in Ourselves),3 and Ernst Cassirer’s The Myth of the State,4 all 
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of which appeared in the same year.  Put forth in the shared social climate of political and 
moral dis- and reorientation, these philosophical statements offer different perspectives 
on the postwar situation.  In this vein, they set the paradigm for different approaches to 
what was later called Vergangenheitsbewältigung (coping with the past), focused on the 
problem of regaining a political and cultural identity, after twelve years of intellectual 
isolation and the trauma of the death camps.
As is well known, the main thrust of Jaspers’ book consists in his rejection of the 
notion of collective guilt, in favor of an account of individual responsibility, a statement 
that was going to fuel the discussion well into the 1960s.5  Cassirer’s book proffers a 
cultural semiotics that stresses the political implications of his earlier work in the 
Philosophy of Symbolic Forms (1923-1929), as he now examines “The Technique of the 
Modern Political Myths.”6  Picard’s text, finally, puts forth a specific kind of 
phenomenological ethics, a Dasein’s analysis concerned with the dangers of political 
idolatry.7  In this analysis, Picard’s draws on a conception of the demonic, which strikes 
me as directly inspired by Paul Tillich’s 1926 essay by the same title,8 although Picard 
does not acknowledge Tillich.9
Considering these texts, and the fact that the Davos disputation confronted 
Cassirer and Heidegger as the two most famous philosophers of the age, it is worth noting 
that Cassirer does not criticize Heidegger as harshly as one might expect.  Instead of 
declaring him a Nazi philosopher, Cassirer characterizes Heidegger as an adept of 
philosophical fatalism, which easily lend itself to being utilized by the propaganda 
machinery of the National Socialists, without being identical with, or reducible to their 
ideological perversions.10  Picard is less subtle in his philosophical distinctions, when he 
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aligns Jaspers and Heidegger under the general rubric of Existenzphilosophie and jointly 
charges them with nihilism.11  Such oversimplification notwithstanding, Picard’s book 
remains relevant in his account of the “Nazi world” as a “world of discontinuity.”  As 
long as we recognize his theoretical debt to Tillich and Cassirer, Picard’s characterization 
of “Hitler’s face”12 provides one of the most gripping illustrations of the violent 
manifestations of political idolatry, a disturbing description of idolatrous “physiognomy” 
(pp. 26 f.) within a structuralist framework. 
Heidegger’s Letter on Humanism, then, differs from the statements of these 
authors in some obvious and some not so obvious ways.  To begin with, Heidegger’s 
involvement with the Nazi regime remains the subject matter of extensive debate, and 
over the last ten to fifteen years it has dominated Heidegger scholarship, especially in an 
Anglophone context.  Sparked in large part by the publication of Victor Farias’ book 
Heidegger and Nazism (1989 [French orig., 1987]), this focus on Heidegger’s politics 
actually marks the fourth wave of a recurrent criticism since the end of World War II, as 
Hugo Ott has pointed out.13
At the heart of this on-going controversy lies the fact that Heidegger never 
recanted.  More specifically, in the widely discussed Spiegel-interview (conducted in 
1966, but not published until Heidegger’s death in 1976), Heidegger did not seem to add 
significant qualifiers to, much less withdraw, his notorious remark, made in 1953 (1935), 
about “the inner truth and greatness of this movement [National Socialism] (namely, the 
encounter between global technology and contemporary man).”14  Needless to say, in 
1946 one could not make such pronouncements. 
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However, while it thus comes as no surprise that Heidegger would have taken a 
very different route to “coping with the past” right after the war, pointing to his lingering 
attachment to what he might have seen as the “philosophical resources” of National 
Socialism does not yet capture the complex texture of the Letter on Humanism.  The 
latter, it can be shown, comprises a vibrant mixture of at least four different, though 
related debates about cultural meaning, and their particular discourses, which Heidegger 
effectively intertwines to appropriate the resulting amalgam as a philosophical discourse 
of his own: a humanism debate, a debate about the status of philosophy as a science, a 
debate about literature, and a critical aesthetics debate.15
For my present purposes, I shall confine my inquiry to the first debate on 
humanism, the complex nature of which deserves separate treatment with respect to 
Heidegger’s “theft of faith,” that is, his attempt to deprive certain sites of religious 
meaning production of their social power.  Most importantly, in this arena of cultural 
discourse, Heidegger’s philosophical rhetoric creates a tension between religious and 
political meanings, resulting in a polyvocal message flexibly tailored for different 
factions among his (German) postwar audience.  
Due to its deployment of calculated ambiguities (see below), different parts of the 
Brief über den Humanismus can be read variously as expressions of stoic acquiescence or 
the “proper silence” (“das rechte Schweigen” [344]), as strategic advice for 
“(re)armament” (Zurüstung [ibid.]), or as an agitating call for “open resistance” (durch 
einen offenen Widerstand [346]) – to the allied forces, or whomever else the reader may 
intuit.  Of course, these initiatives are not plainly delivered in the context of political 
action but coded as possible “modes of thought.”16  Accordingly, the Brief cannot be 
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decoded conclusively so that it would yield a single, consistent message, as Heidegger’s 
language keeps hovering between connotations of comfort, combat, and conspiracy. 
This textual situation notwithstanding, one can extrapolate a thematic strand from 
Heidegger’s text as exemplary of the kind of political idolatry that Tillich, Cassirer, and 
Picard tried to expose and obviate in their respective works.  In this respect, Heidegger’s 
Letter emerges as a demonic document, in Tillich’s sense of the term: 
In diesen [dämonischen] Wirklichkeiten ist überall die gleiche Spannung 
enthalten […]: die übergreifende Form, die ein gestaltendes und ein 
gestaltzerstörendes Element in sich vereinigt, und damit ein Gegen-Positives, eine 
positive, d.h. formschaffende Formwidrigkeit. […] 
Die Spannung zwischen Formschöpfung und Formzerstörung, auf der das 
Dämonische beruht, grenzt es ab gegen das Satanische, in dem die Zerstörung 
ohne Schöpfung gedacht ist. (44-45)17
For Tillich, the demonic cannot be conceived as pure evil, since it may approach the 
satanic but can never reach it.  The satanic stands for sheer destruction or absolute 
negation but as such it does not exist. “[…] denn das Satanische hat keine Existenz wie 
das Dämonische, Um Existenz zu haben, müsste es zur Gestalt kommen können, also 
einen Rest von Schöpfung in sich tragen” (45).  The demonic, on the other hand, 
maintains a hybrid nature, it is creatively destructive (formschaffende Formwidrigkeit) 
and, above all, it is dialectical.18
In Heidegger we will detect this dialectical feature with respect to how he 
suspends the notion of Being between a cultural essence and absolute exteriority. Being 
does not itself amount to a cultural essence but it can “call” on it.  In fact, almost all we 
will find out about Being is that it does address cultural communities selectively, or so 
Heidegger would want us believe.  It is the closest, the farthest, it is nearness itself.19
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To start with “half” of the dialectic of Being, we can say that, what is demonic 
about Heidegger’s view, is its tendency to essentialize German culture by positing it as an 
absolute that is exempt from the critical and transformatory feedback effects of concrete 
communication.  In other words, under the pretense of reconceiving the “humanitas” 
(319) of humanity, Heidegger effectively insulates German Wesen from the dynamics of 
reciprocal invasion among different possible worlds, culminating in the pivotal 
statement: 
Das “Deutsche” ist nicht der Welt gesagt, damit sie am deutschen Wesen genese, 
sondern es ist den Deutschen gesagt, damit sie aus der geschickhaften 
Zugehörigkeit zu den Völkern mit diesen weltgeschichtlich werden (vgl. zu 
Hölderlins Gedicht “Andenken.” Tübinger Gedenkschrift 1943 S. 322). Die 
Heimat dieses geschichtlichen Wohnens ist die Nähe zum Sein. [Here Heidegger 
inserts note a: Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit, 1. Auflage 1947: Als diese Nähe 
verwahrt und birgt sich das Sein selbst.] (338)
“German” is not spoken to the world so that the world might be reformed [better: 
might recover]20 through the German essence; rather, it is spoken to the Germans 
so that from a fateful belongingness to the nations they might become world-
historical along with them. [the translators insert note 4: Cf. Hölderlin’s poem 
“Remembrance” [Andenken] in the Tübingen Memorial (1943), p. 322. 
[Hamburger, pp. 488ff.] 
In this spirit, Heidegger promotes a form of cultural nationalism, traces of which could 
already be detected in Vossler (1904).21  To be sure, Heidegger would immediately point 
out that “essence” (Wesen) is not intended to designate any metaphysical substance.  
However, as the above passage shows, even if we understand Heidegger’s reference to 
“German” ([d]as “Deutsche”) in terms of a process phenomenon of cultural evolution, it 
is clear that Heidegger wants to keep “German evolution” separate from other cultural 
processes or influxes.   
Along this line of argument, Heidegger now rejects the kind of communication he 
had imported from Paul’s Prinzipien into his own Prolegomena (1925).  While his earlier 
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notion of “talking-to” (Ansprechen) entailed the openness requisite for being addressed 
by the concrete expressions or “faces” of other life-worlds, Heidegger now imposes a 
double restriction, according to his present definition of “language [as] the clearling-
concealing advent of Being itself” (Sprache [als] lichtend-verbergende Ankunft des Seins 
selbst) (326).  The former conception of Ansprechen, in the Prolegomena , views 
language as concrete communication, a material dialogic carried by unrestricted “world 
traveling” among different planes of immanence.  The later conception of Ankunft, in the 
Letter on Humanism, isolates “the German,” in the sense of essence and/as language, 
from other languages.  Remember, according to Heidegger’s 1925 reference to 
Humboldt, the use of Daseinsadverbien (adverbs of Dasein, in the sense of orientations 
of Dasein) cuts across all linguistic boundaries, the enforcement of which Heidegger 
belittled as the petty business of grammarians.22  In 1946, it would seem, he entertains the 
possibility that there is a difference between German Daseinsadverbien and, presumably, 
American, French, British, or Russian ones. 
At the same time he excludes “plants and animals” (Gewächs und Getier) (326) 
from the realm of language altogether.  While these further exclusions may attract 
criticism in its own right, it is important to notice that, rhetorically, the communicative 
discrimination against vegetative and animal life serves Heidegger as a red herring to 
withdraw attention from his politically more aggressive discrimination against other 
human communities of language.  In adopting a diction that bears overtones of man as the 
crown of creation, Heidegger appears to make the case for a united front among humans 
“against” the rest of God’s creatures.  This impression is deceptive, however, since 
Heidegger immediately begins to draw boundaries within the human speech community 
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as well.  In his complaint about a deterioration of “thinking” into a mere “cultural bustle” 
(Kulturbetrieb), Heidegger elaborates: 
Man denkt nicht mehr, sondern man beschäftigt sich mit der “Philosophie.” Im 
Wettbewerb solcher Beschäftigungen bieten sich diese dann öffentlich als ein 
…ismus an und versuchen, sich zu überbieten. Die Herrschaft solcher Title ist nicht 
zufällig. Sie beruht, und das vor allem in der Neuzeit, auf der eigentümlichen 
Diktatur der Öffentlichkeit. […] Diese [Verknechtung an die Öffentlichkeit] selbst ist 
aber die metaphysisch bedingte, weil aus der Herrschaft der Subjektivität stammende 
Einrichtung und Ermächtigung der Offenheit des Seienden in die unbedingte 
Vergegenständlichung von allem. Darum gerät die Sprache in den Dienst des 
Vermittelns der Verkehrswege, auf denen sich die Vergegenständlichung als die 
gleichförmige Zugnglichkeit von Allem für Alle unter Missachtung jeder Grenze
ausbreitet. So kommt die Sprache unter die Diktatur der Öffentlichkeit. (317) 
Heidegger’s repeated reference to the “dictatorship of the public” restages his notion of 
das Man, in the truncated version of Being and Time rather than the more comprehensive 
version of the Prolegomena, but in this place it receives yet another twist.  As one of the 
prime examples of Heidegger’s rhetorical finesse, he delivers a peculiar intertwining of 
what is normally considered direct opposites within the political arena of language use.  
If we are to believe Heidegger, the new dictatorship comes in the guise of diplomacy
(Vermittlung; lit. mediation).  Diplomacy, in turn, is linked to democracy, intimated by 
the phrase “equal access to everything for everybody” (gleichförmige Zugänglichkeit von 
Allem für Alle).  Such communicative infrastructure (Verkehrswege) is denigrated as the 
road to objectification (Vergegenständlichung), which “disrespects all boundaries” 
(Missachtung jeder Grenze).  
Concrete communication among different life-worlds, then, especially if it serves 
democratic ends and political diplomacy, is no longer welcomed as a medium of 
Ansprechen (“talking-to”) but criticized as an obstacle to the clearing-concealing Ankunft
(advent) of Being itself.  “Language is the house of being” (Die Sprache ist das Haus des 
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Seins [313]), but the culture-nation (Kulturnation) of Germany, the self-declared land of 
“poets and thinkers” ought to guard its own, which is not for everyone to share: “Die 
Denkenden und Dichtenden sind die Wächter dieser Behausung” (ibid.).23
In Heidegger’s text, this message of cultural nationalism is rhetorically attenuated 
by a series of calculated ambiguities that ensure that his plea for guarding and fostering a 
German essence does not assume an air that is (too) pompous or even imperialist.  Given 
the dire circumstances of his audience, Heidegger aims for a “style” of dignity, modesty, 
and austerity.  During the “rubble years” of the immediate postwar period 
(Trümmerjahre),24 dignity is Heidegger’s rhetorical alternative to guilt or shame, in the 
first round of the discussion over “coping with the past.”  The right dose of “quiet 
arrogance” or “proper silence” (cf. above), we might say, is his recipe for keeping his 
style of austere dignity from sliding into an idiom of pride, humiliation, or depression.  
Walking such a thin line, stylistically, Heidegger surrounds the Würde motif with an 
array of calculated ambiguities, setting off a dialectic according to which certain qualities 
or traits keep collapsing into their opposites: 
Der Mensch ist nicht der Herr des Seinenden. Der Mensch ist der Hirt des Seins. In 
diesem “weniger” büsst der Mensch nichts ein, sondern er gewinnt, indem er in die 
Wahrheit des Seins gelangt. Er gewinnt die wesenhafte Armut des Hirten, dessen 
Würde darin beruht, vom Sein selbst in die Wahrnis seiner Wahrheit gerufen zu sein. 
Dieser Ruf kommt als der Wurf, dem die Geworfenheit des Daseins entstammt. Der 
Mensch ist in seinem seinsgeschichtlichen Wesen das Seiende, dessen Sein als Ek-
sistenz darin besteht, dass er in der Nähe des Seins wohnt. Der Mensch ist der 
Nachbar des Seins. (342) 
Within a few sentences, Heidegger establishes a network of surprising connections, 
swiftly combining what would appear to be mutually exclusive.  To begin with, dignity is 
linked to poverty.  Whether one finds some religious overtones in this or not (poverty as a 
Christian virtue), this relation is not dichotomic.  Poverty may make it hard to maintain 
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dignity, or, if wealth increases the chances of (moral) corruption, the opposite may be the 
case.  At any rate, these two attributes are generally compatible.  
The actual twist occurs, when Heidegger turns poverty into gain, in the image of 
the shepherd25 who becomes dignified through the calling of Being.  Material poverty is 
compensated through spiritual wealth, yielding a state of dignity, as man “dwells in the 
nearness of Being” (in der Nähe des Seins wohnt).  Here it is worth noticing that, in the 
real-life poverty of 1946, the theme of dwelling takes on a very tangible meaning.  Since 
accommodations were sparse and shelter was not a matter of course in several parts of 
Germany at the time,26 the concept of neighbor (Nachbar) gained new importance and, 
under favorable circumstances, a new ring of local solidarity.
Analogously to the dialectic between poverty and wealth, Heidegger blurs the 
distinction activity and passivity, which gets condensed into his befuddling phrase of an 
“achievement [of] letting” (313).  Humans achieve letting themselves be claimed by 
Being, and they do so in, or through, thinking.  Thinking is thus presented as a unique 
kind of action (Aktion, Handlung), the efficacy of which defies the usual distinction 
between active and passive mode: 
Das Denken wird nicht erst dadurch zur Aktion, dass von ihm eine Wirkung 
ausgeht oder dass es angewendet wird, Das Denken handelt, indem es denkt. 
Dieses Handeln ist vermutlich das einfachste und zugleich das höchste, weil es 
den Bezug des Seins zum Menschen angeht. Alles Wirken aber beruht im Sein 
und geht auf das Seiende aus. Das Denken dagegen lässt sich vom Sein in den 
Anspruch nehmen, um die Wahrheit des Seins zu sagen. Das Denken vollbringt 
dieses Lassen. (313) [emphases added]
Embedded in this passage, we find yet another merger of opposites in Heidegger’s 
characterization of “the act of thinking” as both “the most plain and at the same time the 
most refined” (das einfachste und zugleich das höchste; lit. “the simplest and at the same 
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time the highest”).27  Perhaps most pertinent to the immediate postwar situation in the 
aftermath of political catastrophe, Heidegger appears to turn tragedy into triumph, failure 
(Scheitern) into success – even a “gift” (Geschenk).  The importance of this equivocation, 
in particular, is indicated by the fact that Heidegger resorts to more violent and more 
dramatic language than in the other instances of dialectical dichotomies, listed thus far.  
Still speaking as if only about the “act” of thinking as opposed to mere “philosophizing,” 
Heidegger adds a tone of sarcasm (according to my reading of the first sentence) and 
declares: 
Solange die Philosophie jedoch sich nur damit beschäftigt, ständig die 
Möglichkeit zu verbauen, sich erst auf die Sache des Denkens, nämlich die 
Wahrheit des Seins, einzulassen, steht sie gesichert ausserhalb der Gefahr, jemals 
an der Härte ihrer Sache zu zerbrechen. Darum ist das “Philosophieren” über das 
Scheitern  durch eine Kluft getrennt von einem scheiternden Denken. Wenn 
dieses einem Menschen glücken dürfte, geschähe kein Unglück. Ihm würde das 
einzige Geschenk, das dem Denken aus dem Sein zukommen könnte. (343) 
To be sure, not all of the above, calculated ambiguities are equally mysterious.  
Illustrated through my own interpretation of Heidegger’s poverty-wealth relation, in 
terms of material poverty and spiritual wealth, e.g., some of these dialectical dichotomies 
do not seem necessarily paradoxical.  Whenever the terms of the relation under 
consideration allow for a further distinction, the initial tension appears resolvable.  What 
renders the Letter on Humanism one of Heidegger’s most conflicted writings, however, is 
the fact that the most central ambiguity he engages does not allow for any such solution –
the relation between the human and the inhuman.  
As I intimated at the beginning of this chapter, what makes the Letter such a 
provocative piece is Heidegger’s way of turning humanity against itself, or more 
precisely, of turning humanity against humans.  In this case, no variation or subdivision 
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on either side of the relation is available.  To be clear, we must not hastily assume that 
being human is a monolithic quality, some thoroughly homogeneous property, for if we 
did, Heidegger would rightly point out that we were making a metaphysical commitment 
that he does not motivate in his text.  This much we can grant Heidegger, irrespective of 
the more general question as to whether he manages to deliver a notion of humanism that 
is no longer metaphysical at all, which he puts forth as his declared goal in several 
passages of the Humanismusbrief.  The need for “overcoming humanistic metaphysics,” 
is stated most directly as follows: 
Jeder Humanismus gründet entweder in einer Metaphysik oder er macht sich 
selbst zum Grund einer solchen. Jede Bestimmung des Wesens des Menschen, die 
schon die Auslegung des Seienden ohne die Frage der Wahrheit des Seins 
voraussetzt, sei es mit Wissen, sei es ohne Wissen, ist metaphysisch. Darum zeigt 
sich, und zwar im Hinblick auf die Art, wie das Wesen des Menschen bestimmt 
wird, das Eigentümliche aller Metaphysik darin, dass sie “humanistisch” ist. 
Demgemäss bleibt jeder Humanismus metaphysisch. (321). 
This argument appears strikingly circular.  Heidegger begins with the claim that “any 
Humanism is either grounded in a metaphysics, or makes itself into the ground of some 
[kind of metaphysics or other]” (gründet entweder in einer Metaphysik oder macht sich 
selbst zum Grund einer solchen).  In the middle of the argument, he relies on a non 
sequitur, when he infers from the (purported) fact that, what is peculiar about all 
metaphysics is its being “humanistic” (das Eigentümliche aller Metaphysik [zeigt sich] 
darin, dass sie “humanistisch” ist), the inverse claim that any humanism is metaphysical.  
Logically this does not follow.  Even if it were true that all metaphysics is “humanistic,” 
it is still possible that one or several kinds of humanism are not metaphysical; unless, of 
course, we already assume the latter, as Heidegger seems to do with his first sentence in 
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the above quote.  In this case, however, the argument simply turns back to its initial claim 
and thus proves circular. 
Notice, however, that this does not immediately disprove Heidegger’s overall 
agenda.  So far, Heidegger has failed to show how we can “overcome humanistic 
metaphysics” or “metaphysical humanism.”  Yet, in itself, this does not address his other 
central claim that his alternative notion of humanism (metaphysical or not) is not 
inhuman.  Unless, we presuppose that any metaphysical humanism, by virtue of being 
metaphysical, inevitably turns into its opposite, the problems pertaining to the relation 
between the human and the inhuman, in Heidegger’s account, are not predetermined by 
his failure to show that all forms of traditional humanism are metaphysical.  In other 
words, the concern that Heidegger’s alternative form of humanism – if we still want keep 
this term, in the first place28 – is inhuman, is not dealt with merely in light of the fact that 
Heidegger has not delivered a consistent argument for “overcoming metaphysical 
humanism” thus far.  This is so because there is no direct link between metaphysical and 
inhuman.  These intricacies are not thoroughly examined by recent commentary on the 
Humanismusbrief,29 although the complications do not stop here. 
In fact, at his point we have to pause once more, because things get even more 
involved.  While Heidegger’s argument about old versus new understandings of 
humanism does not claim, much less establish, that there is a necessary connecting 
between being-metaphysical and being-inhuman, he does imply that there might be a 
scale of different degrees of humanity or being human.  Differently put, Heidegger 
implies that some forms of humanism are less human than others, insofar as they are “less 
essentially human” than others: 
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Es [das Wort “Humanismus”] hat ihn [seinen Sinn] verloren durch die Einsicht, 
dass das Wesen des Humanismus metaphysisch ist und das heisst jetzt, dass die 
Metaphysik die Frage nach der Wahrheit des Seins nicht nur nicht stellt, sondern 
verbaut, insofern die Metaphysik in der Seinsvergessenheit verharrt. Allein eben 
das Denken, das zu dieser Einsicht in das fragwürdige Wesen des Humanismus 
führt, hat uns zugleich dahin gebracht, das Wesen des Menschen anfänglicher zu 
denken. Im Hinblick auf diese wesentlichere Humanitas des homo humanus 
ergibt sich die Möglichkeit, dem Wort Humanismus einen geschichtlichen Sinn 
zurückzugeben, der älter ist als sein historisch gerechnet ältester. (345) [emphases 
added]
Here Heidegger speaks of a “more esssential humanitas” (wesentlichere Humanitas), 
which would pull traditional metaphysical humanism out of its forgetfulness of Being.  In 
this passage, then, metaphysics is associated with forgetting about Being, which entails a 
lesser, namely “less essential,” meaning of humanity or being-human.  Hence, it is with 
this hint at different degrees of humanity in mind that we have to turn to those statements 
on Heidegger’s part, through which he defends himself against the anticipated charge that 
his critique of traditional, metaphysical humanism amounts to a wholesale rejection of 
humanism.  If this were the case, the accusation holds, then Heidegger’s purportedly 
post-metaphysical humanism would be no humanism at all.  Instead he would be making 
a case for something inhuman, which merely usurps the name of a humanist cause.  
At this point the textual situation in Heidegger’s Letter becomes increasingly 
demonic.  Against the backdrop of his already disquieting suggestion that there may be 
different degrees of human-ness, Heidegger takes it one step further when he, 
paradoxically, subordinates humans to humanity – a “more essential humanitas,” as 
intimated by the last quotation.  At first, we might have feared that Heidegger’s 
distinction of degree would be just a philosophical cover up for some inhuman elitism, 
which ranks certain kinds of humans above others, regardless whether such ranking is 
based on some racist “biology” (which Heidegger openly rejects) or whether such 
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differences in essence are spelled out in a “historical sense” (345).  Heidegger 
distinguishes “Geschichte” from a mere “historical calendar” or linear ordering of events 
(historisch gerechnte).  Still, the meaning of “historical”, in the context of different 
degrees of humanity, remains opaque.  
At the same time, it does tend to support, however vaguely, Heidegger’s implicit 
conception of cultural nationalism.  While the standard for “ranking” is still as obscure as 
it is disturbing, the reference to different historical essences (Wesen) within humanity, 
clearly enforces the isolationist, or exclusionist, aspect of Kulturnation.  Heidegger does 
not use this term, but it is apparent that some such conception informs his account of how 
a post-metaphysical humanism is supposed to be more “original” (anfänglicher [345]) 
and, again, more “historical.”  This sort of a “more” human historicality retains a 
linguistic dimension, captured in the image of the shepherd who is dignified by, and 
dependent upon, the language-coded calling (Ruf) of Being.  To repeat, “the ‘German’ is 
not spoken to the world […], but it is spoken to the Germans, […]” (338).  Language is a 
destiny, and it is not shared by all humans alike.  According to this double-gesture at 
linguistic exclusionism as well as linguistic imperialism, different language communities 
have different world-historical missions.30
Communicative Spatiality and the Grave of Poetry
Heidegger realizes from the first that language and rhetoric are the keys to 
understanding the human condition.  In making his case for a postmetaphysical, “more 
essential,” and “more historical” humanism, Heidegger is aware of the immediate danger 
of falling into a rhetoric of the inhuman.  As noted earlier, the special difficulty in this 
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context springs from the fact that the human-inhuman relation does not easily lend itself 
to the dialectical twist we saw Heidegger exploit in his treatment of the relations of 
wealth and poverty, activity and passivity, even success and failure.  Each of these 
conceptual couplets offered sufficient leeway to make a more or less plausible case as to 
how one could be poor in one regard, but rich in another, etc.  Yet for humanity and its 
opposite no such dialectic is readily available, which would seem to drastically restrict 
the quest for “alternatives.”  And Heidegger quickly lays his finger on this issue: 
Soll aber der Mensch noch einmal in die Nähe des Seins finden, dann muss er 
zuvor lernen im Namenlosen zu existieren. Er muss in gleicher Weise sowohl die 
Verführung durch die Öffentlichkeit als auch die Ohnmacht des Privaten
erkennen. Der Mensch muss, bevor er spricht, erst vom Sein sich wieder 
ansprechen lassen auf die Gefahr, dass er unter diesem Anspruch wenig oder 
selten etwas zu sagen hat.  [...] 
Liegt nun aber nicht in diesem Anspruch an den Menschen, liegt nicht in 
dem Versuch, den Menschen für diesen Anspruch bereit zu machen, eine 
Bemühung um den Menschen? […] So bleibt die Humanitas das Anliegen eines 
solchen Denkens; denn das ist Humanismus: Sinnen und Sorgen, dass der Mensch 
menschlich sei und nicht un-menschlich, “inhuman,” das heisst ausserhalb seines 
Wesens. Doch worin besteht die Menschlichkeit des Menschen? Sie ruht in 
seinem Wesen. (319) [all emphases added] 
This passage, I argue, is absolutely crucial for unlocking the rhetorical structure of 
Heidegger’s Letter on Humanism, although, taken by itself, it is only half of the story.  
More precisely, the first part of it provides an unmistakable indication of Heidegger’s 
occluded dialogue with the Young Hegelians and their “other mentor” (besides Hegel as 
inspiration and target), Schelling.  
Here we find one of the few clear indications in the Letter about the actual task 
that a new kind of humanism has to meet, irrespective of whether we label it 
“metaphysical” or “postmetaphysical.”  The task is to determine a mode of human 
communication that can give meaning to people’s lives, beyond the dichotomic confines 
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of private and public “existence.”  The main challenge for a Young-Hegelian kind of 
Existenzphilosophie (in contradistinction to a Sartrean e xistentialism) is to determine and 
explore a communicative spatiality, as Heidegger intimates at the very beginning of the 
Humanismusbrief, in terms of his famous key phrase of “language as the house of being” 
(313).   
In the second part of the above quotation, Heidegger specifies this spatiality, 
when he equates “in-human” with “out-of-human-essence” (or external to human 
essence).  Bracketing, for the moment, the question what exactly that means, we may 
note that inhumanity is associated with exteriority.  Correlatively, one would assume, 
humanity is bound to interiority.  In other words, on this general level of communicative 
spatiality we find that at the heart of Heidegger’s call for a new humanism lies a call for 
immanence.  Any attempt at being “more human” thus implies trying to be “more 
immanent” or more sensitive to immanence.  Here we already catch a glimpse at the 
connection to Schelling’s critical Christological thought.  But soon Heidegger’s 
orientation will take a different turn, as he redirects the Young-Hegelian route to 
immanence in a way that will distort, and suspend, the critical-Christological stakes of 
the debate over a new humanist paradigm of communication – a clear gesture at his “theft 
of faith.” 
The distortive transition from Heidegger’s Young-Hegelian roots to some 
demonic corruption thereof is effected by his equivocal interchange of Ansprechen
(talking-to) and Anspruch (demand).  As I mentioned earlier, the human-inhuman relation 
is rather “cumbersome” for the rhetorical technique, which Heidegger deploys throughout 
the Letter, when he blends conceptual opposites into a dialectical swirl.  (To the aforesaid 
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“swirls” of poor-wealthy, active-passive, successful-failing, we might add simple-
mysterious31 and progressive-stagnant.32)  The terms “human” and “inhuman” are so 
morally loaded that they do not blend well.  This is not a trivial thing to say, after it was 
shown that there are other, less “intense” oppositions which can be blended quite 
effectively. 
Faced with this rhetorical obstacle, the Ansprechen-Anspruch relation, I argue, is 
Heidegger’s most effective detour device for still blending the human and the inhuman, 
after all.  The surface tension of the humanism debate is thus neutralized by transposing a 
moral polarity onto a plane of communication.  As we shall see, the moral conflict has by 
no means disappeared, but it is now sufficiently withdrawn from the surface of the text to 
be manipulated or “swirled.”  
To this end, Heidegger takes full advantage of the “obvious” etymological and 
semantic proximity, if not identity, between Ansprechen and Anspruch.  To be clear, I do 
not think that any reader (native speaker or not) will be duped into assuming complete 
congruence in meaning among these terms.  Instead, what is important for Heidegger’s 
detour device to work is that, on the face of it, the two expressions are “close enough” to 
be set in motion with on another, so to speak.  In other words, rhetorical success does not 
depend on actual congruence but on tentative compatibility.  
In fact, upon close inspection, it does not seem all that far-fetched to claim a 
communicative link between Ansprechen and Anspruch, because demanding appears to 
be a subtype of talking-to.  If that were to be the case, one could aptly describe the 
relation between these two communicative modes as one of subsumption or special 
instantiation.  Demanding can be subsumed, as special instance, under the broader notion 
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of talking-to.  However, this interpretation is not tenable, although Heidegger’s entire 
case for a different understanding of humanism as a more essential humanitas rests on it.  
The entanglement of Ansprechen and Anspruch is the spurious backbone of Heidegger’s 
moral argument which, of course, he would not call moral but a matter of care. 
The spuriousness of Heidegger’s communicative detour can be brought out as 
follows.  The expression Ansprechen still belongs to the conception of material 
communication, which we located and explored in some detail in Heidegger’s 
Prolegomena.  The decisive quality of this mode of human existence or Dasein, in terms 
of communicative space, is the aspect of inherent reciprocity, previously discussed as the 
mutual trace left by “in-forming” (Mitteilung).  (If a “face” from another life-world 
breaks into my experiential domain and starts talking-to me, it will leave an imprint on 
me just as it will receive a mark from me.) 
The term Anspruch, by contrast, belongs to a new vocabulary, which bespeaks a 
new paradigm of communication space.  Its primary spatial aspect is one-directionality.  
A demand can be said to expect compliance but as an act of communication it does not 
open itself up to feedback effects of meaning.  In this sense a demand, or command, is 
not material in the same way talking-to is.  The “location” from which the command is 
issued is not concrete, which means, it is not localizable on a particular plane of 
immanence.  The communicative spatiality of Anspruch, in Heidegger’s sense, is 
absolute exteriority, a transcendent, not an “immanent transcendent.”  Thus understood 
the source from which the command emanates can be viewed as a void, a no-place, or 
“nothing” (Nichts), from which a command raises its “faceless voice.”  
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Heidegger’s own phrasing in the last quotation is telling, when he speaks of 
“existence in the nameless” (im Namenlosen zu existieren), for it is not only the (German) 
individuals that are assigned a nameless mode in their (pseudo-) communication with 
Being.  Their lack of name is but the mirror image of the anonymous authority of Being 
itself.  In this context, speaking of “names” does not refer to personal proper names.  
Instead, within concrete communication, a name is an index of unique immanence, the 
designator of one’s own or an other’s possible world, which may not be interpreted yet, 
but which is already concrete.  When a possible world breaks into another, mutual in-
forming (Mitteilung) takes place, leaving a trace on both sides of the communicative 
encounter.  
Stated in the language of our previous example in section two, the reciprocity of 
naming implies that the crosses on our doors are actually impacted by our reaction to 
them.  Stuck on our communal surface, they do not command anonymously, as if from 
out of nowhere.  Surely, we could not just fancy them into existence, but the meaning of 
their presence on our plane of immanence is determined, not exhausted, by our reaction 
to them.  Conversely, it is only in the course of our response that “we” emerge as 
solidaric, paranoid, or maybe indifferent subjects.  At any rate, the crosses leave their 
mark, but they can only do so through material mediation.  
Concrete expressions are concrete only insofar as they enter a possible world, in 
which they can be recognized an interpreted.  Heidegger’s Being never enters into any 
world, but only commands them from an insurpassable distance.  As its “guardians” we 
may “dwell” in its nearness (Nähe), but humans are never on the same plane with Being.  
The shepherds become sheep and flock around an empty space, a tombstone with no 
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name on it.  They “exist in the nameless,” because Being is not a concrete reference 
point, from which they could take their bearing and localize themselves as “more 
historical” individuals or otherwise. 
My cemetery image of a tombstone with no name is deliberate, and it should not 
be mistaken for some gothic hint at Heidegger’s nihilism.  In my reading, Heidegger is 
not a nihilist, but a cultural nationalist.  Accordingly, when I spoke of Heidegger’s 
conception of Anspruch as creating a communicative void or “nothing,” this analysis 
must be reinserted into Heidegger’s agenda of German essentialism.  Heidegger’s entire 
rhetorical edifice is suspended between these two poles of the anonymous authority of 
Being and the cultural mission of “the German.”  In recognizing this, we have to 
immediately qualify the metaphor of a nameless tomb.  
More accurately, then, we should say that Heidegger’s philosophical rhetoric 
twists and turns around a headstone, on which he sometimes writes a name, which he will 
erase and re-inscribe perpetually.  The name on the headstone is, of course, Hölderlin (on 
“lesser” occasions replaced with Rilke, Trakl, and George).  Hölderlin is Heidegger’s 
“door,” which he opens to the Germans but closes shut to any other culture-nation, 
especially the French, of whom he says that “when they begin to think they speak 
German.”33  As the German poet, Hölderlin is Heidegger’s conceptual persona, as 
Deleuze and Guattari would recognize.  That is to say, the body of German poetry, 
exemplified by Hölderlin’s work, is the communal surface, on which the German 
shepherds may gather, the possible world in which they emerge as dignified.  If 
Heidegger did not allow for any such concrete poetic reference point, the preacher of 
Being would indeed be a nihilist.34
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The relevance of the tombstone image, then, for Heidegger’s account of a new 
humanism as a new form of human communication is instructively captured by the 
Girard scholar, Gil Bailie.  In chapter twelve of his book, Violence Unveiled, Bailie 
proffers a section in which he provides an account of “the empty tomb” as an illustration 
of the dynamic structures of symbolic violence.  Openly drawing from the work of René 
Girard, Bailie uses the tomb metaphor to illustrate how any (communication) community 
is both united and threatened by acts of symbolic violence: 
Because culture begins, so to speak, at the grave site, tombs and graves have 
tended to provide existing cultures with an ideal venue for “prodding wrath 
toward its just devotions,” and reviving cultural solidarity. The use of graves for 
deflecting moral responsibility for violence onto others is an explicit concern of 
the New Testament, and this concern sheds light on the structural significance of 
the empty tomb story. 
Tombs function to extinguish precisely that recognition of complicity. By 
decorating the tombs of past victims, those morally troubled by acts of collective 
violence can bemoan the violence and shift responsibility for it to others without 
having either to acknowledge or to renounce their own complicity in the violence. 
The discovery of the empty tomb meant that Jesus’ corpse and its resting 
place could not be made into a shrine and become the locus for a new religious 
cult. (230-231)35
Here I cannot engage Bailie’s complex analysis and its sources in Girard’s theory of 
sacred violence.  Instead, I want to suggest that his account of the symbolic stakes of “the 
empty tomb” can be used to explicate the implications of Heidegger’s double-edged 
rendering of a more essentially human mode of communication, which oscillates between 
the model of Ansprechen and the model of Anspruch.  As noted earlier, the 
communicative spatiality of Ansprechen, or talking-to, is one of open interiority or 
immanence, whereas the communication space entailed by Anspruch , or demand, is one 
of absolute exteriority or transcendence.  The former grounds a reciprocal mode of 
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material communication, the latter grounds a one-directional mode of immaterial and 
anonymous command. 
Translated into the language of Bailie’s gravesite imagery, communication as 
talking-to has the symbolic structure of an “empty tomb,” which resists “be[ing] made 
into a shrine.”  Communication as demand, on the other hand, structurally resembles a 
“occupied tomb” [not Bailie’s term] that is filled with a transcendental substance like the 
dead body of “the German poet, ” which can easily be turned into an object of cult or 
zealous reverence.  In its double role as an unquestionable authority and a cultural 
mission, sometimes the German poet has a name and sometimes he does not, depending 
on its symbolic-structural modulation.  
The latter notion, as I use it here, speaks to the fact that the phrase “the German 
poet” instantiates the three different aspects of any single cultural eidos, of the sort that
the Husserl of the Phenomenological Psychology (1925) was willing to consider in his 
quest for objectivity in historical science.  This speaks to the fact that all cultural eide are 
trinitarian in their symbolic structure, in that they allow for, but are also confined to, 
three basic possibilities of shifting emphasis symbolically. 
According to the first modulation, or accent (to borrow Vossler’s [1904] term), 
“the German poet” stands for Being, an anonymous authority, a mere “The” that is not 
even specifiable as anything like the “the poet,” “the king,” or “the God.”  All of these 
qualifiers are already too restrictive.  This paradoxical enunciation of a definite article 
without a noun to be determined by it, is Heidegger’s Being or Being as such, which 
lacks any meaning.  It is a grammatical promise that is not kept.  Due to syntactical habit, 
a definite article incites a certain expectation level of concretization, which is not met in 
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this case.  Being as the “The …” is a rhetorical gesture of infinite postponement, which 
never even specifies what is being postponed.  It is a grammatical hoax, the empty shell 
of the “gift” of language, the clearing-concealing advent (lichtend-bergende Ankunft) that 
never comes.  
What is crucial to notice about the cultural eidos of the “The…” is that it has no 
name (be it Hölderlin or any other) but still has a dynamic symbolic structure, thus 
exercising symbolic power.  A vacuous gesture is still a gesture; it has a trajectory if not a 
specific content.  In fact, Heidegger’s rhetorical celebration of such vacuous gesture may 
well be seen as one of his most idiosyncratic cooptions of critical Christology in the form 
examined in chapter one of this study.  Upon scrutiny, the “The…” is no different from 
Schelling’s tranquil continuum, it is absolute homogeneity.  The main difference is that 
Schelling never encouraged anyone to revere this continuum as such or to feel dignified 
by it.  In this regard, he would reject Heidegger’s talk about “dwelling” in the “nearness” 
to Being.  Since the tranquil continuum is pre-spatial (prior to regional “inflammation” 
through the sting of the first potency), it does not make sense to speak of nearness in 
relation to absolute continuity.  Hence, Heidegger’s notion of Nähe proves to be a 
rhetorically stylized Daseinsadverb void of any meaning.  Similar to the symbolic 
structure of the “The…,” any reference to Nähe, in Heidegger’s sense, amounts to saying 
“Close to …” – the “accent” is the same in both cases, and so is the false promise.  
As for the second modulation, “the German poet” designates a type of cultural 
eidos that has the structure of cultural essentialism or nationalism, positing a cultural 
essence.  Such positing calls for a proper name to be written on the headstone not of an 
individual person but of a self-declared Kulturnation.  To this end, Hölderlin is buried 
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and his “occupied grave” is turned into a linguistic-religious shrine, marking the destiny 
and destination of the kind of poetic pilgrimage that Heidegger encouraged in the 
Spiegel-interview.36  Hölderlin can be interpreted only by the Germans, but never be 
translated into other languages.37  The horizon of the nation’s linguistic life-world is 
closed.  Translation is a sacrilege. 
Considering the third modulation, finally, the symobolic structure of the cultural 
eidos of “the German poet” engenders the form of concrete communication that Paul 
explicated in his Prinzipien der Sprachgeschichte.  Hölderlin has left his grave and is no 
longer in the sole possession of his Graeco-German “guardians” (Wächter).38  Yet, he can 
be resurrected from his cultural tomb and German enclosure only by becoming a concrete 
expression, or rather many expressions, the meaning of each of which will transform any 
time it breaks into a new life-world.  To come to life again and again, Hölderlin has to 
multiply, just as Schelling’s unpreconceivable God has to be prismatized into different 
modes of spiritual activity for creation to be possible.  The Poethead, if you will, has just 
as infinitely many faces as the Godhead in Schelling’s Philosophy of Revelation, because 
revelation is inherently pluralistic, in the medium of poetry or any other “symbolic form” 
(Cassirer).  
Approaching the Letter on Humanism from the perspective of eidetic modulation, 
we find all three “accents” represented in this text.  The first accentuation is noticeable in 
all those passages where Heidegger emphasizes the importance and dignity of Being or 
Humanitas over the dignity of human beings: 
Das auch heute erst noch zu Sagende könnte vielleicht ein Anstoss werden, das 
Wesen des Menschen dahin zu geleiten, dass es denkend auf die es durchwaltende 
Dimension der Wahrheit des Seins achtet. Doch auch dies könnte jeweils nur dem 
Sein zur Würde und dem Da-sein zugunsten geschehen, das der Mensch eksistierend 
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aussteht, nicht aber des Menschen wegen, damit sich durch sein Schaffen Zivilisation 
und Kultur geltend machen. (329).
Human existence is subordinated to the “dignity of Being” (dem Sein zur Würde).  
Against the background of our previous considerations about the pervasive religious 
import of Christology into the Letter, we can explicate the above statement as a prayer’s 
guide.  In keeping with my preceding comment on the first accent, out of three modular 
possibilities, we can translate Heidegger’s idiom into Schelling’s language and say that 
Heidegger’s present remarks encourage the reader to pray to the tranquil continuum.  He 
wants us to solemly say “The…” or “Close to…” and feel dignified.  Schelling would be 
appalled and Milan Kundera would charge us of shedding “the second tear that makes 
kitsch kitsch,”39 because praying to the continuum can only mean one of two things.  
Either we do not know what we are doing or we are praying to ourselves.  More 
precisely, we are praying to our prayers, worshipping our own worship.  Basking in the 
nearness of Being is idolatry, since our payers are pointing back at us. 
This form of idolatrous prayer, or “thinking” qua meditation over Being, must not 
be taken in a directly personal sense.  Accordingly, the implied notion of self-worship 
does not point to an individual human self, or aggregate of selves, given to philosophical 
narcissism or the megalomania of hubris.  After all, Heidegger goes to great length to 
debunk any metaphysics that is based on, or promotes a false emphasis on the human 
(epistemic and/or psychological) self or human subjectivity writ large.  To repeat, in the 
passage at hand, Heidegger places the dignity of Being above the dignity of human 
beings.  Yet, he does so in such a way that, whenever human worship or “thinking” 
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attempts to relate to Being, these efforts are deflected, and the ensuing production of 
religious meanings infuses human dignity with an aspect of idolatry or Götzendienst.  
Uttered into the non-spatiality (or pre-spatiality) of the tranquil continuum, our 
prayers are distorted because claiming “nearness” to the non-spatial is a meaningless –
but not powerless – religious gesture.  “We” neither identify (approximate) nor distance 
ourselves from the divinity of Being, and yet we claim some kind of meaningful relation 
to it, in the name of “dignity.”  Humanity is dignified not in itself but only in its “care” 
for the dignity of Being.  We are guarding not an empty place but a no-place, a void of 
meaning.  According to this dialectic between the spatial and the non-spatial, the 
discursive power of thinking’s “achievement of letting” (313) begins to self-corrupt, thus 
instantiating the creatively destructive workings of the demonic as formschaffende 
Formwidrigkeit (Tillich).  The discourse of dwelling and nearness, in Heidegger’s present 
rendering, becomes a site for demonic prayer.  
In this sense, we can fully embrace the Heideggerian de-emphasis of human 
subjectivity and still charge that Heidegger, at central junctures in the Letter on 
Humanism, engages a new religious idiom that speaks in an idolatrous voice.  The 
discursivity of dwelling initiates a mode of religious meaning production that transposes 
the conceptual persona (Deleuze and Guattari) of the guardian into new subject positions 
for new achievements-of-letting.  The new guardians do not just guard themselves, nor 
can they guard Being in any direct sense.  Instead, in the paradoxical sphere of 
“nearness” toward what is beyond space, both closest and farthest, they guard their
guarding of Being and become idolaters.
312
The second modular mode is implied by Heidegger’s claim, quoted before, that 
“the ‘German’ is not spoken to the world […], but [that] it is spoken to the Germans 
[…]” (338).  Put in terms of our analysis of the symbolic role of Hölderlin in Heidegger’s 
text, the accent has shifted to “the German poet.”  Thus oriented the poetic or linguistic 
eidos at hand, is prone to produce meanings of cultural nationalism. 
The third modulation, in turn, echoes through those passage where Heidegger 
speaks in a Schellingean voice and describes the most human, that is, most “essential” 
mode of Dasein as “ekstatic in-standing” (ekstatisches Innestehen), which I interpret to 
be very similar to Schelling’s notion of “the transcendent within the immanent,” which 
Deleuze and Guattari presented as (Spinoza’s) main contribution underway to the 
“modern moment” in philosophy.  In the Letter, we find a rendition of the same 
contribution: 
[D]er Mensch west so, dass er das “Da,” das heisst die Lichtung des Seins, ist. Dieses 
“Sein” des Da, und nur dieses, hat den Grundzug der Ek-sistenz, das heisst des 
ekstatischen Innestehens in der Wahrheit des Seins. Das ekstatische Wesen des 
Menschen beruht in der Ek-sistenz, die von der metaphysisch gedachten existentia 
verschieden bleibt. (325) 
Significantly, the first sentence tends to identify the essence (Wesen) of human being 
with the clearing of Being.  Within this formulation, Heidegger could not drive the same 
wedge between the dignity of humans and the superior dignity of Being, as he did in the 
earlier quotation, which I discussed in terms of idolatrous prayer and demonic spatiality: 
“Doch auch dies könnte jeweils nur dem Sein zur Würde und dem Da-sein zugunsten 
geschehen, das der Mensch existierend austeht, nicht aber des Menschen wegen, damit 
sich durch sein Schaffen Zivilisation und Kulture geltend machen” (329).  Instead, if the 
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essence of man is inseparable from the clearing of Being, then the “advent” (Ankunft) of 
Being can take place only on a plane of immanence.
To meet with the Poethead of Hölderlin, therefore, we have to encounter a 
concrete face that talks-to us in a mutual encounter of in-forming.  Pretending to “dwell” 
in the “nearness” of Being is the inconsistent attempt to approximate absolute exteriority 
– a pretense of communication, a self-addressed prayer, a demonic instance of idolatry. 
Some Conclusions about A Temporary Remedy to the Demonic: “Vital Anecdotes”
Taking stock of the dialectic between Ansprechen und Anspruch, as well as of the 
dynamic, trinitarian structure of all cultural eide, the text of the Humanismusbrief seems 
to leave us with an uneasy mixture of communicative modes. These, then, are the keys to 
how Heidegger ties a philology to a Christology for his particular aims, and in order to 
manufacture his distinctive corrective for phenomology.  If any eidos of the form “the 
German poet” remains subject to three irreducible possibilities of shifting accentuation, 
we appear to be confined to a position of phenomenological observation.  In this position 
we can but watch how prayers to the tranquil continuum transform into pleas for cultural 
nationalism which, at times, turn into events of concrete communication.  
What is worse, these three vectors of cultural orientation and meaning formation 
do not seem to balance each other on their own.  On the contrary, Heidegger’s 
philosophical rhetoric proves very efficient in promoting the second accent of cultural 
nationalism through its technique of “swirling” conceptual pairs like active-passive, 
success-failure, etc.  Via a detour, this technique even allowed him to gloss over a 
seemingly more robust moral tension, as he managed to project the human-inhuman 
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relation from a plane of ethical discourse onto a more “neutral” plane of communicative 
discourse.  
Arguably, Heidegger did not succeed at palming off the unethical as ethical 
through the direct inversion of purportedly fixed moral standards.  Instead, the rhetorical 
power of his Letter showed itself in the capacity to suspend the ethical (to borrow 
Kierkegaard’s phrase).  Whenever, the first modulation of cultural accent eclipses the 
other two, the readers are encouraged to idolatry by praying to the tranquil continuum 
and, eventually, to themselves.  Similarly, as soon as the second modulation overpowers 
the other two, a grave is filled with transcendental substance, in a promotion of cultural 
essentialism and religious enshrinement (Bailie).  Heidegger’s philosophical rhetoric does 
not directly dictate to do “evil.”  Instead it is prone to lure its audience in a demonic 
realm of meaning formation, where symbolic violence is more likely to turn physical and 
be unleashed with a vengeance.  For those who believe that Hölderlin can and ought to be 
translated into other languages, the question becomes whether there is any, however 
temporary, antidote against demonic rhetoric in Heidegger’s mold.  Is there a symbolic 
means of resistance that would keep us, at least partially, from gravitating toward “the 
occupied tomb”? 
Going against the grain of Heidegger scholarship, which tends to either 
completely demonize or exonerate Heidegger, I suggest that his text provides a possible 
remedy to its own tendencies of symbolic corruption.  A temporary safeguard against the 
kind of idolatry stimulated by Heidegger’s demonic rhetoric, then, is contained in the 
anecdote of Heraclitus, which is imparted toward the end of the Humanismusbrief.  The 
anecdotal structure of this segment stands out, because it proves largely immune to 
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Heidegger’s rhetorical ruses of distortion.  This is remarkable, in that Heidegger is surely 
not delivering this piece in a neutral manner.  On the contrary, he immediately engages in 
spurious etymology, when he prefaces the anecdote with the Heraclitus Fragment 119, 
which consists of only three words: 
  µ.
The standard translation, Heidegger assures us, would renders this short sentence 
“the character peculiar to humans is their own demon” (Seine Eigenart ist dem Menschen 
sein Dämon).  He then interpolates a short story (Geschichte)40 about Heraclitus, as 
related by Aristotle, in De partibus animalium, A 5, 645a 17: 
The story is told of something Heraclitus said to some strangers who wanted to come 
visit him. Having arrived, they saw him warming himself at a stove. Surprised, they 
stood there in consternation – above all because he encouraged them, the astounded 
ones, and called for them to come in, with the words, “For here too the gods are 
present.”41
Heidegger zeros in on the last sentence, in Greek:     
, which 
he brings to bear on the original fragment, now translated as: “The (un-eerie) abode is for 
humans the openness for the nearing essence of god (of the eerie).”42
As his etymological key moves, Heidegger, first, translates 
 as “abode” 
rather than “character,” thereby substituting a spatial term for a tendentially 
psychological or attitudinal term; and, second, he renders the demonic connotations of 
µ parenthetical, thereby effectively approximating, if not conflating, µ and 

, which changes the religious overtones and intensity of the more common 
translation of Fragment 119.  
However, in drawing attention to the Heraclitus anecdote in conjunction with the 
fragment, I am not primarily interested in Heidegger’s etymological extravagance.  As 
the preceding remarks suggest, Heidegger’s (re)translation of the fragment in light of the 
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last sentence of the anecdote is highly unorthodox, at best, and willfully distorting, at 
worst.  What I am interested in is the difference in semiotic resilience, displayed by the 
anecdote in comparison to the three-word fragment.  Despite Heidegger’s etymological 
onslaught, which he levels against both textual items, the anecdote of “Heraclitus by the 
stove” and his discombobulated visitors is less vulnerable to Heidegger’s conceptual 
slides.  
More precisely, it is easier for him to select and highlight a concept like ethos and 
reinterpret it in isolation, in spurious ways.  Yet he cannot dissociate, dissect, and reshape 
an anecdote in the same way.  The reason for this can be seen in the fact that anecdotes 
do not easily fit conceptual grids or hierarchies, nor do they have a clear plot structure 
like narratives, at least if we tie the latter to a requirement of having a more or less 
distinct beginning and end.  Anecdotes resemble open scenes more than they do 
integrated stories.  Certainly, the general notion of story does not necessarily imply any 
such structural closure.  Within the variegated genre of short stories, for example, open-
ended plots may be a fairly frequent phenomenon.  For my purposes, then, I am using the 
expressions “narrative” and “story” in an overtly reductive way, to bring out a general 
contrast between open and closed structures of meaning formation, in the context of 
philosophical rhetorics as powerful as Heidegger’s.
Particularly, the personae that occur within an anecdotal open-ended structure are 
interwoven with the structural texture of the anecdote so that they cannot be directly 
emulated.  In this sense, “Heraclitus by the stove” is not a person but a concrete 
expression in the sense discussed in the second section of this study, namely, with respect 
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to the material mediation of meaning.  “Heraclitus by the stove” is a possible world and 
does not stand for a mental state, a readily identifiable character trait, or a moral quality. 
To be sure, in the context of the Letter on Humanism, and after Heidegger spent 
about forty pages modulating a rhetoric of cultural nationalism, the Heraclitus anecdote 
could easily be read as a mini-parody of the postwar situation of occupied Germany, in 
which the freezing Heraclitus represents the torn Kulturnation of German thinkers, while 
the nosy visitors stand for the ally powers and their ignorant “dictatorship of the public” 
(Diktatur der Öffentlichkeit) (317).  
However, even if such a reading was intended by Heidegger, we see that he had to 
do a lot more preparatory work to achieve this effect and the final result is still less 
baffling than his dizzying generation of conceptual swirls.  “Heraclitus by the stove” 
persists as a concrete site of meaning formation that remains open for the readers to 
construct their own concepts.  In this manner, the scene at the stove could be interpreted 
variously as an event of hospitality, philosophical mockery, or perhaps a certain form of 
cheerful paganism.  Above all, one cannot directly identify with the philosopher or his 
visitors, since neither party has a clear profile in isolation from the material setting that 
binds them. 
Because of these features of semiotic resilience and productivity, I view 
Heidegger’s Heraclitus anecdote as an example of a vital anecdote of the kind described 
by Deleuze and Guattari, in What is Philosophy?: 
And there are existential features: Nietzsche said that philosophy invents modes 
of existence or possibilities of life. That is why a few vital anecdotes are sufficient 
to produce a portrait of philosophy, like the one Diogenes Laertius knew how to 
produce by writing the philosophers’ bedside book or golden legend –
Empedocles and his volcano, Diogenes and his barrel. It will be argued that most 
philosophers’ lives are very bourgeois: but is not Kant’s stocking-suspender a 
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vital anecdote appropriate to the system of Reason? [note 8]43 […] These 
anecdotes do not refer simply to social or even psychological types of philosopher 
(Empedocles the prince, Diogenes the slave) but show rather the conceptual 
personae who inhabit them. Possibilities of life or modes of existence can be
invented only on a plance of immanence that develops the power of conceptual 
personae. (72-73)
The examples listed by the authors, in this passage, are quite comparable to Heidegger’s 
depiction of “Heraclitus by the stove.”  None of these anecdotes has a clear moral story to 
tell, and neither delivers an explicit defense of the human against the inhuman.  Instead, 
they all are concrete expressions of a “face” that looms up in our life-world, a dynamic 
open structure from which we can construct new concepts and thereby go against the 
propensity toward any demonic fixture of meaning. 
Heidegger’s Letter on Humanism thus proves a great example of both the 
demonic and the remedial tendencies that can be gleaned from our semiotic transactions, 
in which we keep encountering concrete expressions of other possible life-worlds.  This 
is a microcosm of the epistemological moves he employs throughout his later writings to 
characterize Being.   The special gain of reading the Humanismusbrief against the 
background of our previous findings in section one and section two, in consequence, is 
that it allows us to identify the ethical stakes that underlie Heidegger’s philosophical 
rhetoric, when he sets out to turn humanity against humanity.  The challenge of this 
largely Young- Hegelian project, in the footsteps of Schelling, consists in finding a new 
paradigm of language as concrete communication, which surpasses the traditional 
distinctions between private and public modes of human speech in order to open up new 
sources for religious meaning production. 
The methodological blueprint for this paradigm, we found, was provided by 
Hermann Paul’s Prinzipien der Sprachgeschichte, which Heidegger engages at crucial 
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junctures in his habilitation (1916) and especially in the Prolegomena lecture course 
(1925), one year before the publication of his magnum opus.  In so doing, Heidegger’s 
theoretical viewpoint remains evasive.  Not only does he blatantly gloss over his debt to 
the Neogrammarian revolution in comparative linguistics and historical psychology.  He 
also keeps wavering between an emphasis on those theoretical elements that he imports 
from Paul, as opposed to those elements that he takes over from one of Paul’s most 
acclaimed critics in the Sprachwissenschafts-controversy of the day, Karl Vossler. 
 By tracking these sources in Heidegger’s early thought and bringing them to bear 
on Heidegger’s politically most aggressive text, the Letter on Humanism, we were able to 
identify a persistent theme complex that remains at the center of his work, namely the 
problem of political idolatry and ineradicable symbolic violence.  From this perspective 
our findings suggest a new reading of Being and Time, focused on the “demonic” 
tendencies (Tillich) in concrete communication and the search for a possible, if only 
temporary remedy. 
More specifically, by using our findings about the material mediation of meaning 
in the course of concrete communication, we can apply our notion of “vital anecdote” 
(exemplified by “Heraclitus at the stove”) back to the troubled relation between Zeug
(equipment or “equipmedley”)44 and Werkzeug (tools), in Heidegger’s breakthrough 
work.  Most commentators tend to reduce the former to the latter and thus confine their 
analysis to Werkzeug primarily.45  In this regard, Heidegger’s famous image of a 
breaking hammer has been all too “instrumental.”  Going against the grain of 
emphasizing the hammer’s tool-character as indicative of our practical, pre-conceptual 
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mode of being-in-the-world in the sense of dealing-with-the-world, I suggest interpreting 
the scenario of a breaking hammer as Heidegger’s truncated version of a “vital anecdote.”  
From this perspective, the breaking hammer stands for an open-ended structure, 
not just a practical rupture.  What is never satisfactorily explained in Heidegger 
scholarship is how the incident of a breaking hammer is different from any other accident
that catches someone off guard.  The disappointing outcome of most analyses in this 
regard is something to the effect that tangible surprise, in the form of practical failure, 
breaks the rhythm of our daily copings and jostles us into considering alternative 
possibilities.46  The breaking hammer thus becomes some kind of willy-nilly inspiration 
to do things differently.  What remains unclear is why this is philosophically important.  
What would be the philosophical cost if hammers did not break from time to time? 
In response to this question, I propose to consider Heidegger’s hammer example 
as part of a material semiotics of Zeug rather than Werkzeug,47 in which the symbolic 
structure of Zeug becomes morally important and not merely epistemologically 
surprising, with respect to its resources for negotiating the demonic tendencies of 
symbolic violence and political idolatry.  In this regard, we may catch a first glimpse at 
the structural analogy between the vital anecdote of “Heraclitus at the stove,” in the 
Humanismusbrief, as well as Heidegger’s exposition of Zeug, in Being and Time, if we 
compare the latter to its “Urfassung” in the Prolegomena.  
Significantly, in this earlier version, Heidegger’s illustrations are more clearly 
stated and more anecdotal, in my technical sense of the term, e.g., when he describes how 
environment-things (Umweltdinge) like a hammer or a stone hatchet (ein Hammer oder 
ein Steinbeil) can become sign-things (Zeichendinge).  Under the rubric of “historical 
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discovery” (historisches Entdecken) and “historical source” (historische Quelle), 
Heidegger characterizes the encounter of a peasant with a stone hatchet in much more 
anecdotal detail than he will talk about the breaking hammer in Being and Time.48  What 
is more, the possible transition from environmental things to sign-things is here presented 
as a subject matter for “a heremeneutics of the historical disciplines” (290), yet another 
anonymous gesture at the work of Droysen, who was already passed over in the opening 
pages of the Prolegomena, where Heidegger discarded the entire nineteenth century as 
historico-methodologically insensitive.49
This connection between the hammer as a sign-thing and as an object of 
hermeneutic inquiry, in the context of the historical science debate, will not be stated in 
Being and Time, where most discursive or discipline-related commentary is bleached out.  
The main difference in terms of symbolic structure between these two featurings of the 
hammer, then, can be put as follows.  In the historico-hermeneutic context, still 
acknowledged in Prolegomena, the hammer (or stone hatchet) is a concrete expression 
that may or may not “intrude” the world of the peasant.  In this case the semiotic 
directionality is one of entering, or breaking in, as we examined in section two in the 
context of meaning transfer between different possible worlds.  
By contrast, in the Werkzeug context, predominant in Being and Time, the 
semiotic directionality is one of exiting, insofar as the hammer, literally, “breaks out” of 
the practical fabric in which it was comfortably submerged before.  To be sure, 
something unexpected stands out, in both cases.  But the Werkzeug scenario puts an one-
sided emphasis on the life-world of the hammer-handling subject.  A rupture occurs in 
one’s life-world but there is no indication of reciprocal, concrete communication.  In the 
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Prolegomena version, on the other hand, Heidegger speaks explicitly of Mitteilung (290), 
in a way that is generally open to an interpretation according to our earlier analysis of in-
forming. 
All of these interfaces of Zeug (especially in the “breaking hammer” example) 
with the historical science debate in the second half of the nineteenth century, with the 
Neogrammarian project of language as concrete communication, and with “vital 
anecdotes” as a Christological antidote against the demonics of political idolatry are 
foregone, if we follow the Dilthey-bypass, along with the neo-Kantian bypass that 
contemporary Heidegger scholars like Kisiel have laid out, in their ontoeroteric fantasy 
about a hyper-radical hermeneutics that Heidegger single-handedly bestowed on us.  In 
opposition to this trend, we ought to put our faith in the theoretical resources of a material 
semiotics that explores Heidegger’s philosophical contributions on a plane of post-
Schellingean thought, where his texts can emerge as both a warning and an inspiration in 
the quest for new religious meaning and an open commitment to “vital anecdotes.” 
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verschlungen hat und nun sich selber anbetet: Götze und Götzenanbeter zugleich.” (27-28)
8
 Paul Tillich, “Das Dämonische: Ein Beitrag zur Sinndeutung der Geschichte,” in: Paul Tillich (GW VI, 
1963), pp. 42-71. 
9
 See, e.g., Picard’s (1946) following remarks, in the context of “the bare aspect of the Nazi phenomenon” 
(Der blosse Aspekt des Naziphänomens): “So sieht das Nazitum aus, so ist es, wenn man es nur anschaut, 
wenn man vergisst, was darüber gesagt und geschrieben worden ist: aus dem Volumen eines ungeheuren 
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Nichts wird etwas herausgebrüllt, Schreie werden ausgestossen, man weiss nicht, ob von den Befehlenden 
oder von den Befohlenen, die wegen der Bedrückung schreien; […] 
So schreit sich nur das Nichts aus, das selbst weiss, das es eigentlich nicht da ist, und das durch 
Geschrei sich selbst und anderen seine Existenz zeigen will. 
Das ist der phänomenologische Aspekt des Nazismus. So sieht weder ein politisches, noch ein 
soziologisches oder ein psychologisches Phänomen aus. Diesen Aspekt hat nur ein dämonisches 
Phänomen” (23-24). 
10
 For the instructive expression of Cassirer’s (1946) view of Heidegger’s philosophical fatalism, see: “The 
new men were convinced that they fulfilled Spengler’s prophecy. They interpreted him in their own sense. 
If our culture – science, philosophy, poetry, and art – is dead, let us make a fresh start. Let us try our vast 
possibilities, let us create a new world and become the rulers of this world. 
The same trend of thought appears in the work of a modern German philosopher who, at first 
sight, seems to have very little in common with Spengler and who developed his theories quite 
independently of him. In 1927 Martin Heidegger published the first volume of his book Sein und Zeit. […] 
He [Heidegger] does not admit that there is something like “eternal” truth, a Platonic “realm of ideas,” or a 
strict logical method of philosophic thought. All this is declared to be elusive. In vain we try to build up a 
logical philosophy; we can only give an Existenzialphilosophie. Such an existential philosophy does not 
claim to give us an objective and universally valid truth. […] In order to express his thought Heidegger had 
to coin a new term. He spoke of the Geworfenheit of man (the being-thrown). […] To be thrown into the 
stream of time is a fundamental and inalterable feature of our human situation. We cannot emerge from this 
stream and we cannot change its course. We have to accept the historical conditions of our existence. We 
can try to understand and to interpret them; but we cannot change them. 
I do not mean to say that these philosophical doctrines had a direct bearing on the development of 
the political ideas in Germany. Most of these ideas arose from quite different sources. They had a very 
“realistic” not a “speculative” purport. But the new philosophy did enfeeble and slowly undermine the 
forces that could have resisted the modern political myths. A philosophy of history that consists in somber 
predictions of the decline and the inevitable destruction of our civilization and a theory that sees in the 
Geworfenheit [sic.] of man one of his principal characters have given up all hopes of an active share in the 
construction and reconstruction of man’s cultural life. Such philosophy renounces its own fundamental and 
ethical ideals. It can be used, then, as a pliable instrument in the hands of the political leaders. 
The return to fatalism in our modern world […] (292-293). 
11
 Contrasting Heidegger und Jaspers with Kierkegaard, Picard (1946) writes: Weil der Mensch von keiner 
Kontinuität gehalten wird, nur deshalb kann es ihm vorkommen, dass er ein ins Nichts Geworfener sei, ein 
vom Nichts ins Nichts Geworfener. Die Philosophie, die den Menschen so sieht, gehört ganz und gar zu 
dem zusammenhanglosen Menschen von heute. Die philosophische Entsprechung einer solchen 
Zusammenhanglosigkeit also kann nichts anderes sein als das “Nichts” (Heidegger) oder das “Scheitern” 
(Jaspers). 
[…] Und in diesem Nichts weist ihn die Existenzialphilosophie darauf hin, dass er jetzt “Angst” 
und “Sorge” habe. […] 
Das Nichts Hitlers und das Nichts der Heideggerschen Existenzialphilosophie entsprechen 
einander ganz und gar. Es ist nicht weit vom Nichts Heideggers zum Nichts Hitlers. 
Die Angst und Sorge hat Heidegger von Kierkegaard hergeholt. Bei Kierkegaard aber ist die 
Angst und Sorge die Folge davon, dass die Kontinuität mit Gott vom Menschen aufgehoben ist. Angst und 
Sorge sind hier das Letzte, das Ende, Zeichen des Todes, es sind dunkle Blumen auf einem Grabe, in dem 
der Zusammenhang des Menschen mit Gott begraben liegt. 
Was bei Kierkegaard Zeichen des Endes der menschlichen Existenz ist, Angst und Sorge, das wird 
in der Existenzphilosophie der Anfang der menschlichen Existenz und wird ein Beweis für sie. Die 
Existenzphilosophie gibt für Leben aus, was bei Kierkegaard Tod bedeutete” (170-173). 
12
 See: Picard (1946), “Das Gesicht Hitlers,” pp. 68-75. 
13
 For these four waves, which are not identified by number, see: Hugo Ott, Martin Heidegger: Unterwegs 
zu seiner Biographie (Frankfurt/New York: Campus, 1988), pp. 7-8. 
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14
 Martin Heidegger, “Only a God Can Save Us,” in: The Heidegger Controversy: A Crtical Reader, ed. R. 
Wolin (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993), pp. 91-116; for the quotation of Heidegger’s (in)famous 
remark, see: pp. 103-104. 
15
 As he had so many of the underpinnings of his work, Heidegger had inherited the humanism debate from 
the pre-WWII writings of Karl Jaspers and Ernst Cassirer. This debate concerned the options for 
negotiating the tension between human individuals and the social mechanisms of crisis-ridden modern 
society. One of the most instructive accounts of this cultural context is given by Pierre Bourdieu, The 
Political Ontology of Martin Heidegger, trans. P. Collier (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 
1991). 
Here it is crucial to notice that this debate was inherently linked to the upheavals in the field of 
historical science, which I addressed in section two of this study, with respect to the Neogrammarians and 
their neo-Idealist detractors. In this sense, the humanism debate was always already a science debate. 
Zeroing in on the plane of the second debate, it becomes clear that the controversies over scientific 
methodology during the second half of the nineteenth century, which threatened to disintegrate the 
disciplinary landscape of the academic organization of culture (including, above all, the German university 
system), are part and parcel of the “modern crisis” in human self-understanding, which Heidegger 
encounters at the beginning of his philosophical career. The classical reference in this regard is Fritz 
Ringer, The Decline of the German Mandarines: The German Academic Community, 1890-1933
(Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard University Press, 1969). Cf. also Herbert Schnädelbach, Philosophy in 
Germany 1831-1933, trans. E. Matthews (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).
The third plane of discourse laid out by the Humanismusbrief, the debate about the role of 
literature in the reclaiming of cultural territory after the Nazi abuse, gained momentum after Alfred 
Andersch had delivered his famous essay Deutsche Literatur in der Entscheidung (1947) (German 
literature at the point of decision). This essay was intended as a statement by a publicist (not a literary 
scholar or critic, as Andersch himself hastens to point out) on the challenges and possible pitfalls of 
Germany’s cultural reconstruction during the immediate postwar years. After deserting the German forces 
in Italy in 1944, Anders had been a prisoner of war and went through a series of US internation camps, 
most notably Fort Getty, where he underwent “re-education in a test-tube” (Umerziehung in der Retorte), 
before he was sent back to Europe and released in Darmstadt near the end of 1945. The particular 
importance of Andersch’s aforementioned public(ist) intervention pertains to his affiliation with the so-
called Group 47. Comprising a motley crew of literary and culture critics, whose visibility, under the 
auspices of Hans Werner Richter, dominated the intellectual postwar scene throughout the 1950s. 
Finally, associated with the writings of Siegfried Kracauer, Max Kommerell, Walter Benjamin, 
and Bertold Brecht, the debate about critical aesthetics is geared toward questions concerning new 
paradigms of artistic expressions. The latter include, e.g., film, so-called epic theater, and “puppet shows 
for adults” (Kasperle-Spiele für grosse Leute).” (Note that the first edition of Max Kommerell’s book by 
the same title appeared posthumously in 1948, thus roughly coinciding with the publication of Heidegger’s 
Letter on Humanism. The focus of inquiry in this debate is the political import of such aesthetic paradigms, 
each of which hoped in its own way to provide novel patterns of orientation and political perception or 
peceptivity for their respective audience. 
16
 In the context of “thinking,” then, these different courses of (mental) action are spelled out as follows: 
“Alles liegt einzig daran, dass die Wahrheit des Seins zur Sprache komme und dass das Denken in diese 
Sprache gelange. Vielleicht verlangt dann die Sprache weit weniger das überstürzte Aussprechen als 
vielmehr das rechte Schweigen. Doch wer von uns Heutigen möchte sich einbilden, seine Versuche zu 
denken seien auf dem Pfad des Schweigens heimisch. […] 
Auf der vorletzten Seite von “S.u.Z.” (S. 437) stehen die Sätze: ‘der Streit bezüglich der 
Interpretationen des Seins (das heisst also nicht des Seienden, auch nicht des Seins des Menschen) kann 
nicht geschlichtet werden, weil er noch nicht einmal entfacht ist. Und am Ende lässt er sich nicht ‘vom 
Zaun brechen,’ sondern das Entfachen des Streites bedarf schon einer Zurüstung. Hierzu allein ist die 
vorliegende Untersuchung unterwegs.’ Diese Sätze gelten heute noch nach zwei Jahrzehnten. […] 
Soll man diesen ‘Humanismus,’ der gegen allen bisherigen Humanismus spricht, aber gleichwohl 
sich ganz und gar nicht zum Fürsprecher des Inhumanen macht, noch “Humanismus” nennen? Und das nur, 
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um vielleicht durch die Teilnahme am Gebrauch des Titels in den herrschenden Strömungen, die im 
metaphysischen Subjektivismus ersticken und in der Seinsvergessenheit versunken sind, mitzuschwimmen? 
Oder soll das Denken versuchen, durch einen offenen Widerstand gegen den “Humanismus” einen Anstoss 
zu wagen, der veranlassen könnte, erst einmal über die Humanitas des homo humanus und ihre Begründung 
stutzig zu werden?” (344-346). 
17
 Tillich (GW VI). 
18
 Ibid.: “Die Dialektik des Dämonischen erklärt den schwankenden Sprachgebrauch des Wortes 
“dämonisch.” Immer bleibt die Grundbedeutung erhalten, wenn das Wort noch nicht zum entleerten 
Schlagwort geworden ist: die Einheit von formschöpferischer und formzerbrechender Kraft. […] Die Tiefe 
des Dämonischen ist das Dialektische in ihm” (45-46). 
19
 “Das Sein selber ist das Verhältnis [note a], insofern Es die Ek-sistenz in ihrem existenzialen, das heisst 
ekstatischen Wesen an sich hält und zu sich versammelt als die Ortschaft der Wahrheit des Seins inmitten 
des Seienden. […] Er [der Mensch] meint sogar, dieses sei das Nächste. Doch näher als das Nächste, das 
Seiende, und zugleich für das gewöhnliche Denken ferner als sein Fernstes ist die Nähe selbst: die 
Wahrheit des Seins” (332). 
20
 The translation by Frank A. Capuzzi and J. Glenn Gray is inaccurate and does not capture the audacity of 
Heidegger’s diction: “genesen” means to recover or to recuperate. Hence, even as he rejects this 
suggestion, Heidegger points to the general possibility that the world could reach a better or “healthier” 
state through the [effects of] German essence. Also note, that the translators do not indicate Heidegger’s 
cross-reference to his essay “Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit” (1947 [1931/32, 1940]), in: Martin 
Heidegger, Basic Writings, ed. D. F. Krell (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1993), pp. 217-265.
21
 Vossler (1904) is less “world-historical” in his analyses than Heidegger, but a sentiment of cultural 
nationalism may be detected in the following passages, among others: “Gustav Gröber hat in einer sehr 
beachtenswerten Studie [note 1] darauf hingewiesen, dass alle romanischen Sprachen mehr oder weniger 
von der “Tendenz” beseelt sind, artikulatorische Hindernisse in den Worten und zwischen den Worten 
hinwegzuräumen, d.h. möglichste Offensilbigkeit herzustellen. Es ist dies im grossen ganzen eine Folge der 
den romanischen Sprachen eigenen musikalisch-wiegenden Accentuierung, die uns Germanen so 
fremdartig und reizvoll anmutet. Dem Deutschen kommt alles auf Heraushebung der Wortstämme als der 
Träger des Gedankens an; seine Gliederung der Rede entwickelt sich mehr nach geistigen als nach 
akustischen Rücksichten. Daher wir denn vor konsonantischen Komplikationen in keiner Weise 
zurückschrecken. 
[…] Das Deutsche ist sozusagen innerlicher und geistiger, und deshalb in seinen äusseren Formen 
komplizierter, verschrumpfter und stacheliger. Die romanischen Sprachen sind im ganzen sinnlicher und in 
den äusseren Formen besser durchgearbeitet und harmonisiert. Hier scheint es, als sei der Geist zur Form 
verdichtet und versinnlicht, dort als habe die Form sich zum Geiste verflüchtigt. Dort die grossen 
Philosophen und Ethiker, hier die grossen Künstler. 
[…] Sollten diese beiden Erscheinungen nicht in Zusammenhang stehen? Sollte nicht so etwas wie 
ein germanischer und nordischer Hauch in die lateinische Seele des heutigen Franzosen sich 
eingeschmeichelt haben? (73-74). 
22
 Heidegger (GA 20), p. 343.
23
 For another prominent passage where Heidegger engages the “guardian” motif, see also: p. 345.
24
 For a comprehensive account of that period, see, e.g.: Hermann Glaser, The Rubble Years: The Cultural 
Roots of Postwar Germany, 1945-1948 (New York: Paragon House, 1986). 
25
 Cf. also: “Für den Menschen aber bleibt die Frage, ob er in das Schickliche seines Wesens findet, das 
diesem Geschick entspricht; denn diesem gemäss hat er als der Ek-sistierende die Wahrheit des Seins zu 
hüten. Der Mensch ist der Hirt des Seins” (331). 
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26
 In his essay “Wohnungen,” Karl Christian Führer points to significant discrepancies between cities and 
rural areas, with respect to the actual numbers of destroyed houses and apartments (Wohnungen). In: 
Deutschland unter alliierter Besatzung 1945-1949/55: Ein Handbuch, ed. W. Benz (Berlin: Akademie, 
1999), pp. 206-209. 
27
 Cf. also Heidegger’s similar remarks on “descent” (Abstieg) and  “ascent” (Aufstieg): “Der Abstieg ist, 
zumal dort, wo der Mensch sich in die Subjektivität verstiegen hat, schwieriger und gefährlicher als der 
Aufstieg. Der Abstieg führt in die Armut der Ek-sistenz des homo humanus” (352). 
28
 Addressing Jean Beaufret, as the recipient of the Letter, Heidegger implies that we may want to drop the 
term “humanism” from our philosophical vocabulary altogether, since it has lost its meaning: “Sie fragen: 
Comment redonner un sens au mot ‘Humanisme’? ‘Auf welche Weise lässt sich dem Wort Humanismus 
ein Sinn zurückgeben?’ Ihre Frage setzt nicht nur vorraus, dass Sie das Wort ‘Humanismus’ festhalten 
wollen, sondern sie enthält auch das Zugeständnis, dass dieses Wort seinen Sinn verloren hat” (344-345). 
29
 See, e.g., the concluding analysis in: Tom Rockmore, Heidegger and French Philosophy: Humanism, 
Antihumanism, and Being (New York: Routledge, 1995), pp. 181-189, eps. pp. 184-187. 
30
 Surpassing Vossler’s (1904) neo-Idealist tendencies toward cultural nationalism as linguisic nationalism, 
one of Heidegger’s starkest and frequently quoted statements on the issue is put forth in the Spiegel-
interview, “Only a God Can Save Us”:
H[eidegger]: […] Thinking iself can be transformed only by a thinking which has the same origin 
and calling. 
S[piegel]: […] 
H: […] 
S: You assign in particular a special task to the Germans? 
H: Yes, in the sense of the dialogue with Hölderlin. 
S: Do you believe that the Germans have a special qualification for this reversal? 
H: I have in mind especially the inner relationship of the German language with the language of 
the Greeks and with their thought. This has been confirmed for me today again by the French. 
When they begin to think, they speak German, being sure that they could not make it with their 
own language. 
S: Are you trying to tell us that this is why you had such a strong influence on the Romance 
countries, in particular the French? 
H: Because they see that they can no longer get by in the contemporary world with all their great 
rationality when it comes right down to understanding the world in the origin of its being. One can  
translate thinking no more satisfactorily than one can translate poetry. At best one can 
circumscribe it. As soon as one makes a literal translation everything is changed. 
S: A discomforting thought. 
H: We would do well to take this discomfort seriously and on a large scale, and to finally consider 
the grave consequences of the translation which Greek thought experienced when it was translated 
into Roman Latin. Indeed this today, even this, blocks the way to an adequate reflection on the 
fundamental words of Greek thought. (Cited in  Wolin [1993], p. 113.)
31
 “Das Einzige, was das Denken, das sich in “S.u.Z.” zum erstenmal auszusprechen versucht, erlangen 
möchte, ist etwas Einfaches. Als dieses bleibt das Sein geheimnisvoll, die schlichte Nähe eines 
unaufdringlichen Waltens. Diese Nähe west als die Sprache selbst” (333). 
32
 “Das 	   des Parmenides ist heute noch ungedacht. Daran lässt sich ermessen, wie es mit 
dem Fortschritt der Philosophie steht. Sie schreitet, wenn sie ihr Wesen achtet, überhaupt nicht fort. Sie tritt 
auf der Stelle, um stets dasselbe zu denken. Das Fortschreiten, nämlich fort von dieser Stelle, ist ein Irrtum, 
der dem Denken folgt als der Schatten, den es selbst wirft” (335). 
33
 Wolin (1993), p. 113.
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34
 Hans Ebeling detects such complete lack of any community-grounding reference point in Being and 
Time: “Indessen zeigt sich, dass die sog. Formalität der Existenzanalytik neue – und angemasste – nicht 
bloss formale Präskripte einschliesst, und deren philosophisch wie politisch folgenreichstes ist das 
fürchterliche Offenlassen aller Optionen, also auch einer solchen die Gemeinschaft nur usurpiert, re vera 
aber bei der Einzigkeit des zu allem Entschlossenen bleibt und so die Negation der Sozietät nicht erneut 
aufhebt” (50). In: Hans Ebeling, Martin Heidegger: Philosophie und Ideologie (Reinbeck bei Hamburg: 
Rowohlt, 1991). Considering Heidegger’s Letter on Humanism, we should at least add that whenever 
Heidegger’s adopts the voice of cultural nationalism, he posits a cultural essence as the supposed anchor of 
community, which is mostly specified as a linguistic one, the national treasure of the German language. 
35
 In: Gil Bailie, Violence Unveiled: Humanity at the Crossroads (New York: Crossroad, 1995). 
36
 S: You assign in particular a special task to the Germans?
H: Yes, in the sense of the dialogue with Hölderlin. (Cited in Wolin [1993], p. 113)
37
 H: […] One can translate thinking no more satisfactorily than one can translate poetry. At best one can 
circumscribe it. As soon as one makes a literal translation everything is changed. (Ibid.)
38
 Cf. Heidegger’s remark on the “inner relationship of the German language with the language of the 
Greeks and with their thought.” (Ibid.)
39
 Milan Kundera, The Unbearable Lightness of Being (New York: Perennial Classics, 1999 [1984]): 
“Kitsch causes two tears to flow in quick succession. The first tear says: How nice to see children running 
on the grass! The second tear says: How nice to be moved, together with all mankind, by children running
on the grass! It is the second tear that makes kitsch kitsch. The brotherhood of man on earth will be 
possible only on a base of kitsch” (251). 
40
 Due to the special emphasis I put on the specific structural features of anecdotes, in the present context of 
symbolic corruption, Heidegger’s term “Geschichte” strikes me as a misnomer. Instead, one ought to speak 
of an anecdote here, for reasons that I will address shortly. Admittedly, in German, the term “Geschichte” 
(history, story, or tale) is generally vague and can refer to texts presented in different formats. Speaking of 
a “misnomer,” then, does not so much imply negligence on Heidegger’s part as it calls for more precision 
in order to specify the unique workings of anecdotes, according to my present account. 
41
 I adopt this translation as part of F. A. Capuzzi’s and J. G. Gray’s translation of Heidegger’s Letter, in: 
David F. Krell (ed.) (1993), p. 256. 
42
 No fully accurate translation of the German expressions Heidegger chooses is possible. Translating 
“geheuer” as “familiar” and “[u]n-geheuer” as “unfamiliar” as Capuzzi and Gray do, omits the 
connotations of “monstrous” that adhere to “Un-geheuer,” used as a noun phrase. “Ungeheuer” in German 
means “monster.” Yet, there is an assymmetry, here, which Heidegger exploits. If “geheuer” is negated as 
“nicht geheuer” it means something like “dubious,” “not kosher,” or “eerie.” Yet, if it is negated with the 
prefix “un-“ and thus rendered “ungeheuer” it means “enormous,” “vast,” or “gigantic.” My rendering of 
“geheuer” as “un-eerie” and “Un-geheuer” as “eerie” preserves at least some of the “monstrous” 
connotations. The main disadvantage of this translation is that it has to criss-cross the negating prefixes, to 
approximate the proper meaning.  
43
 Note 8: “On this complex device, cf. Thomas de Quincey, “The Last Days of Immanuel Kant, “ in David 
Masson, ed., Collected Writings, vol. 4, pp. 340-41 (Edinburgh: Adam and Charles Black, 1890)” (222). 
Here I omit the Translator’s note, which provides the text of the passage under consideration, thus relating 
the “technical” details of Kant’s device.  
44
 For the problems pertaining to the translation of this term, see: Introduction, note 5, above. 
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45
 See, e.g.: Polt (1999), pp. 50-54. To be fair, Polt shows himself aware of the potential problem regarding 
the status of Zeug vis-à-vis Werkzeug, but does not pause to fully address it: “It is tempting to interpret the 
referential totality purely in terms of utility, and view it as a set of functions of useful things. Heidegger’s 
own examples encourage this interpretation. But this would be too narrow – […] A world is not only an 
environment, but any context in which entities are available and meaningful to Dasein. Important features 
of the world for someone may include many references that go beyond mere utility – for instance, 
references that are structured around sin, beauty, or sincerity” (52). While Polt lays his finger on an 
important problem, the last sentence remains inconclusive, even with respect to the general direction, in 
which we may look for a solution or refinement of Heidegger’s account. Cf. also, Hubert L. Dreyfus’s 
influential book Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time, Division I
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991), pp. 70-87; 99-107. For two passages in which Dreyfus enforces the 
conception of Zeug/Werkzeug, which I want to put in question, see: “The switch to deliberation is evoked 
by any situation in which absorbed coping is no longer possible – any situation that, as Heidegger puts it, 
requires a “a more precise kind of circumspection, such as ‘inspecting,’ checking up on what has been 
attained, [etc.]” (409) [358]. […] Heidegger, however, concentrates on the specific experiences of 
breakdown, that is, on the experience we have when ongoing coping runs into trouble” (70). Similarly, he 
states: “Hammers make sense by referring to nails, etc. But how does the activity of hammering make 
sense? Equipment makes sense only in the context of other equipment; our use of equipment makes sense 
because our activity has a point. Thus, besides the “in-order-to” that assigns equipment to an equipmental 
whole, already discussed, the use of equipment exhibits a “where-in” (or a practical context), a “with-
which” (or item of equipment), a “towards-which” (or goal), and a “for-the-sake-of-which” (or final point)” 
(92). 
46
 Here we have to admit that such disappointment is, in large part, due to Heidegger’s own exposition, in 
Being and Time. One of the passages, in which Heidegger himself suggest this restrictive reading of Zeug, 
is the following: “Die Struktur des Seins von Zuhandenem als Zeug ist durch die Verweisungen bestimmt. 
Das eigentümliche und selbstverständliche “An-sich” der nächsten “Dinge” begegnet in dem sie 
gebrauchenden und dabei nicht ausdrücklich beachtenden Besorgen, das auf Unbrauchbares stossen kann. 
Ein Zeug ist unverwendbar – darin liegt: die konstitutive Verweisung des Um-zu auf ein Dazu ist gestört” 
(74). The general problem is that Heidegger keeps begging the question whether the character of Zeug is 
prior to any practical agenda (e.g., hammering, whether conscious or not) or whether the “Um-zu” of Zeug
is somehow prior to any such activity. At least, it is not immediately apparent, which of these alternatives is 
closer to Heidegger’s view, when he writes: “Das Hämmern selbst entdeckt die spezifische “Handlichkeit” 
des Hammers. Die Seinsart von Zeug, in der es sich von ihm selbst her offenbart, nennen wir die 
Zuhandenheit. Nur weil das Zeug dieses “An-sich-sein” hat und nicht lediglich noch vorkommt, ist es 
handlich im weitesten Sinne und verfügbar” (69). In § 17., finally, things seem to get worse, i.e., opaquely 
complex, when Heidegger makes the following distinction: “Unter den Zeichen gibt es Anzeichen, Vor-
und Rückzeichen, Merkzeichen, Kennzeichen, deren Zeigung jeweils verschieden ist, ganz abgesehen 
davon, was je als solches Zeichen dient. Von diesen “Zeichen” sind zu scheiden: Spur, Überrest, Denkmal, 
Dokument, Zeugnis, Symbol, Ausdruck, Erscheinung, Bedeutung. Diese Phänomene lassen sich auf Grund 
ihres formalen Beziehungscharakters leicht formalisieren: […]” (78). 
47
 To this end we will have to critically revisit especially those passages in Being and Time, where 
Heidegger keeps sliding between the terms Zeug, Zuhandenheit, Werk, and Werkzeug, all of which he 
defines in terms of one another without fully clarifying their relations; see esp. p. 69-70. 
48
 In the Prolegomena, then, Heidegger writes: “Solche eigentümlichen Dinge wie eine historische Quelle 
sind in ihrer spezifischen Struktur nicht selbst verständlich und einfach zu sehen. Das Steinbeil ist in 
diesem Fall noch als Vorhandenes entdeckt, während es zuvor, vor seiner Entdeckung, für einen Bauern 
vielleicht nur als vorkommender Stein zugänglich war, der seinem Wagen und Fuss im Wege liegt, woran 
der Pflug schartig wird” (289).  
49
 See: Prolegomena, pp. 14-15.
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